**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **747** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **24 March 1992** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **2** |
| **Demand number:** | **747.0211** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate fully with the Special Representative of the SG for Angola and with the Mission (UNAVEM II).

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Angola's September 1992 election should have marked the end of 30 years of conflict...The resumption of the war has seen the development of military tactics new to Angola, in particular the siege, which has characterized this phase of the struggle. The siege of central Angolan towns has continued against a

backdrop of negotiations to achieve a cease-fire and peace settlement.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“By the time the Bicesse Peace Accords were signed in May 1991 by the warring factions, the rebels controlled most of the southeastern portion of Angola.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“In May 1991…the government of Angola and UNITA signed a peace agreement at Bicesse, Portugal…it called for…an eighteen month transition period in which each party would canton its troops, demobilize some of them, and then join the remainder in a unified Angolan army….The agreement contained no provisions for power sharing, nor was there a provision for the election’s loser to receive a share of ministerial portfolios or provincial governorships in the highly centralized state structure. Although each party had been urged to consider various power-sharing options, both vetoed them in the belief that they would win the elections.”

--Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” *International Security,* Vol. 22, No. 2 (1997): 5-53.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In total, neither the government of Angola nor UNITA and its leaders and members truly cooperated with the special representative. Their interests lied in completing the election and winning the popular vote in order to grant themselves a “referendum” on acquiring total power. As the Peace Agreement contained no provisions for power sharing, nor was there a provision for the election’s loser to receive a share of ministerial portfolios or provincial governorships in the highly centralized state structure, it is clear that neither side truly cooperated with a honest, collaborative effort to create a government post-Peace Accords.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Angola's September 1992 election should have marked the end of 30 years of conflict...The resumption of the war has seen the development of military tactics new to Angola, in particular the siege, which has characterized this phase of the struggle. The siege of central Angolan towns has continued against a

backdrop of negotiations to achieve a cease-fire and peace settlement.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“The major global and regional changes that took place in the late 1980s and

early 1990s-the end of the Cold War…presented UNITA with major challenges. The rebels could no longer count on the generosity of external benefactors to ensure survival, let alone victory. Thus UNITA reluctantly joined an externally driven peace process aimed at ending the civil war. As expected, however, UNITA did not completely abandon its long-term goal of capturing state power.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“In 1992, the international community (and indeed the Angolan government) did not take seriously UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi's warnings that he would take an election loss as a priori proof of fraud, and deliberately turned a blind eye to the fact that the UNITA army had been kept virtually intact while the government army had been reduced to a shadow of its previous strength.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In the medium-term, neither the government of Angola nor UNITA and its leaders and members truly cooperated with the special representative. Each party geared its efforts toward winning the election. The Peace Agreement contained no provisions for power sharing, and neither side truly cooperated with a honest, collaborative effort to create a government post-Peace Accords. Both parties were simply interested in winning the national election. This lack of full cooperation in the Peace process led to the re-engagement in civil war.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This was a high depth of demand because it put the fundamental existence and raison d’etre of each party in question. A failed election for each party would have meant practical elimination from national politics, as the Bicesse Peace Agreement contained no provisions for power sharing or for the creation of a bi-lateral or multi-party state post-election. So full compliance with the fundamentals of the process was threatening insofar as full compliance would have meant agreeing to the potential elimination of each side’s body in the national government structure.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **747** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **24 March 1992** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **3** |
| **Demand number:** | **747.0311** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Explicitly agree to the Peace Accords for Angola

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Angola's September 1992 election should have marked the end of 30 years of conflict...The resumption of the war has seen the development of military tactics new to Angola, in particular the siege, which has characterized this phase of the struggle. The siege of central Angolan towns has continued against a

backdrop of negotiations to achieve a cease-fire and peace settlement.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“After losing and rejecting the results of the first multiparty national elections of September 1992, UNITA used conventional military tactics to overrun most government positions around the country and seriously threatened the capital city, Luanda. It would take the Angolan government about two years to beat back UNITA's pressure.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“In May 1991…the government of Angola and UNITA signed a peace agreement at Bicesse, Portugal…it called for…an eighteen month transition period in which each party would canton its troops, demobilize some of them, and then join the remainder in a unified Angolan army….The agreement contained no provisions for power sharing, nor was there a provision for the election’s loser to receive a share of ministerial portfolios or provincial governorships in the highly centralized state structure. Although each party had been urged to consider various power-sharing options, both vetoed them in the belief that they would win the elections.”

--Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” *International Security,* Vol. 22, No. 2 (1997): 5-53.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In total, neither the government of Angola nor UNITA explicitly agreed to all elements of the Bicesse Peace Accords. The government of Angola and UNITA signed a peace agreement at Bicesse, Portugal which called for an eighteen month transition period in which each party would canton its troops, demobilize some of them, and then join the remainder in a unified Angolan army. Neither party got to work very fast on these demands, particularly not UNITA. While the Angolan national army exhibited exhaustion and low morale in 1991-1992, UNITA troops proved to be ready to re-engage in war almost immediately. UNITA leaders, particularly Savimbi were intent on winning the national election and taking over the government. The Peace Accords for Savimbi were truly only a means for achieving a win in the national elections. The Peace Accords were agreed to in name only, almost as a theater of diplomacy. The Accords contained little language for constructing a functional multi-party national government after the elections—it was almost a winner-take-all structure. So both sides were willing to agree to Peace Accords because each believed they would be a “victor” of the eventual outcome. This is essentially a “low compliance” with the spirit of the Accords.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Angola's September 1992 election should have marked the end of 30 years of conflict...The resumption of the war has seen the development of military tactics new to Angola, in particular the siege, which has characterized this phase of the struggle. The siege of central Angolan towns has continued against a

backdrop of negotiations to achieve a cease-fire and peace settlement.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“By the time the Bicesse Peace Accords were signed in May 1991 by the warring factions, the rebels controlled most of the southeastern portion of Angola.”

-- Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“The major global and regional changes that took place in the late 1980s and

early 1990s-the end of the Cold War…presented UNITA with major challenges. The rebels could no longer count on the generosity of external benefactors to ensure survival, let alone victory. Thus UNITA reluctantly joined an externally driven peace process aimed at ending the civil war. As expected, however, UNITA did not completely abandon its long-term goal of capturing state power.”

-- Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“the civilian population in Luanda was heavily armed, a result of the government's distribution of about a million rifles (type AK-47) to its sympathizers in the aftermath of the electoral fiasco of 1992.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“It should be recalled that the first sanctions against UNITA - those relating to arms, military equipment and fuel - were introduced in 1993, after UNITA refused to accept the results of the September 1992 election in which President dos Santos won 49.6 percent of the vote to Savimbi's 40.7 percent, and the Movimento Popular de Libertaí§ao de Angola (MPLA) won 54 per cent of the vote in this legislature to 34 per cent for UNITA. Following its defeat in the elections, UNITA restarted the war. In order to compel UNITA to agree to a cease-fire and accept the election results, sanctions against UNITA were first threatened and then imposed. Following the signing of the Lusaka Protocol on 20 November 1994, an imperfect and uneasy peace ensued during which exhaustive efforts were made to implement the provisions agreed at Lusaka.”

----The Fowler Report, Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA,S/2000/203, 10 March 2000.

“In 1992, the international community (and indeed the Angolan government) did not take seriously UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi's warnings that he would take an election loss as a priori proof of fraud, and deliberately turned a blind eye to the fact that the UNITA army had been kept virtually intact while the government army had been reduced to a shadow of its previous strength.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In the medium-term, neither the government of Angola nor UNITA explicitly agreed to all elements of the Bicesse Peace Accords. The government of Angola and UNITA signed a peace agreement at Bicesse, Portugal which called for an eighteen month transition period in which each party would canton its troops, demobilize some of them, and then join the remainder in a unified Angolan army. Neither party got to work very fast on these demands, particularly not UNITA. While the Angolan national army exhibited exhaustion and low morale in 1991-1992, UNITA troops proved to be ready to re-engage in war almost immediately. UNITA leaders, particularly Savimbi were intent on winning the national election and taking over the government. The Peace Accords for Savimbi were truly only a means for achieving a win in the national elections. The Peace Accords were agreed to in name only, almost as a theater of diplomacy. The Accords contained little language for constructing a functional multi-party national government after the elections—it was almost a winner-take-all structure. So both sides were willing to agree to Peace Accords because each believed they would be a “victor” of the eventual outcome. This is essentially a “low compliance” with the spirit of the Accords.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This was a high depth of demand because the demands of the Peace Accords threatened the existence of each party in its own way. One demand of the Peace Accords, a national election (whereby there was no mention of power-sharing or shared governorships or regional governance after the winning of the national election by one party) was particularly threatening to each party, as a failed election for one party would have meant practical elimination from national politics. So full compliance with the fundamentals of the process was threatening insofar as full compliance would have meant agreeing to the potential elimination of each side’s body in the national government structure.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **747** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **30 October 1992** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **6** |
| **Demand number:** | **785.0511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Comply with the provisions of the Peace Accords and with the agreed deadlines

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Angola's September 1992 election should have marked the end of 30 years of conflict...The resumption of the war has seen the development of military tactics new to Angola, in particular the siege, which has characterized this phase of the struggle. The siege of central Angolan towns has continued against a

backdrop of negotiations to achieve a cease-fire and peace settlement.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“After losing and rejecting the results of the first multiparty national elections of September 1992, UNITA used conventional military tactics to overrun most government positions around the country and seriously threatened the capital city, Luanda. It would take the Angolan government about two years to beat back UNITA's pressure.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“In May 1991…the government of Angola and UNITA signed a peace agreement at Bicesse, Portugal…it called for…an eighteen month transition period in which each party would canton its troops, demobilize some of them, and then join the remainder in a unified Angolan army….The agreement contained no provisions for power sharing, nor was there a provision for the election’s loser to receive a share of ministerial portfolios or provincial governorships in the highly centralized state structure. Although each party had been urged to consider various power-sharing options, both vetoed them in the belief that they would win the elections.”

--Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” *International Security,* Vol. 22, No. 2 (1997): 5-53.

“The Constitution was revised in 1991 to provide for elections and for guarantees of basic human rights, but the Government does not generally respect its provisions in practice. In 1992 President Jose Eduardo dos Santos received a plurality of the votes in Angola's first elections, which the United Nations' observers declared to be free and fair. The President and the MPLA, backed by the security services, continue to dominate the Government and to repress all opposition forces that they regard as a threat to their power.”

*--*US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1995,* Washington DC: Department of State Publication, 1996.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While both UNITA and the government of Angola signed off on the Peace Accords, in truth, neither the government of Angola nor UNITA explicitly carried out all elements of the Bicesse Peace Accords. The government of Angola and UNITA signed a peace agreement at Bicesse, Portugal which called for an eighteen month transition period in which each party would canton its troops, demobilize some of them, and then join the remainder in a unified Angolan army. Neither party got to work very fast on these demands, particularly not UNITA. While the Angolan national army exhibited exhaustion and low morale in 1991-1992, UNITA troops proved to be ready to re-engage in war almost immediately. UNITA leaders, particularly Savimbi were intent on winning the national election and taking over the government. The Peace Accords for Savimbi were truly only a means for achieving a win in the national elections. The Peace Accords were agreed to in name only, almost as a theater of diplomacy. The Accords contained little language for constructing a functional multi-party national government after the elections—it was almost a winner-take-all structure. So both sides were willing to agree to Peace Accords because each believed they would be a “victor” of the eventual outcome. This is essentially a “low compliance” with the spirit of the Accords.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Constitution was revised in 1991 to provide for elections and for guarantees of basic human rights, but the Government does not generally respect its provisions in practice. In 1992 President Jose Eduardo dos Santos received a plurality of the votes in Angola's first elections, which the United Nations' observers declared to be free and fair. The President and the MPLA, backed by the security services, continue to dominate the Government and to repress all opposition forces that they regard as a threat to their power.”

*--*US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1995,* Washington DC: Department of State Publication, 1996.

“Angola's September 1992 election should have marked the end of 30 years of conflict...The resumption of the war has seen the development of military tactics new to Angola, in particular the siege, which has characterized this phase of the struggle. The siege of central Angolan towns has continued against a

backdrop of negotiations to achieve a cease-fire and peace settlement.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“By the time the Bicesse Peace Accords were signed in May 1991 by the warring factions, the rebels controlled most of the southeastern portion of Angola.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“The major global and regional changes that took place in the late 1980s and

early 1990s-the end of the Cold War…presented UNITA with major challenges. The rebels could no longer count on the generosity of external benefactors to ensure survival, let alone victory. Thus UNITA reluctantly joined an externally driven peace process aimed at ending the civil war. As expected, however, UNITA did not completely abandon its long-term goal of capturing state power.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“In 1992, the international community (and indeed the Angolan government) did not take seriously UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi's warnings that he would take an election loss as a priori proof of fraud, and deliberately turned a blind eye to the fact that the UNITA army had been kept virtually intact while the government army had been reduced to a shadow of its previous strength.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In the medium-term, while both UNITA and the government of Angola signed off on the Peace Accords, in truth, neither the government of Angola nor UNITA explicitly carried out all elements of the Bicesse Peace Accords. The government of Angola and UNITA signed a peace agreement at Bicesse, Portugal which called for an eighteen month transition period in which each party would canton its troops, demobilize some of them, and then join the remainder in a unified Angolan army. Neither party got to work very fast on these demands, particularly not UNITA. While the Angolan national army exhibited exhaustion and low morale in 1991-1992, UNITA troops proved to be ready to re-engage in war almost immediately. UNITA leaders, particularly Savimbi were intent on winning the national election and taking over the government. The Peace Accords for Savimbi were truly only a means for achieving a win in the national elections. The Peace Accords were agreed to in name only, almost as a theater of diplomacy. The Accords contained little language for constructing a functional multi-party national government after the elections—it was almost a winner-take-all structure. So both sides were willing to agree to Peace Accords because each believed they would be a “victor” of the eventual outcome. This is essentially a “low compliance” with the spirit of the Accords.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This was a high depth of demand because the demands of the Peace Accords threatened the existence of each party in its own way. One demand of the Peace Accords, a national election (whereby there was no mention of power-sharing or shared governorships or regional governance after the winning of the national election by one party) was particularly threatening to each party, as a failed election for one party would have meant practical elimination from national politics. So full compliance with the fundamentals of the process was threatening insofar as full compliance would have meant agreeing to the potential elimination of each side’s body in the national government structure.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **747** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **24 March 1992** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **6** |
| **Demand number:** | **747.0611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Finalize political, legal, organizational and budgetary preparations for free and fair multiparty elections to be held in September 1992.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA, Angolan Democratic Forum, National Liberaion Front of Angola, MPLA, The Democratic Party for Progress - Angolan National Alliance**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Constitution was revised in 1991 to provide for elections and for guarantees of basic human rights, but the Government does not generally respect its provisions in practice. In 1992 President Jose Eduardo dos Santos received a plurality of the votes in Angola's first elections, which the United Nations' observers declared to be free and fair. The President and the MPLA, backed by the security services, continue to dominate the Government and to repress all opposition forces that they regard as a threat to their power.”

*--*US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1995,* Washington DC: Department of State Publication, 1996.

“The election, held in the last week of September 1992, was, according to observers, well-attended, well administered and relatively peaceful. From a total population of 10.5 million, 4.86 million had been registered before the vote.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, (1994), page 251.

The September 1992 election result gave the Movimento Popular de Liberta Vaode Angola (MPLA) a clear majority in the parliamentary election.

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, (1994), page 241.

“UNAVEM II was staffed with 350 unarmed military observers, 90 unarmed police observers (later increased to 126) and 100 electoral observers (increased to 400 during the elections period). The initial budget was US$132.3 million, later increased by $18.8 million in recognition of its election duties…the Angola mission was undertaken in a country affected by 16 years of civil war, wrecked infrastructure, and buttressed by two large and mutually suspicious armies.”

--Manuel J. Paulo, “The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process,” Conciliation Resources, 1994.

“For the elections…the government approved a budget of US$17 million for campaign financing to be distributed equally among parties competing in the polls. However, after the campaign period had started, UNITA complained that the money had not been paid out and that even when it was paid out the amount would not be sufficient to allow them to campaign on equal terms with the MPLA.”

--Alex Vines, Angola: Drivers of Change, Chatham House Report, May 2005.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

All sides, political parties and interested actors participated in the process to establish national elections. The elections were held slightly behind schedule, although within a reasonable amount of time of the initial scheduled elections, and were deemed to be free and fair by numerous outside observers. Both the government of Angola and UNITA were very assured in their respective prospects of winning the election, and both sides displayed encouraging cooperation in participating in the construction of an election process.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The elections were peaceful. The United Nations took multiple, intricate precautions to prevent fraud: representatives of the competing parties were present at the 5800 polling stations and at every municipal, provincial, and national electoral center…international observers judged the elections to be free from intimidation and fraud.”

--Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” *International Security,* Vol. 22, No. 2 (1997): 5-53.

“The Constitution was revised in 1991 to provide for elections and for guarantees of basic human rights, but the Government does not generally respect its provisions in practice. In 1992 President Jose Eduardo dos Santos received a plurality of the votes in Angola's first elections, which the United Nations' observers declared to be free and fair. The President and the MPLA, backed by the security services, continue to dominate the Government and to repress all opposition forces that they regard as a threat to their power.”

*--*US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1995,* Washington DC: Department of State Publication, 1996.

“The election, held in the last week of September 1992, was, according to observers, well-attended, well administered and relatively peaceful. From a total population of 10.5 million, 4.86 million had been registered before the vote.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No. 2, (1994), page 251.

“The major global and regional changes that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s-the end of the Cold War…presented UNITA with major challenges. The rebels could no longer count on the generosity of external benefactors to ensure survival, let alone victory. Thus UNITA reluctantly joined an externally driven peace process aimed at ending the civil war. As expected, however, UNITA did not completely abandon its long-term goal of capturing state power.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“the civilian population in Luanda was heavily armed, a result of the government's distribution of about a million rifles (type AK-47) to its sympathizers in the aftermath of the electoral fiasco of 1992.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“In 1992, the international community (and indeed the Angolan government) did not take seriously UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi's warnings that he would take an election loss as a priori proof of fraud, and deliberately turned a blind eye to the fact that the UNITA army had been kept virtually intact while the government army had been reduced to a shadow of its previous strength.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In the medium-term, all sides, political parties and interested actors participated in the process to establish national elections. The elections were held slightly behind schedule, although within a reasonable amount of time of the initial scheduled elections, and were deemed to be free and fair by numerous outside observers. Both the government of Angola and UNITA were very assured in their respective prospects of winning the election, and both sides displayed encouraging cooperation in participating in the construction of an election process.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | **Medium depth of demand (2)** | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Considering each party’s mindset and perspective on the elections, this ranks as medium-term, because nither party believed it was truly “threatened” by a national election or put at risk. UNITA believed it had the will of the common people (UNITA did not count on the rural populace’s exhaustion and traumatic memories of war which many blamed on UNITA tactis), and the MPLA or the ruling party of the government of Angola believed that it had international support and was seen as the “legitimate” governor of Angola. So the election was not a risk to either party—in the minds of these parties. Clearly, the outcome of the election was what posed the threat. But compliance with the election was what both parties willingly agreed to.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **747** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **24 March 1992** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **8** |
| **Demand number:** | **747.0811** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Establish as soon as possible a precise timetable for the electoral process in Angola.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The election, held in the last week of September 1992, was, according to observers, well-attended, well administered and relatively peaceful. From a total population of 10.5 million, 4.86 million had been registered before the vote.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No. 2, (1994), page 251.

“The elections were peaceful. The United Nations took multiple, intricate precautions to prevent fraud: representatives of the competing parties were present at the 5800 polling stations and at every municipal, provincial, and national electoral center…international observers judged the elections to be free from intimidation and fraud.”

--Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” *International Security,* Vol. 22, No. 2 (1997): 5-53.

The September 1992 election result gave the Movimento Popular de Liberta Vaode Angola (MPLA) a clear majority in the parliamentary election.

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No. 2, (1994), page 241.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | **Full or almost full compliance (4)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Both sides worked competently to create a workable timetable for the elections. UNITA expected to sweep the polls, and the government of Angola was confident it was seen as the legitimate ruler of Angola—so neither side delayed the process very seriously.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA expected to sweep the polls.”

--Center for Democracy in Angola, FAS Intelligence Resource Program, 2001.

“The two main contenders for the country's first multiparty elections, set for September 29 and 30, 1992, were UNITA and the ruling MPLA party and their respective leaders, Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi and Jose Eduardo dos Santos. UNITA expected to sweep the polls. The elections were characterised by a large voter turnout.”

--Center for Democracy in Angola, FAS Intelligence Resource Program, 2001.

“The election, held in the last week of September 1992, was, according to observers, well-attended, well administered and relatively peaceful. From a total population of 10.5 million, 4.86 million had been registered before the vote.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No. 2, (1994), page 251.

“In 1992, the international community (and indeed the Angolan government) did not take seriously UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi's warnings that he would take an election loss as a priori proof of fraud, and deliberately turned a blind eye to the fact that the UNITA army had been kept virtually intact while the government army had been reduced to a shadow of its previous strength.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

“By May 1992 about 70 percent of the estimated 160,000 soldiers had been processed at assembly points, but only 6,000 had been demobilized. By the elections on September 29-30, substantially more government troops had been demobilized than had UNITA soldiers; nonetheless, both sides had intact armies.”

--Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” *International Security,* Vol. 22, No. 2 (1997): 5-53.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | **Full or almost full compliance (4)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Both sides worked competently to create a workable timetable for the elections. UNITA expected to sweep the polls, and the government of Angola was confident it was seen as the legitimate ruler of Angola—so neither side delayed the process very seriously.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | **Medium depth of demand (2)** | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Etablishing a precise timetable was not that risky of a demand to agree to, considering each party’s mindset and perspective on the elections. UNITA believed it had the will of the common people (UNITA did not count on the rural populace’s exhaustion and traumatic memories of war which many blamed on UNITA tactis), and the MPLA or the ruling party of the government of Angola believed that it had international support and was seen as the “legitimate” governor of Angola. So the election was not a risk to either party—in the minds of these parties. Clearly, the outcome of the election was what posed the threat. But compliance with the election was what both parties willingly agreed to.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **785** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **30 October 1992** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **3** |
| **Demand number:** | **785.0311** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Condemns resumption of hostilities and urgently demands that such acts cease forthwith.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The elections were characterised by a large voter turnout, but ended up shrouded in controversy amid UNITA charges that the ruling MPLA party had resorted to electoral fraud. Although the UN declared the elections free and fair, UNITA did not accept the outcome and intense fighting broke out country-wide between UNITA and Government forces. United Nations Security Council Resolution 864 (1993) obliges all Member States to maintain sanctions against UNITA. This UN Security Council resolution specified steps for UNITA to do for the sanctions to be lifted. Every subsequent resolution has signalled that as soon as those steps are fulfilled, the sanctions would be lifted.”

--Center for Democracy in Angola, FAS Intelligence Resource Program, 2001.

“The Rapid Intervention Police were created by the Government of Angola in 1992 to quell civil unrest. The armed forces have responsibility for external security but have been primarily engaged in fighting the civil war against UNITA. While civilian authorities generally maintain effective control of the security forces, there were frequent instances in which the security forces act independently of government authority in 1992 through 1995. Members of the security forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.”

*--*US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1995,* Washington DC: Department of State Publication, 1996.

"The UNITA militia claim that MPLA supporters…were given guns by the government just before the 1992 elections. During that time, anyone who wanted a gun, got one, and very often…young unemployed people were in possession of these weapons… In 1991 the government armed its supporters in key towns, after accusing UNITA of not properly demobilising its troops.”

--IRIN, Humanitarian News and Analysis, “Angola: accuses govt of 'deliberately' delaying election date” 12 February 2004.

“The latest war began after the losing party rejected the results of elections in 1992. In the September 1992 elections, judged free and fair by UN observers, the MPLA won 54% and Unita 34% in the legislative race. President Jose' Eduardo dos Santos, of the MPLA, fell just short of 50% in the presidential contest, while Unita leader Savimbi had 40%. After Savimbi refused to accept the results, Angola returned to war. Unita, aided by supplies from Zaire and South Africa (then still under the previous apartheid regime), launched offensives around the country. The government responded, expelling Unita from Luanda while armed civilians took reprisals against Unita supporters. In 1993-94, Unita controlled much of the countryside and some inland cities. Bitter fighting raged in most areas. In mid-1993 an estimated 1,000 people were dying each day from war and war- related causes. Critics charged that inaction by the U.S. and the United Nations, which failed to protest Unita's failure to disarm before the election or to react quickly when the war resumed, was in part responsible for the catastrophe. In May 1993, the United States finally recognized the elected Angolan government.”

--APIC Background Paper: Angola, The Washington Office on Africa, 16 March 1995

Jonas Savimbi's…the leader of the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA)…refusal to accept the election result, and failure to contest a second-round presidential election,

precipitated the return to war.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No. 2, (1994), page 241.

“Angola's September 1992 election should have marked the end of 30 years of conflict...The resumption of the war has seen the development of military tactics new to Angola, in particular the siege, which has characterized this phase of the struggle. The siege of central Angolan towns has continued against a

backdrop of negotiations to achieve a cease-fire and peace settlement.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“By May 1992 about 70 percent of the estimated 160,000 soldiers had been processed at assembly points, but only 6,000 had been demobilized. By the elections on September 29-30, substantially more government troops had been demobilized than had UNITA soldiers; nonetheless, both sides had intact armies.”

--Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” *International Security,* Vol. 22, No. 2 (1997): 5-53.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Due to the extremely violent nature of the civil war in Angola preceding the cease-fire and General Peace agreement, it was hard to implement all aspects of the Peace agreement immediately or in the long-term. The cease-fire was violated in the early months of the peace agreement, but these violations soon came under control. Weapons were plentiful throughout the countryside. and communication was spotty between regions, thus news regarding the cease-fire and its violations did not evenly get communicated throughout the country. UNITA immediately rejected the results of the election, and claimed the government had defrauded the voters and particularly UNITA of a UNITA victory. Hostilities re-emerged almost immediately following news of the election results.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Rapid Intervention Police were created by the Government of Angola in 1992 to quell civil unrest. The armed forces have responsibility for external security but have been primarily engaged in fighting the civil war against UNITA. While civilian authorities generally maintain effective control of the security forces, there were frequent instances in which the security forces act independently of government authority in 1992 through 1995. Members of the security forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.”

*--*US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1995,* Washington DC: Department of State Publication, 1996.

“On 2 December 1992 the new government was announced. UNITA was offered the culture ministry, four deputy ministerial posts (in defence, social affairs, urban affairs, and agriculture) and two senior positions in the FAA. UNITA’s officials never took up their posts.”

--*Angola Report,* Economist Intelligence Unit, 1993, page 9.

“Angola's September 1992 election should have marked the end of 30 years of conflict...The resumption of the war has seen the development of military tactics new to Angola, in particular the siege, which has characterized this phase of the struggle. The siege of central Angolan towns has continued against a

backdrop of negotiations to achieve a cease-fire and peace settlement.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“It should be recalled that the first sanctions against UNITA - those relating to arms, military equipment and fuel - were introduced in 1993, after UNITA refused to accept the results of the September 1992 election in which President dos Santos won 49.6 percent of the vote to Savimbi's 40.7 percent, and the Movimento Popular de Libertaí§ao de Angola (MPLA) won 54 per cent of the vote in this legislature to 34 per cent for UNITA. Following its defeat in the elections, UNITA restarted the war. In order to compel UNITA to agree to a cease-fire and accept the election results, sanctions against UNITA were first threatened and then imposed. Following the signing of the Lusaka Protocol on 20 November 1994, an imperfect and uneasy peace ensued during which exhaustive efforts were made to implement the provisions agreed at Lusaka.”

----The Fowler Report, Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA,S/2000/203, 10 March 2000.

“UNITA (the Union for the Total Independence of Angola) quickly gained the ascendancy when it resumed the war following its failure to win power (and Savimbi's failure to win the Presidency) in the 1992 elections. Having cached vast .quantities of weapons and retained key fighting units intact despite claiming to have complied with demobilisation and disarmament procedures under the Bicesse Accords, UNITA forces quickly gained control over 70% of the country.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“The major global and regional changes that took place in the late 1980s and

early 1990s-the end of the Cold War…presented UNITA with major challenges. The rebels could no longer count on the generosity of external benefactors to ensure survival, let alone victory. Thus UNITA reluctantly joined an externally driven peace process aimed at ending the civil war. As expected, however, UNITA did not completely abandon its long-term goal of capturing state power.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“After losing and rejecting the results of the first multiparty national elections of September 1992, UNITA used conventional military tactics to overrun most government positions around the country and seriously threatened the capital city, Luanda. It would take the Angolan government about two years to beat back UNITA's pressure.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Due to the extremely violent nature of the civil war in Angola preceding the cease-fire and General Peace agreement, it was hard to implement all aspects of the Peace agreement immediately or in the long-term. The cease-fire was violated in the early months of the peace agreement, but these violations soon came under control. Weapons were plentiful throughout the countryside. and communication was spotty between regions, thus news regarding the cease-fire and its violations did not evenly get communicated throughout the country. UNITA immediately rejected the results of the election, and claimed the government had defrauded the voters and particularly UNITA of a UNITA victory. Hostilities re-emerged almost immediately following news of the election results.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Hostilities could not have ended right in 1992 following the elections. Most of the civilian population was armed, and UNITA militia units were at the ready to cause disruptions and violence when necessary. The government of Angola’s army was disorganized and had already begun disengaging from battle, army discipline, and all other functions. UNITA took advantage of government disorganization and disarmament to arm itself and its civilian allies. Adhering to this demand – on UNITA’s part—would have meant that they would not only have lost the election, but would have garnered the distrust of all government agencies and representatives and would have had no place at the bargaining table post-election. This put UNITA’s politicl fate at too great a risk to comply.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **785** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **30 October 1992** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **6** |
| **Demand number:** | **785.0611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Respect the result of the 09/30/92 elections**.**

# List of addressees of the demand

**MPLA, UNITA, Angolan Democratic Forum, National Liberaion Front of Angola, The Democratic Party for Progress - Angolan National Alliance**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The elections were peaceful. The United Nations took multiple, intricate precautions to prevent fraud: representatives of the competing parties were present at the 5800 polling stations and at every municipal, provincial, and national electoral center…international observers judged the elections to be free from intimidation and fraud.”

--Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” *International Security,* Vol. 22, No. 2 (1997): 5-53.

The September 1992 election result gave the Movimento Popular de Liberta Vaode Angola (MPLA) a clear majority in the parliamentary election. President Dos Santos narrowly failed to achieve the 50 per cent plus-one vote required for outright victory over his rival, Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA). Savimbi's refusal to accept the election result, and failure to contest a second-round presidential election, precipitated the return to war.

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No. 2, (1994), page 241.

“Angola's September 1992 election should have marked the end of 30 years of conflict...The resumption of the war has seen the development of military tactics new to Angola, in particular the siege, which has characterized this phase of the struggle. The siege of central Angolan towns has continued against a

backdrop of negotiations to achieve a cease-fire and peace settlement.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“The final election result gave UNITA 70 seats in the elected assembly (44 seats at national level, and 26 seats at provincial level). The MPLA won 70 seats at national level, and 59 seats at provincial level - a total of 129 parliamentarys eats. The remaining2 1 seats were divided between ten small parties, including Holden Roberto's Angola National Liberation Front (FNLA). In the Presidential contest, neither Dos Santos nor Savimbi won the 50 per cent (plus 1) of the vote required for outright victory. Mr Dos Santos won almost two million votes, or 49.57 per cent, while Savimbi secured just over 1.5 million votes, or 40.07

per cent of the vote”

--Alex Vines, *One Hand Tied*: *Angola and the UN* (CIIR Briefing Paper), London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1993.

“After losing and rejecting the results of the first multiparty national elections of September 1992, UNITA used conventional military tactics to overrun most government positions around the country and seriously threatened the capital city, Luanda. It would take the Angolan government about two years to beat back UNITA's pressure.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“The 'winner takes all' nature of the election threatened Savimbi and UNITA with minimal influence in the new government after 16 years of civil war. For Savimbi this was unacceptable. Claiming massive vote rigging, Savimbi withdrew UNITA's armed forces from the FAA. It quickly became apparent that UNITA was better prepared for a return to war than the government. UNITA had failed to demobilise its army and had used the cease-fire period to infiltrate its forces into towns and cities it had never been able to occupy during the war. This gave UNITA a powerful advantage once fighting restarted.”

--Alex Vines, *One Hand Tied*: *Angola and the UN* (CIIR Briefing Paper), London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1993.

“Once the decision to reject the election results was taken, UNITA forces were quickly able to make substantial territorial gains before the MPLA could respond.58 The MPLA, anxious to adhere to the Bicesse Accord, was constrained in its response to UNITA's return to arms by a temporary constitutional crisis”

--*The Guardian*, 23 October 1992

“the civilian population in Luanda was heavily armed, a result of the government's distribution of about a million rifles (type AK-47) to its sympathizers in the aftermath of the electoral fiasco of 1992.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“By May 1992 about 70 percent of the estimated 160,000 soldiers had been processed at assembly points, but only 6,000 had been demobilized. By the elections on September 29-30, substantially more government troops had been demobilized than had UNITA soldiers; nonetheless, both sides had intact armies.”

--Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” *International Security,* Vol. 22, No. 2 (1997): 5-53.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There was truly no compliance, primarily by UNITA, and subsequently by any party. The 1992 elections dissolved without a true “winner”. The MPLA or the government of Angola “won” the election due to the nature of how the post-election political process dissolved. UNITA refused to comply or participate in politics in a diplomatic fashion and resorted to a state of war. Due to the extremely violent nature of the civil war in Angola preceding the cease-fire and General Peace agreement, it was hard to implement all aspects of the Peace agreement immediately or in the long-term. The cease-fire was violated in the early months of the peace agreement, but these violations soon came under control. Weapons were plentiful throughout the countryside. and communication was spotty between regions, thus news regarding the cease-fire and its violations did not evenly get communicated throughout the country.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Angola's September 1992 election should have marked the end of 30 years of conflict...The resumption of the war has seen the development of military tactics new to Angola, in particular the siege, which has characterized this phase of the struggle. The siege of central Angolan towns has continued against a

backdrop of negotiations to achieve a cease-fire and peace settlement.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“The inconclusive presidential election should have led to a second round of voting for the Presidency. Savimbi's withdrawal meant that there was no constitutionally elected president and Parliament could not be called into session. To overcome this dilemma Dos Santos, in November 1992, called a meeting of all parties who had participated in the September election to allow the constitution to be changed so that the

National Assembly could sit and a transitional government be formed. UNITA refused to attend, stating that the imposition of a new administration would be viewed as a declaration of war.”

--*The Independent*, 21 November 1992

“Fighting erupted in Luanda on 30 October. After three days of combat, in which UNITA was driven from the capital, over 1,000 people were reported killed...UNITA took control of Huambo on 30 October and established its headquarters there, and laid siege to Malanje. Fighting spread through the north of the country as UNITA attempted to occupy as much territory as possible. Caxito, the capital of Bengo province, was captured by UNITA on 2 November.”

--*The Guardian*, 13 November 1992.

“The UN also became involved in mediation efforts. On 9 October 1992 the UN special representative, Margaret Anstee, flew to Huambo to negotiate with Savimbi, and on 11 October a crisis mission from the UN Security Council arrived in Luanda as UNITA forces and police loyal to the government exchanged fire in the capital.67 On 1 November, UNITA and the government forces agreed a UN cease-fire while UN representatives Marrack Goulding and Margaret Anstee frantically attempted to negotiate a new peace settlement. Between 6 and 12 November 1992 Marrack Goulding negotiated with UNITA and the government. Following this meeting, Savimbi wrote to Margaret Anstee to state that UNITA would abide by the results of the September elections. However, Savimbi refused to accept the result of the Presidential election, repeating claims that the election had been rigged. By negotiating with UNITA on equal terms with the MPLA government, the UN inadvertently legitimized UNITA's decision to return to war.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 253

“Unfortunately, neither peace nor development were secured by the 1992 Elections. Ironically, those elections demonstrated an overwhelming commitment by the Angolan people to the principal of democracy (over 90 per cent of those eligible voted), but one of democracy's principal international proponents, the US Govern-ment, delayed almost six months in recognising the elected government. In the meantime, Angola had descended once more into civil war.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“It should be recalled that the first sanctions against UNITA - those relating to arms, military equipment and fuel - were introduced in 1993, after UNITA refused to accept the results of the September 1992 election in which President dos Santos won 49.6 percent of the vote to Savimbi's 40.7 percent, and the Movimento Popular de Libertaí§ao de Angola (MPLA) won 54 per cent of the vote in this legislature to 34 per cent for UNITA. Following its defeat in the elections, UNITA restarted the war. In order to compel UNITA to agree to a cease-fire and accept the election results, sanctions against UNITA were first threatened and then imposed. Following the signing of the Lusaka Protocol on 20 November 1994, an imperfect and uneasy peace ensued during which exhaustive efforts were made to implement the provisions agreed at Lusaka.”

----The Fowler Report, Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA,S/2000/203, 10 March 2000.

“The major global and regional changes that took place in the late 1980s and

early 1990s-the end of the Cold War…presented UNITA with major challenges. The rebels could no longer count on the generosity of external benefactors to ensure survival, let alone victory. Thus UNITA reluctantly joined an externally driven peace process aimed at ending the civil war. As expected, however, UNITA did not completely abandon its long-term goal of capturing state power.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There was truly no compliance, primarily by UNITA, and subsequently by any party. The 1992 elections dissolved without a true “winner”. The MPLA or the government of Angola “won” the election due to the nature of how the post-election political process dissolved. UNITA refused to comply or participate in politics in a diplomatic fashion and resorted to a state of war. Due to the extremely violent nature of the civil war in Angola preceding the cease-fire and General Peace agreement, it was hard to implement all aspects of the Peace agreement immediately or in the long-term. The cease-fire was violated in the early months of the peace agreement, but these violations soon came under control. Weapons were plentiful throughout the countryside. and communication was spotty between regions, thus news regarding the cease-fire and its violations did not evenly get communicated throughout the country.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because an acceptance of the election results would have meant the end of the other political party. There were no provisions for power-sharing, and neither party was in a mood to be charitable or equitable after the long civil war. A loss in the election, in the “winner take all” mentality of either party, meant the end of political participation for one side.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **785** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **30 October 1992** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **7** |
| **Demand number:** | **785.0711** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Abide by all the commitments entered into under the Accords**.**

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The UN also became involved in mediation efforts. On 9 October 1992 the UN special representative, Margaret Anstee, flew to Huambo to negotiate with Savimbi, and on 11 October a crisis mission from the UN Security Council arrived in Luanda as UNITA forces and police loyal to the government exchanged fire in the capital.67 On 1 November, UNITA and the government forces agreed a UN cease-fire while UN representatives Marrack Goulding and Margaret Anstee frantically attempted to negotiate a new peace settlement. Between 6 and 12 November 1992 Marrack Goulding negotiated with UNITA and the government. Following this meeting, Savimbi wrote to Margaret Anstee to state that UNITA would abide by the results of the September elections. However, Savimbi refused to accept the result of the Presidential election, repeating claims that the election had been rigged. By negotiating with UNITA on equal terms with the MPLA government, the UN inadvertently legitimized UNITA's decision to return to war.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 253

“Angola's September 1992 election should have marked the end of 30 years of conflict...The resumption of the war has seen the development of military tactics new to Angola, in particular the siege, which has characterized this phase of the struggle. The siege of central Angolan towns has continued against a

backdrop of negotiations to achieve a cease-fire and peace settlement.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In total, neither the government of Angola nor UNITA abided by all elements of the Bicesse Peace Accords, or even many of them, for the most part. Although each party completed the election, the results were not respect. So in total, the Accords were not adhered to, even if elements were carried out in the short-term. The government of Angola and UNITA signed a peace agreement at Bicesse, Portugal which called for an eighteen month transition period in which each party would canton its troops, demobilize some of them, and then join the remainder in a unified Angolan army. Neither party got to work very fast on these demands, particularly not UNITA. While the Angolan national army exhibited exhaustion and low morale in 1991-1992, UNITA troops proved to be ready to re-engage in war almost immediately. UNITA leaders, particularly Savimbi were intent on winning the national election and taking over the government. The Peace Accords for Savimbi were truly only a means for achieving a win in the national elections. The Peace Accords were agreed to in name only, almost as a theater of diplomacy. The Accords contained little language for constructing a functional multi-party national government after the elections—it was almost a winner-take-all structure. So both sides were willing to agree to Peace Accords because each believed they would be a “victor” of the eventual outcome. This is essentially a “low compliance” with the spirit of the Accords.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Angola's September 1992 election should have marked the end of 30 years of conflict...The resumption of the war has seen the development of military tactics new to Angola, in particular the siege, which has characterized this phase of the struggle. The siege of central Angolan towns has continued against a

backdrop of negotiations to achieve a cease-fire and peace settlement.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“The major global and regional changes that took place in the late 1980s and

early 1990s-the end of the Cold War…presented UNITA with major challenges. The rebels could no longer count on the generosity of external benefactors to ensure survival, let alone victory. Thus UNITA reluctantly joined an externally driven peace process aimed at ending the civil war. As expected, however, UNITA did not completely abandon its long-term goal of capturing state power.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“After losing and rejecting the results of the first multiparty national elections of September 1992, UNITA used conventional military tactics to overrun most government positions around the country and seriously threatened the capital city, Luanda. It would take the Angolan government about two years to beat back UNITA's pressure.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In the medium-term, neither the government of Angola nor UNITA abided by all elements of the Bicesse Peace Accords, or even many of them, for the most part. Although each party completed the election, the results were not respect. So in total, the Accords were not adhered to, even if elements were carried out in the short-term. The government of Angola and UNITA signed a peace agreement at Bicesse, Portugal which called for an eighteen month transition period in which each party would canton its troops, demobilize some of them, and then join the remainder in a unified Angolan army. Neither party got to work very fast on these demands, particularly not UNITA. While the Angolan national army exhibited exhaustion and low morale in 1991-1992, UNITA troops proved to be ready to re-engage in war almost immediately. UNITA leaders, particularly Savimbi were intent on winning the national election and taking over the government. The Peace Accords for Savimbi were truly only a means for achieving a win in the national elections. The Peace Accords were agreed to in name only, almost as a theater of diplomacy. The Accords contained little language for constructing a functional multi-party national government after the elections—it was almost a winner-take-all structure. So both sides were willing to agree to Peace Accords because each believed they would be a “victor” of the eventual outcome. This is essentially a “low compliance” with the spirit of the Accords.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This was a high depth of demand because the demands of the Peace Accords threatened the existence of each party in its own way. One demand of the Peace Accords, a national election (whereby there was no mention of power-sharing or shared governorships or regional governance after the winning of the national election by one party) was particularly threatening to each party, as a failed election for one party would have meant practical elimination from national politics. So full compliance with the fundamentals of the process was threatening insofar as full compliance would have meant agreeing to the potential elimination of each side’s body in the national government structure.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **785** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **30 October 1992** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **8** |
| **Demand number:** | **785.0811** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Engage in a dialogue so as to enable the second round of the presidential elections to be

held promptly**.**

# List of addressees of the demand

José Eduardo dos Santos, Jonas Savimbi

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The inconclusive presidential election should have led to a second round of voting for the Presidency. Savimbi's withdrawal meant that there was no constitutionally elected president and Parliament could not be called into session. To overcome this dilemma Dos Santos, in November 1992, called a meeting of all parties who had participated in the September election to allow the constitution to be changed so that the

National Assembly could sit and a transitional government be formed. UNITA refused to attend, stating that the imposition of a new administration would be viewed as a declaration of war.”

--*The Independent*, 21 November 1992

“After losing and rejecting the results of the first multiparty national elections of September 1992, UNITA used conventional military tactics to overrun most government positions around the country and seriously threatened the capital city, Luanda. It would take the Angolan government about two years to beat back UNITA's pressure.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“Just one month after Angolans peacefully thronged polling stations in their first multiparty election ever, the conflict-battered southern African country is on the brink of all-out war. Even if international condemnation persuades the rebel group UNITA to halt its present offensive, months of uncertainty could pass before a runoff is held between President Eduardo dos Santos, who won 49.6 percent of the vote, and UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, who got 40.1 percent. Although Mr. Savimbi was persuaded to accept the election results, which also gave the ruling MPLA a 129-to-70 margin over UNITA in the 220-seat legislature, he still claims the election was marked by massive fraud. Despite lack of support from his former patrons in the United States and South Africa, he has repeatedly threatened to take up arms again. After the late September vote, UNITA generals withdrew from the formally merged national Army. Savimbi's threats delayed release of the vote totals for two weeks, and incidents of violence have increased ominously.”

--William Minter, “Savimbi Should Accept That Democracy Worked in Angola*,” Africa Focus, The Christian Science Monitor*, 3 November 1992.

“The Standing Committee of the Political Commission met in session in Bailundo, from the 21st to 23rd February 1999. It examined thoroughly the political and military situation in the country, emphasising the very dangerous developments related to the cancellation of the second round of the Presidential Elections. Also, the said war crimes law-suit protagonised by Jose Eduardo dos Santos. It concluded that: 1. The cancellation of the second round of the Presidential Elections is a move that has the sole objective of restoring in Angola a regime of a one-party state, dictatorial, oligarchic and military - (a) Eduardo dos Santos wishes to impose himself upon the Angolans as the sole holder of power in the country...(d) The UNITA militants express their total and unequivocal backing for the availability of their candidate, Dr. Jonas Savimbi for the elections. They also wish to alert the national and international communities that they will fight with all means at their disposal to enable this important event to take place, for the sake of the nascent democracy in Angola.”

--UNITA, STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE POLITICAL COMMISSION, 1999 - Year of Generalised Popular Resistance, KWACHA UNITA Press, 1999.

“In 1992 – Elections gave majority to MPLA, but second-round elections postponed as UNITA resumed fighting.. The MPLA won the first round, but the required second round never happened as UNITA launched new raids against the MPLA.”

--Modern Conflicts: Conflict Profile, Angola, 1975-2002.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA resumed fighting immediately following the November 1992 elections and a second round of elections never took place. The second round of elections was also proposed many years later in the late 1990s, and these elections also failed after a lengthy negotiations process. UNITA was determined to gain legitimacy and stage a coup following what it deemed to be a “fraudulent” election, and did not exhibit any signs of willingness to participate in a diplomatic, political process with international observers, even in the mid-1990s, or late 1990s.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Fighting erupted in Luanda on 30 October. After three days of combat, in which UNITA was driven from the capital, over 1,000 people were reported killed...UNITA took control of Huambo on 30 October and established its headquarters there, and laid siege to Malanje. Fighting spread through the north of the country as UNITA attempted to occupy as much territory as possible. Caxito, the capital of Bengo province, was captured by UNITA on 2 November.”

--*The Guardian*, 13 November 1992.

“the civilian population in Luanda was heavily armed, a result of the government's distribution of about a million rifles (type AK-47) to its sympathizers in the aftermath of the electoral fiasco of 1992.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Medium-term compliance* | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA resumed fighting immediately following the November 1992 elections and a second round of elections never took place. The second round of elections was also proposed many years later in the late 1990s, and these elections also failed after a lengthy negotiations process. UNITA was determined to gain legitimacy and stage a coup following what it deemed to be a “fraudulent” election, and did not exhibit any signs of willingness to participate in a diplomatic, political process with international observers, even in the mid-1990s, or late 1990s.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Participating in a second round of elections presented considerable risk to UNITA which had already jeopardized its legitimacy in the eyes of Angolans and the world and international institutions. It had rejected the results of the first round and returned to a state of war—engaging single-handedly in drawing the country back into a civil war. A second round of elections would have meant almost assuredly a crushing political defeat, threatening the existence of UNITA as a political force, and most likely resulting in the arrest of its leadership.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **793** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **30 November 1992** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **3** |
| **Demand number:** | **793.0311** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Take immediate and effective actions in accordance with the 11/26/92 joint declaration.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“On 2 December 1992 the new government was announced. UNITA was offered the culture ministry, four deputy ministerial posts (in defence, social affairs, urban affairs, and agriculture) and two senior positions in the FAA. UNITA’s officials never took up their posts.”

--*Angola Report,* Economist Intelligence Unit, 1993, page 9.

“After losing and rejecting the results of the first multiparty national elections of September 1992, UNITA used conventional military tactics to overrun most government positions around the country and seriously threatened the capital city, Luanda. It would take the Angolan government about two years to beat back UNITA's pressure.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“Despite his grudging concession to the UN verdict and intermittent dialogue with international mediators, Savimbi has never abandoned his threats to resort to war to insure his leadership of Angola. If peace is to prevail, the international community - particularly UNITA's former patrons - must be ready to back up their insistence that Savimbi adhere to peaceful democratic competition. That may mean not only economic sanctions but also military assistance to help keep the peace.”

--William Minter, “Savimbi Should Accept That Democracy Worked in Angola*,” Africa Focus, The Christian Science Monitor*, 3 November 1992.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Both UNITA and the Government of Angola failed to comply with taking action on the joint declaration because by the end of November 1992, they were engaged in escalating civil violent conflict with each others’ forces.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“On 2 December 1992 the new government was announced. UNITA was offered the culture ministry, four deputy ministerial posts (in defence, social affairs, urban affairs, and agriculture) and two senior positions in the FAA. UNITA’s officials never took up their posts.”

--*Angola Report,* Economist Intelligence Unit, 1993, page 9.

“The major global and regional changes that took place in the late 1980s and

early 1990s-the end of the Cold War…presented UNITA with major challenges. The rebels could no longer count on the generosity of external benefactors to ensure survival, let alone victory. Thus UNITA reluctantly joined an externally driven peace process aimed at ending the civil war. As expected, however, UNITA did not completely abandon its long-term goal of capturing state power.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“the civilian population in Luanda was heavily armed, a result of the government's distribution of about a million rifles (type AK-47) to its sympathizers in the aftermath of the electoral fiasco of 1992.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“It should be recalled that the first sanctions against UNITA - those relating to arms, military equipment and fuel - were introduced in 1993, after UNITA refused to accept the results of the September 1992 election in which President dos Santos won 49.6 percent of the vote to Savimbi's 40.7 percent, and the Movimento Popular de Libertaí§ao de Angola (MPLA) won 54 per cent of the vote in this legislature to 34 per cent for UNITA. Following its defeat in the elections, UNITA restarted the war. In order to compel UNITA to agree to a cease-fire and accept the election results, sanctions against UNITA were first threatened and then imposed. Following the signing of the Lusaka Protocol on 20 November 1994, an imperfect and uneasy peace ensued during which exhaustive efforts were made to implement the provisions agreed at Lusaka.”

----The Fowler Report, Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA,S/2000/203, 10 March 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Both UNITA and the Government of Angola failed to comply with taking action on the joint declaration because by the end of November 1992, they were engaged in escalating civil violent conflict with each others’ forces.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Adhering to the joint declaration presented considerable risk to UNITA which had already jeopardized its legitimacy in the eyes of Angolans and the world and international institutions. It had rejected the results of the first round and returned to a state of war—engaging single-handedly in drawing the country back into a civil war.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **793** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **30 November 1992** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **4** |
| **Demand number:** | **793.0411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Scrupulously observe the cease-fire, immediately stop all military confrontations, and create all conditions conducive to the peace process.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Between January and September 1992, there were numerous violations of the cease-fire, with UN monitors estimating that at least sixteen skirmishes could have escalated into major combat between the parties.”

--Thomas Ohlson and Stephen John Stedman, *The New is Not Yet Born: Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa,* Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1994, p. 11

“Fighting erupted in Luanda on 30 October 1992. After three days of combat, in which UNITA was driven from the capital, over 1,000 people were reported killed...UNITA took control of Huambo on 30 October and established its headquarters there, and laid siege to Malanje. Fighting spread through the north of the country as UNITA attempted to occupy as much territory as possible. Caxito, the capital of Bengo province, was captured by UNITA on 2 November.”

--*The Guardian*, 13 November 1992.

“the civilian population in Luanda was heavily armed, a result of the government's distribution of about a million rifles (type AK-47) to its sympathizers in the aftermath of the electoral fiasco of 1992.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“Angola's September 1992 election should have marked the end of 30 years of conflict...The resumption of the war has seen the development of military tactics new to Angola, in particular the siege, which has characterized this phase of the struggle. The siege of central Angolan towns has continued against a

backdrop of negotiations to achieve a cease-fire and peace settlement.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“After losing and rejecting the results of the first multiparty national elections of September 1992, UNITA used conventional military tactics to overrun most government positions around the country and seriously threatened the capital city, Luanda. It would take the Angolan government about two years to beat back UNITA's pressure.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“Attacks by UNITA have increased dramatically in recent weeks, leading to hundreds of people fleeing for the shelter of Government-held towns. This is being read as a clear sign of the military leadership of UNITA'S determination to fiercely resist the agreed process of the extension of state administration to all parts of the country. The was expected to follow on from the formation in April of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, of which UNITA is a partner. It is estimated that UNITA continues to occupy two-thirds of the country. Military sources in Luanda suggest that the increase in attacks is a sign that UNITA is regrouping. The main area of tension is along the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire). In June this was the region where the Angolan army, FAA, launched an operation to stem the flow of armed elements entering the country following the defeat of President Mobutu (see APM no.10, Vol III). Sources state that the Government operation in this area is over and that UNITA has now counter-attacked, taking back several areas retaken by FAA. Lieutenant General Marques Correia said on 7 July that UNITA had launched six military operations to recover lost positions. He gave as an example that UNITA has seized the mining area of Maludi. Ominously, General Corriea said that "UNITA forgets that if this situation continues we will bring in reinforcements and take control of the situation once and for all". On 3 July the Government spokesperson on the Joint Commission, Higino Carneiro, said that an attack had taken place on a border post 55km from Nsange. General Adriano Mackenzie on 4 July stated on Radio Nacional de Angola that UNITA had attacked border posts at Itanda, Cambamba and Muaquesse, and attacked and remined roads in the area.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 11, Volume III, 17 July 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Military confrontations increased between UNITA and the government of Angola throughout the duration of 1992, and escalated in 1993 and 1994, until the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, which dissolved in 1997-1998 and the country resumed a violent level of civil war until 2002 with the death of Jonas Savimbi. UNITA and the government of Angola resisted calls to stop violent confrontations in the rural zones and in cities throughout Angola, as each party sought to control territory, resources, and personnel. Any cease-fire or temporary cessation of military activity would have meant a loss of resources, as neither side was aimed toward a compromise. Both UNITA and the government of Angola sought the annihilation of the other.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“On 2 December 1992 the new government was announced. UNITA was offered the culture ministry, four deputy ministerial posts (in defence, social affairs, urban affairs, and agriculture) and two senior positions in the FAA. UNITA’s officials never took up their posts.”

--*Angola Report,* Economist Intelligence Unit, 1993, page 9.

“Angola's September 1992 election should have marked the end of 30 years of conflict...The resumption of the war has seen the development of military tactics new to Angola, in particular the siege, which has characterized this phase of the struggle. The siege of central Angolan towns has continued against a

backdrop of negotiations to achieve a cease-fire and peace settlement.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“The major global and regional changes that took place in the late 1980s and

early 1990s-the end of the Cold War…presented UNITA with major challenges. The rebels could no longer count on the generosity of external benefactors to ensure survival, let alone victory. Thus UNITA reluctantly joined an externally driven peace process aimed at ending the civil war. As expected, however, UNITA did not completely abandon its long-term goal of capturing state power.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“Unexpectedly, the peace process between 1992 and 1994 opened significant opportunities for the rebels. They deceitfully used the lull in fighting to reorganize for a planned new phase of the war. Rebel leader Jonas Savimbi believed that the MPLA regime was irremediably debilitated…Moreover, the peace process would enable Savimbi to move his best troops from southeastern Angola into the diamond producing regions of Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Malanje and Bie.”

-- Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Military confrontations increased between UNITA and the government of Angola throughout the duration of 1992, and escalated in 1993 and 1994, until the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, which dissolved in 1997-1998 and the country resumed a violent level of civil war until 2002 with the death of Jonas Savimbi. UNITA and the government of Angola resisted calls to stop violent confrontations in the rural zones and in cities throughout Angola, as each party sought to control territory, resources, and personnel. Any cease-fire or temporary cessation of military activity would have meant a loss of resources, as neither side was aimed toward a compromise. Both UNITA and the government of Angola sought the annihilation of the other.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because it put at risk the fundamental existence of each party—both politically and existentially. As each party sought to control territory, resources, and personnel at each stage of the conflict, adhering to any demands for a cessation of violent attacks would have meant the advance of the other party. Any cease-fire would have meant a loss of resources, as neither side was aimed toward a compromise. Both UNITA and the government of Angola sought the annihilation of the other.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **793** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **30 November 1992** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **5** |
| **Demand number:** | **793.0511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Demonstrate adherence to, and fulfillment without exception of the "Acordos de Paz".

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Between January and September 1992, there were numerous violations of the cease-fire, with UN monitors estimating that at least sixteen skirmishes could have escalated into major combat between the parties.”

--Thomas Ohlson and Stephen John Stedman, *The New is Not Yet Born: Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa,* Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1994, p. 11

“On 2 December 1992 the new government was announced. UNITA was offered the culture ministry, four deputy ministerial posts (in defence, social affairs, urban affairs, and agriculture) and two senior positions in the FAA. UNITA’s officials never took up their posts.”

--*Angola Report,* Economist Intelligence Unit, 1993, page 9.

“Angola's September 1992 election should have marked the end of 30 years of conflict...The resumption of the war has seen the development of military tactics new to Angola, in particular the siege, which has characterized this phase of the struggle. The siege of central Angolan towns has continued against a

backdrop of negotiations to achieve a cease-fire and peace settlement.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“The UN mission declared the September 1992 elections generally 'free and fair', a verdict agreed by the US, EU, South Africa and other international observers. Yet with UNITA disputing the results, within weeks of the elections Angola returned to war. Anstee's attempts to negotiate a ceasefire failed and the Security Council responded by reducing and then fully withdrawing all UNAVEM military personnel. Many Angolans felt disenchanted and blamed the UN for the failure of this transition period, believing that it had been in UNAVEM's power to intervene. In fact, both the government and UNITA publicly denounced each other's failure to comply with the Bicesse Accords by blaming the UN. As British researcher Alex Vines noted, "in September 1992 the government transferred special forces to Malanje under orders to encourage anti–UN slogans during the day and firing gunshots at night. Most of the shots were exchanges between UNITA and MPLA supporters but some were directed towards the UN compound. If the MPLA fared badly in the elections it intended to blame the UN for helping UNITA". The Troika countries, which had been such key players in the Bicesse Accords, were spared any blame. Two years of war followed before a new peace agreement was reached. Rounds of talks in Namibe province in November 1992, in Addis Ababa in January 1993 and in Abidjan in April-May 1993 all failed.”

--Manuel J. Paulo, “The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process,” Conciliation Resources, 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While both UNITA and the government of Angola signed off on the Peace Accords, in truth, neither the government of Angola nor UNITA explicitly carried out all elements of the Bicesse Peace Accords. The government of Angola and UNITA signed a peace agreement at Bicesse, Portugal which called for an eighteen month transition period in which each party would canton its troops, demobilize some of them, and then join the remainder in a unified Angolan army. Neither party got to work very fast on these demands, particularly not UNITA. The Peace Accords were proven completely meaningless and defunct when both sides resumed war in late 1992 and continued without cessation until the 1994 Lusaka Peace Accords, whereupon they resumed fighting in 1997-1998 with the collapse of those peace accords.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Angola's September 1992 election should have marked the end of 30 years of conflict...The resumption of the war has seen the development of military tactics new to Angola, in particular the siege, which has characterized this phase of the struggle. The siege of central Angolan towns has continued against a

backdrop of negotiations to achieve a cease-fire and peace settlement.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“Unexpectedly, the peace process between 1992 and 1994 opened significant opportunities for the rebels. They deceitfully used the lull in fighting to reorganize for a planned new phase of the war. Rebel leader Jonas Savimbi believed that the MPLA regime was irremediably debilitated…Moreover, the peace process would enable Savimbi to move his best troops from southeastern Angola into the diamond producing regions of Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Malanje and Bie.”

-- Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“After losing and rejecting the results of the first multiparty national elections of September 1992, UNITA used conventional military tactics to overrun most government positions around the country and seriously threatened the capital city, Luanda. It would take the Angolan government about two years to beat back UNITA's pressure.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While both UNITA and the government of Angola signed off on the Peace Accords, in truth, neither the government of Angola nor UNITA explicitly carried out all elements of the Bicesse Peace Accords. The government of Angola and UNITA signed a peace agreement at Bicesse, Portugal which called for an eighteen month transition period in which each party would canton its troops, demobilize some of them, and then join the remainder in a unified Angolan army. Neither party got to work very fast on these demands, particularly not UNITA. The Peace Accords were proven completely meaningless and defunct when both sides resumed war in late 1992 and continued without cessation until the 1994 Lusaka Peace Accords, whereupon they resumed fighting in 1997-1998 with the collapse of those peace accords.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This was a high depth of demand because the demands of the Peace Accords threatened the existence of each party in its own way. One demand of the Peace Accords, a national election (whereby there was no mention of power-sharing or shared governorships or regional governance after the winning of the national election by one party) was particularly threatening to each party, as a failed election for one party would have meant practical elimination from national politics. So full compliance with the fundamentals of the process was threatening insofar as full compliance would have meant agreeing to the potential elimination of each side’s body in the national government structure.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **793** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **30 November 1992** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **6** |
| **Demand number:** | **793.0611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Engage in a continuous and meaningful dialogue aimed at national reconciliation and at the participation of all parties in the democratic process and to agree to a timetable to comply with the "Acordos de Paz."

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Between January and September 1992, there were numerous violations of the cease-fire, with UN monitors estimating that at least sixteen skirmishes could have escalated into major combat between the parties.”

--Thomas Ohlson and Stephen John Stedman, *The New is Not Yet Born: Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa,* Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1994, p. 11

“On 2 December 1992 the new government was announced. UNITA was offered the culture ministry, four deputy ministerial posts (in defence, social affairs, urban affairs, and agriculture) and two senior positions in the FAA. UNITA’s officials never took up their posts.”

--*Angola Report,* Economist Intelligence Unit, 1993, page 9.

“The UN mission declared the September 1992 elections generally 'free and fair', a verdict agreed by the US, EU, South Africa and other international observers. Yet with UNITA disputing the results, within weeks of the elections Angola returned to war. Anstee's attempts to negotiate a ceasefire failed and the Security Council responded by reducing and then fully withdrawing all UNAVEM military personnel. Many Angolans felt disenchanted and blamed the UN for the failure of this transition period, believing that it had been in UNAVEM's power to intervene. In fact, both the government and UNITA publicly denounced each other's failure to comply with the Bicesse Accords by blaming the UN. As British researcher Alex Vines noted, "in September 1992 the government transferred special forces to Malanje under orders to encourage anti–UN slogans during the day and firing gunshots at night. Most of the shots were exchanges between UNITA and MPLA supporters but some were directed towards the UN compound. If the MPLA fared badly in the elections it intended to blame the UN for helping UNITA". The Troika countries, which had been such key players in the Bicesse Accords, were spared any blame. Two years of war followed before a new peace agreement was reached. Rounds of talks in Namibe province in November 1992, in Addis Ababa in January 1993 and in Abidjan in April-May 1993 all failed.”

--Manuel J. Paulo, “The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process,” Conciliation Resources, 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

National reconciliation did not occur at any point in the 1990s between UNITA and the Government of Angola. Dialogues were extremely rare, occurring sporadically in the 1994-1996 Lusaka Peace process. While both UNITA and the government of Angola signed off on the Bicesse Peace Accords, in truth, neither the government of Angola nor UNITA explicitly carried out all elements of the Bicesse Peace Accords. The government of Angola and UNITA signed a peace agreement at Bicesse, Portugal which called for an eighteen month transition period in which each party would canton its troops, demobilize some of them, and then join the remainder in a unified Angolan army. Neither party got to work very fast on these demands, particularly not UNITA. The Peace Accords were proven completely meaningless and defunct when both sides resumed war in late 1992 and continued without cessation until the 1994 Lusaka Peace Accords, whereupon they resumed fighting in 1997-1998 with the collapse of those peace accords.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Creating the new government in accordance with the Bicesse peace accord and election results gave the MPLA both international and domestic legitimacy. A tough new chief of staff, General Joao Baptista de Matos was appointed to head the FAA. A new National Defence Council was created, which included the prime minister, the ministers of defence, the interior, foreign affairs, finance, and the chief of general staff. Once established, the new government quickly resolved to confront UNITA and in January 1993 went on the offensive. The Angolan government had rapidly rearmed once conflict became inevitable, purchasing new weapons with money from oil revenue.”

--*Angola Report,* Economist Intelligence Report (1993)

“Angola's September 1992 election should have marked the end of 30 years of conflict...The resumption of the war has seen the development of military tactics new to Angola, in particular the siege, which has characterized this phase of the struggle. The siege of central Angolan towns has continued against a

backdrop of negotiations to achieve a cease-fire and peace settlement.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“Unexpectedly, the peace process between 1992 and 1994 opened significant opportunities for the rebels. They deceitfully used the lull in fighting to reorganize for a planned new phase of the war. Rebel leader Jonas Savimbi believed that the MPLA regime was irremediably debilitated…Moreover, the peace process would enable Savimbi to move his best troops from southeastern Angola into the diamond producing regions of Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Malanje and Bie.”

-- Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

National reconciliation did not occur at any point in the 1990s between UNITA and the Government of Angola. Dialogues were extremely rare, occurring sporadically in the 1994-1996 Lusaka Peace process. While both UNITA and the government of Angola signed off on the Bicesse Peace Accords, in truth, neither the government of Angola nor UNITA explicitly carried out all elements of the Bicesse Peace Accords. The government of Angola and UNITA signed a peace agreement at Bicesse, Portugal which called for an eighteen month transition period in which each party would canton its troops, demobilize some of them, and then join the remainder in a unified Angolan army. Neither party got to work very fast on these demands, particularly not UNITA. The Peace Accords were proven completely meaningless and defunct when both sides resumed war in late 1992 and continued without cessation until the 1994 Lusaka Peace Accords, whereupon they resumed fighting in 1997-1998 with the collapse of those peace accords.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This was a high depth of demand because the demands of the Peace Accords threatened the existence of each party in its own way. One demand of the Peace Accords, a national election (whereby there was no mention of power-sharing or shared governorships or regional governance after the winning of the national election by one party) was particularly threatening to each party, as a failed election for one party would have meant practical elimination from national politics. So full compliance with the fundamentals of the process was threatening insofar as full compliance would have meant agreeing to the potential elimination of each side’s body in the national government structure.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **804** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **29 January 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **3** |
| **Demand number:** | **804.0311** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cease fire immediately, restore continued and meaningful dialogue, and agree on a clear timetable for the implementation of the "Acordos de Paz", in particular with regard to confinement of their troops and collection of their weapons, demobilization and formation of the unified national armed forces, effective restoration of the Government administration throughout the country, the completion of the electoral process and the free circulation of people and goods**.**

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“More than 350 people have died in a battle between Unita rebels and Angolan government forces in the city of Huambo, according to Angolan army reports. The government of the southern African country also said that up to 1,500 people had been injured in the fighting. Diplomats say the battle is "vicious", with neither side taking many prisoners. According to the radio station of Angola's rebel movement Unita, government troops are fleeing from the city and large amounts of arms and ammunition have been seized, including several Russian-built tanks. The government garrison in the city has been cut off for several weeks and is being supplied by occasional air drops. Fighting around Huambo has intensified after Unita brought in troop reinforcements from Bie province, which is around 165km away to the east of the city.”

--“1993: Angolans Die in Battle for Huambo,” *BBC News,* 6 March 1993.

“Between January and September 1992, there were numerous violations of the cease-fire, with UN monitors estimating that at least sixteen skirmishes could have escalated into major combat between the parties.”

--Thomas Ohlson and Stephen John Stedman, *The New is Not Yet Born: Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa,* Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1994, p. 11

“Creating the new government in accordance with the Bicesse peace accord and election results gave the MPLA both international and domestic legitimacy. A tough new chief of staff, General Joao Baptista de Matos was appointed to head the FAA. A new National Defence Council was created, which included the prime minister, the ministers of defence, the interior, foreign affairs, finance, and the chief of general staff. Once established, the new government quickly resolved to confront UNITA and in January 1993 went on the offensive. The Angolan government had rapidly rearmed once conflict became inevitable, purchasing new weapons with money from oil revenue.”

--*Angola Report,* Economist Intelligence Report (1993)

“the civilian population in Luanda was heavily armed, a result of the government's distribution of about a million rifles (type AK-47) to its sympathizers in the aftermath of the electoral fiasco of 1992.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“The UN mission declared the September 1992 elections generally 'free and fair', a verdict agreed by the US, EU, South Africa and other international observers. Yet with UNITA disputing the results, within weeks of the elections Angola returned to war. Anstee's attempts to negotiate a ceasefire failed and the Security Council responded by reducing and then fully withdrawing all UNAVEM military personnel. Many Angolans felt disenchanted and blamed the UN for the failure of this transition period, believing that it had been in UNAVEM's power to intervene. In fact, both the government and UNITA publicly denounced each other's failure to comply with the Bicesse Accords by blaming the UN. As British researcher Alex Vines noted, "in September 1992 the government transferred special forces to Malanje under orders to encourage anti–UN slogans during the day and firing gunshots at night. Most of the shots were exchanges between UNITA and MPLA supporters but some were directed towards the UN compound. If the MPLA fared badly in the elections it intended to blame the UN for helping UNITA". The Troika countries, which had been such key players in the Bicesse Accords, were spared any blame. Two years of war followed before a new peace agreement was reached. Rounds of talks in Namibe province in November 1992, in Addis Ababa in January 1993 and in Abidjan in April-May 1993 all failed.”

--Manuel J. Paulo, “The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process,” Conciliation Resources, 1994.

“Attacks by UNITA have increased dramatically in recent weeks, leading to hundreds of people fleeing for the shelter of Government-held towns. This is being read as a clear sign of the military leadership of UNITA'S determination to fiercely resist the agreed process of the extension of state administration to all parts of the country. The was expected to follow on from the formation in April of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, of which UNITA is a partner. It is estimated that UNITA continues to occupy two-thirds of the country. Military sources in Luanda suggest that the increase in attacks is a sign that UNITA is regrouping. The main area of tension is along the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire). In June this was the region where the Angolan army, FAA, launched an operation to stem the flow of armed elements entering the country following the defeat of President Mobutu (see APM no.10, Vol III). Sources state that the Government operation in this area is over and that UNITA has now counter-attacked, taking back several areas retaken by FAA. Lieutenant General Marques Correia said on 7 July that UNITA had launched six military operations to recover lost positions. He gave as an example that UNITA has seized the mining area of Maludi. Ominously, General Corriea said that "UNITA forgets that if this situation continues we will bring in reinforcements and take control of the situation once and for all". On 3 July the Government spokesperson on the Joint Commission, Higino Carneiro, said that an attack had taken place on a border post 55km from Nsange. General Adriano Mackenzie on 4 July stated on Radio Nacional de Angola that UNITA had attacked border posts at Itanda, Cambamba and Muaquesse, and attacked and remined roads in the area.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 11, Volume III, 17 July 1997

“UNITA has started to plant mines, which flies in the face of demining efforts. In Angola mines kill and maim thousands of civilians, and hinder agricultural production and the free movement of people and goods…UNITA troops had replanted landmines on roads which had been cleared and reopened by the United Nations…Observers said that UNITA was mining the road to the provincial capital of Lunda Norte. Major Joao Carlos Carvalho on 4 July accused UNITA of planting mines along the Cacula-Quilengues road, Cacula-Caluquembe-Caconda road and the Matala-Jamba road.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 4, Volume II, 7 May 1993.

“The U.N. Security Council imposed an arms and fuel embargo on UNITA in 1993 in an effort to hinder its ability to wage war. The sanctions were expanded in 1998 to include a ban on the group's diamond exports, estimated to have supplied the rebels with up to $4 billion since 1992.”

--“UN Sanctions Committee Chair Says UNITA Sanctions Tighter Now,” *Global Policy Forum,* 8 January 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In 1993, neither the government of Angola nor UNITA ceased launching violent attacks on each others’ territories, neither one engaged in meaningful dialogue, or agreed on new timetables for diplomatic solutions. Both parties ignored the promises made at the Acordos de Paz, and neither side ceased to build up its military strength. UNITA acquired greater numbers of weapons and tanks, and layed mines throughout its territories. The government was concerned primarily with putting down the UNITA insurrection and the work of everyday governance was put aside. The countryside became increasingly dangerous in 1993, and the UN imposed sanctions on UNITA in an effort to stem its sale of oil and diamonds in exchange for weaponry.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The FAA and Angolan police have also regularly seized weapons and uncovered a number of substantial arms caches. However, most of UNITA's heavy arms and artillery, which have not been surrendered to the UN under the demobilisation process, remain unaccounted for. These events indicate a continuing UNITA military capability, whether authorised or freelance, in almost every province of the country.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“Crucially, however, at least 8,000 and perhaps as many as 20,000 of UNITA's best soldiers are estimated never to have participated in the demobilisation process, [as of May 1998] and therefore remain a potentially potent fighting force spread around the country. This represents one of the major shortcomings of the UNAVEM/MONUA process.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“Unexpectedly, the peace process between 1992 and 1994 opened significant opportunities for the rebels. They deceitfully used the lull in fighting to reorganize for a planned new phase of the war. Rebel leader Jonas Savimbi believed that the MPLA regime was irremediably debilitated…Moreover, the peace process would enable Savimbi to move his best troops from southeastern Angola into the diamond producing regions of Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Malanje and Bie.”

-- Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In 1993, neither the government of Angola nor UNITA ceased launching violent attacks on each others’ territories, neither one engaged in meaningful dialogue, or agreed on new timetables for diplomatic solutions. Both parties ignored the promises made at the Acordos de Paz, and neither side ceased to build up its military strength. UNITA acquired greater numbers of weapons and tanks, and layed mines throughout its territories. The government was concerned primarily with putting down the UNITA insurrection and the work of everyday governance was put aside. The countryside became increasingly dangerous in 1993, and the UN imposed sanctions on UNITA in an effort to stem its sale of oil and diamonds in exchange for weaponry.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The depth of demand of all these parts of the demand was high. Each demand put the government of Angola or UNITA at risk. As the conflict continued through 1993, any disengagement from the conflict by one side would have meant annihilation. It was a zero-sum game until the 1994 Lusaka Protocol.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **804** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **29 January 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **5** |
| **Demand number:** | **804.0511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Produce early evidence of their adherence to and fulfillment of the "Acordos de Paz.**”**

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Creating the new government in accordance with the Bicesse peace accord and election results gave the MPLA both international and domestic legitimacy. A tough new chief of staff, General Joao Baptista de Matos was appointed to head the FAA. A new National Defence Council was created, which included the prime minister, the ministers of defence, the interior, foreign affairs, finance, and the chief of general staff. Once established, the new government quickly resolved to confront UNITA and in January 1993 went on the offensive. The Angolan government had rapidly rearmed once conflict became inevitable, purchasing new weapons with money from oil revenue.”

--*Angola Report,* Economist Intelligence Report (1993)

“the civilian population in Luanda was heavily armed, a result of the government's distribution of about a million rifles (type AK-47) to its sympathizers in the aftermath of the electoral fiasco of 1992.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“The UN mission declared the September 1992 elections generally 'free and fair', a verdict agreed by the US, EU, South Africa and other international observers. Yet with UNITA disputing the results, within weeks of the elections Angola returned to war. Anstee's attempts to negotiate a ceasefire failed and the Security Council responded by reducing and then fully withdrawing all UNAVEM military personnel. Many Angolans felt disenchanted and blamed the UN for the failure of this transition period, believing that it had been in UNAVEM's power to intervene. In fact, both the government and UNITA publicly denounced each other's failure to comply with the Bicesse Accords by blaming the UN. As British researcher Alex Vines noted, "in September 1992 the government transferred special forces to Malanje under orders to encourage anti–UN slogans during the day and firing gunshots at night. Most of the shots were exchanges between UNITA and MPLA supporters but some were directed towards the UN compound. If the MPLA fared badly in the elections it intended to blame the UN for helping UNITA". The Troika countries, which had been such key players in the Bicesse Accords, were spared any blame. Two years of war followed before a new peace agreement was reached. Rounds of talks in Namibe province in November 1992, in Addis Ababa in January 1993 and in Abidjan in April-May 1993 all failed.”

--Manuel J. Paulo, “The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process,” Conciliation Resources, 1994.

“UNITA has started to plant mines, which flies in the face of demining efforts. In Angola mines kill and maim thousands of civilians, and hinder agricultural production and the free movement of people and goods…UNITA troops had replanted landmines on roads which had been cleared and reopened by the United Nations…Observers said that UNITA was mining the road to the provincial capital of Lunda Norte. Major Joao Carlos Carvalho on 4 July accused UNITA of planting mines along the Cacula-Quilengues road, Cacula-Caluquembe-Caconda road and the Matala-Jamba road.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 4, Volume II, 7 May 1993.

“The U.N. Security Council imposed an arms and fuel embargo on UNITA in 1993 in an effort to hinder its ability to wage war. The sanctions were expanded in 1998 to include a ban on the group's diamond exports, estimated to have supplied the rebels with up to $4 billion since 1992.”

--“UN Sanctions Committee Chair Says UNITA Sanctions Tighter Now,” *Global Policy Forum,* 8 January 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Throughout 1993, there was no sign that either the government of Angola or UNITA was interested in fulfilling the obligations of the Acordos de Paz. National reconciliation did not occur at any point in the 1990s between UNITA and the Government of Angola. Dialogues were extremely rare, occurring sporadically in the 1994-1996 Lusaka Peace process. While both UNITA and the government of Angola signed off on the Bicesse Peace Accords, in truth, neither the government of Angola nor UNITA explicitly carried out all elements of the Bicesse Peace Accords. The government of Angola and UNITA signed a peace agreement at Bicesse, Portugal which called for an eighteen month transition period in which each party would canton its troops, demobilize some of them, and then join the remainder in a unified Angolan army. Neither party got to work very fast on these demands, particularly not UNITA. The Peace Accords were proven completely meaningless and defunct when both sides resumed war in late 1992 and continued without cessation until the 1994 Lusaka Peace Accords, whereupon they resumed fighting in 1997-1998 with the collapse of those peace accords.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Unexpectedly, the peace process between 1992 and 1994 opened significant opportunities for the rebels. They deceitfully used the lull in fighting to reorganize for a planned new phase of the war. Rebel leader Jonas Savimbi believed that the MPLA regime was irremediably debilitated…Moreover, the peace process would enable Savimbi to move his best troops from southeastern Angola into the diamond producing regions of Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Malanje and Bie.”

-- Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Throughout 1993, there was no sign that either the government of Angola or UNITA was interested in fulfilling the obligations of the Acordos de Paz. National reconciliation did not occur at any point in the 1990s between UNITA and the Government of Angola. Dialogues were extremely rare, occurring sporadically in the 1994-1996 Lusaka Peace process. While both UNITA and the government of Angola signed off on the Bicesse Peace Accords, in truth, neither the government of Angola nor UNITA explicitly carried out all elements of the Bicesse Peace Accords. The government of Angola and UNITA signed a peace agreement at Bicesse, Portugal which called for an eighteen month transition period in which each party would canton its troops, demobilize some of them, and then join the remainder in a unified Angolan army. Neither party got to work very fast on these demands, particularly not UNITA. The Peace Accords were proven completely meaningless and defunct when both sides resumed war in late 1992 and continued without cessation until the 1994 Lusaka Peace Accords, whereupon they resumed fighting in 1997-1998 with the collapse of those peace accords.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This was a high depth of demand because the demands of the Peace Accords threatened the existence of each party in its own way. One demand of the Peace Accords, a national election (whereby there was no mention of power-sharing or shared governorships or regional governance after the winning of the national election by one party) was particularly threatening to each party, as a failed election for one party would have meant practical elimination from national politics. So full compliance with the fundamentals of the process was threatening insofar as full compliance would have meant agreeing to the potential elimination of each side’s body in the national government structure.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **804** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **29 January 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **6** |
| **Demand number:** | **804.0611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Confirm as soon as possible to the UNSG that real progress has been made towards implementation of the Accords**.**

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The government's January 1993 offensive successfully drove UNITA out of every major city, including Lubango and Huambo….These military successes made the government reluctant to negotiate a cease-fire and delayed UN efforts to restart negotiations. The government sought to drive UNITA from all cities and towns, thus restoring the pre-Bicesse military status quo, before agreeing to a cease-fire.”

--*The Weekly Mail*, 15-21 January 1993; *The Financial Times*, 4 January 1993; *The Financial Times*, 12 January 1993

“Unexpectedly, the peace process between 1992 and 1994 opened significant opportunities for the rebels. They deceitfully used the lull in fighting to reorganize for a planned new phase of the war. Rebel leader Jonas Savimbi believed that the MPLA regime was irremediably debilitated…Moreover, the peace process would enable Savimbi to move his best troops from southeastern Angola into the diamond producing regions of Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Malanje and Bie.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“The UN mission declared the September 1992 elections generally 'free and fair', a verdict agreed by the US, EU, South Africa and other international observers. Yet with UNITA disputing the results, within weeks of the elections Angola returned to war. Anstee's attempts to negotiate a ceasefire failed and the Security Council responded by reducing and then fully withdrawing all UNAVEM military personnel. Many Angolans felt disenchanted and blamed the UN for the failure of this transition period, believing that it had been in UNAVEM's power to intervene. In fact, both the government and UNITA publicly denounced each other's failure to comply with the Bicesse Accords by blaming the UN. As British researcher Alex Vines noted, "in September 1992 the government transferred special forces to Malanje under orders to encourage anti–UN slogans during the day and firing gunshots at night. Most of the shots were exchanges between UNITA and MPLA supporters but some were directed towards the UN compound. If the MPLA fared badly in the elections it intended to blame the UN for helping UNITA". The Troika countries, which had been such key players in the Bicesse Accords, were spared any blame. Two years of war followed before a new peace agreement was reached. Rounds of talks in Namibe province in November 1992, in Addis Ababa in January 1993 and in Abidjan in April-May 1993 all failed.”

--Manuel J. Paulo, “The Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process,” Conciliation Resources, 1994.

“Angola's Government and the main opposition group have begun indirect talks in an effort to avert a return to civil war over the disputed elections held in September 1992. But the two sides appeared to be far apart…The talks are being mediated by Roelof F. Botha, the South African Foreign Minister, who has been trying to steer the two main antagonists, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi of the opposition National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, into face-to-face negotiations. Mr. Botha's role in Angola's political imbroglio has become crucial because Mr. Savimbi has refused to meet with senior officials from the United States, Mr. Savimbi's biggest backer during its 16-year insurgency against the Government, controlled by the leftist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. Mr. Savimbi has accused Washington of siding with the ruling party during the election, a charge that American officials have called ludicrous.”

--Kenneth Noble, “Angolan Parties Begin Indirect Talks on Election,” *New York Times,* 30 January 1993.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Throughout 1993, there was no sign that either the government of Angola or UNITA was interested in fulfilling the obligations of the Acordos de Paz. National reconciliation did not occur at any point in the 1990s between UNITA and the Government of Angola. Dialogues were extremely rare, occurring sporadically in the 1994-1996 Lusaka Peace process. While both UNITA and the government of Angola signed off on the Bicesse Peace Accords, in truth, neither the government of Angola nor UNITA explicitly carried out all elements of the Bicesse Peace Accords. The government of Angola and UNITA signed a peace agreement at Bicesse, Portugal which called for an eighteen month transition period in which each party would canton its troops, demobilize some of them, and then join the remainder in a unified Angolan army. Neither party got to work very fast on these demands, particularly not UNITA. The Peace Accords were proven completely meaningless and defunct when both sides resumed war in late 1992 and continued without cessation until the 1994 Lusaka Peace Accords, whereupon they resumed fighting in 1997-1998 with the collapse of those peace accords.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Negotiations were restarted under UN auspices on 28 January 1993 in Addis Ababa. Agreement was reached by the JPMC that the status quo of the Bicesse accords should be reaffirmed, that the September election result should be accepted, and that the second round of voting to elect the President should take place as soon as possible. The MPLA dropped its demands that UNITA relinquish its control of areas taken since the resumption of the civil war. However, the January talks failed to produce a cease-fire.”

--Alex Vines, *One Hand Tied*: *Angola and the UN* (CIIR Briefing Paper), London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1993.

“Diplomatic initiatives were always dependent upon the military balance of power. UNITA was reluctant to enter negotiations for a cease-fire while its forces were engaged in the battle to re-take Huambo. The battle for Huambo saw the fiercest fighting of the renewed civil war to date, worse than at any stage of the civil war, with estimates of the dead ranging from 6,000 to 13,000 people, and 100,000 people forced to leave the city.”

--*Angola Report*, Economist Intelligence Unit, (1993), p. 10

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Throughout 1993, there was no sign that either the government of Angola or UNITA was interested in fulfilling the obligations of the Acordos de Paz. National reconciliation did not occur at any point in the 1990s between UNITA and the Government of Angola. Dialogues were extremely rare, occurring sporadically in the 1994-1996 Lusaka Peace process. While both UNITA and the government of Angola signed off on the Bicesse Peace Accords, in truth, neither the government of Angola nor UNITA explicitly carried out all elements of the Bicesse Peace Accords. The government of Angola and UNITA signed a peace agreement at Bicesse, Portugal which called for an eighteen month transition period in which each party would canton its troops, demobilize some of them, and then join the remainder in a unified Angolan army. Neither party got to work very fast on these demands, particularly not UNITA. The Peace Accords were proven completely meaningless and defunct when both sides resumed war in late 1992 and continued without cessation until the 1994 Lusaka Peace Accords, whereupon they resumed fighting in 1997-1998 with the collapse of those peace accords.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This was a high depth of demand because the demands of the Peace Accords threatened the existence of each party in its own way. One demand of the Peace Accords, a national election (whereby there was no mention of power-sharing or shared governorships or regional governance after the winning of the national election by one party) was particularly threatening to each party, as a failed election for one party would have meant practical elimination from national politics. So full compliance with the fundamentals of the process was threatening insofar as full compliance would have meant agreeing to the potential elimination of each side’s body in the national government structure.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **804** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **29 January 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **10** |
| **Demand number:** | **804.1011** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Abide by the obligations under humanitarian law and the provisions of the Accords**.**

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The government's January 1993 offensive successfully drove UNITA out of every major city, including Lubango and Huambo….These military successes made the government reluctant to negotiate a cease-fire and delayed UN efforts to restart negotiations. The government sought to drive UNITA from all cities and towns, thus restoring the pre-Bicesse military status quo, before agreeing to a cease-fire.”

--*The Weekly Mail*, 15-21 January 1993; *The Financial Times*, 4 January 1993; *The Financial Times*, 12 January 1993

“The government suffered a significant psychological and economic blow when the oil town of Soyo fell to UNITA on 20 January 1993 and 17 foreign oil workers were captured.”

*The Financial Times*, 21 January 1993

“Throughout 1993 the Government of the Republic of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) remained embroiled in a brutal civil war…Human rights in Angola deteriorated in 1993 in the face of heightened civil war brutalities and the absence of government

and UNITA actions to curb egregious violations of humanitarian law. Media, eyewitness, and international community reports indicated that UNITA forces, government military, and internal

security forces flagrantly disregarded fundamental humanitarian values in their treatment of prisoners of war, their extrajudicial killings of unarmed civilians, including women, children and the elderly, and their impediments to delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians in dire need.The Government detained prisoners accused of political and other crimes for indeterminate periods of time under inhumane conditions and without due process of law, according to a persuasive report published by the Human Rights Subcommittee of the National Assembly. UNITA held foreign hostages in Jamba, Huambo, and other areas under its control. The media published credible allegations of UNITA "ethnic cleansing" in Uige Province bordering Zaire. There were substantiated reports of government reprisals against Zairians resident in Luanda suburbs, as well as "cleansing" during military operations.”

--US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1993,* Washington DC: State Department Publication 1994.

“More than 350 people have died in a battle between Unita rebels and Angolan government forces in the city of Huambo, according to Angolan army reports. The government of the southern African country also said that up to 1,500 people had been injured in the fighting. Diplomats say the battle is "vicious", with neither side taking many prisoners. According to the radio station of Angola's rebel movement Unita, government troops are fleeing from the city and large amounts of arms and ammunition have been seized, including several Russian-built tanks. The government garrison in the city has been cut off for several weeks and is being supplied by occasional air drops. Fighting around Huambo has intensified after Unita brought in troop reinforcements from Bie province, which is around 165km away to the east of the city…Earlier, UN officials admitted defeat in their diplomatic attempts to halt renewed civil war in Angola, calling the outcome a "bitter disappointment". Unita failed to attend UN-sponsored peace talks in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, last week, but proposed fresh talks in Geneva. Local aid agencies have described the health situation in Angola as "dramatic" - with a child dying every two hours in the paediatric hospital in the capital Luanda. Most of the main aid agencies have left the country after Unita launched an abortive coup attempt in Luanda last November.”

--“1993: Angolans Die in Battle for Huambo,” *BBC News,* 6 March 1993.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Humanitarian law was obviously not a concern for members of UNITA or its leadership, nor for those within the government of Angola or its military. Both sides occupied territory without cause, caused damage to civilian resources, layed mines, destroyed cities and villages, took hostages, tortured prisoners, and purposefully ruined landscapes in order to lower the morale of the enemy. Humanitarian law continued to be flagrantly ignored by both UNITA and the government of Angola through 2001 and the end of the conflict.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“On 29 January the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, extended the mandate of UNAVEM II until 30 April 1993, but reduced the observer team by 90 percent to 64. Negotiations were restarted under UN auspices on 28 January 1993 in Addis Ababa. Agreement was reached by the JPMC that the status quo of the Bicesse accords should be reaffirmed, that the September election result should be accepted, and that the second round of voting to elect the President should take place as soon as possible. The MPLA dropped its demands that UNITA relinquish its control of areas taken since the resumption of the civil war.”

--Alex Vines, *One Hand Tied*: *Angola and the UN* (CIIR Briefing Paper), London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1993.

“In March 1993, UNITA regrouped and launched a new offensive on the cities. Government forces controlled the Atlantic coast cities of Luanda, Lobito and Benguela, and the southern port of Namibe. The provincial capitals of N'dalatando, Malanje, Saurimo, Luena, Cuito and Lubango were laid siege by UNITA. Savimbi's forces were able to control large areas of southern Angola, but of more importance, UNITA used its supply lines through Zaire to take control of the northern cities of M'banza Congo, Uige and Caxito, bringing UNITA within striking distance of Luanda.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 255.

“Throughout 1993 the Government of the Republic of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) remained embroiled in a brutal civil war…Human rights in Angola deteriorated in 1993 in the face of heightened civil war brutalities and the absence of government

and UNITA actions to curb egregious violations of humanitarian law. Media, eyewitness, and international community reports indicated that UNITA forces, government military, and internal

security forces flagrantly disregarded fundamental humanitarian values in their treatment of prisoners of war, their extrajudicial killings of unarmed civilians, including women, children and the elderly, and their impediments to delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians in dire need.The Government detained prisoners accused of political and other crimes for indeterminate periods of time under inhumane conditions and without due process of law, according to a persuasive report published by the Human Rights Subcommittee of the National Assembly. UNITA held foreign hostages in Jamba, Huambo, and other areas under its control. The media published credible allegations of UNITA "ethnic cleansing" in Uige Province bordering Zaire. There were substantiated reports of government reprisals against Zairians resident in Luanda suburbs, as well as "cleansing" during military operations.”

--US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1993,* Washington DC: State Department Publication 1994.

“In 1993…The Government and the National Assembly Subcommittee on Human Rights acknowledged that conditions in Angola's prisons were inhuman. Many prisons, lacking financial support from the Government, are unable to supply prisoners with food and medicine, and prisoners are thus forced to depend on international relief organizations and their families and friends. The Government allowed subcommittee personnel, as well as the ICRC, access to all prisons except the Laboratorio in Luanda. According to credible reports government personnel tortured detainees at the Laboratorio, holding them incommunicado for months with a daily ration of two spoons of rice and one half liter of dirty water. If interrogators were not satisfied with the information they were being given, detainees were taken unclothed to a cement cell, approximately the size of a large telephone booth with no windows, and for 10 minutes at a time subjected to electric shocks. Reportedly, at the end of these sessions they could not see, stand, or walk unassisted for several hours. There were credible eyewitness reports of the debilitated physical and mental condition of UNITA members upon their release from that facility. In January 1993 there were credible reports that UNITA forces in Uige mutilated unarmed civilians. In March 1993 accounts emerged, reinforced by a video tape, of an incident at Huambo where government forces were accused of using a shield of women and children hostages to cover their retreat. Government sources claim that the women and children accompanying the government forces had sought their protection. In September 1993 first-hand media accounts reported that government forces in Benguela Province beat and shot UNITA prisoners in the legs and feet so that they would not run away.”

--US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1993,* Washington DC: State Department Publication 1994.

“In August 1993, the bombing of Huambo as part of a major government offensive against UNITA destroyed the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) headquarters in the city. In August, a WFP convoy of seventy-five trucks transporting relief aid to some 145,000 war-affected people in Caimbambo and Cubal was attacked by unidentified gunmen who destroyed one truck and damaged two more. Four members of the convoy were killed.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1994- Angola.*

“More than 350 people have died in a battle between Unita rebels and Angolan government forces in the city of Huambo, according to Angolan army reports. The government of the southern African country also said that up to 1,500 people had been injured in the fighting. Diplomats say the battle is "vicious", with neither side taking many prisoners. According to the radio station of Angola's rebel movement Unita, government troops are fleeing from the city and large amounts of arms and ammunition have been seized, including several Russian-built tanks. The government garrison in the city has been cut off for several weeks and is being supplied by occasional air drops. Fighting around Huambo has intensified after Unita brought in troop reinforcements from Bie province, which is around 165km away to the east of the city…Earlier, UN officials admitted defeat in their diplomatic attempts to halt renewed civil war in Angola, calling the outcome a "bitter disappointment". Unita failed to attend UN-sponsored peace talks in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, last week, but proposed fresh talks in Geneva. Local aid agencies have described the health situation in Angola as "dramatic" - with a child dying every two hours in the paediatric hospital in the capital Luanda. Most of the main aid agencies have left the country after Unita launched an abortive coup attempt in Luanda last November.”

--“1993: Angolans Die in Battle for Huambo,” *BBC News,* 6 March 1993.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Humanitarian law was obviously not a concern for members of UNITA or its leadership, nor for those within the government of Angola or its military. Both sides occupied territory without cause, caused damage to civilian resources, layed mines, destroyed cities and villages, took hostages, tortured prisoners, and purposefully ruined landscapes in order to lower the morale of the enemy. Humanitarian law continued to be flagrantly ignored by both UNITA and the government of Angola through 2001 and the end of the conflict.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | **Medium depth of demand (2)** | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While this demand presented certain risks—such as the risk of having one side (either UNITA rebels or government of Angola army soldiers) violate humanitarian law while the other side abstained and suffered consequences—this demand ranks as medium. Adhering to humanitarian law—refusing to lay mines, torture, maim and dismember bodies, practicing lawful engagement in warfare—would not have posed a fundamental risk to themselves. The rampant humanitarian violations practiced by both UNITA and the government of Angola were largely fruitless and unnecessary, and practiced in order to terrorize and subjugate populations into submission.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **804** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **29 January 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **11** |
| **Demand number:** | **804.1111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Immediately release foreign nationals taken hostage**.**

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“MOMENTS after we entered the Hotel Turismo in central Luanda yesterday morning, the worst shooting since Angola's general election erupted on the streets outside. Our party of reporters were there to see 12 police officers, taken hostage by soldiers of the opposition National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Unita) after a car bomb had blown out the windows of the hotel where senior Unita members live…Two hours later, a formal ceasefire was reached and negotiations began for the release of the police hostages. Last night they were freed, as were 35 Unita members arrested during the election campaign.”

--Karl Maier, “Unita soldiers in gunfight at the Hotel Turismo,” The Independent, 12 October 1993.

“Unexpectedly, the peace process between 1992 and 1994 opened significant opportunities for the rebels. They deceitfully used the lull in fighting to reorganize for a planned new phase of the war. Rebel leader Jonas Savimbi believed that the MPLA regime was irremediably debilitated…Moreover, the peace process would enable Savimbi to move his best troops from southeastern Angola into the diamond producing regions of Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Malanje and Bie.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“Throughout 1993…UNITA held foreign hostages in Jamba, Huambo, and other areas under its control. The media published credible allegations of UNITA "ethnic cleansing" in Uige Province bordering Zaire. There were substantiated reports of government reprisals against Zairians resident in Luanda suburbs, as well as "cleansing" during military operations.”

--US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1993,* Washington DC: State Department Publication 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA continued to take hostages throughout 1993 and 1994, and hostages’ bodies were often found in rural areas or cities. Hostages were rarely released. There is little evidence for the safe release of any hostages in 1993.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Namibian civilians continue to be taken hostage by members of the rebel National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).”

--Xinhua News Agency, “Namibian Police Clash With Angolan Army in Hostage Rescue Mission,” October 4, 2000.

“Throughout 1993…UNITA held foreign hostages in Jamba, Huambo, and other areas under its control. The media published credible allegations of UNITA "ethnic cleansing" in Uige Province bordering Zaire. There were substantiated reports of government reprisals against Zairians resident in Luanda suburbs, as well as "cleansing" during military operations.”

--US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1993,* Washington DC: State Department Publication 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA continued to take hostages throughout 1993 and 1994, and hostages’ bodies were often found in rural areas or cities. Hostages were rarely released. There is little evidence for the safe release of any hostages in 1993.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand did not put UNITA at risk. It was a demand to comply with a humanitarian request. Compliance would not have threatened any individual within UNITA or the party, itself.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **804** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **29 January 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **12** |
| **Demand number:** | **804.1211** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Take all necessary measures to ensure the safety and security of UNAVEM II personnel**.**

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“A number of joint commissions were established by the Angolan Government and UNITA to verify the implementation of the Peace Accords. Observers from UNAVEM II attended all meetings of these commissions. Their main function, however, was to observe the workings of joint Government/UNITA monitoring groups. These groups, consisting of equal numbers of monitors from both sides, were established in 50 locations where troops of the conflicting parties were to be assembled during the cease-fire. UN Observers were also stationed at 12 other 'critical points' in the country and were tasked with regular patrolling of a number of other locations. The unarmed UNAVEM II personnel also assisted in the investigation and resolution of alleged violations of the ceasefire. Their participation was observed across all regions of Angola without interference from local parties.”

--“Overseas Operations – UNAVEM II- Second United Nations Angola Verification Mission,” September 1993.

“UNAVEM II military observers were continuing to perform their verification tasks. However, confinement of both sides’ troops to assembly areas continued to suffer from problems, as did the demobilization of troops, which was also running behind schedule.”

--United Nations: Department of Political Affairs, *Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council: Supplement 1989-1992,* Supplement 1989-1992, New York: United Nations Publications.

“The Secretary-General, in an addendum to his 20 June 1994 report to the Security Council on UNAVEM II, drew attention to the dramatic escalation in the number of serious violations of humanitarian law in Angola, the rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation in places where access was being denied, and threats to the safety of relief workers. In resolution 932 (1994) of 30 June 1994, the Security Council deplored the worsening of the humanitarian situation, urged the parties to grant all necessary security guarantees and to refrain from actions endangering relief personnel or disrupting humanitarian assistance.”

--Mark Malan, “Physical protection in practice: International and regional peacekeeping in Africa,” African Security Review Vol 9 No 2, 2000

“In the coastal provinces and other areas considered secure, the relief programme initiated by the United Nations, in cooperation with national and international non-governmental organizations, brought food aid and other emergency assistance to large numbers of Angolans displaced by the war or affected by the country-wide economic decline. However, the implementation of relief operations in the interior of the country and in zones of active conflict, where the needs were particularly acute, encountered serious difficulties. It was only in October 1993, following intensive negotiations with the two parties on humanitarian access and a general decrease in the intensity of fighting country-wide, that relief flights were able to reach besieged cities such as Kuito and Huambo, whose populations had been cut off from international assistance for many months.”

--Mark Malan, “Physical protection in practice: International and regional peacekeeping in Africa,” African Security Review Vol 9 No 2, 2000

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While UNITA never adhered to this demand, the government of Angola similarly did not take steps to ensure even government-controlled territories were free of dangerous landmines, arbitrary checkpoints, armed bandits, and desperate civilians. Outside of Luanda, the Angolan rural zones were profoundly unsafe for UNAVEM personnel.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“While the joint police monitoring teams were finally established in all 18 provinces, the police monitoring system was almost entirely dependent on UNAVEM II resources for transport, and communication…UNAVEM II resources were utilized and necessary, with the populace…adhering to requests to respect personnel and capacities…”

--United Nations: Department of Political Affairs, *Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council: Supplement 1989-1992,* Supplement 1989-1992, New York: United Nations Publications.

“UNAVEM II remained on the ground in its reduced strength as negotiations continued between the belligerents…President Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola requested that the UN increase the size of its peacekeeping mission and support his government since it was UNITA that broke the cease-fire…the maximum authorized strength of UNAVEM II consisted of 350 military observers, 126 police observers, 96 international and local civilian staff…the operation’s electoral monitoring division included a total of 400 observers…There were five fatalities among the UNAVEM II Personnel between 1991 and 1995.”

--Terry M. Mays, *Historical Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping,* Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004, p. 160.

“For example, the type of verbs used in Security Council Resolution 976 (1995, establishing UNAVEM III) indicates that compliance by the parties is optional, rather than compulsory. The only demand made under the eighteen points of Resolution 976 was that "all concerned in Angola take the necessary measures to ensure the safety and freedom of movement of UN and other personnel deployed under UNAVEM III." From the start, even this demand was patently ignored by UNITA, while no strong action was taken to curb the widespread human rights abuses and civilian deprivation that resulted from poor mandate implementation.”

--Mark Malan, “Physical protection in practice: International and regional peacekeeping in Africa,” African Security Review Vol 9 No 2, 2000

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While UNITA never adhered to this demand, the government of Angola similarly did not take steps to ensure even government-controlled territories were free of dangerous landmines, arbitrary checkpoints, armed bandits, and desperate civilians. Outside of Luanda, the Angolan rural zones were profoundly unsafe for UNAVEM personnel.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | **Medium depth of demand (2)** | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Ensuring a secure level of transport and movement for UNAVEM personnel would have been an enormous effort, and would have necessitated a level of organization, complex communication, and orchestrated attention that was not feasible at this time. While this demand only presented some risks to its adherents, and was not a huge risk, it was still an enormous demand, that if complied with—could have put larger operations at risk which could have threatened the compliers.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **811** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **12 March 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **2** |
| **Demand number:** | **811.0211** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Accept unreservedly the results of the democratic elections and abide by the Accords. Continue the completion of the electoral process and the free circulation of people and goods**.**

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“During 1993, UNITA laid siege to pockets of government control in the central Angolan towns of Cuito, Menongue, Malanje, and Luena, seeking to divide Angola in two.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“After losing and rejecting the results of the first multiparty national elections of September 1992, UNITA used conventional military tactics to overrun most government positions around the country and seriously threatened the capital city, Luanda. It would take the Angolan government about two years to beat back UNITA's pressure.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“Unexpectedly, the peace process between 1992 and 1994 opened significant opportunities for the rebels. They deceitfully used the lull in fighting to reorganize for a planned new phase of the war. Rebel leader Jonas Savimbi believed that the MPLA regime was irremediably debilitated…Moreover, the peace process would enable Savimbi to move his best troops from southeastern Angola into the diamond producing regions of Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Malanje and Bie.”

-- Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“For example, the type of verbs used in Security Council Resolution 976 (1995, establishing UNAVEM III) indicates that compliance by the parties is optional, rather than compulsory. The only demand made under the eighteen points of Resolution 976 was that "all concerned in Angola take the necessary measures to ensure the safety and freedom of movement of UN and other personnel deployed under UNAVEM III." From the start, even this demand was patently ignored by UNITA, while no strong action was taken to curb the widespread human rights abuses and civilian deprivation that resulted from poor mandate implementation.”

--Mark Malan, “Physical protection in practice: International and regional peacekeeping in Africa,” African Security Review Vol 9 No 2, 2000

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

All of these demands were roundly ignored by UNITA. By March 1993, UNITA was organizing a total civil war in its controlled territories, was not complying with any peace accords, and was not planning on returning to an electoral timetable.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“During 1993, UNITA laid siege to pockets of government control in the central Angolan towns of Cuito, Menongue, Malanje, and Luena, seeking to divide Angola in two.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“Unfortunately, neither peace nor development were secured by the 1992 Elections. Ironically, those elections demonstrated an overwhelming commitment by the Angolan people to the principal of democracy (over 90 per cent of those eligible voted), but one of democracy's principal international proponents, the US Govern-ment, delayed almost six months in recognising the elected government. In the meantime, Angola had descended once more into civil war.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

Jonas Savimbi of UNITA refused to accept defeat in the 1992 elections and renewed the civil war.”

--Terry M. Mays, *Historical Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping,* Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004, p. 160.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In the medium-term, all of these demands were roundly ignored by UNITA. Thorugh 1993 and 1994, UNITA was organizing a total civil war in its controlled territories, was not complying with any peace accords, and was not planning on returning to an electoral timetable.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

All of these demands threatened the existence of UNITA, which had, by March 1993, already begun engaging in civil warfare and widespread violence against the state. UNITA rejected the elections and wished for a return to a state of war, where it believed it would have legitimacy and ultimately defeat the government. Compliance with demands would have spelled the end of UNITA, which had proven itself untrustworthy in November 1992.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **811** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **12 March 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **2** |
| **Demand number:** | **811.0212** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Produce evidence that real progress has been made towards the implementation of the Accords.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

.

“During 1993, UNITA laid siege to pockets of government control in the central Angolan towns of Cuito, Menongue, Malanje, and Luena, seeking to divide Angola in two.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“During 1993…The government forces, for their part, concentrated their offensive on UNITA's headquarters at Huambo.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“Throughout 1993 the conflict alternately raged and simmered with shifting hot spots. Talks in Addis Ababa and then Abidjan collapsed due to UNITA intransigence or failure to appear. The international community, the Security Council and the SRSG repeatedly demanded that UNITA accept the results of the election and abide fully by the Bicesse Accords. At the same time, they exhorted both sides to the conflict to respect humanitarian principles and allow those in need access to humanitarian assistance. UNAVEM II's mandate was extended month after month. In July 1993, Margaret Anstee was succeeded by Maître Alioune Blondin Beye as the Secretary-General's Special Representative to Angola. On 15 September 1993, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council imposed an embargo on military goods and oil to UNITA. During exploratory peace talks in October 1993 UNITA reaffirmed its acceptance of the Bicesse Accords and agreed to abide by the results of the 1992 elections. Angolan peace talks in Lusaka then commenced in November 1993. By mid-December sufficient progress had been recorded for the Secretary-General to recommend the postponement of additional measures against UNITA. However progress stalled in early 1994 and by June, military offensives had escalated again. Just one month prior to the scheduled signing of the Lusaka Protocol, heavy fighting occurred throughout Angola.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

“Sayagues has described the ‘peacekeeping’ environment in Angola since 1991 as "an amorphous condition of neither war nor peace ... an exhausting series of war, peace agreement, demobilisation, lack of war, threats of war, lack of peace ... a permanent bleeding and rape of people and resources…”

--Mark Malan, “Physical protection in practice: International and regional peacekeeping in Africa,” African Security Review Vol 9 No 2, 2000

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand was roundly ignored by UNITA. Thorugh 1993 and 1994, UNITA was organizing a total civil war in its controlled territories, was not complying with any peace accords, and not demonstrating any sign of doing so.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“During 1993, UNITA laid siege to pockets of government control in the central Angolan towns of Cuito, Menongue, Malanje, and Luena, seeking to divide Angola in two.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“During 1993…The government forces, for their part, concentrated their offensive on UNITA's headquarters at Huambo.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“In March 1993, UNITA regrouped and launched a new offensive on the cities. Government forces controlled the Atlantic coast cities of Luanda, Lobito and Benguela, and the southern port of Namibe. The provincial capitals of N'dalatando, Malanje, Saurimo, Luena, Cuito and Lubango were laid siege by UNITA. Savimbi's forces were able to control large areas of southern Angola, but of more importance, UNITA used its supply lines through Zaire to take control of the northern cities of M'banza Congo, Uige and Caxito, bringing UNITA within striking distance of Luanda.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 255.

“Unexpectedly, the peace process between 1992 and 1994 opened significant opportunities for the rebels. They deceitfully used the lull in fighting to reorganize for a planned new phase of the war. Rebel leader Jonas Savimbi believed that the MPLA regime was irremediably debilitated…Moreover, the peace process would enable Savimbi to move his best troops from southeastern Angola into the diamond producing regions of Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Malanje and Bie.”

-- Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“Throughout 1993 the conflict alternately raged and simmered with shifting hot spots. Talks in Addis Ababa and then Abidjan collapsed due to UNITA intransigence or failure to appear. The international community, the Security Council and the SRSG repeatedly demanded that UNITA accept the results of the election and abide fully by the Bicesse Accords. At the same time, they exhorted both sides to the conflict to respect humanitarian principles and allow those in need access to humanitarian assistance. UNAVEM II's mandate was extended month after month. In July 1993, Margaret Anstee was succeeded by Maître Alioune Blondin Beye as the Secretary-General's Special Representative to Angola. On 15 September 1993, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council imposed an embargo on military goods and oil to UNITA. During exploratory peace talks in October 1993 UNITA reaffirmed its acceptance of the Bicesse Accords and agreed to abide by the results of the 1992 elections. Angolan peace talks in Lusaka then commenced in November 1993. By mid-December sufficient progress had been recorded for the Secretary-General to recommend the postponement of additional measures against UNITA. However progress stalled in early 1994 and by June, military offensives had escalated again. Just one month prior to the scheduled signing of the Lusaka Protocol, heavy fighting occurred throughout Angola.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

“Sayagues has described the ‘peacekeeping’ environment in Angola since 1991 as "an amorphous condition of neither war nor peace ... an exhausting series of war, peace agreement, demobilisation, lack of war, threats of war, lack of peace ... a permanent bleeding and rape of people and resources…”

--Mark Malan, “Physical protection in practice: International and regional peacekeeping in Africa,” African Security Review Vol 9 No 2, 2000

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In the medium-term, this demand was roundly ignored by UNITA. Thorugh 1993 and 1994, UNITA was organizing a total civil war in its controlled territories, was not complying with any peace accords, and not demonstrating any sign of doing so.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **811** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **12 March 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **3** |
| **Demand number:** | **811.0311** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cease fire, and the resumption of a continued and meaningful dialogue to establish a timetable for the implementation of the Accords**.**

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA condemned for endangering peace process. The Security Council on 1 June extended until 15 July 1993 the mandate of the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) on a reduced basis and in a manner which would respond to the evolution of the military and political situation. It condemned the National Union for the Total independence of Angola (UNITA) for increasing hostilities and endangering the peace process in the country. In resolution 823 (1993), the Council on 30 April had extended the Mission's existing mandate until 31 May.”

--“UNAVEM II mandate extended; UNITA condemned for endangering peace process.” (UN Angola Verification Mission; National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) (United Nations developments), *UN Chronicle*, September 1, 1993

“During 1993, UNITA laid siege to pockets of government control in the central Angolan towns of Cuito, Menongue, Malanje, and Luena, seeking to divide Angola in two.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“Sayagues has described the ‘peacekeeping’ environment in Angola since 1991 as "an amorphous condition of neither war nor peace ... an exhausting series of war, peace agreement, demobilisation, lack of war, threats of war, lack of peace ... a permanent bleeding and rape of people and resources…”

--Mark Malan, “Physical protection in practice: International and regional peacekeeping in Africa,” African Security Review Vol 9 No 2, 2000

“During 1993…The government forces, for their part, concentrated their offensive on UNITA's headquarters at Huambo.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“Throughout 1993 the conflict alternately raged and simmered with shifting hot spots. Talks in Addis Ababa and then Abidjan collapsed due to UNITA intransigence or failure to appear. The international community, the Security Council and the SRSG repeatedly demanded that UNITA accept the results of the election and abide fully by the Bicesse Accords”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In 1993, UNITA did not cease fire, did not engage in any meaningful dialogue with the government, and did not fulfill any aspect of the Peace Accords. The Government of Angola, whose army was still disorganized and not fully ready in 1993, continued to stockpile weapons and train soldiers in order to counter UNITA’s force in its territories. It also did not utilize dialogue or put effort into implementing the Accords.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Angola's September 1992 election should have marked the end of 30 years of conflict...The resumption of the war has seen the development of military tactics new to Angola, in particular the siege, which has characterized this phase of the struggle. The siege of central Angolan towns has continued against a

backdrop of negotiations to achieve a cease-fire and peace settlement.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“UNITA condemned for endangering peace process. The Security Council on 1 June extended until 15 July 1993 the mandate of the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) on a reduced basis and in a manner which would respond to the evolution of the military and political situation. It condemned the National Union for the Total independence of Angola (UNITA) for increasing hostilities and endangering the peace process in the country. In resolution 823 (1993), the Council on 30 April had extended the Mission's existing mandate until 31 May.”

--“UNAVEM II mandate extended; UNITA condemned for endangering peace process.” (UN Angola Verification Mission; National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) (United Nations developments), *UN Chronicle*, September 1, 1993

“During 1993, UNITA laid siege to pockets of government control in the central Angolan towns of Cuito, Menongue, Malanje, and Luena, seeking to divide Angola in two.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“During 1993…The government forces, for their part, concentrated their offensive on UNITA's headquarters at Huambo.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“Sayagues has described the ‘peacekeeping’ environment in Angola since 1991 as "an amorphous condition of neither war nor peace ... an exhausting series of war, peace agreement, demobilisation, lack of war, threats of war, lack of peace ... a permanent bleeding and rape of people and resources…”

--Mark Malan, “Physical protection in practice: International and regional peacekeeping in Africa,” African Security Review Vol 9 No 2, 2000

“Unexpectedly, the peace process between 1992 and 1994 opened significant opportunities for the rebels. They deceitfully used the lull in fighting to reorganize for a planned new phase of the war. Rebel leader Jonas Savimbi believed that the MPLA regime was irremediably debilitated…Moreover, the peace process would enable Savimbi to move his best troops from southeastern Angola into the diamond producing regions of Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Malanje and Bie.”

-- Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In the medium-term, UNITA did not cease fire, did not engage in any meaningful dialogue with the government, and did not fulfill any aspect of the Peace Accords. The Government of Angola, whose army was still disorganized and not fully ready in 1993, continued to stockpile weapons and train soldiers in order to counter UNITA’s force in its territories. It also did not utilize dialogue or put effort into implementing the Accords.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Engaging in this behavior at this stage would have meant the end of the government or

UNITA. Each side had re-engaged in large-scale civil conflict, and any dialogue or peaceful movement toward a cease-fire could have meant a hostile reaction that could threaten their existence.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **811** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **12 March 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **5** |
| **Demand number:** | **811.0511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Attacks against the Special Representative of the SG and UNAVEM II personnel must cease, and take all necessary measures to ensure their safety and security**.**

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“While the joint police monitoring teams were finally established in all 18 provinces, the police monitoring system was almost entirely dependent on UNAVEM II resources for transport, and communication…UNAVEM II resources were utilized and necessary, with the populace…adhering to requests to respect personnel and capacities…”

--United Nations: Department of Political Affairs, *Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council: Supplement 1989-1992,* Supplement 1989-1992, New York: United Nations Publications.

“UNAVEM II remained on the ground in its reduced strength as negotiations continued between the belligerents…President Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola requested that the UN increase the size of its peacekeeping mission and support his government since it was UNITA that broke the cease-fire…the maximum authorized strength of UNAVEM II consisted of 350 military observers, 126 police observers, 96 international and local civilian staff…the operation’s electoral monitoring division included a total of 400 observers…There were five fatalities among the UNAVEM II Personnel between 1991 and 1995.”

--Terry M. Mays, *Historical Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping,* Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004, p. 160.

“According to the report, the crisis arising after the September 1992 elections until 1994…thrust UNAVEM II into a central mediating role. However, with the outbreak of violent and widespread hostilities, and the total collapse of the joint monitoring mechanisms, - "UNAVEM II's original mandate has become less and less relevant". Even its mediating role had been increasingly limited by the deteriorating security situation. At the same time, UNAVEM II teams in the field faced mounting dangers, which became so extensive that 45 of UNAVEM's 67 locations had to be evacuated. The Secretary-General outlined three options for the future of UNAVEM II. The first option was to maintain the mission at its existing strength; the second was to reduce UNAVEM II's provincial deployment to approximately six locations. The Secretary-General's preferred option was to confine UNAVEM II's deployment to the capital, Luanda, and to one or two outstations but with the capability to deploy to six provincial sites if needed, to support his Special Representative's peacemaking efforts. At the same time, the Council stressed its readiness to expand substantially the United Nations presence in Angola in the event of significant progress in the peace process. On 29 January, the Security Council, by its resolution 804 (1993), extended the mandate of UNAVEM II for a period of three months, until 30 April 1993. It did so with the proviso that, as a provisional measure based on security considerations, the Secretary-General could concentrate UNAVEM II's deployment in Luanda and, at his discretion, in other provincial locations, with the levels of personnel and equipment he deemed appropriate to allow for the subsequent expeditious redeployment of UNAVEM II as soon as this became feasible. By other provisions of the resolution, the Council demanded, inter alia, that the two parties establish a cease-fire immediately, restore continued and meaningful dialogue and agree on a clear timetable for the full implementation of the Peace Accords. Subsequently, the Secretary-General decided to temporarily decrease the strength of the Mission.”

--REPORT OF UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II, Chief Military Observer: Major-General Chris Abutu Garuba (Nigeria), 1994.

“For example, the type of verbs used in Security Council Resolution 976 (1995, establishing UNAVEM III) indicates that compliance by the parties is optional, rather than compulsory. The only demand made under the eighteen points of Resolution 976 was that "all concerned in Angola take the necessary measures to ensure the safety and freedom of movement of UN and other personnel deployed under UNAVEM III." From the start, even this demand was patently ignored by UNITA, while no strong action was taken to curb the widespread human rights abuses and civilian deprivation that resulted from poor mandate implementation.”

--Mark Malan, “Physical protection in practice: International and regional peacekeeping in Africa,” African Security Review Vol 9 No 2, 2000

“The Secretary-General, in an addendum to his 20 June 1994 report to the Security Council on UNAVEM II, drew attention to the dramatic escalation in the number of serious violations of humanitarian law in Angola, the rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation in places where access was being denied, and threats to the safety of relief workers. In resolution 932 (1994) of 30 June 1994, the Security Council deplored the worsening of the humanitarian situation, urged the parties to grant all necessary security guarantees and to refrain from actions endangering relief personnel or disrupting humanitarian assistance.”

--Mark Malan, “Physical protection in practice: International and regional peacekeeping in Africa,” African Security Review Vol 9 No 2, 2000

“In the coastal provinces and other areas considered secure, the relief programme initiated by the United Nations, in cooperation with national and international non-governmental organizations, brought food aid and other emergency assistance to large numbers of Angolans displaced by the war or affected by the country-wide economic decline. However, the implementation of relief operations in the interior of the country and in zones of active conflict, where the needs were particularly acute, encountered serious difficulties. It was only in October 1993, following intensive negotiations with the two parties on humanitarian access and a general decrease in the intensity of fighting country-wide, that relief flights were able to reach besieged cities such as Kuito and Huambo, whose populations had been cut off from international assistance for many months.”

--Mark Malan, “Physical protection in practice: International and regional peacekeeping in Africa,” African Security Review Vol 9 No 2, 2000

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand was resolutely ignored by UNITA, and while government army troops for the most part did not attack UNAVEM outright, they were also powerless to stop rogue soldiers and civilian bandits from endangering the safety of UN personnel.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“While the joint police monitoring teams were finally established in all 18 provinces, the police monitoring system was almost entirely dependent on UNAVEM II resources for transport, and communication…UNAVEM II resources were utilized and necessary, with the populace…adhering to requests to respect personnel and capacities…”

--United Nations: Department of Political Affairs, *Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council: Supplement 1989-1992,* Supplement 1989-1992, New York: United Nations Publications.

“UNAVEM II remained on the ground in its reduced strength as negotiations continued between the belligerents…President Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola requested that the UN increase the size of its peacekeeping mission and support his government since it was UNITA that broke the cease-fire…the maximum authorized strength of UNAVEM II consisted of 350 military observers, 126 police observers, 96 international and local civilian staff…the operation’s electoral monitoring division included a total of 400 observers…There were five fatalities among the UNAVEM II Personnel between 1991 and 1995.”

--Terry M. Mays, *Historical Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping,* Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004, p. 160.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In the medium-term, this demand was resolutely ignored by UNITA, and while government army troops for the most part did not attack UNAVEM outright, they were also powerless to stop rogue soldiers and civilian bandits from endangering the safety of UN personnel.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand put neither party at risk and compliance would not have threatened their lives or security. It was a humanitarian mandate that was simply ignored.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **811** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **12 March 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **6** |
| **Demand number:** | **811.0611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Release the UNAVEM II military observer kidnapped on 02/23/93 in Cabinda**.**

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Throughout the 1990s, Cabindan rebels kidnapped and ransomed off foreign oil workers to in turn finance further attacks against the national government…FLEC militants stopped buses, forcing Chevron Oil workers out, and setting fire to the buses on March 27 and April 23, 1992. A large-scale battle took place between FLEC and police in Malongo on May 14 in which 25 mortar rounds accidentally hit a nearby Chevron compound. The government, fearing the loss of their prime source of revenue, began to negotiate with representatives from Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda-Renewal (FLEC-R), Armed Forces of Cabinda (FLEC-FAC), and the Democratic Front of Cabinda (FDC) in 1995…Patronage and bribery failed to assuage the anger of FLEC-R and FLEC-FAC and negotiations ended. In February 1997, FLEC-FAC kidnapped two Inwangsa SDN-timber company employees, killing one and releasing the other after receiving a $400,000 ransom. FLEC-FLAC kidnapped eleven people in April 1998, nine Angolans and two Portuguese, released for a $500,000 ransom.”

--Alex Vines, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process*. Human Rights Watch Report 1999. pp. 39–40

“On January 9, UNITA began a 55-day long battle over Huambo, the War of the Cities. Hundreds of thousands fled and 10,000 were killed before UNITA gained control on March 7. The government engaged in an ethnic cleansing of Bakongo, and, to a lesser extent Ovimbundu, in multiple cities, most notably Luanda, on January 22 in the Bloody Friday massacre. UNITA and government representatives met five days later in Ethiopia, but negotiations failed to restore the peace. The United Nations Security Council sanctioned UNITA through Resolution 864 on September 15, 1993, prohibiting the sale of weapons or fuel to UNITA. Perhaps the clearest shift in U.S. foreign policy emerged when President Clinton issued Executive Order 12865 on September 23, labeling UNITA a "continuing threat to the foreign policy objectives of the U.S.". By August 1993, UNITA had gained control over 70% of Angola.”

--Leon Kukkuk, *Letters to Gabriella: Angola’s Last War for Peace, What the UN Did and* *Why*, Sarasota, FL: FLF Press, 2005, p. 462.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Kidnapping and ransoming continued throughout 1993 and 1994, and there is no evidence that hostages were released.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Throughout the 1990s, Cabindan rebels kidnapped and ransomed off foreign oil workers to in turn finance further attacks against the national government…FLEC militants stopped buses, forcing Chevron Oil workers out, and setting fire to the buses on March 27 and April 23, 1992. A large-scale battle took place between FLEC and police in Malongo on May 14 in which 25 mortar rounds accidentally hit a nearby Chevron compound. The government, fearing the loss of their prime source of revenue, began to negotiate with representatives from Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda-Renewal (FLEC-R), Armed Forces of Cabinda (FLEC-FAC), and the Democratic Front of Cabinda (FDC) in 1995…Patronage and bribery failed to assuage the anger of FLEC-R and FLEC-FAC and negotiations ended. In February 1997, FLEC-FAC kidnapped two Inwangsa SDN-timber company employees, killing one and releasing the other after receiving a $400,000 ransom. FLEC-FLAC kidnapped eleven people in April 1998, nine Angolans and two Portuguese, released for a $500,000 ransom.”

--Alex Vines, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process*. Human Rights Watch Report 1999. pp. 39–40

“A full-scale civil war resumed between the MPLA government and UNITA in January 1993. The Angolan government deployed 15,000 troops in Cabinda. FLEC (now FLEC-FAC - Armed Forces of Cabinda) controlled the rural interior and escalated its activities. Angolan government troops occupied Cabinda town until 1996.”

--“In-Depth: Cabinda,” Detailing the Evolution of a Conflict, *IRIN,* 1999. Sourced from Institute for Security Studies (ISS) - South Africa, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Centre for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland, USA.

“In 1996 Cabindan independence fighters said they were holding three mine workers kidnapped in Cabinda. The government and the FLEC-FAC sign an agreement outlining a cease-fire. Namibia played a facilitating role in the peace process. But the agreement failed as ongoing clashes between the Angolan Defence Force (FAA) and Cabindan separatists resulted in a toll of 29 deaths.”

--“In-Depth: Cabinda,” Detailing the Evolution of a Conflict, *IRIN,* 1999. Sourced from Institute for Security Studies (ISS) - South Africa, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Centre for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland, USA.

“In August 1994 -UNITA accused the Luanda government of carrying out a "scorched earth" policy in Cabinda. UNITA reported that the government killed about 700 villagers in Katabuanga, resulting in the flight of hundreds of other Cabindans to Congo and Zaire.”

--“In-Depth: Cabinda,” Detailing the Evolution of a Conflict, *IRIN,* 1999. Sourced from Institute for Security Studies (ISS) - South Africa, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Centre for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland, USA.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Kidnapping and ransoming continued throughout 1993 and 1994, and there is no evidence that hostages were released.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **811** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **12 March 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **8** |
| **Demand number:** | **811.0811** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Respond positively to a meeting between the Government of Angola and UNITA at the highest possible level with the view to securing the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz"**.**

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA condemned for endangering peace process. The Security Council on 1 June extended until 15 July 1993 the mandate of the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) on a reduced basis and in a manner which would respond to the evolution of the military and political situation. It condemned the National Union for the Total independence of Angola (UNITA) for increasing hostilities and endangering the peace process in the country. In resolution 823 (1993), the Council on 30 April had extended the Mission's existing mandate until 31 May.”

--“UNAVEM II mandate extended; UNITA condemned for endangering peace process.” (UN Angola Verification Mission; National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) (United Nations developments), *UN Chronicle*, September 1, 1993

“During 1993, UNITA laid siege to pockets of government control in the central Angolan towns of Cuito, Menongue, Malanje, and Luena, seeking to divide Angola in two.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“UNITA guerrillas initiated their northward movement immediately after the signing of the Bicesse Peace Accord. The process of demobilizing excess government and UNITA soldiers as part of the peace process provided the ideal pretext inasmuch as both government and rebel troops were expected to assemble with their weapons in various predetermined sites around the country. But UNITA did not send its best soldiers to the demobilisation centres. In fact, after UNITA'S refusal to accept the results of the first multiparty election in October 1992, its guerrillas quickly seized most, if not all, of Angola's richest diamond-producing regions in the northeast.”

--United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“The exploratory talks, held from 25 to 31 October 1993 in Lusaka, resulted in the acceptance by UNITA of the validity of the 1991 Peace Accords and the validity of the results of the legislative and presidential elections of 29 and 30 September 1992. UNITA also agreed to withdraw its troops from the localities occupied since the resumption of the hostilities and to return its troops to United Nations-monitored areas as a transitional measure pending full implementation of the Peace Accords. Following the exploratory talks, the Secretary-General's Special Representative, in consultation with the representatives of the three observer States, set the date and venue for the talks. Accordingly, the Angolan peace talks began at Lusaka on 15 November 1993. By 11 December 1993, agreement was reached on the general and specific principles as well as on the modalities relating to all military issues on the agenda: the re-establishment of the cease-fire; the withdrawal, quartering and demilitarization of all UNITA military forces; the disarming of all civilians; and the completion of the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces. On 14 December 1993, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council in which, in view of the encouraging results achieved at Lusaka under United Nations auspices, he recommended the further postponement of action to impose additional measures against UNITA. He also recommended that the mandate of UNAVEM II be extended for three months.”

--REPORT OF UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II, Chief Military Observer: Major-General Chris Abutu Garuba (Nigeria), 1994.

“The Abidjan meeting began as scheduled, under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, and lasted six weeks. Regrettably, while very nearly reaching success, it ended, on 21 May 1993, without full agreement on the text of what became known as the Protocol of Abidjan. In his 25 May 1993 report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General described the breakdown of the Abidjan talks as "a major and tragic setback to the peace process". Having stated that it would be unthinkable for the United Nations to abandon Angola at this critical juncture, he recommended a further interim extension of UNAVEM II, on a reduced basis, and in a manner which would respond to the evolution of the military and political situation. Such a mission would provide good offices and mediation, with the goal of restoring a cease-fire and reinstating the peace process along the lines of the Peace Accords. At the same time, the Secretary-General stressed that with the humanitarian situation deteriorating daily, it would also be important during this interim period to devote increasing resources to coordination of humanitarian relief activities throughout Angola. To this end, a United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit, headed by a senior official with extensive operational experience, was set up in Luanda in late April 1993, under the overall authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.”

--REPORT OF UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II, Chief Military Observer: Major-General Chris Abutu Garuba (Nigeria), 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA demonstrated any willingness to meet in 1993. It would take until the 1994 talks in Lusaka to bring the two parties together.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In March 1993, UNITA regrouped and launched a new offensive on the cities. Government forces controlled the Atlantic coast cities of Luanda, Lobito and Benguela, and the southern port of Namibe. The provincial capitals of N'dalatando, Malanje, Saurimo, Luena, Cuito and Lubango were laid siege by UNITA. Savimbi's forces were able to control large areas of southern Angola, but of more importance, UNITA used its supply lines through Zaire to take control of the northern cities of M'banza Congo, Uige and Caxito, bringing UNITA within striking distance of Luanda.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 255.

UNITA guerrillas initiated their northward movement immediately after the signing of the Bicesse Peace Accord. The process of demobilizing excess government and UNITA soldiers as part of the peace process provided the ideal pretext inasmuch as both government and rebel troops were expected to assemble with their weapons in various

predetermined sites around the country. But UNITA did not send its best soldiers to the demobilisation centres. In fact, after UNITA'S refusal to accept the results of the first multiparty election in October 1992, its guerrillas quickly seized most, if not all, of Angola's richest diamond-producing regions in the northeast.

--United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“Following the 11 December 1993 agreement on the military issues, the discussions moved to the political issues, including the questions of the police and national reconciliation. By 31 January 1994, after protracted negotiations, the parties reached an agreement on the general and specific principles and on the modalities relating to the police. On 17 February 1994, following several rounds of proximity talks, an agreement was also reached on a document containing a revised text of the general principles concerning the question of national reconciliation. The Lusaka peace talks then focused on efforts to find ways to bridge the gap between the positions of the parties on the specific principles relating to the question of national reconciliation, which included the allocation of high-level government posts to UNITA. It was expected that once agreement was reached on that issue, the remaining items on the agenda would be discussed. Those included the future mandate of the United Nations and the role of the observer States, the conclusion of the electoral process and the re-establishment of a national administration throughout the country. However, this proved to be difficult to resolve quickly.”

--REPORT OF UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II, Chief Military Observer: Major-General Chris Abutu Garuba (Nigeria), 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In the medium-term, UNITA and the government of Angola did meet in Lusaka in 1994, but never in 1993. So compliance was low in 1993, and in the “medium term” of 1994, it was medium. It took many negotiations before a meeting actually took place.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | **Medium depth of demand (2)** | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

A meeting was a threat to the security of each side, if the meeting could have been construed in any way as a capitulation. So the depth of demand is medium.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **811** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **12 March 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **11** |
| **Demand number:** | **811.1111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Abide by applicable rules of int'l humanitarian law**.**

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Throughout 1993 the Government of the Republic of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)… Human rights in Angola deteriorated in 1993 in the face of

heightened civil war brutalities and the absence of government and UNITA actions to curb egregious violations of humanitarian law…In 1993 the Government mandated the transfer of the judicial process and prison system portfolios from the Interior Ministry to the Justice Ministry, but the law was not scheduled to be implemented until 1994. During 1993 the Interior Ministry systematically, arbitrarily, and secretly detained individuals for all categories of crime, without trial, for indeterminate periods of time. Detainees had no rights. Persons detained in the Laboratorio were held incommunicado…UNITA forces continued to attack and capture municipalities throughout the country in 1993, destroying infrastructure, including dams, bridges, electrical pylons, orphanages, schools, hospitals, and medical facilities. In January the oil town of Soyo changed hands several times but ultimately fell under UNITA's control. In March UNITA, after 55 days of siege, expelled government forces from Huambo, Angola's second largest city. The death toll in this battle was estimated at 15,000, mostly civilians. Government forces were able to retake much of Benguela, Huila, and Bengo Provinces in August. There were credible allegations that both the Government and UNITA engaged in indiscriminate killing of civilians and summary executions of prisoners of war. Both sides impeded provision of emergency relief supplies and assistance by the ICRC, nongovernmental voluntary organizations, and United Nations agencies. In UNITA-held Huambo, CARE International officials, visiting in June, described looting of supplies and confiscation of equipment by UNITA officials. In March UNITA sacked an orphanage outside Luanda. In August UNITA attacked a World Food Program convoy. As many as 30,000 people died during UNITA's siege of the city of Cuito, including 30 to 40 children each day who died of malnutrition. UNITA allowed only Portuguese and other foreigners to leave Cuito in September, and continued to prevent local residents from fleeing.”

--US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1993,* Washington DC: State Department Publication 1994.

“In August 1993, the bombing of Huambo as part of a major government offensive against UNITA destroyed the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) headquarters in the city. In August, a WFP convoy of seventy-five trucks transporting relief aid to some 145,000 war-affected people in Caimbambo and Cubal was attacked by unidentified gunmen who destroyed one truck and damaged two more. Four members of the convoy were killed.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1994- Angola.*

“in 1993-4, Unita rebels in Angola purchased weapons, including land-mines, on the open market and in contravention of United Nations sanctions.”

--“Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa,” *International Development Research Center,* 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Neither UNITA nor the government of Angola respected humanitarian efforts, abided by the laws of humanitarian concern, or respected the safety and security of foreign nationals or everyday civilians.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Throughout 1993 the Government of the Republic of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)… Human rights in Angola deteriorated in 1993 in the face of

heightened civil war brutalities and the absence of government and UNITA actions to curb egregious violations of humanitarian law…In 1993 the Government mandated the transfer of the judicial process and prison system portfolios from the Interior Ministry to the Justice Ministry, but the law was not scheduled to be implemented until 1994. During 1993 the Interior Ministry systematically, arbitrarily, and secretly detained individuals for all categories of crime, without trial, for indeterminate periods of time. Detainees had no rights. Persons detained in the Laboratorio were held incommunicado…UNITA forces continued to attack and capture municipalities throughout the country in 1993, destroying infrastructure, including dams, bridges, electrical pylons, orphanages, schools, hospitals, and medical facilities. In January the oil town of Soyo changed hands several times but ultimately fell under UNITA's control. In March UNITA, after 55 days of siege, expelled government forces from Huambo, Angola's second largest city. The death toll in this battle was estimated at 15,000, mostly civilians. Government forces were able to retake much of Benguela, Huila, and Bengo Provinces in August. There were credible allegations that both the Government and UNITA engaged in indiscriminate killing of civilians and summary executions of prisoners of war. Both sides impeded provision of emergency relief supplies and assistance by the ICRC, nongovernmental voluntary organizations, and United Nations agencies. In UNITA-held Huambo, CARE International officials, visiting in June, described looting of supplies and confiscation of equipment by UNITA officials. In March UNITA sacked an orphanage outside Luanda. In August UNITA attacked a World Food Program convoy. As many as 30,000 people died during UNITA's siege of the city of Cuito, including 30 to 40 children each day who died of malnutrition. UNITA allowed only Portuguese and other foreigners to leave Cuito in September, and continued to prevent local residents from fleeing.”

--US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1993,* Washington DC: State Department Publication 1994.

“In 1994 and 1995…According to Human Rights Watch, human rights violations by both the Angolan government and UNITA were a major factor in undermining the Lusaka Peace Process…”

--Simon Chesterman, *Civilians in War*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.

“In August 1993, the bombing of Huambo as part of a major government offensive against UNITA destroyed the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) headquarters in the city. In August, a WFP convoy of seventy-five trucks transporting relief aid to some 145,000 war-affected people in Caimbambo and Cubal was attacked by unidentified gunmen who destroyed one truck and damaged two more. Four members of the convoy were killed.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1994- Angola.*

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Neither UNITA nor the government of Angola respected humanitarian efforts, abided by the laws of humanitarian concern, or respected the safety and security of foreign nationals or everyday civilians.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not put either party at risk. It was a simple humanitarian demand.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **823** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **30 April 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **4** |
| **Demand number:** | **823.0411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Attacks against international humanitarian flights operating in Angola must cease and all necessary measure should be taken to ensure the safety of these flights as well as the security of UNAVEM II personnel**.**

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In September 1993, the US, using the president of Sao Tome, Miguel Trovoada, as an intermediary, attempted to reactivate negotiations. On 15 October the WFP was granted permission by UNITA to fly food aid into Cuito. With the international community raged against UNITA, Savimbi was quite prepared to use humanitarian aid as a weapon to achieve international recognition. On 17 October, after only 51 tons of food had been airlifted into the besieged city, UNITA began demanding access to the government-controlled airport to inspect the UN planes to check that military supplies were not being delivered. When access was denied, UNITA halted all flights, trapping three UN officials in Cuito. The impasse was broken only after the head of the UN emergency programme, Manuel Aranda da Silva, flew to Huambo for direct negotiations with Savimbi - indirectly conferring further UN recognition on the rebel leader.”

--*The Guardian*, 13 November 1993

“UNITA's agreement to allow humanitarian aid flights in November 1993 and the reduction in the intensity of the fighting, won UNITA a respite from the imposition of further UN sanctions.”

----Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“In August 1993, the bombing of Huambo as part of a major government offensive against UNITA destroyed the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) headquarters in the city. In August, a WFP convoy of seventy-five trucks transporting relief aid to some 145,000 war-affected people in Caimbambo and Cubal was attacked by unidentified gunmen who destroyed one truck and damaged two more. Four members of the convoy were killed.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1994- Angola.*

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand was resolutely ignored by UNITA, and while government army troops for the most part did not attack UNAVEM flights or personnel outright, they were also powerless to stop rogue soldiers and civilian bandits from endangering the safety of UN personnel.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“International humanitarian agencies and donors, under UN co-ordination with NGOs active on the ground mounted a very successful emergency operation through 1993 and 1994, keeping tens of thousands displaced by war alive in besieged towns throughout the country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“In August 1993, the bombing of Huambo as part of a major government offensive against UNITA destroyed the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) headquarters in the city. In August, a WFP convoy of seventy-five trucks transporting relief aid to some 145,000 war-affected people in Caimbambo and Cubal was attacked by unidentified gunmen who destroyed one truck and damaged two more. Four members of the convoy were killed.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1994- Angola.*

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In the medium-term, this demand was resolutely ignored by UNITA, and while government army troops for the most part did not attack UNAVEM flights or personnel outright, they were also powerless to stop rogue soldiers and civilian bandits from endangering the safety of UN personnel.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **834** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **1 June 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **3** |
| **Demand number:** | **834.0311** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Accept unreservedly the results of the democratic elections of 1992 and abide by the Accords**.**

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“After losing and rejecting the results of the first multiparty national elections of September 1992, UNITA used conventional military tactics to overrun most government positions around the country and seriously threatened the capital city, Luanda. It would take the Angolan government about two years to beat back UNITA's pressure.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“During 1993, UNITA laid siege to pockets of government control in the central Angolan towns of Cuito, Menongue, Malanje, and Luena, seeking to divide Angola in two.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“During 1993…The government forces, for their part, concentrated their offensive on UNITA's headquarters at Huambo.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“When UNITA lost the elections - which were judged free and fair by the United Nations - it resumed fighting. UNITA had not demobilized as required under the Bicesse Accords and apparently sought to win important political concessions from the government.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

UNITA guerrillas initiated their northward movement immediately after the signing of the Bicesse Peace Accord. The process of demobilizing excess government and UNITA soldiers as part of the peace process provided the ideal pretext inasmuch as both government and rebel troops were expected to assemble with their weapons in various

predetermined sites around the country. But UNITA did not send its best soldiers to the demobilisation centres. In fact, after UNITA'S refusal to accept the results of the first multiparty election in October 1992, its guerrillas quickly seized most, if not all, of Angola's richest diamond-producing regions in the northeast.

--United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There was truly no compliance, primarily by UNITA, and subsequently by any party. The 1992 elections dissolved without a true “winner”. The MPLA or the government of Angola “won” the election due to the nature of how the post-election political process dissolved. UNITA refused to comply or participate in politics in a diplomatic fashion and resorted to a state of war. Due to the extremely violent nature of the civil war in Angola preceding the cease-fire and General Peace agreement, it was hard to implement all aspects of the Peace agreement immediately or in the long-term. The cease-fire was violated in the early months of the peace agreement, but these violations soon came under control. Weapons were plentiful throughout the countryside. and communication was spotty between regions, thus news regarding the cease-fire and its violations did not evenly get communicated throughout the country.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Unfortunately, neither peace nor development were secured by the 1992 Elections. Ironically, those elections demonstrated an overwhelming commitment by the Angolan people to the principal of democracy (over 90 per cent of those eligible voted), but one of democracy's principal international proponents, the US Govern-ment, delayed almost six months in recognising the elected government. In the meantime, Angola had descended once more into civil war.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“During 1993, UNITA laid siege to pockets of government control in the central Angolan towns of Cuito, Menongue, Malanje, and Luena, seeking to divide Angola in two.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“During 1993…The government forces, for their part, concentrated their offensive on UNITA's headquarters at Huambo.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“During 1993, UNITA laid siege to pockets of government control in the central Angolan towns of Cuito, Menongue, Malanje, and Luena, seeking to divide Angola in two.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“In March 1993, UNITA regrouped and launched a new offensive on the cities. Government forces controlled the Atlantic coast cities of Luanda, Lobito and Benguela, and the southern port of Namibe. The provincial capitals of N'dalatando, Malanje, Saurimo, Luena, Cuito and Lubango were laid siege by UNITA. Savimbi's forces were able to control large areas of southern Angola, but of more importance, UNITA used its supply lines through Zaire to take control of the northern cities of M'banza Congo, Uige and Caxito, bringing UNITA within striking distance of Luanda.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 255.

“In May 1993 the government forces launched a counter offensive, targeted on Huambo, but also on the UNITA-controlled diamond fields in the north-east of the country.”

--SouthScan Report 1994, Vol. 4

“Progress was made when, on 10 December 1993, it was announced that agreement had been reached on the demobilisation and confinement of UNITA forces, the handing over of UNITA weapons to the UN, and the integration of UNITA generals into the Angolan Armed Forces. A final settlement was blocked by UNITA's demands for senior positions in the cabinet of a new government of national unity, and autonomy for the central highlands region - concessions that the MPLA was not prepared to make.”

--*Africa Research Bulletin,* 1-31 December 1993

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There was truly no compliance, primarily by UNITA, and subsequently by any party. The 1992 elections dissolved without a true “winner”. The MPLA or the government of Angola “won” the election due to the nature of how the post-election political process dissolved. UNITA refused to comply or participate in politics in a diplomatic fashion and resorted to a state of war. Due to the extremely violent nature of the civil war in Angola preceding the cease-fire and General Peace agreement, it was hard to implement all aspects of the Peace agreement immediately or in the long-term. The cease-fire was violated in the early months of the peace agreement, but these violations soon came under control. Weapons were plentiful throughout the countryside. and communication was spotty between regions, thus news regarding the cease-fire and its violations did not evenly get communicated throughout the country.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because an acceptance of the election results would have meant the end of the other political party. There were no provisions for power-sharing, and neither party was in a mood to be charitable or equitable after the long civil war. A loss in the election, in the “winner take all” mentality of either party, meant the end of political participation for one side.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **834** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **1 June 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **4** |
| **Demand number:** | **834.0411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Immediately cease actions and armed attacks**.**

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“During 1993, UNITA laid siege to pockets of government control in the central Angolan towns of Cuito, Menongue, Malanje, and Luena, seeking to divide Angola in two.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“During 1993…The government forces, for their part, concentrated their offensive on UNITA's headquarters at Huambo.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

UNITA guerrillas initiated their northward movement immediately after the signing of the Bicesse Peace Accord. The process of demobilizing excess government and UNITA soldiers as part of the peace process provided the ideal pretext inasmuch as both government and rebel troops were expected to assemble with their weapons in various

predetermined sites around the country. But UNITA did not send its best soldiers to the demobilisation centres. In fact, after UNITA'S refusal to accept the results of the first multiparty election in October 1992, its guerrillas quickly seized most, if not all, of Angola's richest diamond-producing regions in the northeast.

--United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Military confrontations increased between UNITA and the government of Angola throughout the duration of 1993, and escalated in 1994, until the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, which dissolved in 1997-1998 and the country resumed a violent level of civil war until 2002 with the death of Jonas Savimbi. UNITA and the government of Angola resisted calls to stop violent confrontations in the rural zones and in cities throughout Angola, as each party sought to control territory, resources, and personnel. Any cease-fire or temporary cessation of military activity would have meant a loss of resources, as neither side was aimed toward a compromise. Both UNITA and the government of Angola sought the annihilation of the other.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“After the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, there were numerous violations of the cease-fire arrangement by both UNITA and the Angolan government security forces, such as small-scale attacks, ambushes, and looting. These violations began to increase in 1997.”

--Simon Chesterman, *Civilians in War*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.

“During 1993, UNITA laid siege to pockets of government control in the central Angolan towns of Cuito, Menongue, Malanje, and Luena, seeking to divide Angola in two.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“During 1993…The government forces, for their part, concentrated their offensive on UNITA's headquarters at Huambo.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“In March 1993, UNITA regrouped and launched a new offensive on the cities. Government forces controlled the Atlantic coast cities of Luanda, Lobito and Benguela, and the southern port of Namibe. The provincial capitals of N'dalatando, Malanje, Saurimo, Luena, Cuito and Lubango were laid siege by UNITA. Savimbi's forces were able to control large areas of southern Angola, but of more importance, UNITA used its supply lines through Zaire to take control of the northern cities of M'banza Congo, Uige and Caxito, bringing UNITA within striking distance of Luanda.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 255.

“In May 1993 the government forces launched a counter offensive, targeted on Huambo, but also on the UNITA-controlled diamond fields in the north-east of the country.”

--SouthScan Report 1994, Vol. 4

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Military confrontations increased between UNITA and the government of Angola throughout the duration of 1993, and escalated in 1994, until the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, which dissolved in 1997-1998 and the country resumed a violent level of civil war until 2002 with the death of Jonas Savimbi. UNITA and the government of Angola resisted calls to stop violent confrontations in the rural zones and in cities throughout Angola, as each party sought to control territory, resources, and personnel. Any cease-fire or temporary cessation of military activity would have meant a loss of resources, as neither side was aimed toward a compromise. Both UNITA and the government of Angola sought the annihilation of the other.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat to the existence of both UNITA and the Government of Angola if either had stopped attacks or ceased to address the attacks of the opposing side.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **834** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **1 June 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **7** |
| **Demand number:** | **834.0711** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Reinitiate as soon as possible the interrupted peace talks with a view to a cease-fire and full implementation of the Accords.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“When UNITA refused to re-open negotiations, limited UN sanctions were imposed on 26 September 1993. These sanctions were relatively ineffective, largely due to their limited scope and to continued support for UNITA entering Angola through Zaire. UNITA's control of the diamond mines allowed Savimbi to purchase arms and other supplies and ferry them into Angola."

--Victoria Brittain, *New Statesman and Society*, 4 March 1994

“After the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, there were numerous violations of the cease-fire arrangement by both UNITA and the Angolan government security forces, such as small-scale attacks, ambushes, and looting. These violations began to increase in 1997.”

--Simon Chesterman, *Civilians in War*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Peace talks were never re-initiated in 1993, and Military confrontations increased between UNITA and the government of Angola throughout the duration of 1993, and escalated in 1994, until the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, which dissolved in 1997-1998 and the country resumed a violent level of civil war until 2002 with the death of Jonas Savimbi. UNITA and the government of Angola resisted calls to stop violent confrontations in the rural zones and in cities throughout Angola, as each party sought to control territory, resources, and personnel. Any cease-fire or temporary cessation of military activity would have meant a loss of resources, as neither side was aimed toward a compromise. Both UNITA and the government of Angola sought the annihilation of the other.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Most observers agree that UNITA could have been vanquished as a fighting force in late 1994 or early 1995 had the war continued. However, western diplomats, led by the US, pressurised the govern-ment of President Dos Santos to declare a ceasefire in terms of the Lusaka Protocol, signed in November 1994. Their rationale was that Savimbi would be more likely to agree and then comply if he retained some military, credibility and dignity. The US has consistently supported and promoted Savimbi, despite irrefutable evidence of his bad faith and the most horrendous atrocities committed against the civilian population by his forces.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

UNITA guerrillas initiated their northward movement immediately after the signing of the Bicesse Peace Accord. The process of demobilizing excess government and UNITA soldiers as part of the peace process provided the ideal pretext inasmuch as both government and rebel troops were expected to assemble with their weapons in various

predetermined sites around the country. But UNITA did not send its best soldiers to the demobilisation centres. In fact, after UNITA'S refusal to accept the results of the first multiparty election in October 1992, its guerrillas quickly seized most, if not all, of Angola's richest diamond-producing regions in the northeast.

--United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“After the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, there were numerous violations of the cease-fire arrangement by both UNITA and the Angolan government security forces, such as small-scale attacks, ambushes, and looting. These violations began to increase in 1997.”

--Simon Chesterman, *Civilians in War*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Peace talks were never re-initiated in 1993, and Military confrontations increased between UNITA and the government of Angola throughout the duration of 1993, and escalated in 1994, until the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, which dissolved in 1997-1998 and the country resumed a violent level of civil war until 2002 with the death of Jonas Savimbi. UNITA and the government of Angola resisted calls to stop violent confrontations in the rural zones and in cities throughout Angola, as each party sought to control territory, resources, and personnel. Any cease-fire or temporary cessation of military activity would have meant a loss of resources, as neither side was aimed toward a compromise. Both UNITA and the government of Angola sought the annihilation of the other.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat to the existence of both UNITA and the Government of Angola if either had stopped attacks or ceased to address the attacks of the opposing side.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **834** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **1 June 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **11** |
| **Demand number:** | **834.1111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate fully w/the SG's efforts to strengthen humanitarian activities.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In September 1993, the US, using the president of Sao Tome, Miguel Trovoada, as an intermediary, attempted to reactivate negotiations. On 15 October the WFP was granted permission by UNITA to fly food aid into Cuito. With the international community raged against UNITA, Savimbi was quite prepared to use humanitarian aid as a weapon to achieve international recognition. On 17 October, after only 51 tons of food had been airlifted into the besieged city, UNITA began demanding access to the government-controlled airport to inspect the UN planes to check that military supplies were not being delivered. When access was denied, UNITA halted all flights, trapping three UN officials in Cuito. The impasse was broken only after the head of the UN emergency programme, Manuel Aranda da Silva, flew to Huambo for direct negotiations with Savimbi - indirectly conferring further UN recognition on the rebel leader.”

--*The Guardian*, 13 November 1993

“UNITA's agreement to allow humanitarian aid flights in November 1993 and the reduction in the intensity of the fighting, won UNITA a respite from the imposition of further UN sanctions.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“In August 1993, the bombing of Huambo as part of a major government offensive against UNITA destroyed the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) headquarters in the city. In August, a WFP convoy of seventy-five trucks transporting relief aid to some 145,000 war-affected people in Caimbambo and Cubal was attacked by unidentified gunmen who destroyed one truck and damaged two more. Four members of the convoy were killed.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1994- Angola.*

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There was truly no compliance, primarily by UNITA, and subsequently by any party. Each side continued to take hostages, burn and attack villages, lay landmines, recruit civilians, attack humanitarian convoys, and continue to take territory by force.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Since UNITA's unilateral cease-fire in September 1993 there were improvements in conditions with humanitarian aid saving hundreds of thousands of Angolans from starvation. However, without a permanent and UN-verified cease-fire, the relative peace and the humanitarian relief remained at risk. This was demonstrated in February 1994, when UNITA bombarded Cuito, killing around 400 people. The shelling of Cuito prevented aid from entering the city, provoked the Angolan government to retaliate by halting all aid flights to UNITA controlled areas, and threatened the Lusaka peace talks.”

--*The Guardian*, 12 February 1994

“In August 1993, the bombing of Huambo as part of a major government offensive against UNITA destroyed the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) headquarters in the city. In August, a WFP convoy of seventy-five trucks transporting relief aid to some 145,000 war-affected people in Caimbambo and Cubal was attacked by unidentified gunmen who destroyed one truck and damaged two more. Four members of the convoy were killed.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1994- Angola.*

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Throughout 1993 and 1994 there was truly no compliance, primarily by UNITA, and subsequently by any party. Each side continued to take hostages, burn and attack villages, lay landmines, recruit civilians, attack humanitarian convoys, and continue to take territory by force.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **834** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **1 June 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **13** |
| **Demand number:** | **834.1311** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Strictly abide by the applicable rules of humanitarian law.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“When UNITA refused to re-open negotiations, limited UN sanctions were imposed on 26 September 1993. These sanctions were relatively ineffective, largely due to their limited scope and to continued support for UNITA entering Angola through Zaire. UNITA's control of the diamond mines allowed Savimbi to purchase arms and other supplies and ferry them into Angola."

--Victoria Brittain, *New Statesman and Society*, 4 March 1994

“In September 1993, the US, using the president of Sao Tome, Miguel Trovoada, as an intermediary, attempted to reactivate negotiations. On 15 October the WFP was granted permission by UNITA to fly food aid into Cuito. With the international community raged against UNITA, Savimbi was quite prepared to use humanitarian aid as a weapon to achieve international recognition. On 17 October, after only 51 tons of food had been airlifted into the besieged city, UNITA began demanding access to the government-controlled airport to inspect the UN planes to check that military supplies were not being delivered. When access was denied, UNITA halted all flights, trapping three UN officials in Cuito. The impasse was broken only after the head of the UN emergency programme, Manuel Aranda da Silva, flew to Huambo for direct negotiations with Savimbi - indirectly conferring further UN recognition on the rebel leader.”

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--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“Throughout 1993 the Government of the Republic of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)… Human rights in Angola deteriorated in 1993 in the face of

heightened civil war brutalities and the absence of government and UNITA actions to curb egregious violations of humanitarian law…In 1993 the Government mandated the transfer of the judicial process and prison system portfolios from the Interior Ministry to the Justice Ministry, but the law was not scheduled to be implemented until 1994. During 1993 the Interior Ministry systematically, arbitrarily, and secretly detained individuals for all categories of crime, without trial, for indeterminate periods of time. Detainees had no rights. Persons detained in the Laboratorio were held incommunicado…UNITA forces continued to attack and capture municipalities throughout the country in 1993, destroying infrastructure, including dams, bridges, electrical pylons, orphanages, schools, hospitals, and medical facilities. In January the oil town of Soyo changed hands several times but ultimately fell under UNITA's control. In March UNITA, after 55 days of siege, expelled government forces from Huambo, Angola's second largest city. The death toll in this battle was estimated at 15,000, mostly civilians. Government forces were able to retake much of Benguela, Huila, and Bengo Provinces in August. There were credible allegations that both the Government and UNITA engaged in indiscriminate killing of civilians and summary executions of prisoners of war. Both sides impeded provision of emergency relief supplies and assistance by the ICRC, nongovernmental voluntary organizations, and United Nations agencies. In UNITA-held Huambo, CARE International officials, visiting in June, described looting of supplies and confiscation of equipment by UNITA officials. In March UNITA sacked an orphanage outside Luanda. In August UNITA attacked a World Food Program convoy. As many as 30,000 people died during UNITA's siege of the city of Cuito, including 30 to 40 children each day who died of malnutrition. UNITA allowed only Portuguese and other foreigners to leave Cuito in September, and continued to prevent local residents from fleeing.”

----US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1993,* Washington DC: State Department Publication 1994.

“In August 1993, the bombing of Huambo as part of a major government offensive against UNITA destroyed the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) headquarters in the city. In August, a WFP convoy of seventy-five trucks transporting relief aid to some 145,000 war-affected people in Caimbambo and Cubal was attacked by unidentified gunmen who destroyed one truck and damaged two more. Four members of the convoy were killed.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1994- Angola.*

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Throughout 1993 and 1994 there was truly no compliance, primarily by UNITA, and subsequently by any party. Each side continued to take hostages, burn and attack villages, lay landmines, recruit civilians, attack humanitarian convoys, and continue to take territory by force.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Since UNITA's unilateral cease-fire in September 1993 there were improvements in conditions with humanitarian aid saving hundreds of thousands of Angolans from starvation. However, without a permanent and UN-verified cease-fire, the relative peace and the humanitarian relief remained at risk. This was demonstrated in February 1994, when UNITA bombarded Cuito, killing around 400 people. The shelling of Cuito prevented aid from entering the city, provoked the Angolan government to retaliate by halting all aid flights to UNITA controlled areas, and threatened the Lusaka peace talks.”

--*The Guardian*, 12 February 1994

“Throughout 1993 the Government of the Republic of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)… Human rights in Angola deteriorated in 1993 in the face of

heightened civil war brutalities and the absence of government and UNITA actions to curb egregious violations of humanitarian law…In 1993 the Government mandated the transfer of the judicial process and prison system portfolios from the Interior Ministry to the Justice Ministry, but the law was not scheduled to be implemented until 1994. During 1993 the Interior Ministry systematically, arbitrarily, and secretly detained individuals for all categories of crime, without trial, for indeterminate periods of time. Detainees had no rights. Persons detained in the Laboratorio were held incommunicado…UNITA forces continued to attack and capture municipalities throughout the country in 1993, destroying infrastructure, including dams, bridges, electrical pylons, orphanages, schools, hospitals, and medical facilities. In January the oil town of Soyo changed hands several times but ultimately fell under UNITA's control. In March UNITA, after 55 days of siege, expelled government forces from Huambo, Angola's second largest city. The death toll in this battle was estimated at 15,000, mostly civilians. Government forces were able to retake much of Benguela, Huila, and Bengo Provinces in August. There were credible allegations that both the Government and UNITA engaged in indiscriminate killing of civilians and summary executions of prisoners of war. Both sides impeded provision of emergency relief supplies and assistance by the ICRC, nongovernmental voluntary organizations, and United Nations agencies. In UNITA-held Huambo, CARE International officials, visiting in June, described looting of supplies and confiscation of equipment by UNITA officials. In March UNITA sacked an orphanage outside Luanda. In August UNITA attacked a World Food Program convoy. As many as 30,000 people died during UNITA's siege of the city of Cuito, including 30 to 40 children each day who died of malnutrition. UNITA allowed only Portuguese and other foreigners to leave Cuito in September, and continued to prevent local residents from fleeing.”

--US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1993,* Washington DC: State Department Publication 1994.

“International humanitarian agencies and donors, under UN co-ordination with NGOs active on the ground mounted a very successful emergency operation through 1993 and 1994, keeping tens of thousands displaced by war alive in besieged towns throughout the country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Throughout 1993 and 1994 there was truly no compliance, primarily by UNITA, and subsequently by any party. Each side continued to take hostages, burn and attack villages, lay landmines, recruit civilians, attack humanitarian convoys, and continue to take territory by force.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **834** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **1 June 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **14** |
| **Demand number:** | **834.1411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Take all necessary measures to ensure the safety and security of the personnel involved in humanitarian relief operations.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In September 1993, the US, using the president of Sao Tome, Miguel Trovoada, as an intermediary, attempted to reactivate negotiations. On 15 October the WFP was granted permission by UNITA to fly food aid into Cuito. With the international community raged against UNITA, Savimbi was quite prepared to use humanitarian aid as a weapon to achieve international recognition. On 17 October, after only 51 tons of food had been airlifted into the besieged city, UNITA began demanding access to the government-controlled airport to inspect the UN planes to check that military supplies were not being delivered. When access was denied, UNITA halted all flights, trapping three UN officials in Cuito. The impasse was broken only after the head of the UN emergency programme, Manuel Aranda da Silva, flew to Huambo for direct negotiations with Savimbi - indirectly conferring further UN recognition on the rebel leader.”

--*The Guardian*, 13 November 1993

“UNITA's agreement to allow humanitarian aid flights in November 1993 and the reduction in the intensity of the fighting, won UNITA a respite from the imposition of further UN sanctions.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“In August 1993, the bombing of Huambo as part of a major government offensive against UNITA destroyed the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) headquarters in the city. In August, a WFP convoy of seventy-five trucks transporting relief aid to some 145,000 war-affected people in Caimbambo and Cubal was attacked by unidentified gunmen who destroyed one truck and damaged two more. Four members of the convoy were killed.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1994- Angola.*

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While UNITA never adhered to this demand, the government of Angola similarly did not take steps to ensure even government-controlled territories were free of dangerous landmines, arbitrary checkpoints, armed bandits, and desperate civilians. Outside of Luanda, the Angolan rural zones were profoundly unsafe for humanitarian personnel.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Since UNITA's unilateral cease-fire in September 1993 there were improvements in conditions with humanitarian aid saving hundreds of thousands of Angolans from starvation. However, without a permanent and UN-verified cease-fire, the relative peace and the humanitarian relief remained at risk. This was demonstrated in February 1994, when UNITA bombarded Cuito, killing around 400 people. The shelling of Cuito prevented aid from entering the city, provoked the Angolan government to retaliate by halting all aid flights to UNITA controlled areas, and threatened the Lusaka peace talks.”

--*The Guardian*, 12 February 1994

“International humanitarian agencies and donors, under UN co-ordination with NGOs active on the ground mounted a very successful emergency operation through 1993 and 1994, keeping tens of thousands displaced by war alive in besieged towns throughout the country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While UNITA never adhered to this demand, the government of Angola similarly did not take steps to ensure even government-controlled territories were free of dangerous landmines, arbitrary checkpoints, armed bandits, and desperate civilians. Outside of Luanda, the Angolan rural zones were profoundly unsafe for humanitarian personnel.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | **Medium depth of demand (2)** | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Ensuring a secure level of transport and movement for humanitarian workers would have been an enormous effort, and would have necessitated a level of organization, complex communication, and orchestrated attention that was not feasible at this time. While this demand only presented some risks to its adherents, and was not a huge risk, it was still an enormous demand, that if complied with—could have put larger operations at risk which could have threatened the compliers.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **851** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 July 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **4** |
| **Demand number:** | **851.0411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Accept unreservedly the results of the democratic elections of 1992 and abide by the Accords.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“When UNITA refused to re-open negotiations, limited UN sanctions were imposed on 26 September 1993. These sanctions were relatively ineffective, largely due to their limited scope and to continued support for UNITA entering Angola through Zaire. UNITA's control of the diamond mines allowed Savimbi to purchase arms and other supplies and ferry them into Angola."

--Victoria Brittain, *New Statesman and Society*, 4 March 1994

“During 1993, UNITA laid siege to pockets of government control in the central Angolan towns of Cuito, Menongue, Malanje, and Luena, seeking to divide Angola in two.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

UNITA guerrillas initiated their northward movement immediately after the signing of the Bicesse Peace Accord. The process of demobilizing excess government and UNITA soldiers as part of the peace process provided the ideal pretext inasmuch as both government and rebel troops were expected to assemble with their weapons in various predetermined sites around the country. But UNITA did not send its best soldiers to the demobilisation centres. In fact, after UNITA'S refusal to accept the results of the first multiparty election in October 1992, its guerrillas quickly seized most, if not all, of Angola's richest diamond-producing regions in the northeast.

--United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There was truly no compliance, primarily by UNITA, and subsequently by any party. The 1992 elections dissolved without a true “winner”. The MPLA or the government of Angola “won” the election due to the nature of how the post-election political process dissolved. UNITA refused to comply or participate in politics in a diplomatic fashion and resorted to a state of war.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“During 1993, UNITA laid siege to pockets of government control in the central Angolan towns of Cuito, Menongue, Malanje, and Luena, seeking to divide Angola in two.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“When UNITA lost the elections - which were judged free and fair by the United Nations - it resumed fighting. UNITA had not demobilized as required under the Bicesse Accords and apparently sought to win important political concessions from the government.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“Unfortunately, neither peace nor development were secured by the 1992 Elections. Ironically, those elections demonstrated an overwhelming commitment by the Angolan people to the principal of democracy (over 90 per cent of those eligible voted), but one of democracy's principal international proponents, the US Govern-ment, delayed almost six months in recognising the elected government. In the meantime, Angola had descended once more into civil war.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

UNITA guerrillas initiated their northward movement immediately after the signing of the Bicesse Peace Accord. The process of demobilizing excess government and UNITA soldiers as part of the peace process provided the ideal pretext inasmuch as both government and rebel troops were expected to assemble with their weapons in various

predetermined sites around the country. But UNITA did not send its best soldiers to the demobilisation centres. In fact, after UNITA'S refusal to accept the results of the first multiparty election in October 1992, its guerrillas quickly seized most, if not all, of Angola's richest diamond-producing regions in the northeast.

--United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“UNITA procurement from 1996: the role of Togo. UNITA initiated efforts to try to secure Togo as a possible future base for UNITA. In 1993 Savimbi despatched Col. Alcides Lucas Kangunga…to Lomé to approach President Eyadema on the matter…He was also to claim that many weapons suppliers were already reluctant to ship to Zaire, and that UNITA needed to prepare itself militarily. Kallias was to emphasize to Eyadema that UNITA needed weapons, and that it needed credible end-user certificates - something that Togo could provide. Kallias was to say that UNITA was looking to Togo for support, and that Togo could provide a safe place to locate UNITA equipment…Savimbi's proposal that Togo play a more active role in support of UNITA (a proposal that also included Togo hosting some of Savimbi's children) was accepted by President Eyadema in late 1993. As a token of appreciation, Kallias gave to Eyadema a "passport sized" packet of diamonds on Savimbi's behalf. Kallias became UNITA's representative in Togo, and served there from 1993-1995. According to Kallias, the working arrangement between Togo and UNITA provided for Togo to keep a share of the arms and military equipment that was imported for UNITA, normally 20%...The Togo connection took on particular importance for UNITA in January 1997 when Savimbi reportedly became convinced that "the United States had decided to get rid of Mobutu". Soon afterwards, UNITA began a concerted effort to transfer to Angola the equipment that had been stored in Zaire. Savimbi also made an effort to try to purchase as much new equipment as possible from Eastern Europe before Zaire was closed to UNITA. By May 1997, all of UNITA's equipment in Kinshasa had been shipped out to Angola, with the exception of some SAM6 anti-aircraft missiles that were sent to Togo in an effort to avoid detection by UNAVEM. The equipment in Gbadolite was also pulled out, with much of it going to Togo.”

--The Fowler Report, Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA,S/2000/203, 10 March 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In the medium-term. there was truly no compliance, primarily by UNITA, and subsequently by any party. The 1992 elections dissolved without a true “winner”. The MPLA or the government of Angola “won” the election due to the nature of how the post-election political process dissolved. UNITA refused to comply or participate in politics in a diplomatic fashion and resorted to a state of war

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat to the existence of both UNITA and the Government of Angola if either had stopped attacks or ceased to address the attacks of the opposing side.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **851** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 July 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **5** |
| **Demand number:** | **851.0511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Immediately cease military actions.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“When UNITA refused to re-open negotiations, limited UN sanctions were imposed on 26 September 1993. These sanctions were relatively ineffective, largely due to their limited scope and to continued support for UNITA entering Angola through Zaire. UNITA's control of the diamond mines allowed Savimbi to purchase arms and other supplies and ferry them into Angola."

--Victoria Brittain, *New Statesman and Society*, 4 March 1994

“During 1993, UNITA laid siege to pockets of government control in the central Angolan towns of Cuito, Menongue, Malanje, and Luena, seeking to divide Angola in two.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“During exploratory peace talks in October 1993 UNITA reaffirmed its acceptance of the Bicesse Accords and agreed to abide by the results of the 1992 elections. Angolan peace talks in Lusaka then commenced in November 1993. By mid-December sufficient progress had been recorded for the Secretary-General to recommend the postponement of additional measures against UNITA. However progress stalled in early 1994 and by June, military offensives had escalated again. Just one month prior to the scheduled signing of the Lusaka Protocol, heavy fighting occurred throughout Angola.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There was truly no compliance by UNITA to cease military hostilities. At almost every step of the way through 1993 and 1994, UNITA refused to cease hostilities against innocent civilians, attacked humanitarian convoys, and refused dialogue with the government.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“During 1993, UNITA laid siege to pockets of government control in the central Angolan towns of Cuito, Menongue, Malanje, and Luena, seeking to divide Angola in two.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“UNITA procurement from 1996: the role of Togo. UNITA initiated efforts to try to secure Togo as a possible future base for UNITA. In 1993 Savimbi despatched Col. Alcides Lucas Kangunga…to Lomé to approach President Eyadema on the matter…He was also to claim that many weapons suppliers were already reluctant to ship to Zaire, and that UNITA needed to prepare itself militarily. Kallias was to emphasize to Eyadema that UNITA needed weapons, and that it needed credible end-user certificates - something that Togo could provide. Kallias was to say that UNITA was looking to Togo for support, and that Togo could provide a safe place to locate UNITA equipment…Savimbi's proposal that Togo play a more active role in support of UNITA (a proposal that also included Togo hosting some of Savimbi's children) was accepted by President Eyadema in late 1993. As a token of appreciation, Kallias gave to Eyadema a "passport sized" packet of diamonds on Savimbi's behalf. Kallias became UNITA's representative in Togo, and served there from 1993-1995. According to Kallias, the working arrangement between Togo and UNITA provided for Togo to keep a share of the arms and military equipment that was imported for UNITA, normally 20%...The Togo connection took on particular importance for UNITA in January 1997 when Savimbi reportedly became convinced that "the United States had decided to get rid of Mobutu". Soon afterwards, UNITA began a concerted effort to transfer to Angola the equipment that had been stored in Zaire. Savimbi also made an effort to try to purchase as much new equipment as possible from Eastern Europe before Zaire was closed to UNITA. By May 1997, all of UNITA's equipment in Kinshasa had been shipped out to Angola, with the exception of some SAM6 anti-aircraft missiles that were sent to Togo in an effort to avoid detection by UNAVEM. The equipment in Gbadolite was also pulled out, with much of it going to Togo.”

--The Fowler Report, Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA,S/2000/203, 10 March 2000.

During exploratory peace talks in October 1993 UNITA reaffirmed its acceptance of the Bicesse Accords and agreed to abide by the results of the 1992 elections. Angolan peace talks in Lusaka then commenced in November 1993. By mid-December sufficient progress had been recorded for the Secretary-General to recommend the postponement of additional measures against UNITA. However progress stalled in early 1994 and by June, military offensives had escalated again. Just one month prior to the scheduled signing of the Lusaka Protocol, heavy fighting occurred throughout Angola.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In the medium-term, was truly no compliance by UNITA to cease military hostilities. At almost every step of the way through 1993 and 1994, UNITA refused to cease hostilities against innocent civilians, attacked humanitarian convoys, and refused dialogue with the government.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat to the existence of both UNITA and the Government of Angola if either had stopped attacks or ceased to address the attacks of the opposing side.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **851** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 July 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **6** |
| **Demand number:** | **851.0611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Immediately withdraw troops from locations occupied since the resumption of hostilities, and agree to return troops to UN-monitored areas.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

.

“During 1993, UNITA laid siege to pockets of government control in the central Angolan towns of Cuito, Menongue, Malanje, and Luena, seeking to divide Angola in two.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

UNITA guerrillas initiated their northward movement immediately after the signing of the Bicesse Peace Accord. The process of demobilizing excess government and UNITA soldiers as part of the peace process provided the ideal pretext inasmuch as both government and rebel troops were expected to assemble with their weapons in various

predetermined sites around the country. But UNITA did not send its best soldiers to the demobilisation centres. In fact, after UNITA'S refusal to accept the results of the first multiparty election in October 1992, its guerrillas quickly seized most, if not all, of Angola's richest diamond-producing regions in the northeast.

--United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

During exploratory peace talks in October 1993 UNITA reaffirmed its acceptance of the Bicesse Accords and agreed to abide by the results of the 1992 elections. Angolan peace talks in Lusaka then commenced in November 1993. By mid-December sufficient progress had been recorded for the Secretary-General to recommend the postponement of additional measures against UNITA. However progress stalled in early 1994 and by June, military offensives had escalated again. Just one month prior to the scheduled signing of the Lusaka Protocol, heavy fighting occurred throughout Angola.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA never retreated its troops from the territories it controlled in 1993. In 1993 it never disarmed to came to a conclusion of hostilities.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“During 1993, UNITA laid siege to pockets of government control in the central Angolan towns of Cuito, Menongue, Malanje, and Luena, seeking to divide Angola in two.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“When UNITA refused to re-open negotiations, limited UN sanctions were imposed on 26 September 1993. These sanctions were relatively ineffective, largely due to their limited scope and to continued support for UNITA entering Angola through Zaire. UNITA's control of the diamond mines allowed Savimbi to purchase arms and other supplies and ferry them into Angola."

--Victoria Brittain, *New Statesman and Society*, 4 March 1994

During exploratory peace talks in October 1993 UNITA reaffirmed its acceptance of the Bicesse Accords and agreed to abide by the results of the 1992 elections. Angolan peace talks in Lusaka then commenced in November 1993. By mid-December sufficient progress had been recorded for the Secretary-General to recommend the postponement of additional measures against UNITA. However progress stalled in early 1994 and by June, military offensives had escalated again. Just one month prior to the scheduled signing of the Lusaka Protocol, heavy fighting occurred throughout Angola.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

“UNITA used its substantial diamond revenues to undertake a fundamental military reorganization… between 1993 and 1999…it moved away from its traditional posture as a guerrilla army into a more conventional disposition in preparation for delivering a final victorious blow against government forces and seizing state power. To this end, the rebels engaged in a major military procurement programme. UNITA has activities in acquiring arms and military equipment.”

--The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA never retreated its troops from the territories it controlled in 1993 or 1994. In 1993 it never disarmed to came to a conclusion of hostilities. Even during the 1994-1995 peace process, UNITA never truly engaged its troops in an effective disarmament or a retreat.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat to the existence of both UNITA if it had removed its troops from territory acquired in hostilities. UNITA troops feared execution, arrest, or worse at the hands of government troops if they were to retreat or enter UN areas.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **851** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 July 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **8** |
| **Demand number:** | **851.0811** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Re-initiate without delay the peace talks with a view to the immediate establishment of a cease fire and full implementation of the Accords and resolutions of the UNSC.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“During 1993, UNITA laid siege to pockets of government control in the central Angolan towns of Cuito, Menongue, Malanje, and Luena, seeking to divide Angola in two.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“During 1993…The government forces, for their part, concentrated their offensive on UNITA's headquarters at Huambo.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

During exploratory peace talks in October 1993 UNITA reaffirmed its acceptance of the Bicesse Accords and agreed to abide by the results of the 1992 elections. Angolan peace talks in Lusaka then commenced in November 1993. By mid-December sufficient progress had been recorded for the Secretary-General to recommend the postponement of additional measures against UNITA. However progress stalled in early 1994 and by June, military offensives had escalated again. Just one month prior to the scheduled signing of the Lusaka Protocol, heavy fighting occurred throughout Angola.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Peace talks were never re-initiated between the government of Angola and UNITA, nor was there a cease-fire in 1993. The peace accords were never implemented that year.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“During 1993, UNITA laid siege to pockets of government control in the central Angolan towns of Cuito, Menongue, Malanje, and Luena, seeking to divide Angola in two.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“During 1993…The government forces, for their part, concentrated their offensive on UNITA's headquarters at Huambo.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“UNITA used its substantial diamond revenues to undertake a fundamental military reorganization…between 1993 and 1999…it moved away from its traditional posture as a guerrilla army into a more conventional disposition in preparation for delivering a final victorious blow against government forces and seizing state power. To this end, the rebels engaged in a major military procurement programme. UNITA has activities in acquiring arms and military equipment.”

The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“UNITA procurement from 1996: the role of Togo. UNITA initiated efforts to try to secure Togo as a possible future base for UNITA. In 1993 Savimbi despatched Col. Alcides Lucas Kangunga…to Lomé to approach President Eyadema on the matter…He was also to claim that many weapons suppliers were already reluctant to ship to Zaire, and that UNITA needed to prepare itself militarily. Kallias was to emphasize to Eyadema that UNITA needed weapons, and that it needed credible end-user certificates - something that Togo could provide. Kallias was to say that UNITA was looking to Togo for support, and that Togo could provide a safe place to locate UNITA equipment…Savimbi's proposal that Togo play a more active role in support of UNITA (a proposal that also included Togo hosting some of Savimbi's children) was accepted by President Eyadema in late 1993. As a token of appreciation, Kallias gave to Eyadema a "passport sized" packet of diamonds on Savimbi's behalf. Kallias became UNITA's representative in Togo, and served there from 1993-1995. According to Kallias, the working arrangement between Togo and UNITA provided for Togo to keep a share of the arms and military equipment that was imported for UNITA, normally 20%...The Togo connection took on particular importance for UNITA in January 1997 when Savimbi reportedly became convinced that "the United States had decided to get rid of Mobutu". Soon afterwards, UNITA began a concerted effort to transfer to Angola the equipment that had been stored in Zaire. Savimbi also made an effort to try to purchase as much new equipment as possible from Eastern Europe before Zaire was closed to UNITA. By May 1997, all of UNITA's equipment in Kinshasa had been shipped out to Angola, with the exception of some SAM6 anti-aircraft missiles that were sent to Togo in an effort to avoid detection by UNAVEM. The equipment in Gbadolite was also pulled out, with much of it going to Togo.”

--The Fowler Report, Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA,S/2000/203, 10 March 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In the medium-term, Peace talks were not re-initiated between the government of Angola and UNITA until Lusaka in 1994. There was never a true cease-fire however, even during those peace talks. The peace accords were never implemented.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat to the existence of both UNITA and the Government of Angola if either had stopped attacks or ceased to address the attacks of the opposing side.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **851** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 July 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **9** |
| **Demand number:** | **851.0911** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Act according with statement that it is prepared to resume peace negotiations.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA used its substantial diamond revenues to undertake a fundamental military reorganization…between 1993 and 1999…it moved away from its traditional posture as a guerrilla army into a more conventional disposition in preparation for delivering a final victorious blow against government forces and seizing state power. To this end, the rebels engaged in a major military procurement programme. UNITA has activities in acquiring arms and military equipment.”

The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

During exploratory peace talks in October 1993 UNITA reaffirmed its acceptance of the Bicesse Accords and agreed to abide by the results of the 1992 elections. Angolan peace talks in Lusaka then commenced in November 1993. By mid-December sufficient progress had been recorded for the Secretary-General to recommend the postponement of additional measures against UNITA. However progress stalled in early 1994 and by June, military offensives had escalated again. Just one month prior to the scheduled signing of the Lusaka Protocol, heavy fighting occurred throughout Angola.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA often used rhetoric in order to buy itself time to regroup, amass more weapons, and stall meaningful dialogue between itself and the government of Angola.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA used its substantial diamond revenues to undertake a fundamental military reorganization…between 1993 and 1999…it moved away from its traditional posture as a guerrilla army into a more conventional disposition in preparation for delivering a final victorious blow against government forces and seizing state power. To this end, the rebels engaged in a major military procurement programme. UNITA has activities in acquiring arms and military equipment.”

The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | *Medium high compliance (3)* | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Throughout 1993-2002, UNITA often used rhetoric in order to buy itself time to regroup, amass more weapons, and stall meaningful dialogue between itself and the government of Angola.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | **Medium depth of demand (2)** | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as medium, because it only posed a moderate threat to UNITA and its leadership if peace talks and negotiations were to take place.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **851** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 July 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **15** |
| **Demand number:** | **851.1511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate in ensuring the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all Angolans.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In September 1993, the US, using the president of Sao Tome, Miguel Trovoada, as an intermediary, attempted to reactivate negotiations. On 15 October the WFP was granted permission by UNITA to fly food aid into Cuito. With the international community raged against UNITA, Savimbi was quite prepared to use humanitarian aid as a weapon to achieve international recognition. On 17 October, after only 51 tons of food had been airlifted into the besieged city, UNITA began demanding access to the government-controlled airport to inspect the UN planes to check that military supplies were not being delivered. When access was denied, UNITA halted all flights, trapping three UN officials in Cuito. The impasse was broken only after the head of the UN emergency programme, Manuel Aranda da Silva, flew to Huambo for direct negotiations with Savimbi - indirectly conferring further UN recognition on the rebel leader.”

--*The Guardian*, 13 November 1993

The military situation in Angola remained volatile. Fighting in many provinces of the country continued and intermittently intensified; several major cities remained under siege by one or the other side resulting in increased hardship for the civilian population and aggravating the already disastrous humanitarian situation.

“In the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 10 February 1994, the Council deplored the great loss of life and destruction of property caused by the outbreak of fighting at several locations throughout Angola and stressed that the only way to achieve an effective, verifiable and sustainable cease- fire was for the Government and UNITA to conclude and sign a comprehensive peace agreement. It called upon the parties to honour their commitments, to exercise maximum restraint, to put an immediate halt to all offensive military actions and to commit themselves to the urgent conclusion of the Lusaka talks.”

--REPORT OF UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II, Chief Military Observer: Major-General Chris Abutu Garuba (Nigeria), 1994.

“UNITA's agreement to allow humanitarian aid flights in November 1993 and the reduction in the intensity of the fighting, won UNITA a respite from the imposition of further UN sanctions.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“In August 1993, the bombing of Huambo as part of a major government offensive against UNITA destroyed the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) headquarters in the city. In August, a WFP convoy of seventy-five trucks transporting relief aid to some 145,000 war-affected people in Caimbambo and Cubal was attacked by unidentified gunmen who destroyed one truck and damaged two more. Four members of the convoy were killed.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1994- Angola.*

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA never adhered to this demand and did not take steps to ensure territories were controlled, that UNITA guerillas did not attack convoys, it did not free roads of dangerous landmines, UNITA soldiers often established arbitrary checkpoints where money and resources were demanded in exchange for safe passage, and UNITA never assisted in the delivery of humanitarian aid.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Since UNITA's unilateral cease-fire in September 1993 there were improvements in conditions with humanitarian aid saving hundreds of thousands of Angolans from starvation. However, without a permanent and UN-verified cease-fire, the relative peace and the humanitarian relief remained at risk. This was demonstrated in February 1994, when UNITA bombarded Cuito, killing around 400 people. The shelling of Cuito prevented aid from entering the city, provoked the Angolan government to retaliate by halting all aid flights to UNITA controlled areas, and threatened the Lusaka peace talks.”

--*The Guardian*, 12 February 1994

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA never adhered to this demand and did not take steps to ensure territories were controlled, that UNITA guerillas did not attack convoys, it did not free roads of dangerous landmines, UNITA soldiers often established arbitrary checkpoints where money and resources were demanded in exchange for safe passage, and UNITA never assisted in the delivery of humanitarian aid.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **851** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 July 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **17** |
| **Demand number:** | **851.1711** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Continue to extend its cooperation in ensuring the evacuation of foreign nationals in locations occupied by UNITA.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 10 February 1994, the Council deplored the great loss of life and destruction of property caused by the outbreak of fighting at several locations throughout Angola and stressed that the only way to achieve an effective, verifiable and sustainable cease- fire was for the Government and UNITA to conclude and sign a comprehensive peace agreement. It called upon the parties to honour their commitments, to exercise maximum restraint, to put an immediate halt to all offensive military actions and to commit themselves to the urgent conclusion of the Lusaka talks.”

--REPORT OF UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II, Chief Military Observer: Major-General Chris Abutu Garuba (Nigeria), 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA never adhered to this demand and did not take steps to ensure foreign nationals were evacuated.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 10 February 1994, the Council deplored the great loss of life and destruction of property caused by the outbreak of fighting at several locations throughout Angola and stressed that the only way to achieve an effective, verifiable and sustainable cease- fire was for the Government and UNITA to conclude and sign a comprehensive peace agreement. It called upon the parties to honour their commitments, to exercise maximum restraint, to put an immediate halt to all offensive military actions and to commit themselves to the urgent conclusion of the Lusaka talks.”

--REPORT OF UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II, Chief Military Observer: Major-General Chris Abutu Garuba (Nigeria), 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA never adhered to this demand and did not take steps to ensure foreign nationals were evacuated.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **851** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 July 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **19** |
| **Demand number:** | **851.1911** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Abide by the applicable rules of international humanitarian law.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In September 1993, the US, using the president of Sao Tome, Miguel Trovoada, as an intermediary, attempted to reactivate negotiations. On 15 October the WFP was granted permission by UNITA to fly food aid into Cuito. With the international community raged against UNITA, Savimbi was quite prepared to use humanitarian aid as a weapon to achieve international recognition. On 17 October, after only 51 tons of food had been airlifted into the besieged city, UNITA began demanding access to the government-controlled airport to inspect the UN planes to check that military supplies were not being delivered. When access was denied, UNITA halted all flights, trapping three UN officials in Cuito. The impasse was broken only after the head of the UN emergency programme, Manuel Aranda da Silva, flew to Huambo for direct negotiations with Savimbi - indirectly conferring further UN recognition on the rebel leader.”

--*The Guardian*, 13 November 1993

“UNITA's agreement to allow humanitarian aid flights in November 1993 and the reduction in the intensity of the fighting, won UNITA a respite from the imposition of further UN sanctions.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“In 1993, 1994, and 1995, UNITA did not allow international organizations access to most of the territory under its control. Among the few exceptions were Lutheran World Federation activities in Cazombo (Moxico province) and the Lundas; UNHCR activities in Uige; and Medecins Sans Frontieres in Uige and Huambo. UNITA cooperated with the ICRC regarding visitation of prisoners and hostages in Huambo and in the evacuation of 415 foreigners from UNITA-held territory. However, UNITA's confrontational relationship with international organizations was further tarnished by shooting incidents at M'Banza Congo, Uige, and Luena, when UNITA fired on clearly marked, unarmed humanitarian assistance aircraft. The incident in Luena resulted in one death.”

----US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1996,* Washington DC: State Department Publication 1996.

“In August 1993, the bombing of Huambo as part of a major government offensive against UNITA destroyed the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) headquarters in the city. In August, a WFP convoy of seventy-five trucks transporting relief aid to some 145,000 war-affected people in Caimbambo and Cubal was attacked by unidentified gunmen who destroyed one truck and damaged two more. Four members of the convoy were killed.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1994- Angola.*

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Humanitarian law was obviously not a concern for members of UNITA or its leadership, nor for those within the government of Angola or its military. Both sides occupied territory without cause, caused damage to civilian resources, layed mines, destroyed cities and villages, took hostages, tortured prisoners, and purposefully ruined landscapes in order to lower the morale of the enemy. Humanitarian law continued to be flagrantly ignored by both UNITA and the government of Angola through 2001 and the end of the conflict.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Since UNITA's unilateral cease-fire in September 1993 there were improvements in conditions with humanitarian aid saving hundreds of thousands of Angolans from starvation. However, without a permanent and UN-verified cease-fire, the relative peace and the humanitarian relief remained at risk. This was demonstrated in February 1994, when UNITA bombarded Cuito, killing around 400 people. The shelling of Cuito prevented aid from entering the city, provoked the Angolan government to retaliate by halting all aid flights to UNITA controlled areas, and threatened the Lusaka peace talks.”

--*The Guardian*, 12 February 1994

“In 1993, 1994, and 1995, UNITA did not allow international organizations access to most of the territory under its control. Among the few exceptions were Lutheran World Federation activities in Cazombo (Moxico province) and the Lundas; UNHCR activities in Uige; and Medecins Sans Frontieres in Uige and Huambo. UNITA cooperated with the ICRC regarding visitation of prisoners and hostages in Huambo and in the evacuation of 415 foreigners from UNITA-held territory. However, UNITA's confrontational relationship with international organizations was further tarnished by shooting incidents at M'Banza Congo, Uige, and Luena, when UNITA fired on clearly marked, unarmed humanitarian assistance aircraft. The incident in Luena resulted in one death.”

--US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1996,* Washington DC: State Department Publication 1996.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Humanitarian law was obviously not a concern for members of UNITA or its leadership, nor for those within the government of Angola or its military. Both sides occupied territory without cause, caused damage to civilian resources, layed mines, destroyed cities and villages, took hostages, tortured prisoners, and purposefully ruined landscapes in order to lower the morale of the enemy. Humanitarian law continued to be flagrantly ignored by both UNITA and the government of Angola through 2001 and the end of the conflict.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **851** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 July 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **20** |
| **Demand number:** | **851.2011** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Take all necessary measures to ensure the security and safety of UNAVEM II personnel as well as personnel involved in humanitarian relief.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In September 1993, the US, using the president of Sao Tome, Miguel Trovoada, as an intermediary, attempted to reactivate negotiations. On 15 October the WFP was granted permission by UNITA to fly food aid into Cuito. With the international community raged against UNITA, Savimbi was quite prepared to use humanitarian aid as a weapon to achieve international recognition. On 17 October, after only 51 tons of food had been airlifted into the besieged city, UNITA began demanding access to the government-controlled airport to inspect the UN planes to check that military supplies were not being delivered. When access was denied, UNITA halted all flights, trapping three UN officials in Cuito. The impasse was broken only after the head of the UN emergency programme, Manuel Aranda da Silva, flew to Huambo for direct negotiations with Savimbi - indirectly conferring further UN recognition on the rebel leader.”

--*The Guardian*, 13 November 1993

“UNITA's agreement to allow humanitarian aid flights in November 1993 and the reduction in the intensity of the fighting, won UNITA a respite from the imposition of further UN sanctions.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“In 1993, 1994, and 1995, UNITA did not allow international organizations access to most of the territory under its control. Among the few exceptions were Lutheran World Federation activities in Cazombo (Moxico province) and the Lundas; UNHCR activities in Uige; and Medecins Sans Frontieres in Uige and Huambo. UNITA cooperated with the ICRC regarding visitation of prisoners and hostages in Huambo and in the evacuation of 415 foreigners from UNITA-held territory. However, UNITA's confrontational relationship with international organizations was further tarnished by shooting incidents at M'Banza Congo, Uige, and Luena, when UNITA fired on clearly marked, unarmed humanitarian assistance aircraft. The incident in Luena resulted in one death.”

----US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1996,* Washington DC: State Department Publication 1996.

“In August 1993, the bombing of Huambo as part of a major government offensive against UNITA destroyed the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) headquarters in the city. In August, a WFP convoy of seventy-five trucks transporting relief aid to some 145,000 war-affected people in Caimbambo and Cubal was attacked by unidentified gunmen who destroyed one truck and damaged two more. Four members of the convoy were killed.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1994- Angola.*

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While UNITA never adhered to this demand, the government of Angola similarly did not take steps to ensure even government-controlled territories were free of dangerous landmines, arbitrary checkpoints, armed bandits, and desperate civilians. Outside of Luanda, the Angolan rural zones were profoundly unsafe for UNAVEM personnel.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Since UNITA's unilateral cease-fire in September 1993 there were improvements in conditions with humanitarian aid saving hundreds of thousands of Angolans from starvation. However, without a permanent and UN-verified cease-fire, the relative peace and the humanitarian relief remained at risk. This was demonstrated in February 1994, when UNITA bombarded Cuito, killing around 400 people. The shelling of Cuito prevented aid from entering the city, provoked the Angolan government to retaliate by halting all aid flights to UNITA controlled areas, and threatened the Lusaka peace talks.”

--*The Guardian*, 12 February 1994

“International humanitarian agencies and donors, under UN co-ordination with NGOs active on the ground mounted a very successful emergency operation through 1993 and 1994, keeping tens of thousands displaced by war alive in besieged towns throughout the country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“In 1993, 1994, and 1995, UNITA did not allow international organizations access to most of the territory under its control. Among the few exceptions were Lutheran World Federation activities in Cazombo (Moxico province) and the Lundas; UNHCR activities in Uige; and Medecins Sans Frontieres in Uige and Huambo. UNITA cooperated with the ICRC regarding visitation of prisoners and hostages in Huambo and in the evacuation of 415 foreigners from UNITA-held territory. However, UNITA's confrontational relationship with international organizations was further tarnished by shooting incidents at M'Banza Congo, Uige, and Luena, when UNITA fired on clearly marked, unarmed humanitarian assistance aircraft. The incident in Luena resulted in one death.”

----US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1996,* Washington DC: State Department Publication 1996.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While UNITA never adhered to this demand, the government of Angola similarly did not take steps to ensure even government-controlled territories were free of dangerous landmines, arbitrary checkpoints, armed bandits, and desperate civilians. Outside of Luanda, the Angolan rural zones were profoundly unsafe for UNAVEM personnel.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **864** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 July 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **6** |
| **Demand number:** | **864.0611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Accept unreservedly the results of the democratic elections and abide by the Accords.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“When UNITA lost the elections - which were judged free and fair by the United Nations - it resumed fighting. UNITA had not demobilized as required under the Bicesse Accords and apparently sought to win important political concessions from the government.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

In fact, after UNITA'S refusal to accept the results of the first multiparty election in October 1992, its guerrillas quickly seized most, if not all, of Angola's richest diamond-producing regions in the northeast.

--United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“UNITA used its substantial diamond revenues to undertake a fundamental military reorganization…between 1993 and 1999…it moved away from its traditional posture as a guerrilla army into a more conventional disposition in preparation for delivering a final victorious blow against government forces and seizing state power. To this end, the rebels engaged in a major military procurement programme. UNITA has activities in acquiring arms and military equipment.”

The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There was truly no compliance, primarily by UNITA, and subsequently by any party. The 1992 elections dissolved without a true “winner”. The MPLA or the government of Angola “won” the election due to the nature of how the post-election political process dissolved. UNITA refused to comply or participate in politics in a diplomatic fashion and resorted to a state of war. The Accords were never abided by.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA used its substantial diamond revenues to undertake a fundamental military reorganization… between 1993 and 1999…it moved away from its traditional posture as a guerrilla army into a more conventional disposition in preparation for delivering a final victorious blow against government forces and seizing state power. To this end, the rebels engaged in a major military procurement programme. UNITA has activities in acquiring arms and military equipment.”

--The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“Throughout 1993…fighting intensified throughout the Angolan national territory between the Angolan Government and UNITA forces, particularly in the central provincial capital of Huambo…and in Mulenje province and Cabinda region.”

--Progress Report of the Secretary-General, submitted to the Security Council, 4 December 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There was truly no compliance, primarily by UNITA, and subsequently by any party. The 1992 elections dissolved without a true “winner”. The MPLA or the government of Angola “won” the election due to the nature of how the post-election political process dissolved. UNITA refused to comply or participate in politics in a diplomatic fashion and resorted to a state of war. The Accords were never abided by.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **864** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 July 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **7** |
| **Demand number:** | **864.0711** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Immediately cease military actions.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA used its substantial diamond revenues to undertake a fundamental military reorganization…between 1993 and 1999…it moved away from its traditional posture as a guerrilla army into a more conventional disposition in preparation for delivering a final victorious blow against government forces and seizing state power. To this end, the rebels engaged in a major military procurement programme. UNITA has activities in acquiring arms and military equipment.”

The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“Throughout 1993…fighting intensified throughout the Angolan national territory between the Angolan Government and UNITA forces, particularly in the central provincial capital of Huambo…and in Mulenje province and Cabinda region.”

--Progress Report of the Secretary-General, submitted to the Security Council, 4 December 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There was truly no compliance by UNITA to cease military hostilities. At almost every step of the way through 1993 and 1994, UNITA refused to cease hostilities against innocent civilians, attacked humanitarian convoys, and refused dialogue with the government.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA used its substantial diamond revenues to undertake a fundamental military reorganization… between 1993 and 1999…it moved away from its traditional posture as a guerrilla army into a more conventional disposition in preparation for delivering a final victorious blow against government forces and seizing state power. To this end, the rebels engaged in a major military procurement programme. UNITA has activities in acquiring arms and military equipment.”

--The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“Throughout 1993…fighting intensified throughout the Angolan national territory between the Angolan Government and UNITA forces, particularly in the central provincial capital of Huambo…and in Mulenje province and Cabinda region.”

--Progress Report of the Secretary-General, submitted to the Security Council, 4 December 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There was truly no compliance by UNITA to cease military hostilities. At almost every step of the way through 1993 and 1994, UNITA refused to cease hostilities against innocent civilians, attacked humanitarian convoys, and refused dialogue with the government.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat to the existence of both UNITA and the Government of Angola if either had stopped attacks or ceased to address the attacks of the opposing side.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **864** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 July 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **8** |
| **Demand number:** | **864.0811** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Immediately withdraw its troops from locations it has occupied since resumption of hostilities, and return to UN-monitored areas.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA used its substantial diamond revenues to undertake a fundamental military reorganization…between 1993 and 1999…it moved away from its traditional posture as a guerrilla army into a more conventional disposition in preparation for delivering a final victorious blow against government forces and seizing state power. To this end, the rebels engaged in a major military procurement programme. UNITA has activities in acquiring arms and military equipment.”

The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

--“Throughout 1993…fighting intensified throughout the Angolan national territory between the Angolan Government and UNITA forces, particularly in the central provincial capital of Huambo…and in Mulenje province and Cabinda region.”

--Progress Report of the Secretary-General, submitted to the Security Council, 4 December 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA never retreated its troops from the territories it controlled in 1993. In 1993 it never disarmed to came to a conclusion of hostilities.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Throughout 1993…fighting intensified throughout the Angolan national territory between the Angolan Government and UNITA forces, particularly in the central provincial capital of Huambo…and in Mulenje province and Cabinda region.”

--Progress Report of the Secretary-General, submitted to the Security Council, 4 December 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA never retreated its troops from the territories it controlled in 1993. In 1993 it never disarmed to came to a conclusion of hostilities.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat to the existence of both UNITA if it had removed its troops from territory acquired in hostilities. UNITA troops feared execution, arrest, or worse at the hands of government troops if they were to retreat or enter UN areas.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **864** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 July 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **10** |
| **Demand number:** | **864.1011** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Reinitiate without delay the peace talks with a view to a cease-fire and full implementation of the Accords.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“By late 1993 UNITA had gained control over 70% of Angola, but the government's military successes in 1994 forced UNITA to sue for peace. By November 1994 the government had taken control of 60% of the country. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi called the situation UNITA's "deepest crisis" since its creation. Savimbi, unwilling to personally sign the accord, had former UNITA Secretary General Eugenio Manuvakola sign in his place and President José Eduardo dos Santos responded by having Angolan Foreign Minister Venancio de Moura represent the MPLA. According to Manuvakola, Savimbi wanted him to act as a scapegoat.”

--Rothchild, Donald S. *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation*, 1997. Pages 137-138

“Despite a partially effective unilateral UNITA cease-fire, announced in September 1993, which enabled humanitarian aid agencies to bring relief to some of the 3 million people who were faced with imminent starvation, the situation in Angola remained critical.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241-242.

“UNITA used its substantial diamond revenues to undertake a fundamental military reorganization…between 1993 and 1999…it moved away from its traditional posture as a guerrilla army into a more conventional disposition in preparation for delivering a final victorious blow against government forces and seizing state power. To this end, the rebels engaged in a major military procurement programme. UNITA has activities in acquiring arms and military equipment.”

--The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“Savimbi resumed his guerrilla war against the Angolan government in October of 1992. UNITA controlled more than half of Angola's national territory by 1993.”

--“Angola Diamond Mining and War,” *Trade and Environment Database,* Case number 32, 14 June 1997.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Peace talks were never re-initiated in 1993, and Military confrontations increased between UNITA and the government of Angola throughout the duration of 1993, and escalated in 1994, until the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, which dissolved in 1997-1998 and the country resumed a violent level of civil war until 2002 with the death of Jonas Savimbi. UNITA and the government of Angola resisted calls to stop violent confrontations in the rural zones and in cities throughout Angola, as each party sought to control territory, resources, and personnel. Any cease-fire or temporary cessation of military activity would have meant a loss of resources, as neither side was aimed toward a compromise. Both UNITA and the government of Angola sought the annihilation of the other.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“By late 1993 UNITA had gained control over 70% of Angola, but the government's military successes in 1994 forced UNITA to sue for peace. By November 1994 the government had taken control of 60% of the country. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi called the situation UNITA's "deepest crisis" since its creation. Savimbi, unwilling to personally sign the accord, had former UNITA Secretary General Eugenio Manuvakola sign in his place and President José Eduardo dos Santos responded by having Angolan Foreign Minister Venancio de Moura represent the MPLA. According to Manuvakola, Savimbi wanted him to act as a scapegoat.”

--Rothchild, Donald S. *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation*, 1997. Pages 137-138

“Despite a partially effective unilateral UNITA cease-fire, announced in September 1993, which enabled humanitarian aid agencies to bring relief to some of the 3 million people who were faced with imminent starvation, the situation in Angola remained critical.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241-242.

“Throughout 1993…fighting intensified throughout the Angolan national territory between the Angolan Government and UNITA forces, particularly in the central provincial capital of Huambo…and in Mulenje province and Cabinda region.”

--Progress Report of the Secretary-General, submitted to the Security Council, 4 December 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Peace talks were never re-initiated in 1993, and Military confrontations increased between UNITA and the government of Angola throughout the duration of 1993, and escalated in 1994, until the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, which dissolved in 1997-1998 and the country resumed a violent level of civil war until 2002 with the death of Jonas Savimbi. UNITA and the government of Angola resisted calls to stop violent confrontations in the rural zones and in cities throughout Angola, as each party sought to control territory, resources, and personnel. Any cease-fire or temporary cessation of military activity would have meant a loss of resources, as neither side was aimed toward a compromise. Both UNITA and the government of Angola sought the annihilation of the other.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” as any cease-fire or temporary cessation of military activity would have meant a loss of resources, as neither side was aimed toward a compromise. Both UNITA and the government of Angola sought the annihilation of the other

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **864** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 July 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **11** |
| **Demand number:** | **864.1111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Act according to statement that it is prepared to resume peace.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA used its substantial diamond revenues to undertake a fundamental military reorganization…between 1993 and 1999…it moved away from its traditional posture as a guerrilla army into a more conventional disposition in preparation for delivering a final victorious blow against government forces and seizing state power. To this end, the rebels engaged in a major military procurement programme. UNITA has activities in acquiring arms and military equipment.”

The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“Throughout 1993…fighting intensified throughout the Angolan national territory between the Angolan Government and UNITA forces, particularly in the central provincial capital of Huambo…and in Mulenje province and Cabinda region.”

--Progress Report of the Secretary-General, submitted to the Security Council, 4 December 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Peace was never on the agenda of UNITA in 1993, and Military confrontations increased between UNITA and the government of Angola throughout the duration of 1993, and escalated in 1994, until the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, which dissolved in 1997-1998 and the country resumed a violent level of civil war until 2002 with the death of Jonas Savimbi. UNITA and the government of Angola resisted calls to stop violent confrontations in the rural zones and in cities throughout Angola, as each party sought to control territory, resources, and personnel. Any cease-fire or temporary cessation of military activity would have meant a loss of resources, as neither side was aimed toward a compromise. Both UNITA and the government of Angola sought the annihilation of the other.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In 1994, prior to the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, the Angolan chief of staff, General Joao de Matos, argued that UNITA would make a commitment to a peace accord only if it was at a military disadvantage: “If there is military equilibrium, which is what we have at the moment, there will not be a lasting agreement ... It is necessary to have a military imbalance to reach an agreement,” he claimed. Although the government's aggressive weapons' acquisition and its contract with Executive Outcomes did eventually allow it to bargain from a position of military strength, its inability or unwillingness to prevent UNITA's re-armament and its simultaneous slow erosion of strength meant that its position of superiority was only temporary.”

-- Human Rights Watch, *Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War since the 1992 Elections* (New York: Human Rights Watch 1994), 25-6.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Peace was never on the agenda of UNITA in 1993, and Military confrontations increased between UNITA and the government of Angola throughout the duration of 1993, and escalated in 1994, until the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, which dissolved in 1997-1998 and the country resumed a violent level of civil war until 2002 with the death of Jonas Savimbi. UNITA and the government of Angola resisted calls to stop violent confrontations in the rural zones and in cities throughout Angola, as each party sought to control territory, resources, and personnel. Any cease-fire or temporary cessation of military activity would have meant a loss of resources, as neither side was aimed toward a compromise. Both UNITA and the government of Angola sought the annihilation of the other.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” as any cease-fire or temporary cessation of military activity would have meant a loss of resources, as neither side was aimed toward a compromise. Both UNITA and the government of Angola sought the annihilation of the other

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **864** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 July 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **14** |
| **Demand number:** | **864.1411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Act according to statement that will cooperate in ensuring the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all Angolans.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Throughout 1993 the Government of the Republic of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) remained embroiled in a brutal civil war…Human rights in Angola deteriorated in 1993 in the face of heightened civil war brutalities and the absence of government

and UNITA actions to curb egregious violations of humanitarian law. Media, eyewitness, and international community reports indicated that UNITA forces, government military, and internal

security forces flagrantly disregarded fundamental humanitarian values in their treatment of prisoners of war, their extrajudicial killings of unarmed civilians, including women, children and the elderly, and their impediments to delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians in dire need.The Government detained prisoners accused of political and other crimes for indeterminate periods of time under inhumane conditions and without due process of law, according to a persuasive report published by the Human Rights Subcommittee of the National Assembly. UNITA held foreign hostages in Jamba, Huambo, and other areas under its control. The media published credible allegations of UNITA "ethnic cleansing" in Uige Province bordering Zaire. There were substantiated reports of government reprisals against Zairians resident in Luanda suburbs, as well as "cleansing" during military operations.”

--US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1993,* Washington DC: State Department Publication 1994.

“More than 350 people have died in a battle between Unita rebels and Angolan government forces in the city of Huambo, according to Angolan army reports. The government of the southern African country also said that up to 1,500 people had been injured in the fighting. Diplomats say the battle is "vicious", with neither side taking many prisoners. According to the radio station of Angola's rebel movement Unita, government troops are fleeing from the city and large amounts of arms and ammunition have been seized, including several Russian-built tanks. The government garrison in the city has been cut off for several weeks and is being supplied by occasional air drops. Fighting around Huambo has intensified after Unita brought in troop reinforcements from Bie province, which is around 165km away to the east of the city…Earlier, UN officials admitted defeat in their diplomatic attempts to halt renewed civil war in Angola, calling the outcome a "bitter disappointment". Unita failed to attend UN-sponsored peace talks in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, last week, but proposed fresh talks in Geneva. Local aid agencies have described the health situation in Angola as "dramatic" - with a child dying every two hours in the paediatric hospital in the capital Luanda. Most of the main aid agencies have left the country after Unita launched an abortive coup attempt in Luanda last November.”

--“1993: Angolans Die in Battle for Huambo,” *BBC News,* 6 March 1993.

In July and August 1993, the situation in Angola worsened further despite all efforts by the Secretary-General…According to the Secretary-General's 13 September 1993 report to the Security Council, some 3 million people, particularly the most vulnerable population groups - children, women and the elderly - suffered from the consequences of the conflict. It was estimated that during 1993 more than 1,000 persons died every day from the direct or indirect effects of the war. In the coastal provinces and other areas considered secure, the relief programme initiated by the United Nations, in cooperation with national and international non-governmental organizations, brought food aid and other emergency assistance to large numbers of Angolans displaced by the war or affected by the country-wide economic decline. However, the implementation of relief operations in the interior of the country and in zones of active conflict, where the needs were particularly acute, encountered serious difficulties. It was only in October 1993, following intensive negotiations with the two parties on humanitarian access and a general decrease in the intensity of fighting country-wide, that relief flights were able to reach besieged cities such as Kuito and Huambo, whose populations had been cut off from international assistance for many months. In many of these previously inaccessible communities, people were found to be starving to death, and the malnutrition rates in many cases were higher than 35 per cent. The United Nations started a massive programme of humanitarian assistance with WFP spearheading the effort by providing air transport of relief supplies for other United Nations agencies, such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Donor response to the May 1993 appeal improved considerably, and nearly 50 per cent of the $226 million target was reached by the end of January 1994.”

--REPORT OF UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II, Chief Military Observer: Major-General Chris Abutu Garuba (Nigeria), 1994.

“The…UNITA cease-fire, announced in September 1993…enabled humanitarian aid agencies to bring relief to some of the 3 million people who were faced with imminent starvation…”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241-242.

“In September 1993, the US, using the president of Sao Tome, Miguel Trovoada, as an intermediary, attempted to reactivate negotiations. On 15 October the WFP was granted permission by UNITA to fly food aid into Cuito. With the international community raged against UNITA, Savimbi was quite prepared to use humanitarian aid as a weapon to achieve international recognition. On 17 October, after only 51 tons of food had been airlifted into the besieged city, UNITA began demanding access to the government-controlled airport to inspect the UN planes to check that military supplies were not being delivered. When access was denied, UNITA halted all flights, trapping three UN officials in Cuito. The impasse was broken only after the head of the UN emergency programme, Manuel Aranda da Silva, flew to Huambo for direct negotiations with Savimbi - indirectly conferring further UN recognition on the rebel leader.”

--*The Guardian*, 13 November 1993

“UNITA's agreement to allow humanitarian aid flights in November 1993 and the reduction in the intensity of the fighting, won UNITA a respite from the imposition of further UN sanctions.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

“In August 1993, the bombing of Huambo as part of a major government offensive against UNITA destroyed the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) headquarters in the city. In August, a WFP convoy of seventy-five trucks transporting relief aid to some 145,000 war-affected people in Caimbambo and Cubal was attacked by unidentified gunmen who destroyed one truck and damaged two more. Four members of the convoy were killed.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1994- Angola.*

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA never demonstrated any willingness to assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid, and continued to block the delivery of assistance and foodstuff to certain regions and territories under its control.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Since UNITA's unilateral cease-fire in September 1993 there were improvements in conditions with humanitarian aid saving hundreds of thousands of Angolans from starvation. However, without a permanent and UN-verified cease-fire, the relative peace and the humanitarian relief remained at risk. This was demonstrated in February 1994, when UNITA bombarded Cuito, killing around 400 people. The shelling of Cuito prevented aid from entering the city, provoked the Angolan government to retaliate by halting all aid flights to UNITA controlled areas, and threatened the Lusaka peace talks.”

--*The Guardian*, 12 February 1994

“International humanitarian agencies and donors, under UN co-ordination with NGOs active on the ground mounted a very successful emergency operation through 1993 and 1994, keeping tens of thousands displaced by war alive in besieged towns throughout the country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA never demonstrated any willingness to assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid, and continued to block the delivery of assistance and foodstuff to certain regions and territories under its control.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **864** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 July 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **15** |
| **Demand number:** | **864.1511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Take all necessary measures to ensure the security and safety of UNAVEM II personnel as well as personnel involved in humanitarian relief.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Six months of relative stability and steady progress in relief efforts between November 1993 and April 1994 were followed by intensified conflict and a near standstill in humanitarian assistance to critical areas of the country. United Nations officials negotiated with both sides in the conflict in order to secure access to people in need. But between mid-May and mid-August the delivery of humanitarian relief dropped sharply, due to increased security risks and curtailment or suspension of relief flights. The Secretary-General, in an addendum to his 20 June 1994 report to the Security Council on UNAVEM II, drew attention to the dramatic escalation in the number of serious violations of humanitarian law in Angola, the rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation in places where access was being denied, and threats to the safety of relief workers. In resolution 932 (1994) of 30 June 1994, the Security Council deplored the worsening of the humanitarian situation, urged the parties to grant all necessary security guarantees and to refrain from actions endangering relief personnel or disrupting humanitarian assistance.”

--REPORT OF UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II, Chief Military Observer: Major-General Chris Abutu Garuba (Nigeria), 1994.

“In September 1993, the US, using the president of Sao Tome, Miguel Trovoada, as an intermediary, attempted to reactivate negotiations. On 15 October the WFP was granted permission by UNITA to fly food aid into Cuito. With the international community raged against UNITA, Savimbi was quite prepared to use humanitarian aid as a weapon to achieve international recognition. On 17 October, after only 51 tons of food had been airlifted into the besieged city, UNITA began demanding access to the government-controlled airport to inspect the UN planes to check that military supplies were not being delivered. When access was denied, UNITA halted all flights, trapping three UN officials in Cuito. The impasse was broken only after the head of the UN emergency programme, Manuel Aranda da Silva, flew to Huambo for direct negotiations with Savimbi - indirectly conferring further UN recognition on the rebel leader.”

--*The Guardian*, 13 November 1993

“UNITA's agreement to allow humanitarian aid flights in November 1993 and the reduction in the intensity of the fighting, won UNITA a respite from the imposition of further UN sanctions.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While UNITA never adhered to this demand, the government of Angola similarly did not take steps to ensure even government-controlled territories were free of dangerous landmines, arbitrary checkpoints, armed bandits, and desperate civilians. Outside of Luanda, the Angolan rural zones were profoundly unsafe for UNAVEM personnel.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Since UNITA's unilateral cease-fire in September 1993 there were improvements in conditions with humanitarian aid saving hundreds of thousands of Angolans from starvation. However, without a permanent and UN-verified cease-fire, the relative peace and the humanitarian relief remained at risk. This was demonstrated in February 1994, when UNITA bombarded Cuito, killing around 400 people. The shelling of Cuito prevented aid from entering the city, provoked the Angolan government to retaliate by halting all aid flights to UNITA controlled areas, and threatened the Lusaka peace talks.”

--*The Guardian*, 12 February 1994

“International humanitarian agencies and donors, under UN co-ordination with NGOs active on the ground mounted a very successful emergency operation through 1993 and 1994, keeping tens of thousands displaced by war alive in besieged towns throughout the country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“Six months of relative stability and steady progress in relief efforts between November 1993 and April 1994 were followed by intensified conflict and a near standstill in humanitarian assistance to critical areas of the country. United Nations officials negotiated with both sides in the conflict in order to secure access to people in need. But between mid-May and mid-August the delivery of humanitarian relief dropped sharply, due to increased security risks and curtailment or suspension of relief flights. The Secretary-General, in an addendum to his 20 June 1994 report to the Security Council on UNAVEM II, drew attention to the dramatic escalation in the number of serious violations of humanitarian law in Angola, the rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation in places where access was being denied, and threats to the safety of relief workers. In resolution 932 (1994) of 30 June 1994, the Security Council deplored the worsening of the humanitarian situation, urged the parties to grant all necessary security guarantees and to refrain from actions endangering relief personnel or disrupting humanitarian assistance.”

--REPORT OF UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II, Chief Military Observer: Major-General Chris Abutu Garuba (Nigeria), 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While UNITA never adhered to this demand, the government of Angola similarly did not take steps to ensure even government-controlled territories were free of dangerous landmines, arbitrary checkpoints, armed bandits, and desperate civilians. Outside of Luanda, the Angolan rural zones were profoundly unsafe for UNAVEM personnel.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **864** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 July 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **16** |
| **Demand number:** | **864.1611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Proceed immediately to the release of all foreign citizens held against their will and abstain from any action which might cause damage to foreign property.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA has been involved in numerous human rights abuses, particularly against civilians…UNITA soldiers have been involved in extrajudicial killings of civilians and foreigners…In addition, certain detainees have “disappeared” while in UNITA custody, including foreign workers and aid workers.”

--Simon Chesterman, *Civilians in War*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, p. 34-35.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA continued to demonstrate bad faith throughout 1993-1994 in refusing to adhere to demands even regarding international hostages, and kidnappings.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA has been involved in numerous human rights abuses, particularly against civilians…UNITA soldiers have been involved in extrajudicial killings of civilians and foreigners…In addition, certain detainees have “disappeared” while in UNITA custody, including foreign workers and aid workers.”

--Simon Chesterman, *Civilians in War*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, p. 34-35.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA continued to demonstrate bad faith throughout 1993-1994 in refusing to adhere to demands even regarding international hostages, and kidnappings.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **890** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 December 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **2** |
| **Demand number:** | **890.0211** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Continue to demonstrate flexibility in the negotiations and a commitment to peace.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The period since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol has been termed a time of "no war, no peace" as UNITA continues to control much of Angolan territory, security is tenuous, and freedom of movement remains restricted (though slowly improving). For instance, in December 1995, security for humanitarian activities deteriorated to such a degree in some parts of the country that several NGOs either suspended their activities in UNITA-held areas or refused to expand their work into UNITA areas.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

“At the Lusaka peace talks, the most contentious issue was the question of national reconciliation, which included the allocation of posts at the national, provincial and local levels to the members of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). In May 1994, the Government accepted a set of proposals on this issue put forward by the United Nations and the three observer States to the Angolan peace process, Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America. After lengthy discussions and the intervention of a number of African leaders, including President Nelson Mandela of South Africa, UNITA finally accepted the proposals in September. The way was thus paved for the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in the Zambian capital on 20 November 1994 and for the cease-fire that came into force two days later. President José Eduardo dos Santos and several other Heads of State, foreign ministers and dignitaries attended the ceremony.”

--Angola, Report of the Secretary-General, 1995- <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/SG-Rpt/ch4e-1.htm>

“By late 1993 UNITA had gained control over 70% of Angola, but the government's military successes in 1994 forced UNITA to sue for peace. By November 1994 the government had taken control of 60% of the country. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi called the situation UNITA's "deepest crisis" since its creation. Savimbi, unwilling to personally sign the accord, had former UNITA Secretary General Eugenio Manuvakola sign in his place and President José Eduardo dos Santos responded by having Angolan Foreign Minister Venancio de Moura represent the MPLA. According to Manuvakola, Savimbi wanted him to act as a scapegoat.”

--Rothchild, Donald S. *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation*, 1997. Pages 137-138

“In 1993, Angola was in the eighteenth year of a civil war which pitted the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government against National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgents. (1) During that year, perhaps 1,000 people a day died. (2) But the renewed Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) felt they were on their way to victory. The government had hired extensive outside assistance from security firms such as South Africa's Executive Outcomes. FAA Sukhoi and MiG aircraft, many flown by foreign pilots, strafed the Central Highlands held by UNITA's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FALA). Rather than allowing the war to run its course and fearful that it could continue for years to come, the international community pressed hard for a cease-fire. Talks started in Lusaka, Zambia in December 1993. However, every time it looked like there was progress toward a cease-fire and a peace agreement, the war in Angola would intensify as each side sought an advantage on the ground to gain extra leverage in Lusaka.”

--Dawn M. Hewitt, “Peacekeeping and the Lusaka Protocol,” Melbourne Journal of Politics, Vol. 26, 1999.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

By the end of 1993, UNITA had taken over 70% of the countryside and was in no way prepared to cede any ground to the government of Angola. Peace was not on the horizon.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In 1994, prior to the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, the Angolan chief of staff, General Joao de Matos, argued that UNITA would make a commitment to a peace accord only if it was at a military disadvantage: “If there is military equilibrium, which is what we have at the moment, there will not be a lasting agreement ... It is necessary to have a military imbalance to reach an agreement,” he claimed. Although the government's aggressive weapons' acquisition and its contract with Executive Outcomes did eventually allow it to bargain from a position of military strength, its inability or unwillingness to prevent UNITA's re-armament and its simultaneous slow erosion of strength meant that its position of superiority was only temporary.”

-- Human Rights Watch, *Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War since the 1992 Elections* (New York: Human Rights Watch 1994), 25-6.

“The period since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol has been termed a time of "no war, no peace" as UNITA continues to control much of Angolan territory, security is tenuous, and freedom of movement remains restricted (though slowly improving). For instance, in December 1995, security for humanitarian activities deteriorated to such a degree in some parts of the country that several NGOs either suspended their activities in UNITA-held areas or refused to expand their work into UNITA areas.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

“By late 1993 UNITA had gained control over 70% of Angola, but the government's military successes in 1994 forced UNITA to sue for peace. By November 1994 the government had taken control of 60% of the country. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi called the situation UNITA's "deepest crisis" since its creation. Savimbi, unwilling to personally sign the accord, had former UNITA Secretary General Eugenio Manuvakola sign in his place and President José Eduardo dos Santos responded by having Angolan Foreign Minister Venancio de Moura represent the MPLA. According to Manuvakola, Savimbi wanted him to act as a scapegoat.”

--Rothchild, Donald S. *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation*, 1997. Pages 137-138

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

By the end of 1993, UNITA had taken over 70% of the countryside and was in no way prepared to cede any ground to the government of Angola. Peace was not on the horizon. It would take until 1994 and the gaining of ground by the government of Angola in order to bring UNITA to the table for peace talks.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat to the existence of both UNITA and the Government of Angola if either had stopped attacks or ceased to address the attacks of the opposing side.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **890** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 December 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **6** |
| **Demand number:** | **890.0611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Honour the commitments already made at the talks in Lusaka, Stop immediately all military actions to prevent further suffering of the population and damage to the Angolan economy, and agree on a sustainable and effective cease-fire, and conclude a peaceful settlement as soon as possible.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Eventually, on 3I October I 994, the government and UNITA initialled a final agreement. Despite continued fighting the Lusaka Protocol was formally signed by the Luanda foreign minister Venancio de Moura and UNITA's secretary-general Eugenio Manuvakola on 20 November, and a cease-fire was declared. Although dos Santos had gone to Zambia to sign on behalf of the government, Savimbi had not made the journey. This was to prove part of a pattern of behaviour which would complicate and confuse the implementation of the agreement.”

--Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

“In 1993, Angola was in the eighteenth year of a civil war which pitted the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government against National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgents. (1) During that year, perhaps 1,000 people a day died. (2) But the renewed Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) felt they were on their way to victory. The government had hired extensive outside assistance from security firms such as South Africa's Executive Outcomes. FAA Sukhoi and MiG aircraft, many flown by foreign pilots, strafed the Central Highlands held by UNITA's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FALA). Rather than allowing the war to run its course and fearful that it could continue for years to come, the international community pressed hard for a cease-fire. Talks started in Lusaka, Zambia in December 1993. However, every time it looked like there was progress toward a cease-fire and a peace agreement, the war in Angola would intensify as each side sought an advantage on the ground to gain extra leverage in Lusaka.”

--Dawn M. Hewitt, “Peacekeeping and the Lusaka Protocol,” Melbourne Journal of Politics, Vol. 26, 1999.

“In his report on 3 May, the Secretary-General of the UN stated that the second phase of disengagement as set out in the Lusaka Protocol (see ACTSA Briefing on Lusaka Protocol) has now almost been completed.

This phase covers the disengagement of FAA and UNITA forces in the Provinces of Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul and Moxico. A working group of the Joint Commission will visit these areas to verify that the disengagement has been completed.”

--*Angola Peace Monitor,* 19 May 1995, Issue 4. Univeristy of Pennsylvania African Studies Center.

“Despite a partially effective unilateral UNITA cease-fire, announced in September 1993, which enabled humanitarian aid agencies to bring relief to some of the 3 million people who were faced with imminent starvation, the situation in Angola remained critical.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241-242.

“The period since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol has been termed a time of "no war, no peace" as UNITA continues to control much of Angolan territory, security is tenuous, and freedom of movement remains restricted (though slowly improving). For instance, in December 1995, security for humanitarian activities deteriorated to such a degree in some parts of the country that several NGOs either suspended their activities in UNITA-held areas or refused to expand their work into UNITA areas.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

“The peace process subsequently regained momentum in mid-April. Although a number of incidents, unauthorized movements of troops and other cease-fire violations have occurred, the general trend has been towards a progressive decrease of such violations. Two meetings between the Chiefs of General Staff from the Government and UNITA, held in January and in February, also helped to consolidate the cease-fire and strengthen the peace process. Under the supervision of UNAVEM III, progress has been achieved in the disengagement of forces. In an especially positive development, the President of the Republic of Angola, Mr. José Eduardo dos Santos, and Mr. Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA, met at Lusaka on 6 May in the presence of my Special Representative. This meeting gave a new and important impetus to the peace process and the parties took further concrete steps to consolidate the progress achieved. In June and July, the parties reached agreement on several important issues and approved an accelerated timetable for the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.”

--Angola, Report of the Secretary-General, 1995- <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/SG-Rpt/ch4e-1.htm>

“By late 1993 UNITA had gained control over 70% of Angola, but the government's military successes in 1994 forced UNITA to sue for peace. By November 1994 the government had taken control of 60% of the country. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi called the situation UNITA's "deepest crisis" since its creation. Savimbi, unwilling to personally sign the accord, had former UNITA Secretary General Eugenio Manuvakola sign in his place and President José Eduardo dos Santos responded by having Angolan Foreign Minister Venancio de Moura represent the MPLA. According to Manuvakola, Savimbi wanted him to act as a scapegoat.”

--Rothchild, Donald S. *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation*, 1997. Pages 137-138

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While the talks did eventually lead to a temporary warming of relations between UNITA and the government of Angola, and the Lusaka Protocol was indeed signed, there was no true cease-fire that was ever achieved, and a peace settlement was never declared.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“By late 1993 UNITA had gained control over 70% of Angola, but the government's military successes in 1994 forced UNITA to sue for peace. By November 1994 the government had taken control of 60% of the country. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi called the situation UNITA's "deepest crisis" since its creation. Savimbi, unwilling to personally sign the accord, had former UNITA Secretary General Eugenio Manuvakola sign in his place and President José Eduardo dos Santos responded by having Angolan Foreign Minister Venancio de Moura represent the MPLA. According to Manuvakola, Savimbi wanted him to act as a scapegoat.”

--Rothchild, Donald S. *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation*, 1997. Pages 137-138

“Despite a partially effective unilateral UNITA cease-fire, announced in September 1993, which enabled humanitarian aid agencies to bring relief to some of the 3 million people who were faced with imminent starvation, the situation in Angola remained critical.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241-242.

“Since UNITA's unilateral cease-fire in September 1993 there were improvements in conditions with humanitarian aid saving hundreds of thousands of Angolans from starvation. However, without a permanent and UN-verified cease-fire, the relative peace and the humanitarian relief remained at risk. This was demonstrated in February 1994, when UNITA bombarded Cuito, killing around 400 people. The shelling of Cuito prevented aid from entering the city, provoked the Angolan government to retaliate by halting all aid flights to UNITA controlled areas, and threatened the Lusaka peace talks.”

--*The Guardian*, 12 February 1994

“After the Lusaka Protocol, Savimbi was able to regroup his forces and rearm via Zaire.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“UNITA's compliance with the de-mobilisation process has been subject to frequent delays, misinformation and out-right contradiction. The laying of landmines certainly also continued after, and in violation of, the Lusaka accords; Human Rights Watch has documented new mine laying activities as recently as 1997, while attacks during May 1998 have provided ongoing evidence of this. High level pressure from the UN and US failed to hasten Savimbi's pace, eventually resulting in the imposition of much-delayed UN sanctions at the end of February 1998.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“Progress in implementing the 'final timetable' under the Lusaka Protocol during March 1998 was smoother, but it again failed to meet even the revised deadline, and so continued into April…Notwithstanding these developments, UNITA has continued to give contradictory signals and even to launch new armed attacks. Several towns, villages and communes in Uige, Moxico Malanje and Lunda Sul provinces previously handed over to the government were retaken by UNITA soldiers. Other settle-ments in Benguela, Bengo, Cuando Cubango, Huambo, Malanje, Huila, Cabinda, Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul provinces were raided during March, April and May, when properties were destroyed and local administrators expelled or abducted.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“In 1993, Angola was in the eighteenth year of a civil war which pitted the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government against National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgents. (1) During that year, perhaps 1,000 people a day died. (2) But the renewed Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) felt they were on their way to victory. The government had hired extensive outside assistance from security firms such as South Africa's Executive Outcomes. FAA Sukhoi and MiG aircraft, many flown by foreign pilots, strafed the Central Highlands held by UNITA's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FALA). Rather than allowing the war to run its course and fearful that it could continue for years to come, the international community pressed hard for a cease-fire. Talks started in Lusaka, Zambia in December 1993. However, every time it looked like there was progress toward a cease-fire and a peace agreement, the war in Angola would intensify as each side sought an advantage on the ground to gain extra leverage in Lusaka.”

--Dawn M. Hewitt, “Peacekeeping and the Lusaka Protocol,” Melbourne Journal of Politics, Vol. 26, 1999.

“In 1994, prior to the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, the Angolan chief of staff, General Joao de Matos, argued that UNITA would make a commitment to a peace accord only if it was at a military disadvantage: “If there is military equilibrium, which is what we have at the moment, there will not be a lasting agreement ... It is necessary to have a military imbalance to reach an agreement,” he claimed. Although the government's aggressive weapons' acquisition and its contract with Executive Outcomes did eventually allow it to bargain from a position of military strength, its inability or unwillingness to prevent UNITA's re-armament and its simultaneous slow erosion of strength meant that its position of superiority was only temporary.”

-- Human Rights Watch, *Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War since the 1992 Elections* (New York: Human Rights Watch 1994), 25-6.

“Most people survive via candongo, the informal or parallel economy. Even since the Lusaka Protocol, the state's capacity to provide services and pay salaries has continued to collapse as a result of disillusionment, bankruptcy, corruption, the endless delays in the peace process and return of UNITA areas to government control and the like. The government has resorted to devaluation of the Kwanza as a crisis management tool, resulting in high inflation rates which peaked at 31.5% per month in 1995. However, the 'New Life Programme' introduced in 1996 with the objective of balancing the budget, succeeded in bring-ing down inflation dramatically, to a manageable 6% in December 1996. IMF data suggest an annualised 92% by June 1997. However, a further devaluation of 25% in July 1997 still failed to close the gap between the official and parallel exchange rates, and seemed to revive the previous vicious spiral. The fall in the oil price during April and May 1998 will squeeze government expenditure further and probably renew inflationary pressures.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“An intensification of fighting on the eve of the Lusaka signing was followed by a rash of local violations of the cease-fire in late November and December I994. Military hard-liners on both sides were unenthusiastic about the agreement. On the government side particularly, military advances during I993 and I994 encouraged a 'one more push' mentality which looked to the final defeat of an enfeebled UNITA. On the other side, a number of UNITA generals saw the agreement as the beginning of the end for the movement… In the second week of February I995, three months after the signing of the agreement, UNITA held a party congress in its new central highland headquarters at Bailundo. Jonas Savimbi offered contradictory pointers to his attitude. In one speech he denounced the Lusaka Protocol as a 'collection of lies' and a 'meaningless piece of paper'…Yet later, speaking directly to foreign journalists, Savimbi insisted he was committed to the agreement but constrained by his own hard-line generals.”

--“Angola,” *The Economist,* 18-24 February 1995

“UNITA used its substantial diamond revenues to undertake a fundamental military reorganization…between 1993 and 1999…it moved away from its traditional posture as a guerrilla army into a more conventional disposition in preparation for delivering a final victorious blow against government forces and seizing state power. To this end, the rebels engaged in a major military procurement programme. UNITA has activities in acquiring arms and military equipment.”

The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“The Lusaka Protocol had one fundamental flaw in relation to the prospects for a transition to peace. It owed more to international pressure for a settlement, rather than to a real commitment, from UNITA in particular, to make it work. Each side wished to hang on to the spoils that it had, using the political and military conflict to destroy or seize the spoils of its opponents…”

--Barry Munslow, “The Politics of Unsustainable Development,” *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 20, No. 3, (1999): 551-568.

“The peace process subsequently regained momentum in mid-April. Although a number of incidents, unauthorized movements of troops and other cease-fire violations have occurred, the general trend has been towards a progressive decrease of such violations. Two meetings between the Chiefs of General Staff from the Government and UNITA, held in January and in February, also helped to consolidate the cease-fire and strengthen the peace process. Under the supervision of UNAVEM III, progress has been achieved in the disengagement of forces. In an especially positive development, the President of the Republic of Angola, Mr. José Eduardo dos Santos, and Mr. Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA, met at Lusaka on 6 May in the presence of my Special Representative. This meeting gave a new and important impetus to the peace process and the parties took further concrete steps to consolidate the progress achieved. In June and July, the parties reached agreement on several important issues and approved an accelerated timetable for the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.”

--Angola, Report of the Secretary-General, 1995- <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/SG-Rpt/ch4e-1.htm>

## Assessment

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While the talks did eventually lead to a temporary warming of relations between UNITA and the government of Angola, and the Lusaka Protocol was indeed signed, there was no true cease-fire that was ever achieved, and a peace settlement was never declared.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat to the existence of both UNITA and the Government of Angola if either was seen to be in a position of weakness. Adhering to talks made in Lusaka and fully carrying them out threatened each party insofar as the other was prepared to interpret signs of peacemaking as capitulation.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **890** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **15 December 1993** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **10** |
| **Demand number:** | **890.1011** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all civilian populations.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“International humanitarian agencies and donors, under UN co-ordination with NGOs active on the ground mounted a very successful emergency operation through 1993 and 1994, keeping tens of thousands displaced by war alive in besieged towns throughout the country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“Six months of relative stability and steady progress in relief efforts between November 1993 and April 1994 were followed by intensified conflict and a near standstill in humanitarian assistance to critical areas of the country. United Nations officials negotiated with both sides in the conflict in order to secure access to people in need. But between mid-May and mid-August the delivery of humanitarian relief dropped sharply, due to increased security risks and curtailment or suspension of relief flights. The Secretary-General, in an addendum to his 20 June 1994 report to the Security Council on UNAVEM II, drew attention to the dramatic escalation in the number of serious violations of humanitarian law in Angola, the rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation in places where access was being denied, and threats to the safety of relief workers. In resolution 932 (1994) of 30 June 1994, the Security Council deplored the worsening of the humanitarian situation, urged the parties to grant all necessary security guarantees and to refrain from actions endangering relief personnel or disrupting humanitarian assistance.”

--REPORT OF UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II, Chief Military Observer: Major-General Chris Abutu Garuba (Nigeria), 1994.

“Human rights deteriorated further in the face of an intensified armed conflict and the failure of the Government and UNITA to stop egregious violations of humanitarian law. Military and security forces on both sides flagrantly disregarded fundamental humanitarian values in their treatment of prisoners of war (POW's), their extrajudicial killings of unarmed civilians, including humanitarian relief workers, women, children, and the elderly. Both sides repeatedly interfered for political purposes with internationally provided humanitarian assistance. Informed observers estimated that approximately 1,000 persons died daily at the beginning of 1994 and that at least 100,000 persons have perished since fighting resumed in 1992. Other human rights abuses included mistreatment of detainees, deplorable prison conditions, arbitrary arrest and detention, unfair trials, broad restrictions on freedom of speech, press, and association, and violence against women and children… There were credible accounts that government military officers

killed civilian men, women, children, and elderly persons suspected of being UNITA sympathizers after they recaptured N'Dalatando in May (see Section 1.g.). As the war worsened throughout 1994, common criminal violence often was indistinguishable from politically motivated violence. Fighting between members of the military and police and among military, police, and bandits in a large open-air market on the outskirts of Luanda regularly resulted in fatalities. There were eyewitness accounts of police killing unarmed civilians, including youths and street children in Luanda, and of violent, unexplained deaths, such as the August discovery of a well-known journalist who was found stuffed in a garbage can in a Luanda suburb. Unknown assailants assassinated the Vice Governor of Malange Province in early July. It is widely believed that the killing was for political reasons.”

--US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1994,* Washington, DC: Department of State Publication, 1995.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Not only did UNITA and the government of Angola make little to no effort to clear roads, make rural areas safe, and disarm civilians in order to make humanitarian deliveries possible, both sides actively engaged in randomized violence which put humanitarian workers’ lives at risk and threatened the completion of humanitarian deliveries throughout Angola.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The…UNITA cease-fire, announced in September 1993…enabled humanitarian aid agencies to bring relief to some of the 3 million people who were faced with imminent starvation…”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 241-242.

“The first is Angolas increasing- and largely avoidable- humanitarian crisis. The return to war has exacerbated an already difficult internal refugee problem. By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The

Number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angola’s population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanjein the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000....The

War has also obstructed or interrupted aid flights and convoys by organizations such as the World Food Programme and CARE at a time when some donors have failed to live up to promises of relief aid to the region.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“Six months of relative stability and steady progress in relief efforts between November 1993 and April 1994 were followed by intensified conflict and a near standstill in humanitarian assistance to critical areas of the country. United Nations officials negotiated with both sides in the conflict in order to secure access to people in need. But between mid-May and mid-August the delivery of humanitarian relief dropped sharply, due to increased security risks and curtailment or suspension of relief flights. The Secretary-General, in an addendum to his 20 June 1994 report to the Security Council on UNAVEM II, drew attention to the dramatic escalation in the number of serious violations of humanitarian law in Angola, the rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation in places where access was being denied, and threats to the safety of relief workers. In resolution 932 (1994) of 30 June 1994, the Security Council deplored the worsening of the humanitarian situation, urged the parties to grant all necessary security guarantees and to refrain from actions endangering relief personnel or disrupting humanitarian assistance.”

--REPORT OF UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II, Chief Military Observer: Major-General Chris Abutu Garuba (Nigeria), 1994.

“Since August 1995, improvements in the security situation and the consolidation of the cease-fire have enabled the United Nations and international and local non-governmental organizations to extend their humanitarian relief activities to all regions of the country. Since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, humanitarian agencies have reoriented their programmes to support the peace process in three realms of activity: relief and resettlement; demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; and action related to land-mines. It is estimated that over 3 million Angolans are receiving food aid or other types of relief assistance. These activities are directed inside Angola by the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit, affiliated with the Department of Humanitarian Affairs.”

--Angola, Report of the Secretary-General, 1995- <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/SG-Rpt/ch4e-1.htm>

“Human rights deteriorated further in the face of an intensified armed conflict and the failure of the Government and UNITA to stop egregious violations of humanitarian law. Military and security forces on both sides flagrantly disregarded fundamental humanitarian values in their treatment of prisoners of war (POW's), their extrajudicial killings of unarmed civilians, including humanitarian relief workers, women, children, and the elderly. Both sides repeatedly interfered for political purposes with internationally provided humanitarian assistance. Informed observers estimated that approximately 1,000 persons died daily at the beginning of 1994 and that at least 100,000 persons have perished since fighting resumed in 1992. Other human rights abuses included mistreatment of detainees, deplorable prison conditions, arbitrary arrest and detention, unfair trials, broad restrictions on freedom of speech, press, and association, and violence against women and children… There were credible accounts that government military officers

killed civilian men, women, children, and elderly persons suspected of being UNITA sympathizers after they recaptured N'Dalatando in May (see Section 1.g.). As the war worsened throughout 1994, common criminal violence often was indistinguishable from politically motivated violence. Fighting between members of the military and police and among military, police, and bandits in a large open-air market on the outskirts of Luanda regularly resulted in fatalities. There were eyewitness accounts of police killing unarmed civilians, including youths and street children in Luanda, and of violent, unexplained deaths, such as the August discovery of a well-known journalist who was found stuffed in a garbage can in a Luanda suburb. Unknown assailants assassinated the Vice Governor of Malange Province in early July. It is widely believed that the killing was for political reasons.”

--US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1994,* Washington, DC: Department of State Publication, 1995.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Not only did UNITA and the government of Angola make little to no effort to clear roads, make rural areas safe, and disarm civilians in order to make humanitarian deliveries possible, both sides actively engaged in randomized violence which put humanitarian workers’ lives at risk and threatened the completion of humanitarian deliveries throughout Angola.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as high because ensuring a secure level of transport and movement for UNAVEM personnel would have been an enormous effort, and would have necessitated a level of organization, complex communication, and orchestrated attention that was not feasible at this time. While this demand only presented some risks to its adherents, and was not a huge risk, it was still an enormous demand, that if complied with—could have put larger operations at risk which could have threatened the compliers.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **903** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **16 March 1994** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **2** |
| **Demand number:** | **903.0211** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Honor the commitments already made at the talks in Lusaka and Redouble efforts to finish agenda to attain a cease-fire and a peaceful settlement.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Eventually, on 3I October I 994, the government and UNITA initialled a final agreement. Despite continued fighting the Lusaka Protocol was formally signed by the Luanda foreign minister Venancio de Moura and UNITA's secretary-general Eugenio Manuvakola on 20 November, and a cease-fire was declared. Although dos Santos had gone to Zambia to sign on behalf of the government, Savimbi had not made the journey. This was to prove part of a pattern of behaviour which would complicate and confuse the implementation of the agreement.”

--Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

“In 1993, Angola was in the eighteenth year of a civil war which pitted the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government against National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgents. (1) During that year, perhaps 1,000 people a day died. (2) But the renewed Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) felt they were on their way to victory. The government had hired extensive outside assistance from security firms such as South Africa's Executive Outcomes. FAA Sukhoi and MiG aircraft, many flown by foreign pilots, strafed the Central Highlands held by UNITA's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FALA). Rather than allowing the war to run its course and fearful that it could continue for years to come, the international community pressed hard for a cease-fire. Talks started in Lusaka, Zambia in December 1993. However, every time it looked like there was progress toward a cease-fire and a peace agreement, the war in Angola would intensify as each side sought an advantage on the ground to gain extra leverage in Lusaka.”

--Dawn M. Hewitt, “Peacekeeping and the Lusaka Protocol,” Melbourne Journal of Politics, Vol. 26, 1999.

“After the Lusaka Protocol, Savimbi was able to regroup his forces and rearm via Zaire.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“The peace process subsequently regained momentum in mid-April. Although a number of incidents, unauthorized movements of troops and other cease-fire violations have occurred, the general trend has been towards a progressive decrease of such violations. Two meetings between the Chiefs of General Staff from the Government and UNITA, held in January and in February, also helped to consolidate the cease-fire and strengthen the peace process. Under the supervision of UNAVEM III, progress has been achieved in the disengagement of forces. In an especially positive development, the President of the Republic of Angola, Mr. José Eduardo dos Santos, and Mr. Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA, met at Lusaka on 6 May in the presence of my Special Representative. This meeting gave a new and important impetus to the peace process and the parties took further concrete steps to consolidate the progress achieved. In June and July, the parties reached agreement on several important issues and approved an accelerated timetable for the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.”

--Angola, Report of the Secretary-General, 1995- <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/SG-Rpt/ch4e-1.htm>

“In November 1994, Angolan government forces captured Huambo, UNITA's main stronghold only days before the two sides were due to sign the Lusaka Peace Protocol to end the post-electoral round of fighting. Ominously, Jonas Savimbi did not personally endorse this accord. He retreated to Bailundo and Andulo to set up his group's new headquarters.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“Since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994, Angolans have been living between war and peace. They are grateful for the cease-fire and peace process that ended the previous two years of unrestrained conflict. But they are concerned at repeated delays in implementation of the agreement.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

“The period since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol has been termed a time of "no war, no peace" as UNITA continues to control much of Angolan territory, security is tenuous, and freedom of movement remains restricted (though slowly improving). For instance, in December 1995, security for humanitarian activities deteriorated to such a degree in some parts of the country that several NGOs either suspended their activities in UNITA-held areas or refused to expand their work into UNITA areas.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While the talks did eventually lead to a temporary warming of relations between UNITA and the government of Angola, and the Lusaka Protocol was indeed signed, there was no true cease-fire that was ever achieved, and a peace settlement was never declared.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA's compliance with the de-mobilisation process has been subject to frequent delays, misinformation and out-right contradiction. The laying of landmines certainly also continued after, and in violation of, the Lusaka accords; Human Rights Watch has documented new mine laying activities as recently as 1997, while attacks during May 1998 have provided ongoing evidence of this. High level pressure from the UN and US failed to hasten Savimbi's pace, eventually resulting in the imposition of much-delayed UN sanctions at the end of February 1998.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“UNITA used its substantial diamond revenues to undertake a fundamental military reorganization…between 1993 and 1999…it moved away from its traditional posture as a guerrilla army into a more conventional disposition in preparation for delivering a final victorious blow against government forces and seizing state power. To this end, the rebels engaged in a major military procurement programme. UNITA has activities in acquiring arms and military equipment.”

The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“The Lusaka Protocol had one fundamental flaw in relation to the prospects for a transition to peace. It owed more to international pressure for a settlement, rather than to a real commitment, from UNITA in particular, to make it work. Each side wished to hang on to the spoils that it had, using the political and military conflict to destroy or seize the spoils of its opponents…”

--Barry Munslow, “The Politics of Unsustainable Development,” *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 20, No. 3, (1999): 551-568.

“In 1993, Angola was in the eighteenth year of a civil war which pitted the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government against National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgents. (1) During that year, perhaps 1,000 people a day died. (2) But the renewed Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) felt they were on their way to victory. The government had hired extensive outside assistance from security firms such as South Africa's Executive Outcomes. FAA Sukhoi and MiG aircraft, many flown by foreign pilots, strafed the Central Highlands held by UNITA's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FALA). Rather than allowing the war to run its course and fearful that it could continue for years to come, the international community pressed hard for a cease-fire. Talks started in Lusaka, Zambia in December 1993. However, every time it looked like there was progress toward a cease-fire and a peace agreement, the war in Angola would intensify as each side sought an advantage on the ground to gain extra leverage in Lusaka.”

--Dawn M. Hewitt, “Peacekeeping and the Lusaka Protocol,” Melbourne Journal of Politics, Vol. 26, 1999.

“In 1994, prior to the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, the Angolan chief of staff, General Joao de Matos, argued that UNITA would make a commitment to a peace accord only if it was at a military disadvantage: “If there is military equilibrium, which is what we have at the moment, there will not be a lasting agreement ... It is necessary to have a military imbalance to reach an agreement,” he claimed. Although the government's aggressive weapons' acquisition and its contract with Executive Outcomes did eventually allow it to bargain from a position of military strength, its inability or unwillingness to prevent UNITA's re-armament and its simultaneous slow erosion of strength meant that its position of superiority was only temporary.”

-- Human Rights Watch, Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War since the 1992 Elections (New York: Human Rights Watch 1994), 25-6.

“Progress in implementing the 'final timetable' under the Lusaka Protocol during March 1998 was smoother, but it again failed to meet even the revised deadline, and so continued into April…Notwithstanding these developments, UNITA has continued to give contradictory signals and even to launch new armed attacks. Several towns, villages and communes in Uige, Moxico Malanje and Lunda Sul provinces previously handed over to the government were retaken by UNITA soldiers. Other settle-ments in Benguela, Bengo, Cuando Cubango, Huambo, Malanje, Huila, Cabinda, Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul provinces were raided during March, April and May, when properties were destroyed and local administrators expelled or abducted.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“An intensification of fighting on the eve of the Lusaka signing was followed by a rash of local violations of the cease-fire in late November and December I994. Military hard-liners on both sides were unenthusiastic about the agreement. On the government side particularly, military advances during I993 and I994 encouraged a 'one more push' mentality which looked to the final defeat of an enfeebled UNITA. On the other side, a number of UNITA generals saw the agreement as the beginning of the end for the movement… In the second week of February I995, three months after the signing of the agreement, UNITA held a party congress in its new central highland headquarters at Bailundo. Jonas Savimbi offered contradictory pointers to his attitude. In one speech he denounced the Lusaka Protocol as a 'collection of lies' and a 'meaningless piece of paper'…Yet later, speaking directly to foreign journalists, Savimbi insisted he was committed to the agreement but constrained by his own hard-line generals.”

--“Angola,” *The Economist,* 18-24 February 1995

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While the talks did eventually lead to a temporary warming of relations between UNITA and the government of Angola, and the Lusaka Protocol was indeed signed, there was no true cease-fire that was ever achieved, and a peace settlement was never declared.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat to the existence of both UNITA and the Government of Angola if either was seen to be in a position of weakness. Adhering to talks made in Lusaka and fully carrying them out threatened each party insofar as the other was prepared to interpret signs of peacemaking as capitulation.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **903** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **16 March 1994** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **3** |
| **Demand number:** | **903.0311** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cease all offensive military actions immediately.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA used its substantial diamond revenues to undertake a fundamental military reorganization… between 1993 and 1999…it moved away from its traditional posture as a guerrilla army into a more conventional disposition in preparation for delivering a final victorious blow against government forces and seizing state power. To this end, the rebels engaged in a major military procurement programme. UNITA has activities in acquiring arms and military equipment.”

The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“Since the signing of the Protocol, UNAVEM and the international community appear to have been dragging the two parties, particularly UNITA, slowly and painfully towards fulfillment of the peace agreements.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

“To counter UNITA, the Government continued a major buildup in 1994 of its military and police organizations and also continued to arm urban civilians. These civilians, sympathetic to the governing party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), assisted government forces during the outbreak of hostilities that led to the resumption of the civil war. All of these organizations, including the Government and UNITA, were responsible for persistent human rights abuses. The MPLA controlled tightly the 220-member National Assembly and harassed the few opposition deputies, including UNITA deputies, in attendance. MPLA leader President dos Santos continued to manipulate the party in order to consolidate political control and neutralize potential opposition.”

--US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1994,* Washington, DC: Department of State Publication, 1995.

“In 1993, Angola was in the eighteenth year of a civil war which pitted the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government against National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgents. During that year, perhaps 1,000 people a day died. But the renewed Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) felt they were on their way to victory. The government had hired extensive outside assistance from security firms such as South Africa's Executive Outcomes. FAA Sukhoi and MiG aircraft, many flown by foreign pilots, strafed the Central Highlands held by UNITA's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FALA). Rather than allowing the war to run its course and fearful that it could continue for years to come, the international community pressed hard for a cease-fire. Talks started in Lusaka, Zambia in December 1993. However, every time it looked like there was progress toward a cease-fire and a peace agreement, the war in Angola would intensify as each side sought an advantage on the ground to gain extra leverage in Lusaka.”

--Dawn M. Hewitt, “Peacekeeping and the Lusaka Protocol,” Melbourne Journal of Politics, Vol. 26, 1999.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There was truly no compliance, primarily by UNITA, and subsequently by any party. Each side continued to take hostages, burn and attack villages, lay landmines, recruit civilians, attack humanitarian convoys, and continue to take territory by force.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“A new UN peace-keeping operation in Angola was established on 8 February by the Security Council to help restore peace and achieve national reconciliation in that country after 20 years of civil war. With an initial mandate until 8 August 1995 the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) was authorized under resolution 976 (1995) to deploy a maximum of 7000 military personnel in addition to 350 military and 260 police observers. It replaced UNAVEM II whose mandate had expired.”

--“New UN Verification Mission Set Up,” *UN Chronicle,* 1 June 1995.

“Since the signing of the Protocol, UNAVEM and the international community appear to have been dragging the two parties, particularly UNITA, slowly and painfully towards fulfillment of the peace agreements.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

To counter UNITA, the Government continued a major buildup in 1994 of its military and police organizations and also continued to arm urban civilians. These civilians, sympathetic to the governing party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), assisted government forces during the outbreak of hostilities that led to the resumption of the civil war. All of these organizations, including the Government and UNITA, were responsible for persistent human rights abuses. The MPLA controlled tightly the 220-member National Assembly and harassed the few opposition deputies, including UNITA deputies, in attendance. MPLA leader President dos Santos continued to manipulate the party in order to consolidate political control and neutralize potential opposition.”

----US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1994,* Washington, DC: Department of State Publication, 1995

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There was truly no compliance, primarily by UNITA, and subsequently by any party. Each side continued to take hostages, burn and attack villages, lay landmines, recruit civilians, attack humanitarian convoys, and continue to take territory by force.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat to the existence of both UNITA and the Government of Angola if either had stopped attacks or ceased to address the attacks of the opposing side.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **903** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **16 March 1994** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **7** |
| **Demand number:** | **903.0711** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Full cooperation with the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need in Angola and in protecting the lives of humanitarian assistance workers.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“International humanitarian agencies and donors, under UN co-ordination with NGOs active on the ground mounted a very successful emergency operation through 1993 and 1994, keeping tens of thousands displaced by war alive in besieged towns throughout the country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“Six months of relative stability and steady progress in relief efforts between November 1993 and April 1994 were followed by intensified conflict and a near standstill in humanitarian assistance to critical areas of the country. United Nations officials negotiated with both sides in the conflict in order to secure access to people in need. But between mid-May and mid-August the delivery of humanitarian relief dropped sharply, due to increased security risks and curtailment or suspension of relief flights. The Secretary-General, in an addendum to his 20 June 1994 report to the Security Council on UNAVEM II, drew attention to the dramatic escalation in the number of serious violations of humanitarian law in Angola, the rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation in places where access was being denied, and threats to the safety of relief workers. In resolution 932 (1994) of 30 June 1994, the Security Council deplored the worsening of the humanitarian situation, urged the parties to grant all necessary security guarantees and to refrain from actions endangering relief personnel or disrupting humanitarian assistance.”

--REPORT OF UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II, Chief Military Observer: Major-General Chris Abutu Garuba (Nigeria), 1994.

“In March 1995 UNITA militants shot and destroyed an UNAVEM III helicopter in Quibaxe. Military leaders met on January 10, 1995 and in February in Waku Kungo to make sure both sides continued to observe the ceasefire. Savimbi and dos Santos met four times after the helicopter downing; in Lusaka on May 6, in Gabon in August, in Brussels, Belgium in September, and in March 1996 in Libreville, Gabon. Between the first and second meetings dos Santos offered Savimbi the position of Vice President, but Savimbi turned him down in August 1996 during the party's Third Congress.”

--Alex Vines. *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process,* 1999. Human Rights Watch

“Human rights deteriorated further in the face of an intensified armed conflict and the failure of the Government and UNITA to stop egregious violations of humanitarian law. Military and security forces on both sides flagrantly disregarded fundamental humanitarian values in their treatment of prisoners of war (POW's), their extrajudicial killings of unarmed civilians, including humanitarian relief workers, women, children, and the elderly. Both sides repeatedly interfered for political purposes with internationally provided humanitarian assistance. Informed observers estimated that approximately 1,000 persons died daily at the beginning of 1994 and that at least 100,000 persons have perished since fighting resumed in 1992. Other human rights abuses included mistreatment of detainees, deplorable prison conditions, arbitrary arrest and detention, unfair trials, broad restrictions on freedom of speech, press, and association, and violence against women and children… There were credible accounts that government military officers

killed civilian men, women, children, and elderly persons suspected of being UNITA sympathizers after they recaptured N'Dalatando in May (see Section 1.g.). As the war worsened throughout 1994, common criminal violence often was indistinguishable from politically motivated violence. Fighting between members of the military and police and among military, police, and bandits in a large open-air market on the outskirts of Luanda regularly resulted in fatalities. There were eyewitness accounts of police killing unarmed civilians, including youths and street children in Luanda, and of violent, unexplained deaths, such as the August discovery of a well-known journalist who was found stuffed in a garbage can in a Luanda suburb. Unknown assailants assassinated the Vice Governor of Malange Province in early July. It is widely believed that the killing was for political reasons.”

--US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1994,* Washington, DC: Department of State Publication, 1995.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In the medium-term, this demand was resolutely ignored by UNITA, and while government army troops for the most part did not attack UNAVEM outright, they were also powerless to stop rogue soldiers and civilian bandits from endangering the safety of UN personnel.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The peace process that began in late 1994 has relatively improved stability and increased accessibility of areas within and between Government and UNITA-controlled parts of the country. Therefore in the past three years, the Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions have had improving opportunities for discussion and observation in the field. However, many areas remain difficult to access by road and the security situation in several provinces has deteriorated, particularly given repeated reports of bandit attacks.”

--Special Report- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola, 20 May 1998

“The first is Angolas increasing- and largely avoidable- humanitarian crisis. The return to war has exacerbated an already difficult internal refugee problem. By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The

Number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angola’s population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanjein the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000....The

War has also obstructed or interrupted aid flights and convoys by organizations such as the World Food Programme and CARE at a time when some donors have failed to live up to promises of relief aid to the region.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“Six months of relative stability and steady progress in relief efforts between November 1993 and April 1994 were followed by intensified conflict and a near standstill in humanitarian assistance to critical areas of the country. United Nations officials negotiated with both sides in the conflict in order to secure access to people in need. But between mid-May and mid-August the delivery of humanitarian relief dropped sharply, due to increased security risks and curtailment or suspension of relief flights. The Secretary-General, in an addendum to his 20 June 1994 report to the Security Council on UNAVEM II, drew attention to the dramatic escalation in the number of serious violations of humanitarian law in Angola, the rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation in places where access was being denied, and threats to the safety of relief workers. In resolution 932 (1994) of 30 June 1994, the Security Council deplored the worsening of the humanitarian situation, urged the parties to grant all necessary security guarantees and to refrain from actions endangering relief personnel or disrupting humanitarian assistance.”

--REPORT OF UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II, Chief Military Observer: Major-General Chris Abutu Garuba (Nigeria), 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In the medium-term, this demand was resolutely ignored by UNITA, and while government army troops for the most part did not attack UNAVEM outright, they were also powerless to stop rogue soldiers and civilian bandits from endangering the safety of UN personnel.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **922** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **31 May 1994** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **4** |
| **Demand number:** | **922.0411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Do like the Gov't of Angola in accepting the proposals on national reconciliation by the Special Representative of the UNSG and the three observer states to the Angolan Peace Process.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Annex 2: Reaffirmation of the acceptance by the Government and by UNITA of the relevant legal instruments 1. The Peace Accords; 2. Security Council Resolutions--Lusaka, 19 November 1994

For the attention of His Excellency Maître Alioune Blondin Beye Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Angola Lusaka

Excellency,

We have the honor to inform you herewith that, within the framework of discussions of item I on the agenda of the Lusaka peace talks, the Government of the Republic of Angola represented by its delegation, solemnly and officially reaffirms the validity of the Peace Accords for Angola concluded with UNITA on 31 May 1991 at Lisbon, Portugal.

The Government of the Republic of Angola also reaffirms its unequivocal acceptance of the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council relating to the post-electoral conflict, in particular, resolutions 804, of 29 January 1993; 811, of 12 March 1993 ; 823, of 30 April 1993; 834, of 1 June 1993; 851, of 14 July 1993 and 864, of 15 September 1993.

Fernando Faustino Muteka Head of the Government delegation Lusaka, 20 November 1994

UNITA'S POSITION ON ITEM I.1 OF THE LUSAKA-II AGENDA: UNITA reaffirms the validity of the Peace Accords for Angola as the basis for peace in Angola. Taking into consideration the current situation of our country and the imperatives of peace, the Peace Accords for Angola must be updated.

UNITA'S POSITION ON ITEM I.2 OF THE LUSAKA-II AGENDA: UNITA reaffirms that it has taken good note of the Security Council resolutions relating to the Angolan crisis, particularly resolution 864/93, as indicated in our letter dated 30 October 1993 addressed to His Excellency, Dr. Boutros Boutros Ghali, Secretary General of the UN.”

--Except from a letter sent November 1994 from UNITA to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Boutros Boutros Ghali. *Conciliation Resources,* 1994.

“By late 1993 UNITA had gained control over 70% of Angola, but the government's military successes in 1994 forced UNITA to sue for peace. By November 1994 the government had taken control of 60% of the country. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi called the situation UNITA's "deepest crisis" since its creation. Savimbi, unwilling to personally sign the accord, had former UNITA Secretary General Eugenio Manuvakola sign in his place and President José Eduardo dos Santos responded by having Angolan Foreign Minister Venancio de Moura represent the MPLA. According to Manuvakola, Savimbi wanted him to act as a scapegoat.”

--Rothchild, Donald S. *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation*, 1997. Pages 137-138

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA was slow to accept the national reconciliation process. Deep into the Lusaka negotiations, UNITA demonstrated reluctance and non-compliance at various stages. UNITA was not leading the compromises and its compliance was low throughout the process.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Annex 2: Reaffirmation of the acceptance by the Government and by UNITA of the relevant legal instruments 1. The Peace Accords; 2. Security Council Resolutions--Lusaka, 19 November 1994

For the attention of His Excellency Maître Alioune Blondin Beye Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Angola Lusaka

Excellency,

We have the honor to inform you herewith that, within the framework of discussions of item I on the agenda of the Lusaka peace talks, the Government of the Republic of Angola represented by its delegation, solemnly and officially reaffirms the validity of the Peace Accords for Angola concluded with UNITA on 31 May 1991 at Lisbon, Portugal.

The Government of the Republic of Angola also reaffirms its unequivocal acceptance of the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council relating to the post-electoral conflict, in particular, resolutions 804, of 29 January 1993; 811, of 12 March 1993 ; 823, of 30 April 1993; 834, of 1 June 1993; 851, of 14 July 1993 and 864, of 15 September 1993.

Fernando Faustino Muteka Head of the Government delegation Lusaka, 20 November 1994

UNITA'S POSITION ON ITEM I.1 OF THE LUSAKA-II AGENDA: UNITA reaffirms the validity of the Peace Accords for Angola as the basis for peace in Angola. Taking into consideration the current situation of our country and the imperatives of peace, the Peace Accords for Angola must be updated.

UNITA'S POSITION ON ITEM I.2 OF THE LUSAKA-II AGENDA: UNITA reaffirms that it has taken good note of the Security Council resolutions relating to the Angolan crisis, particularly resolution 864/93, as indicated in our letter dated 30 October 1993 addressed to His Excellency, Dr. Boutros Boutros Ghali, Secretary General of the UN.”

--Except from a letter sent November 1994 from UNITA to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Boutros Boutros Ghali. *Conciliation Resources,* 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While the Lusaka Protocol did eventually get signed, UNITA was slow to accept the national reconciliation process. Deep into the Lusaka negotiations, UNITA demonstrated reluctance and non-compliance at various stages. UNITA was not leading the compromises and its compliance was low throughout the process.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | **Medium depth of demand (2)** | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “medium”. While this demand only presented some risks to its adherents, and was not a huge risk, it was still an enormous demand, that if complied with—could have put larger operations at risk which could have threatened UNITA’s position.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **922** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **31 May 1994** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **4** |
| **Demand number:** | **922.0421** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Finalize outstanding details to allow for the successful conclusion of the Lusaka Peace Talks.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Eventually, on 3I October I 994, the government and UNITA initialled a final agreement. Despite continued fighting the Lusaka Protocol was formally signed by the Luanda foreign minister Venancio de Moura and UNITA's secretary-general Eugenio Manuvakola on 20 November, and a cease-fire was declared. Although dos Santos had gone to Zambia to sign on behalf of the government, Savimbi had not made the journey. This was to prove part of a pattern of behaviour which would complicate and confuse the implementation of the agreement.”

--Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

“After the Lusaka Protocol, Savimbi was able to regroup his forces and rearm via Zaire.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“By late 1993 UNITA had gained control over 70% of Angola, but the government's military successes in 1994 forced UNITA to sue for peace. By November 1994 the government had taken control of 60% of the country. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi called the situation UNITA's "deepest crisis" since its creation. Savimbi, unwilling to personally sign the accord, had former UNITA Secretary General Eugenio Manuvakola sign in his place and President José Eduardo dos Santos responded by having Angolan Foreign Minister Venancio de Moura represent the MPLA. According to Manuvakola, Savimbi wanted him to act as a scapegoat.”

--Rothchild, Donald S. *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation*, 1997. Pages 137-138

“The agreement created a joint commission, consisting of officials from the Angolan government, UNITA, and the UN with the governments of Portugal, the United States, and Russia observing, to oversee its implementation. Violations of the protocol's provisions would be discussed and reviewed by the commission…The protocol's provisions, integrating UNITA into the military, a ceasefire, and a coalition government….however, many of the same environmental problems, mutual distrust between UNITA and the MPLA, loose international oversight, the importation of foreign arms, and an overemphasis on maintaining the balance of power, led to the protocol's collapse and the civil war. The Bicesse Accords largely punished the weaker signatory while the Lusaka Protocol guaranteed UNITA's hold over important governorships.”

--Rothchild, Donald S. *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation*, 1997. Pages 137-138

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA and the Government of Angola did demonstrate a medium high level of compliance with actually signing and coming to a successful conclusion of the accords talks in Lusaka. There was a physical accord signed, with many concessions made and compromises agreed upon. The Lusaka Accord eventually collapsed several years later, but the two sides did effectively make an agreement in 1994.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Progress in implementing the 'final timetable' under the Lusaka Protocol during March 1998 was smoother, but it again failed to meet even the revised deadline, and so continued into April…Notwithstanding these developments, UNITA has continued to give contradictory signals and even to launch new armed attacks. Several towns, villages and communes in Uige, Moxico Malanje and Lunda Sul provinces previously handed over to the government were retaken by UNITA soldiers. Other settle-ments in Benguela, Bengo, Cuando Cubango, Huambo, Malanje, Huila, Cabinda, Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul provinces were raided during March, April and May, when properties were destroyed and local administrators expelled or abducted.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“A new UN peace-keeping operation in Angola was established on 8 February by the Security Council to help restore peace and achieve national reconciliation in that country after 20 years of civil war. With an initial mandate until 8 August 1995 the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) was authorized under resolution 976 (1995) to deploy a maximum of 7000 military personnel in addition to 350 military and 260 police observers. It replaced UNAVEM II whose mandate had expired.”

--“New UN Verification Mission Set Up,” *UN Chronicle,* 1 June 1995.

“UNITA has, since 1994, also imported conventional weapons systems including mechanized vehicles such as tanks and armored personnel carriers, mines and explosives, a variety of small arms and light weapons, and anti-aircraft weapons, and a variety of artillery pieces."

The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“The Lusaka Protocol had one fundamental flaw in relation to the prospects for a transition to peace. It owed more to international pressure for a settlement, rather than to a real commitment, from UNITA in particular, to make it work. Each side wished to hang on to the spoils that it had, using the political and military conflict to destroy or seize the spoils of its opponents…”

--Barry Munslow, “The Politics of Unsustainable Development,” *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 20, No. 3, (1999): 551-568.

“Since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994, Angolans have been living between war and peace. They are grateful for the cease-fire and peace process that ended the previous two years of unrestrained conflict. But they are concerned at repeated delays in implementation of the agreement.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

“By late 1993 UNITA had gained control over 70% of Angola, but the government's military successes in 1994 forced UNITA to sue for peace. By November 1994 the government had taken control of 60% of the country. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi called the situation UNITA's "deepest crisis" since its creation. Savimbi, unwilling to personally sign the accord, had former UNITA Secretary General Eugenio Manuvakola sign in his place and President José Eduardo dos Santos responded by having Angolan Foreign Minister Venancio de Moura represent the MPLA. According to Manuvakola, Savimbi wanted him to act as a scapegoat.”

--Rothchild, Donald S. *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation*, 1997. Pages 137-138

“The agreement created a joint commission, consisting of officials from the Angolan government, UNITA, and the UN with the governments of Portugal, the United States, and Russia observing, to oversee its implementation. Violations of the protocol's provisions would be discussed and reviewed by the commission…The protocol's provisions, integrating UNITA into the military, a ceasefire, and a coalition government….however, many of the same environmental problems, mutual distrust between UNITA and the MPLA, loose international oversight, the importation of foreign arms, and an overemphasis on maintaining the balance of power, led to the protocol's collapse and the civil war. The Bicesse Accords largely punished the weaker signatory while the Lusaka Protocol guaranteed UNITA's hold over important governorships.”

--Rothchild, Donald S. *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation*, 1997. Pages 137-138

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In the medium-term, UNITA and the Government of Angola and made decisions which eventually led to the collapse of the Accords several years later, even though the two sides did effectively make an agreement in 1994.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat to the existence of both UNITA and the Government of Angola if either side had been too weak or too strong during negotiations. Arriving at a conclusion made the future uncertain for both parties, as the political process is much more shrouded in Angola than the military process.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **922** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **31 May 1994** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **9** |
| **Demand number:** | **922.0911** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cease immediately all offensive military operations.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNAVEM III was deployed under a Chapter VI mandate. It was presumed the Lusaka Protocol signed by both parties provided for a cease-fire and the insertion of UN forces. Yet, these assumptions were incorrect. UNITA leader Savimbi refused to sign the Lusaka Protocol. Instead, UNITA Secretary General Eugenio Manuvakola signed the document. (7) Neither was there a cease-fire. Fighting intensified after the 31 October initialing of the Lusaka Protocol and MPLA/UNITA clashes continued following the 20 November ceremony. (8) Another cease-fire had to be signed on 3 February. (9) Despite the dubious cease-fire, on 8 February 1995 UNSC Resolution 960 was passed establishing UNAVEM III with a maximum deployment of 7,000 military peacekeepers, 1350 military observers, and 260 police observers. While the resolution authorized the immediate deployment of planning and support elements, the military peacekeepers would not arrive until the Secretary General received a further report certifying an effective cease-fire, and that both sides had provided all requested military data. Despite the warning that the UN deployment was contingent upon both sides' cooperation and a countrywide cease-fire, neither side was eager to cooperate fully with UNAVEM. The Security Council in April noted both sides continued military actions, failed to completely disengage, placed restrictions on UNAVEM III and attacked UNAVEM in personnel.”

--Dawn M. Hewitt, “Peacekeeping and the Lusaka Protocol,” Melbourne Journal of Politics, Vol. 26, 1999.

“In 1994, prior to the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, the Angolan chief of staff, General Joao de Matos, argued that UNITA would make a commitment to a peace accord only if it was at a military disadvantage: “If there is military equilibrium, which is what we have at the moment, there will not be a lasting agreement ... It is necessary to have a military imbalance to reach an agreement,” he claimed. Although the government's aggressive weapons' acquisition and its contract with Executive Outcomes did eventually allow it to bargain from a position of military strength, its inability or unwillingness to prevent UNITA's re-armament and its simultaneous slow erosion of strength meant that its position of superiority was only temporary.”

-- Human Rights Watch, *Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War since the 1992 Elections* (New York: Human Rights Watch 1994), 25-6.

“The period since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol has been termed a time of "no war, no peace" as UNITA continues to control much of Angolan territory, security is tenuous, and freedom of movement remains restricted (though slowly improving). For instance, in December 1995, security for humanitarian activities deteriorated to such a degree in some parts of the country that several NGOs either suspended their activities in UNITA-held areas or refused to expand their work into UNITA areas.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

“UNITA has, since 1994, also imported conventional weapons systems including mechanized vehicles such as tanks and armored personnel carriers, mines and explosives, a variety of small arms and light weapons, and anti-aircraft weapons, and a variety of artillery pieces."

The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“Through great perseverance, UN Special Representative Alouine Blondin Beye oversaw the hammering out of the Lusaka Protocol, which was initialed by all parties on 31 October 1994. Although war still swept Angola, the UN was charged with overseeing the implementation of the protocol's provisions. The main vehicle for this was the Joint Commission chaired by the UN. There would be representatives from UNITA and the MPLA, and an observer from each of the Troika nations (Portugal, Russia, United States) who would assist in resolving disputes. The Lusaka Protocol called for the formation of a Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) to be followed by the second round of the presidential elections, canceled due to a return to war in October 1992. (3) Government troops would be confined to barracks and UNITA troops quartered. A unified army under civilian control would be formed and excess forces demobilized. Mercenaries would be expelled from Angola and UNITA troops incorporated into the Angolan National Police (ANP). State administration would be extended to all of Angola. UNITA's Radio VORGAN, a means of militant mass propaganda, was to be transformed into a non-partisan radio station.”

--Dawn M. Hewitt, “Peacekeeping and the Lusaka Protocol,” Melbourne Journal of Politics, Vol. 26, 1999.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Prior to and following the Lusaka protocol neither the government of Angola nor UNITA complied with demands to cease-fire, disarm, or remove their troops from occupied zones.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“A new UN peace-keeping operation in Angola was established on 8 February by the Security Council to help restore peace and achieve national reconciliation in that country after 20 years of civil war. With an initial mandate until 8 August 1995 the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) was authorized under resolution 976 (1995) to deploy a maximum of 7000 military personnel in addition to 350 military and 260 police observers. It replaced UNAVEM II whose mandate had expired.”

--“New UN Verification Mission Set Up,” *UN Chronicle,* 1 June 1995.

“UNAVEM III was deployed under a Chapter VI mandate. It was presumed the Lusaka Protocol signed by both parties provided for a cease-fire and the insertion of UN forces. Yet, these assumptions were incorrect. UNITA leader Savimbi refused to sign the Lusaka Protocol. Instead, UNITA Secretary General Eugenio Manuvakola signed the document. (7) Neither was there a cease-fire. Fighting intensified after the 31 October initialing of the Lusaka Protocol and MPLA/UNITA clashes continued following the 20 November ceremony. (8) Another cease-fire had to be signed on 3 February. (9) Despite the dubious cease-fire, on 8 February 1995 UNSC Resolution 960 was passed establishing UNAVEM III with a maximum deployment of 7,000 military peacekeepers, 1350 military observers, and 260 police observers. While the resolution authorized the immediate deployment of planning and support elements, the military peacekeepers would not arrive until the Secretary General received a further report certifying an effective cease-fire, and that both sides had provided all requested military data. Despite the warning that the UN deployment was contingent upon both sides' cooperation and a countrywide cease-fire, neither side was eager to cooperate fully with UNAVEM. The Security Council in April noted both sides continued military actions, failed to completely disengage, placed restrictions on UNAVEM III and attacked UNAVEM in personnel.”

--Dawn M. Hewitt, “Peacekeeping and the Lusaka Protocol,” Melbourne Journal of Politics, Vol. 26, 1999.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Prior to and following the Lusaka protocol neither the government of Angola nor UNITA complied with demands to cease-fire, disarm, or remove their troops from occupied zones.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Complying with the promises and eventual protocol that came out of the discussions at Lusaka meant risking a great deal of public confidence, legitimacy, freedom, and even life. UNITA leaders were at risk of being put on trial or executed, and government ministers feared UNITA retribution once UNITA was given a politically viable positon.

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **932** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **31 May 1994** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **3** |
| **Demand number:** | **932.0311** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Honor the commitments already made at the talks in Lusaka and Redouble efforts to finish agenda to attain a cease-fire and a peaceful settlement.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“After the Lusaka Protocol, Savimbi was able to regroup his forces and rearm via Zaire.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“Eventually, on 3I October I 994, the government and UNITA initialled a final agreement. Despite continued fighting the Lusaka Protocol was formally signed by the Luanda foreign minister Venancio de Moura and UNITA's secretary-general Eugenio Manuvakola on 20 November, and a cease-fire was declared. Although dos Santos had gone to Zambia to sign on behalf of the government, Savimbi had not made the journey. This was to prove part of a pattern of behaviour which would complicate and confuse the implementation of the agreement.”

--Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

“UNAVEM III was deployed under a Chapter VI mandate. It was presumed the Lusaka Protocol signed by both parties provided for a cease-fire and the insertion of UN forces. Yet, these assumptions were incorrect. UNITA leader Savimbi refused to sign the Lusaka Protocol. Instead, UNITA Secretary General Eugenio Manuvakola signed the document. (7) Neither was there a cease-fire. Fighting intensified after the 31 October initialing of the Lusaka Protocol and MPLA/UNITA clashes continued following the 20 November ceremony. (8) Another cease-fire had to be signed on 3 February. (9) Despite the dubious cease-fire, on 8 February 1995 UNSC Resolution 960 was passed establishing UNAVEM III with a maximum deployment of 7,000 military peacekeepers, 1350 military observers, and 260 police observers. While the resolution authorized the immediate deployment of planning and support elements, the military peacekeepers would not arrive until the Secretary General received a further report certifying an effective cease-fire, and that both sides had provided all requested military data. Despite the warning that the UN deployment was contingent upon both sides' cooperation and a countrywide cease-fire, neither side was eager to cooperate fully with UNAVEM. The Security Council in April noted both sides continued military actions, failed to completely disengage, placed restrictions on UNAVEM III and attacked UNAVEM in personnel.”

--Dawn M. Hewitt, “Peacekeeping and the Lusaka Protocol,” Melbourne Journal of Politics, Vol. 26, 1999.

“UNITA's compliance with the de-mobilisation process has been subject to frequent delays, misinformation and out-right contradiction. The laying of landmines certainly also continued after, and in violation of, the Lusaka accords; Human Rights Watch has documented new mine laying activities as recently as 1997, while attacks during May 1998 have provided ongoing evidence of this. High level pressure from the UN and US failed to hasten Savimbi's pace, eventually resulting in the imposition of much-delayed UN sanctions at the end of February 1998.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“In November 1994, Angolan government forces captured Huambo, UNITA's main stronghold only days before the two sides were due to sign the Lusaka Peace Protocol to end the post-electoral round of fighting. Ominously, Jonas Savimbi did not personally endorse this accord. He retreated to Bailundo and Andulo to set up his group's new headquarters.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“The period since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol has been termed a time of "no war, no peace" as UNITA continues to control much of Angolan territory, security is tenuous, and freedom of movement remains restricted (though slowly improving). For instance, in December 1995, security for humanitarian activities deteriorated to such a degree in some parts of the country that several NGOs either suspended their activities in UNITA-held areas or refused to expand their work into UNITA areas.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While the talks did eventually lead to a temporary warming of relations between UNITA and the government of Angola, and the Lusaka Protocol was indeed signed, there was no true cease-fire that was ever achieved, and a peace settlement was never declared.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Progress in implementing the 'final timetable' under the Lusaka Protocol during March 1998 was smoother, but it again failed to meet even the revised deadline, and so continued into April…Notwithstanding these developments, UNITA has continued to give contradictory signals and even to launch new armed attacks. Several towns, villages and communes in Uige, Moxico Malanje and Lunda Sul provinces previously handed over to the government were retaken by UNITA soldiers. Other settle-ments in Benguela, Bengo, Cuando Cubango, Huambo, Malanje, Huila, Cabinda, Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul provinces were raided during March, April and May, when properties were destroyed and local administrators expelled or abducted.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“In 1994, prior to the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, the Angolan chief of staff, General Joao de Matos, argued that UNITA would make a commitment to a peace accord only if it was at a military disadvantage: “If there is military equilibrium, which is what we have at the moment, there will not be a lasting agreement ... It is necessary to have a military imbalance to reach an agreement,” he claimed. Although the government's aggressive weapons' acquisition and its contract with Executive Outcomes did eventually allow it to bargain from a position of military strength, its inability or unwillingness to prevent UNITA's re-armament and its simultaneous slow erosion of strength meant that its position of superiority was only temporary.”

--Human Rights Watch, *Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War since the 1992 Elections* (New York: Human Rights Watch 1994), 25-6.

“UNITA has, since 1994, also imported conventional weapons systems including mechanized vehicles such as tanks and armored personnel carriers, mines and explosives, a variety of small arms and light weapons, and anti-aircraft weapons, and a variety of artillery pieces."

--The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“Between 1994 and 1998, UNITA purchased military hardware from Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine and Bulgaria. The purchases included about 50 T-55 and T-62 tanks; a significant number of 155-mm G-5, B-2, D-2 and D-30 guns; medium- and long-range D-130 guns; BMP-1 and BMP-2 combat vehicles; ZU-23s anti-aircraft weapons; and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.”

--BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Radio notes British study of UNITA's military resources,” 17 August 1999; Chris Gordon, “Eastern Europe aid bolsters UNITA,” *Africa News Online*, 15 January 1999.

“The Lusaka Protocol had one fundamental flaw in relation to the prospects for a transition to peace. It owed more to international pressure for a settlement, rather than to a real commitment, from UNITA in particular, to make it work. Each side wished to hang on to the spoils that it had, using the political and military conflict to destroy or seize the spoils of its opponents…”

--Barry Munslow, “The Politics of Unsustainable Development,” *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 20, No. 3, (1999): 551-568.

“Since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994, Angolans have been living between war and peace. They are grateful for the cease-fire and peace process that ended the previous two years of unrestrained conflict. But they are concerned at repeated delays in implementation of the agreement.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While the talks did eventually lead to a temporary warming of relations between UNITA and the government of Angola, and the Lusaka Protocol was indeed signed, there was no true cease-fire that was ever achieved, and a peace settlement was never declared.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Complying with the promises and eventual protocol that came out of the discussions at Lusaka meant risking a great deal of public confidence, legitimacy, freedom, and even life. UNITA leaders were at risk of being put on trial or executed, and government ministers feared UNITA retribution once UNITA was given a politically viable positon.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **932** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **31 May 1994** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **4** |
| **Demand number:** | **932.0411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Do like the Gov't of Angola in accepting the proposals on national reconciliation by the Special Representative of the UNSG and the three observer states to the Angolan Peace Process.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Annex 2: Reaffirmation of the acceptance by the Government and by UNITA of the relevant legal instruments 1. The Peace Accords; 2. Security Council Resolutions--Lusaka, 19 November 1994

For the attention of His Excellency Maître Alioune Blondin Beye Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Angola Lusaka

Excellency,

We have the honor to inform you herewith that, within the framework of discussions of item I on the agenda of the Lusaka peace talks, the Government of the Republic of Angola represented by its delegation, solemnly and officially reaffirms the validity of the Peace Accords for Angola concluded with UNITA on 31 May 1991 at Lisbon, Portugal.

The Government of the Republic of Angola also reaffirms its unequivocal acceptance of the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council relating to the post-electoral conflict, in particular, resolutions 804, of 29 January 1993; 811, of 12 March 1993 ; 823, of 30 April 1993; 834, of 1 June 1993; 851, of 14 July 1993 and 864, of 15 September 1993.

Fernando Faustino Muteka Head of the Government delegation Lusaka, 20 November 1994

UNITA'S POSITION ON ITEM I.1 OF THE LUSAKA-II AGENDA: UNITA reaffirms the validity of the Peace Accords for Angola as the basis for peace in Angola. Taking into consideration the current situation of our country and the imperatives of peace, the Peace Accords for Angola must be updated.

UNITA'S POSITION ON ITEM I.2 OF THE LUSAKA-II AGENDA: UNITA reaffirms that it has taken good note of the Security Council resolutions relating to the Angolan crisis, particularly resolution 864/93, as indicated in our letter dated 30 October 1993 addressed to His Excellency, Dr. Boutros Boutros Ghali, Secretary General of the UN.”

--Except from a letter sent November 1994 from UNITA to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Boutros Boutros Ghali. *Conciliation Resources,* 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA was slow to accept the national reconciliation process. Deep into the Lusaka negotiations, UNITA demonstrated reluctance and non-compliance at various stages. UNITA was not leading the compromises and its compliance was low throughout the process.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Annex 2: Reaffirmation of the acceptance by the Government and by UNITA of the relevant legal instruments 1. The Peace Accords; 2. Security Council Resolutions--Lusaka, 19 November 1994

For the attention of His Excellency Maître Alioune Blondin Beye Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Angola Lusaka

Excellency,

We have the honor to inform you herewith that, within the framework of discussions of item I on the agenda of the Lusaka peace talks, the Government of the Republic of Angola represented by its delegation, solemnly and officially reaffirms the validity of the Peace Accords for Angola concluded with UNITA on 31 May 1991 at Lisbon, Portugal.

The Government of the Republic of Angola also reaffirms its unequivocal acceptance of the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council relating to the post-electoral conflict, in particular, resolutions 804, of 29 January 1993; 811, of 12 March 1993 ; 823, of 30 April 1993; 834, of 1 June 1993; 851, of 14 July 1993 and 864, of 15 September 1993.

Fernando Faustino Muteka Head of the Government delegation Lusaka, 20 November 1994

UNITA'S POSITION ON ITEM I.1 OF THE LUSAKA-II AGENDA: UNITA reaffirms the validity of the Peace Accords for Angola as the basis for peace in Angola. Taking into consideration the current situation of our country and the imperatives of peace, the Peace Accords for Angola must be updated.

UNITA'S POSITION ON ITEM I.2 OF THE LUSAKA-II AGENDA: UNITA reaffirms that it has taken good note of the Security Council resolutions relating to the Angolan crisis, particularly resolution 864/93, as indicated in our letter dated 30 October 1993 addressed to His Excellency, Dr. Boutros Boutros Ghali, Secretary General of the UN.”

--Except from a letter sent November 1994 from UNITA to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Boutros Boutros Ghali. *Conciliation Resources,* 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA was slow to accept the national reconciliation process. Deep into the Lusaka negotiations, UNITA demonstrated reluctance and non-compliance at various stages. UNITA was not leading the compromises and its compliance was low throughout the process.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | **Medium depth of demand (2)** | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “medium”. While this demand only presented some risks to its adherents, and was not a huge risk, it was still an enormous demand, that if complied with—could have put larger operations at risk which could have threatened UNITA’s position.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **932** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **31 May 1994** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **9** |
| **Demand number:** | **932.0911** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cease immediately all military operations.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA has, since 1994, also imported conventional weapons systems including mechanized vehicles such as tanks and armored personnel carriers, mines and explosives, a variety of small arms and light weapons, and anti-aircraft weapons, and a variety of artillery pieces."

--The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“UNAVEM III was deployed under a Chapter VI mandate. It was presumed the Lusaka Protocol signed by both parties provided for a cease-fire and the insertion of UN forces. Yet, these assumptions were incorrect. UNITA leader Savimbi refused to sign the Lusaka Protocol. Instead, UNITA Secretary General Eugenio Manuvakola signed the document. (7) Neither was there a cease-fire. Fighting intensified after the 31 October initialing of the Lusaka Protocol and MPLA/UNITA clashes continued following the 20 November ceremony. (8) Another cease-fire had to be signed on 3 February. (9) Despite the dubious cease-fire, on 8 February 1995 UNSC Resolution 960 was passed establishing UNAVEM III with a maximum deployment of 7,000 military peacekeepers, 1350 military observers, and 260 police observers. While the resolution authorized the immediate deployment of planning and support elements, the military peacekeepers would not arrive until the Secretary General received a further report certifying an effective cease-fire, and that both sides had provided all requested military data. Despite the warning that the UN deployment was contingent upon both sides' cooperation and a countrywide cease-fire, neither side was eager to cooperate fully with UNAVEM. The Security Council in April noted both sides continued military actions, failed to completely disengage, placed restrictions on UNAVEM III and attacked UNAVEM in personnel”

--Dawn M. Hewitt, “Peacekeeping and the Lusaka Protocol,” Melbourne Journal of Politics, Vol. 26, 1999.

“The period since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol has been termed a time of "no war, no peace" as UNITA continues to control much of Angolan territory, security is tenuous, and freedom of movement remains restricted (though slowly improving). For instance, in December 1995, security for humanitarian activities deteriorated to such a degree in some parts of the country that several NGOs either suspended their activities in UNITA-held areas or refused to expand their work into UNITA areas.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Immediately prior and following the Lusaka protocol, neither the government of Angola nor UNITA ceased fire, nor moved troops out of occupied areas, and continued unabated with military operations against the opposing side.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“A new UN peace-keeping operation in Angola was established on 8 February by the Security Council to help restore peace and achieve national reconciliation in that country after 20 years of civil war. With an initial mandate until 8 August 1995 the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) was authorized under resolution 976 (1995) to deploy a maximum of 7000 military personnel in addition to 350 military and 260 police observers. It replaced UNAVEM II whose mandate had expired.”

--“New UN Verification Mission Set Up,” *UN Chronicle,* 1 June 1995.

“Between 1994 and 1998, UNITA purchased military hardware from Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine and Bulgaria. The purchases included about 50 T-55 and T-62 tanks; a significant number of 155-mm G-5, B-2, D-2 and D-30 guns; medium- and long-range D-130 guns; BMP-1 and BMP-2 combat vehicles; ZU-23s anti-aircraft weapons; and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.”

--BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Radio notes British study of UNITA's military resources,” 17 August 1999; Chris Gordon, “Eastern Europe aid bolsters UNITA,” *Africa News Online*, 15 January 1999.

“Since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994, Angolans have been living between war and peace. They are grateful for the cease-fire and peace process that ended the previous two years of unrestrained conflict. But they are concerned at repeated delays in implementation of the agreement.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Immediately prior and following the Lusaka protocol, neither the government of Angola nor UNITA ceased fire, nor moved troops out of occupied areas.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat to the existence of both UNITA and the Government of Angola if either had stopped attacks or ceased to address the attacks of the opposing side.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **932** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **31 May 1994** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **11** |
| **Demand number:** | **932.1111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Grant immediately security clearances and guarantees of relief deliveries and refrain from any action that could jeopardize the safety of relief personnel or disrupt the distribution of humanitarian assistance.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“International humanitarian agencies and donors, under UN co-ordination with NGOs active on the ground mounted a very successful emergency operation through 1993 and 1994, keeping tens of thousands displaced by war alive in besieged towns throughout the country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“On 15 September 1993, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council imposed an embargo on military goods and oil to UNITA.**7** During exploratory peace talks in October 1993 UNITA reaffirmed its acceptance of the Bicesse Accords and agreed to abide by the results of the 1992 elections. Angolan peace talks in Lusaka then commenced in November 1993. By mid-December sufficient progress had been recorded for the Secretary-General to recommend the postponement of additional measures against UNITA. However progress stalled in early 1994 and by June, military offensives had escalated again. Just one month prior to the scheduled signing of the Lusaka Protocol, heavy fighting occurred throughout Angola. The international community, the Security Council and the Secretary-General increased their pressure on the parties, and finally, on 20 November, 1994, the Lusaka Protocol was signed.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

“The coordination of action against land mines and coordination of humanitarian assistance to the areas in which UNITA soldiers were…was made difficult by the lack of resources available to UNITA soldiers, and the constancy of…threatening acts made by both the government and the rebels…”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

“The numbers of people displaced by the conflict continued to grow, estimated at two million by June 1993. According to the government, Angola required 27,000 tons of food per month plus medical supplies. Commercial food imports into Luanda diminished due to the lack of foreign exchange, with the government forced to spend money on armaments and exporters reluctant to send ships into a war zone. A U.N. World Food Program report suggested that a significant proportion of Angola's harvest would rot due to disruption caused by the fighting, and estimated that 1.9 million conflict- and drought-affected persons would require 337,000 tons of food assistance. Reports of human rights abuses by both sides increased as the conflict intensified and civilians became victims of calculated violence. Reports from the central and northern provinces indicated that both sides have engaged in killings and intimidation of civilians, especially if they were not from the home ethnic group. These tactics caused massive civilian displacement, especially out of UNITA, held areas, and have encouraged ethnic divisions. Africa Watch also received frequent reports of violations of the laws of war by both sides, including executions of captured soldiers and cases of children forced to fight on the war front. UNITA was also responsible for gross human rights abuses, including executions of civilians and other deliberate and arbitrary killings. Near Quipungo (Huila) UNITA attacked a train on May 27 in which 225 people were killed and several hundred injured, most of them civilians. Humanitarian efforts were also hampered by the war. Several relief flights were hit by UNITA fire. In April, a World Food Programme (WFP) aircraft was shot down by UNITA in eastern Angola. UNITA attempted to deny the delivery of food aid to isolated government towns in order to capture them. There were frequent suspensions of relief flights because of these attacks. The government also sought to deny food aid delivery to rebel-held areas. In July, an agreement reached between the government, UNITA and the U.N. allowedthe resumption of some relief flights to agreed locations. Only in late October was the U.N. able to fly again to all towns across the country.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report 1994* – Angola, UNHCR RefWorld, 1995.

Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The peace process that began in late 1994 has relatively improved stability and increased accessibility of areas within and between Government and UNITA-controlled parts of the country. Therefore in the past three years, the Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions have had improving opportunities for discussion and observation in the field. However, many areas remain difficult to access by road and the security situation in several provinces has deteriorated, particularly given repeated reports of bandit attacks.”

--Special Report- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola, 20 May 1998

“The first is Angolas increasing- and largely avoidable- humanitarian crisis. The return to war has exacerbated an already difficult internal refugee problem. By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The

Number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angola’s population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanjein the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000....The

War has also obstructed or interrupted aid flights and convoys by organizations such as the World Food Programme and CARE at a time when some donors have failed to live up to promises of relief aid to the region.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“And, despite large-scale international commitments of humanitarian and reconstruction aid, the prospects for quick implementation of sustainable projects for reconstruction which could give additional momentum to peaceful activities are still hampered by government incapacity, UNITA fears of losing control over their population base, and the lack of sufficient local knowledge and problems of coordination among newly arrived agencies.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

“By mid-1998 military actions by UNITA had resulted in a dramatic humanitarian and human rights situation, with 1,3 million people, or ten per cent of the population displaced. The military and security situation in the country further deteriorated through 1998, and the risks of a resumption of full-scale hostilities increased significantly. UNITA forces continued to threaten Lunda Sul, Lunda Norte, Moxico, Uige and Cuanza Norte Provinces. Evidently, UNITA maintained a significant military capability, despite its past declarations on the demilitarization of its forces. On many occasions, UNITA "residual" troops were identified as being responsible for attacks on villages and towns, as well as ambushes on major roads. There were also incidents of selective killing and kidnapping in order to intimidate the population and dissuade it from cooperating with government authorities.”

--Center for Democracy in Angola, FAS Resource Intelligence program, 26 February 1999.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **945** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **29 September 1994** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **11** |
| **Demand number:** | **945.0311** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Honor the commitments already made at the talks in Lusaka and Complete negotiations as soon as possible, and make every necessary effort to have the Lusaka Agreement signed before 10/31/94.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Lusaka Protocol, signed in Lusaka, Zambia on October 31, 1994, attempted to end the Angolan Civil War by integrating and disarming UNITA and national reconciliation. Both sides signed a ceasefire as part of the protocol on November 20… By November 1994 the government had taken control of 60% of the country. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi called the situation UNITA's "deepest crisis" since its creation. Savimbi, unwilling to personally sign the accord, had former UNITA Secretary General Eugenio Manuvakola sign in his place and President José Eduardo dos Santos responded by having Angolan Foreign Minister Venancio de Moura represent the MPLA. According to Manuvakola, Savimbi wanted him to act as a scapegoat.”

--Rothchild, Donald S. *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation*, 1997. Pages 137-138

“After the Lusaka Protocol, Savimbi was able to regroup his forces and rearm via Zaire.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“UNAVEM III was deployed under a Chapter VI mandate. It was presumed the Lusaka Protocol signed by both parties provided for a cease-fire and the insertion of UN forces. Yet, these assumptions were incorrect. UNITA leader Savimbi refused to sign the Lusaka Protocol. Instead, UNITA Secretary General Eugenio Manuvakola signed the document. (7) Neither was there a cease-fire. Fighting intensified after the 31 October initialing of the Lusaka Protocol and MPLA/UNITA clashes continued following the 20 November ceremony. (8) Another cease-fire had to be signed on 3 February. (9) Despite the dubious cease-fire, on 8 February 1995 UNSC Resolution 960 was passed establishing UNAVEM III with a maximum deployment of 7,000 military peacekeepers, 1350 military observers, and 260 police observers. While the resolution authorized the immediate deployment of planning and support elements, the military peacekeepers would not arrive until the Secretary General received a further report certifying an effective cease-fire, and that both sides had provided all requested military data. Despite the warning that the UN deployment was contingent upon both sides' cooperation and a countrywide cease-fire, neither side was eager to cooperate fully with UNAVEM. The Security Council in April noted both sides continued military actions, failed to completely disengage, placed restrictions on UNAVEM III and attacked UNAVEM in personnel.”

--Dawn M. Hewitt, “Peacekeeping and the Lusaka Protocol,” Melbourne Journal of Politics, Vol. 26, 1999.

“Eventually, on 3I October I 994, the government and UNITA initialled a final agreement. Despite continued fighting the Lusaka Protocol was formally signed by the Luanda foreign minister Venancio de Moura and UNITA's secretary-general Eugenio Manuvakola on 20 November, and a cease-fire was declared. Although dos Santos had gone to Zambia to sign on behalf of the government, Savimbi had not made the journey. This was to prove part of a pattern of behaviour which would complicate and confuse the implementation of the agreement.”

--Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

“UNITA has, since 1994, also imported conventional weapons systems including mechanized vehicles such as tanks and armored personnel carriers, mines and explosives, a variety of small arms and light weapons, and anti-aircraft weapons, and a variety of artillery pieces."

--The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“In November 1994, Angolan government forces captured Huambo, UNITA's main stronghold only days before the two sides were due to sign the Lusaka Peace Protocol to end the post-electoral round of fighting. Ominously, Jonas Savimbi did not personally endorse this accord. He retreated to Bailundo and Andulo to set up his group's new headquarters.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

For an exceedingly short period, both the government of Angola and UNITA complied with UN demands and signed the Lusaka Protocol before December 1994. It was signed in November 1994.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA's compliance with the de-mobilisation process has been subject to frequent delays, misinformation and out-right contradiction. The laying of landmines certainly also continued after, and in violation of, the Lusaka accords; Human Rights Watch has documented new mine laying activities as recently as 1997, while attacks during May 1998 have provided ongoing evidence of this. High level pressure from the UN and US failed to hasten Savimbi's pace, eventually resulting in the imposition of much-delayed UN sanctions at the end of February 1998.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“Progress in implementing the 'final timetable' under the Lusaka Protocol during March 1998 was smoother, but it again failed to meet even the revised deadline, and so continued into April…Notwithstanding these developments, UNITA has continued to give contradictory signals and even to launch new armed attacks. Several towns, villages and communes in Uige, Moxico Malanje and Lunda Sul provinces previously handed over to the government were retaken by UNITA soldiers. Other settle-ments in Benguela, Bengo, Cuando Cubango, Huambo, Malanje, Huila, Cabinda, Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul provinces were raided during March, April and May, when properties were destroyed and local administrators expelled or abducted.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“An intensification of fighting on the eve of the Lusaka signing was followed by a rash of local violations of the cease-fire in late November and December I994. Military hard-liners on both sides were unenthusiastic about the agreement. On the government side particularly, military advances during I993 and I994 encouraged a 'one more push' mentality which looked to the final defeat of an enfeebled UNITA. On the other side, a number of UNITA generals saw the agreement as the beginning of the end for the movement… In the second week of February I995, three months after the signing of the agreement, UNITA held a party congress in its new central highland headquarters at Bailundo. Jonas Savimbi offered contradictory pointers to his attitude. In one speech he denounced the Lusaka Protocol as a 'collection of lies' and a 'meaningless piece of paper'…Yet later, speaking directly to foreign journalists, Savimbi insisted he was committed to the agreement but constrained by his own hard-line generals.”

--“Angola,” *The Economist,* 18-24 February 1995

“A new UN peace-keeping operation in Angola was established on 8 February by the Security Council to help restore peace and achieve national reconciliation in that country after 20 years of civil war. With an initial mandate until 8 August 1995 the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) was authorized under resolution 976 (1995) to deploy a maximum of 7000 military personnel in addition to 350 military and 260 police observers. It replaced UNAVEM II whose mandate had expired.”

--“New UN Verification Mission Set Up,” *UN Chronicle,* 1 June 1995.

“Between 1994 and 1998, UNITA purchased military hardware from Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine and Bulgaria. The purchases included about 50 T-55 and T-62 tanks; a significant number of 155-mm G-5, B-2, D-2 and D-30 guns; medium- and long-range D-130 guns; BMP-1 and BMP-2 combat vehicles; ZU-23s anti-aircraft weapons; and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.”

--BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Radio notes British study of UNITA's military resources,” 17 August 1999; Chris Gordon, “Eastern Europe aid bolsters UNITA,” *Africa News Online*, 15 January 1999.

“The Lusaka Protocol had one fundamental flaw in relation to the prospects for a transition to peace. It owed more to international pressure for a settlement, rather than to a real commitment, from UNITA in particular, to make it work. Each side wished to hang on to the spoils that it had, using the political and military conflict to destroy or seize the spoils of its opponents…”

--Barry Munslow, “The Politics of Unsustainable Development,” *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 20, No. 3, (1999): 551-568.

“Since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994, Angolans have been living between war and peace. They are grateful for the cease-fire and peace process that ended the previous two years of unrestrained conflict. But they are concerned at repeated delays in implementation of the agreement.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

For an exceedingly short period, both the government of Angola and UNITA complied with UN demands and signed the Lusaka Protocol before December 1994. It was signed in November 1994.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | **Medium depth of demand (2)** | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “medium” for while it did not present any great threats to the parties to sign the agreement, the cessation of hostilities and attempts to return to diplomatic negotiations threatened the parties’ viability and legitimacy in the long run.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **945** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **29 September 1994** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **7** |
| **Demand number:** | **945.0711** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cease forthwith all military operations.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“A new UN peace-keeping operation in Angola was established on 8 February by the Security Council to help restore peace and achieve national reconciliation in that country after 20 years of civil war. With an initial mandate until 8 August 1995 the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) was authorized under resolution 976 (1995) to deploy a maximum of 7000 military personnel in addition to 350 military and 260 police observers. It replaced UNAVEM II whose mandate had expired.”

--“New UN Verification Mission Set Up,” *UN Chronicle,* 1 June 1995.

“UNAVEM III was deployed under a Chapter VI mandate. It was presumed the Lusaka Protocol signed by both parties provided for a cease-fire and the insertion of UN forces. Yet, these assumptions were incorrect. UNITA leader Savimbi refused to sign the Lusaka Protocol. Instead, UNITA Secretary General Eugenio Manuvakola signed the document. (7) Neither was there a cease-fire. Fighting intensified after the 31 October initialing of the Lusaka Protocol and MPLA/UNITA clashes continued following the 20 November ceremony. (8) Another cease-fire had to be signed on 3 February. (9) Despite the dubious cease-fire, on 8 February 1995 UNSC Resolution 960 was passed establishing UNAVEM III with a maximum deployment of 7,000 military peacekeepers, 1350 military observers, and 260 police observers. While the resolution authorized the immediate deployment of planning and support elements, the military peacekeepers would not arrive until the Secretary General received a further report certifying an effective cease-fire, and that both sides had provided all requested military data. Despite the warning that the UN deployment was contingent upon both sides' cooperation and a countrywide cease-fire, neither side was eager to cooperate fully with UNAVEM. The Security Council in April noted both sides continued military actions, failed to completely disengage, placed restrictions on UNAVEM III and attacked UNAVEM in personnel”

--Dawn M. Hewitt, “Peacekeeping and the Lusaka Protocol,” Melbourne Journal of Politics, Vol. 26, 1999.

“UNITA has, since 1994, also imported conventional weapons systems including mechanized vehicles such as tanks and armored personnel carriers, mines and explosives, a variety of small arms and light weapons, and anti-aircraft weapons, and a variety of artillery pieces."

--The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government and UNITA did not comply with this demand and returned to a state of war in many territories with Angola, all while making rhetorical efforts to appear as if they were disarming or ceding territorial control.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA has, since 1994, also imported conventional weapons systems including mechanized vehicles such as tanks and armored personnel carriers, mines and explosives, a variety of small arms and light weapons, and anti-aircraft weapons, and a variety of artillery pieces."

--The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“Between 1994 and 1998, UNITA purchased military hardware from Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine and Bulgaria. The purchases included about 50 T-55 and T-62 tanks; a significant number of 155-mm G-5, B-2, D-2 and D-30 guns; medium- and long-range D-130 guns; BMP-1 and BMP-2 combat vehicles; ZU-23s anti-aircraft weapons; and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.”

--BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Radio notes British study of UNITA's military resources,” 17 August 1999; Chris Gordon, “Eastern Europe aid bolsters UNITA,” *Africa News Online*, 15 January 1999.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government and UNITA did not comply with this demand and returned to a state of war in many territories with Angola, all while making rhetorical efforts to appear as if they were disarming or ceding territorial control.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat to the existence of both UNITA and the Government of Angola if either had stopped attacks or ceased to address the attacks of the opposing side.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **945** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **29 September 1994** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **10** |
| **Demand number:** | **945.1011** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Full cooperation with stopping any action which threatens the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need in Angola.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“International humanitarian agencies and donors, under UN co-ordination with NGOs active on the ground mounted a very successful emergency operation through 1993 and 1994, keeping tens of thousands displaced by war alive in besieged towns throughout the country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“The peace process that began in late 1994 has relatively improved stability and increased accessibility of areas within and between Government and UNITA-controlled parts of the country. Therefore in the past three years, the Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions have had improving opportunities for discussion and observation in the field. However, many areas remain difficult to access by road and the security situation in several provinces has deteriorated, particularly given repeated reports of bandit attacks.”

--Special Report- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola, 20 May 1998

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Not only did UNITA and the government of Angola make little to no effort to clear roads, make rural areas safe, and disarm civilians in order to make humanitarian deliveries possible, both sides actively engaged in randomized violence which put humanitarian workers’ lives at risk and threatened the completion of humanitarian deliveries throughout Angola. There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The United Nations reports as of May 1995 that UN agencies and non-governmental organisations have been able to extend their humanitarian and rehabilitation programmes to several previously inaccessible areas. Efforts to intensify the distribution of humanitarian aid by road have begun to show results. Overland convoys have been operating from Lobito to Cubal in Benguela Province, and humanitarian organisations have travelled by road in Malanje Province and halfway through Huambo Province. However, the UN reports that as a result of logistic constraints, mines and banditry, overland access to many parts of the country is still restricted. These factors are hindering the return of displaced people to their places of origin. As a result, the WFP airlift operation remains essential to the humanitarian aid programme.”

--*Angola Peace Monitor,* 19 May 1995, Issue 4. Univeristy of Pennsylvania African Studies Center.

“The peace process that began in late 1994 has relatively improved stability and increased accessibility of areas within and between Government and UNITA-controlled parts of the country. Therefore in the past three years, the Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions have had improving opportunities for discussion and observation in the field. However, many areas remain difficult to access by road and the security situation in several provinces has deteriorated, particularly given repeated reports of bandit attacks.”

--Special Report- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola, 20 May 1998

“The first is Angolas increasing- and largely avoidable- humanitarian crisis. The return to war has exacerbated an already difficult internal refugee problem. By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The

Number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angola’s population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanjein the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000....The

War has also obstructed or interrupted aid flights and convoys by organizations such as the World Food Programme and CARE at a time when some donors have failed to live up to promises of relief aid to the region.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“And, despite large-scale international commitments of humanitarian and reconstruction aid, the prospects for quick implementation of sustainable projects for reconstruction which could give additional momentum to peaceful activities are still hampered by government incapacity, UNITA fears of losing control over their population base, and the lack of sufficient local knowledge and problems of coordination among newly arrived agencies.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Not only did UNITA and the government of Angola make little to no effort to clear roads, make rural areas safe, and disarm civilians in order to make humanitarian deliveries possible, both sides actively engaged in randomized violence which put humanitarian workers’ lives at risk and threatened the completion of humanitarian deliveries throughout Angola. There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **945** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **29 September 1994** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **10** |
| **Demand number:** | **945.1111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Immediate release of disappeared humanitarian relief workers and complete cooperation of the parties, especially UNITA with the UN investigation into their disappearance.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The peace process that began in late 1994 has relatively improved stability and increased accessibility of areas within and between Government and UNITA-controlled parts of the country. Therefore in the past three years, the Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions have had improving opportunities for discussion and observation in the field. However, many areas remain difficult to access by road and the security situation in several provinces has deteriorated, particularly given repeated reports of bandit attacks.”

--Special Report- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola, 20 May 1998

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There is no evidence that the government of Angola or UNITA released humanitarian workers held hostage safely, nor is there evidence that the government or UNITA investigated the disappearance of such hostages.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The peace process that began in late 1994 has relatively improved stability and increased accessibility of areas within and between Government and UNITA-controlled parts of the country. Therefore in the past three years, the Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions have had improving opportunities for discussion and observation in the field. However, many areas remain difficult to access by road and the security situation in several provinces has deteriorated, particularly given repeated reports of bandit attacks.”

--Special Report- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola, 20 May 1998

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There is no evidence that the government of Angola or UNITA released humanitarian workers held hostage safely, nor is there evidence that the government or UNITA investigated the disappearance of such hostages.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **952** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **27 October 1994** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **3** |
| **Demand number:** | **952.0311** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Honor the commitments made at the Lusaka talks and Conclude immediately an agreement and thereafter to establish and respect an effective and sustainable cease-fire.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“After the Lusaka Protocol, Savimbi was able to regroup his forces and rearm via Zaire.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“In November 1994, Angolan government forces captured Huambo, UNITA's main stronghold only days before the two sides were due to sign the Lusaka Peace Protocol to end the post-electoral round of fighting. Ominously, Jonas Savimbi did not personally endorse this accord. He retreated to Bailundo and Andulo to set up his group's new headquarters.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

“Eventually, on 3I October I 994, the government and UNITA initialled a final agreement. Despite continued fighting the Lusaka Protocol was formally signed by the Luanda foreign minister Venancio de Moura and UNITA's secretary-general Eugenio Manuvakola on 20 November, and a cease-fire was declared. Although dos Santos had gone to Zambia to sign on behalf of the government, Savimbi had not made the journey. This was to prove part of a pattern of behaviour which would complicate and confuse the implementation of the agreement.”

--Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

“UNITA has, since 1994, also imported conventional weapons systems including mechanized vehicles such as tanks and armored personnel carriers, mines and explosives, a variety of small arms and light weapons, and anti-aircraft weapons, and a variety of artillery pieces."

--The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“UNAVEM III was deployed under a Chapter VI mandate. It was presumed the Lusaka Protocol signed by both parties provided for a cease-fire and the insertion of UN forces. Yet, these assumptions were incorrect. UNITA leader Savimbi refused to sign the Lusaka Protocol. Instead, UNITA Secretary General Eugenio Manuvakola signed the document. (7) Neither was there a cease-fire. Fighting intensified after the 31 October initialing of the Lusaka Protocol and MPLA/UNITA clashes continued following the 20 November ceremony. (8) Another cease-fire had to be signed on 3 February. (9) Despite the dubious cease-fire, on 8 February 1995 UNSC Resolution 960 was passed establishing UNAVEM III with a maximum deployment of 7,000 military peacekeepers, 1350 military observers, and 260 police observers. While the resolution authorized the immediate deployment of planning and support elements, the military peacekeepers would not arrive until the Secretary General received a further report certifying an effective cease-fire, and that both sides had provided all requested military data. Despite the warning that the UN deployment was contingent upon both sides' cooperation and a countrywide cease-fire, neither side was eager to cooperate fully with UNAVEM. The Security Council in April noted both sides continued military actions, failed to completely disengage, placed restrictions on UNAVEM III and attacked UNAVEM in personnel.”

--Dawn M. Hewitt, “Peacekeeping and the Lusaka Protocol,” Melbourne Journal of Politics, Vol. 26, 1999.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Following the Lusaka protocol neither the government of Angola nor UNITA complied with demands to cease-fire, disarm, or remove their troops from occupied zones.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA's compliance with the de-mobilisation process has been subject to frequent delays, misinformation and out-right contradiction. The laying of landmines certainly also continued after, and in violation of, the Lusaka accords; Human Rights Watch has documented new mine laying activities as recently as 1997, while attacks during May 1998 have provided ongoing evidence of this. High level pressure from the UN and US failed to hasten Savimbi's pace, eventually resulting in the imposition of much-delayed UN sanctions at the end of February 1998.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“Progress in implementing the 'final timetable' under the Lusaka Protocol during March 1998 was smoother, but it again failed to meet even the revised deadline, and so continued into April…Notwithstanding these developments, UNITA has continued to give contradictory signals and even to launch new armed attacks. Several towns, villages and communes in Uige, Moxico Malanje and Lunda Sul provinces previously handed over to the government were retaken by UNITA soldiers. Other settle-ments in Benguela, Bengo, Cuando Cubango, Huambo, Malanje, Huila, Cabinda, Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul provinces were raided during March, April and May, when properties were destroyed and local administrators expelled or abducted.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“An intensification of fighting on the eve of the Lusaka signing was followed by a rash of local violations of the cease-fire in late November and December I994. Military hard-liners on both sides were unenthusiastic about the agreement. On the government side particularly, military advances during I993 and I994 encouraged a 'one more push' mentality which looked to the final defeat of an enfeebled UNITA. On the other side, a number of UNITA generals saw the agreement as the beginning of the end for the movement… In the second week of February I995, three months after the signing of the agreement, UNITA held a party congress in its new central highland headquarters at Bailundo. Jonas Savimbi offered contradictory pointers to his attitude. In one speech he denounced the Lusaka Protocol as a 'collection of lies' and a 'meaningless piece of paper'…Yet later, speaking directly to foreign journalists, Savimbi insisted he was committed to the agreement but constrained by his own hard-line generals.”

--“Angola,” *The Economist,* 18-24 February 1995

“A new UN peace-keeping operation in Angola was established on 8 February by the Security Council to help restore peace and achieve national reconciliation in that country after 20 years of civil war. With an initial mandate until 8 August 1995 the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) was authorized under resolution 976 (1995) to deploy a maximum of 7000 military personnel in addition to 350 military and 260 police observers. It replaced UNAVEM II whose mandate had expired.”

--“New UN Verification Mission Set Up,” *UN Chronicle,* 1 June 1995.

“UNITA used its substantial diamond revenues to undertake a fundamental military reorganization…between 1993 and 1999…it moved away from its traditional posture as a guerrilla army into a more conventional disposition in preparation for delivering a final victorious blow against government forces and seizing state power. To this end, the rebels engaged in a major military procurement programme. UNITA has activities in acquiring arms and military equipment.”

--The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“UNITA has, since 1994, also imported conventional weapons systems including mechanized vehicles such as tanks and armored personnel carriers, mines and explosives, a variety of small arms and light weapons, and anti-aircraft weapons, and a variety of artillery pieces."

The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“Between 1994 and 1998, UNITA purchased military hardware from Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine and Bulgaria. The purchases included about 50 T-55 and T-62 tanks; a significant number of 155-mm G-5, B-2, D-2 and D-30 guns; medium- and long-range D-130 guns; BMP-1 and BMP-2 combat vehicles; ZU-23s anti-aircraft weapons; and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.”

--BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Radio notes British study of UNITA's military resources,” 17 August 1999; Chris Gordon, “Eastern Europe aid bolsters UNITA,” *Africa News Online*, 15 January 1999.

“The Lusaka Protocol had one fundamental flaw in relation to the prospects for a transition to peace. It owed more to international pressure for a settlement, rather than to a real commitment, from UNITA in particular, to make it work. Each side wished to hang on to the spoils that it had, using the political and military conflict to destroy or seize the spoils of its opponents…”

--Barry Munslow, “The Politics of Unsustainable Development,” *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 20, No. 3, (1999): 551-568.

“Since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994, Angolans have been living between war and peace. They are grateful for the cease-fire and peace process that ended the previous two years of unrestrained conflict. But they are concerned at repeated delays in implementation of the agreement.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Following the Lusaka protocol neither the government of Angola nor UNITA complied with demands to cease-fire, disarm, or remove their troops from occupied zones.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat to the existence of both UNITA and the Government of Angola if either had stopped attacks or ceased to address the attacks of the opposing side.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **952** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **27 October 1994** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **6** |
| **Demand number:** | **952.0611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cease immediately all military operations.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“A new UN peace-keeping operation in Angola was established on 8 February by the Security Council to help restore peace and achieve national reconciliation in that country after 20 years of civil war. With an initial mandate until 8 August 1995 the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) was authorized under resolution 976 (1995) to deploy a maximum of 7000 military personnel in addition to 350 military and 260 police observers. It replaced UNAVEM II whose mandate had expired.”

--“New UN Verification Mission Set Up,” *UN Chronicle,* 1 June 1995.

“UNITA has, since 1994, also imported conventional weapons systems including mechanized vehicles such as tanks and armored personnel carriers, mines and explosives, a variety of small arms and light weapons, and anti-aircraft weapons, and a variety of artillery pieces."

The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Following the Lusaka protocol neither the government of Angola nor UNITA complied with demands to cease hostilities, disarm, or remove their troops from occupied zones

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA has, since 1994, also imported conventional weapons systems including mechanized vehicles such as tanks and armored personnel carriers, mines and explosives, a variety of small arms and light weapons, and anti-aircraft weapons, and a variety of artillery pieces."

The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“Between 1994 and 1998, UNITA purchased military hardware from Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine and Bulgaria. The purchases included about 50 T-55 and T-62 tanks; a significant number of 155-mm G-5, B-2, D-2 and D-30 guns; medium- and long-range D-130 guns; BMP-1 and BMP-2 combat vehicles; ZU-23s anti-aircraft weapons; and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.”

--BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Radio notes British study of UNITA's military resources,” 17 August 1999; Chris Gordon, “Eastern Europe aid bolsters UNITA,” *Africa News Online*, 15 January 1999.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Following the Lusaka protocol neither the government of Angola nor UNITA complied with demands to cease hostilities, disarm, or remove their troops from occupied zones

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat to the existence of both UNITA and the Government of Angola if either had stopped attacks or ceased to address the attacks of the opposing side.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **952** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **27 October 1994** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **7** |
| **Demand number:** | **952.0711** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Grant security clearances and guaranties for relief deliveries to all locations and refrain from any action that could jeopardize the safety of relief personnel or disrupt the distribution of humanitarian assistance.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“As of May 1995, the roads situation is improving. In a significant sign that the road problems were being overcome, the members of the Joint Commission left Luanda on 17 May in a convoy of 40 vehicles to travel 300 miles overland to Lobito on the South Coast. There an extraordinary session of the Joint Commission was held on the 18 May. The meeting decided to make efforts to open up roads as soon as possible for the rapid deployment of UN troops in the centre and south of Angola.”

--*Angola Peace Monitor,* 19 May 1995, Issue 4. Univeristy of Pennsylvania African Studies Center.

“The United Nations reports as of May 1995 that UN agencies and non-governmental organisations have been able to extend their humanitarian and rehabilitation programmes to several previously inaccessible areas. Efforts to intensify the distribution of humanitarian aid by road have begun to show results. Overland convoys have been operating from Lobito to Cubal in Benguela Province, and humanitarian organisations have travelled by road in Malanje Province and halfway through Huambo Province. However, the UN reports that as a result of logistic constraints, mines and banditry, overland access to many parts of the country is still restricted. These factors are hindering the return of displaced people to their places of origin. As a result, the WFP airlift operation remains essential to the humanitarian aid programme.”

--*Angola Peace Monitor,* 19 May 1995, Issue 4. Univeristy of Pennsylvania African Studies Center

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“International humanitarian agencies and donors, under UN co-ordination with NGOs active on the ground mounted a very successful emergency operation through 1993 and 1994, keeping tens of thousands displaced by war alive in besieged towns throughout the country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“The peace process that began in late 1994 has relatively improved stability and increased accessibility of areas within and between Government and UNITA-controlled parts of the country. Therefore in the past three years, the Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions have had improving opportunities for discussion and observation in the field. However, many areas remain difficult to access by road and the security situation in several provinces has deteriorated, particularly given repeated reports of bandit attacks.”

--Special Report- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola, 20 May 1998

“The first is Angolas increasing- and largely avoidable- humanitarian crisis. The return to war has exacerbated an already difficult internal refugee problem. By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The

Number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angola’s population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanjein the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000....The

War has also obstructed or interrupted aid flights and convoys by organizations such as the World Food Programme and CARE at a time when some donors have failed to live up to promises of relief aid to the region.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“And, despite large-scale international commitments of humanitarian and reconstruction aid, the prospects for quick implementation of sustainable projects for reconstruction which could give additional momentum to peaceful activities are still hampered by government incapacity, UNITA fears of losing control over their population base, and the lack of sufficient local knowledge and problems of coordination among newly arrived agencies.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA or the government in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **952** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **27 October 1994** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **8** |
| **Demand number:** | **952.0811** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Immediate release of humanitarian relief workers, and complete cooperation of the parties, especially UNITA, with the UN investigation into their disappearance.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Between 1994 and 2001, poor roads and pervasive security concerns forced relief groups to transport 60 percent of all aid items by air despite aviation fuel shortages and often badly maintained rural airstrips. Combatants fired at three WFP relief planes during the year, forcing a temporary suspension of relief flights nationwide. UNITA rebels killed and abducted some local aid workers. “Overall humanitarian conditions deteriorated,” UN relief agencies reported late in the year. Child mortality rates climbed to nearly 40 percent, according to the UN Population Fund. Angola’s maternal mortality rates were reportedly ten times higher than in neighboring Namibia.”

--*World Refugee Survey 2002 Country Report: Angola*, USCR

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There is no evidence that the government of Angola or UNITA released humanitarian workers held hostage safely, nor is there evidence that the government or UNITA investigated the disappearance of such hostages.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Between 1994 and 2001, poor roads and pervasive security concerns forced relief groups to transport 60 percent of all aid items by air despite aviation fuel shortages and often badly maintained rural airstrips. Combatants fired at three WFP relief planes during the year, forcing a temporary suspension of relief flights nationwide. UNITA rebels killed and abducted some local aid workers. “Overall humanitarian conditions deteriorated,” UN relief agencies reported late in the year. Child mortality rates climbed to nearly 40 percent, according to the UN Population Fund. Angola’s maternal mortality rates were reportedly ten times higher than in neighboring Namibia.”

--*World Refugee Survey 2002 Country Report: Angola*, USCR

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There is no evidence that the government of Angola or UNITA released humanitarian workers held hostage safely, nor is there evidence that the government or UNITA investigated the disappearance of such hostages.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **966** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 December 1994** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **3** |
| **Demand number:** | **966.0311** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Respect fully the cease-fire entered into effect on 11/22/94.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Reduction in cease-fire violations: According to the United Nations, by early May there had been a further reduction in the number of cease-fire violations. However, the United Nations reports that both UNITA and FAA have continued to occupy forward positions and complaints have been lodged against UNITA and FAA each of the Lusaka Protocol. UNAVEM, however, were only able to confirm such breaches in a limited number of cases, partially because its movement is still restricted in parts of the country because of poor road conditions and mines.”

--*Angola Peace Monitor,* 19 May 1995, Issue 4. Univeristy of Pennsylvania African Studies Center.

“In each of May and June 1995 over I 30 separate violations had to be pursued by the UN but there was a gradual decline over the following months.”

--United Nations Document SC/RES/1008, 7 August 1995

“In November 1994, Angolan government forces captured Huambo, UNITA's main stronghold only days before the two sides were due to sign the Lusaka Peace Protocol to end the post-electoral round of fighting. Ominously, Jonas Savimbi did not personally endorse this accord. He retreated to Bailundo and Andulo to set up his group's new headquarters.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Following the Lusaka protocol neither the government of Angola nor UNITA complied with demands to cease-fire, disarm, or remove their troops from occupied zones

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“A new UN peace-keeping operation in Angola was established on 8 February by the Security Council to help restore peace and achieve national reconciliation in that country after 20 years of civil war. With an initial mandate until 8 August 1995 the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) was authorized under resolution 976 (1995) to deploy a maximum of 7000 military personnel in addition to 350 military and 260 police observers. It replaced UNAVEM II whose mandate had expired.”

--“New UN Verification Mission Set Up,” *UN Chronicle,* 1 June 1995.

“The Angolan peace process, launched in 1991 with an accord between the Government and the rebel movement UNITA, had by the end of 1998 collapsed for a second time leaving international mediators on the sidelines, no longer able to influence events. Years of accumulated mistrust produced an environment of fear in which the chief opposition party is reluctant to relinquish the security of their arms and commit themselves completely to the parliamentary process. Since the signature of the Lusaka protocol in 1994, high level shuttle diplomacy between the belligerent party leaders, mediated by the UN, failed to bring UNITA on board as a stakeholder. The post-Lusaka attempt at building a peace process failed to trickle down to soften the fears and suspicions of communities at the grassroots, in what remains a divided country.”

--Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“UNITA has, since 1994, also imported conventional weapons systems including mechanized vehicles such as tanks and armored personnel carriers, mines and explosives, a variety of small arms and light weapons, and anti-aircraft weapons, and a variety of artillery pieces."

--The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“Between 1994 and 1998, UNITA purchased military hardware from Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine and Bulgaria. The purchases included about 50 T-55 and T-62 tanks; a significant number of 155-mm G-5, B-2, D-2 and D-30 guns; medium- and long-range D-130 guns; BMP-1 and BMP-2 combat vehicles; ZU-23s anti-aircraft weapons; and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.”

--BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Radio notes British study of UNITA's military resources,” 17 August 1999; Chris Gordon, “Eastern Europe aid bolsters UNITA,” *Africa News Online*, 15 January 1999.

“Since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994, Angolans have been living between war and peace. They are grateful for the cease-fire and peace process that ended the previous two years of unrestrained conflict. But they are concerned at repeated delays in implementation of the agreement.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Following the Lusaka protocol neither the government of Angola nor UNITA complied with demands to cease-fire, disarm, or remove their troops from occupied zones

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat to the existence of both UNITA and the Government of Angola if either had stopped attacks or ceased to address the attacks of the opposing side

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **966** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 December 1994** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **5** |
| **Demand number:** | **966.0511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Re-Honor the commitments and continue to work together to achieve national reconciliation based on the "Acordos de Paz and the Lusaka Protocol.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Eventually, on 3I October I 994, the government and UNITA initialled a final agreement. Despite continued fighting the Lusaka Protocol was formally signed by the Luanda foreign minister Venancio de Moura and UNITA's secretary-general Eugenio Manuvakola on 20 November, and a cease-fire was declared. Although dos Santos had gone to Zambia to sign on behalf of the government, Savimbi had not made the journey. This was to prove part of a pattern of behaviour which would complicate and confuse the implementation of the agreement.”

--Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

“After the Lusaka Protocol, Savimbi was able to regroup his forces and rearm via Zaire.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“In November 1994, Angolan government forces captured Huambo, UNITA's main stronghold only days before the two sides were due to sign the Lusaka Peace Protocol to end the post-electoral round of fighting. Ominously, Jonas Savimbi did not personally endorse this accord. He retreated to Bailundo and Andulo to set up his group's new headquarters.”

--Assis Malaquias, “Diamonds Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 2001): 311-325

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Commitments entered into at the Lusaka Protocol were never fully—or even largely—carried out by either UNITA or the government of Angola. Violent hostilities continued throughout the rural zones, and humanitarian aid was impeded by fighting across provinces.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA's compliance with the de-mobilisation process has been subject to frequent delays, misinformation and out-right contradiction. The laying of landmines certainly also continued after, and in violation of, the Lusaka accords; Human Rights Watch has documented new mine laying activities as recently as 1997, while attacks during May 1998 have provided ongoing evidence of this. High level pressure from the UN and US failed to hasten Savimbi's pace, eventually resulting in the imposition of much-delayed UN sanctions at the end of February 1998.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“An intensification of fighting on the eve of the Lusaka signing was followed by a rash of local violations of the cease-fire in late November and December I994. Military hard-liners on both sides were unenthusiastic about the agreement. On the government side particularly, military advances during I993 and I994 encouraged a 'one more push' mentality which looked to the final defeat of an enfeebled UNITA. On the other side, a number of UNITA generals saw the agreement as the beginning of the end for the movement… In the second week of February I995, three months after the signing of the agreement, UNITA held a party congress in its new central highland headquarters at Bailundo. Jonas Savimbi offered contradictory pointers to his attitude. In one speech he denounced the Lusaka Protocol as a 'collection of lies' and a 'meaningless piece of paper'…Yet later, speaking directly to foreign journalists, Savimbi insisted he was committed to the agreement but constrained by his own hard-line generals.”

--“Angola,” *The Economist,* 18-24 February 1995

“A new UN peace-keeping operation in Angola was established on 8 February by the Security Council to help restore peace and achieve national reconciliation in that country after 20 years of civil war. With an initial mandate until 8 August 1995 the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) was authorized under resolution 976 (1995) to deploy a maximum of 7000 military personnel in addition to 350 military and 260 police observers. It replaced UNAVEM II whose mandate had expired.”

--“New UN Verification Mission Set Up,” *UN Chronicle,* 1 June 1995.

“The Angolan peace process, launched in 1991 with an accord between the Government and the rebel movement UNITA, had by the end of 1998 collapsed for a second time leaving international mediators on the sidelines, no longer able to influence events. Years of accumulated mistrust produced an environment of fear in which the chief opposition party is reluctant to relinquish the security of their arms and commit themselves completely to the parliamentary process. Since the signature of the Lusaka protocol in 1994, high level shuttle diplomacy between the belligerent party leaders, mediated by the UN, failed to bring UNITA on board as a stakeholder. The post-Lusaka attempt at building a peace process failed to trickle down to soften the fears and suspicions of communities at the grassroots, in what remains a divided country.”

--Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“Between 1994 and 1998, UNITA purchased military hardware from Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine and Bulgaria. The purchases included about 50 T-55 and T-62 tanks; a significant number of 155-mm G-5, B-2, D-2 and D-30 guns; medium- and long-range D-130 guns; BMP-1 and BMP-2 combat vehicles; ZU-23s anti-aircraft weapons; and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.”

--BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Radio notes British study of UNITA's military resources,” 17 August 1999; Chris Gordon, “Eastern Europe aid bolsters UNITA,” *Africa News Online*, 15 January 1999.

“The Lusaka Protocol had one fundamental flaw in relation to the prospects for a transition to peace. It owed more to international pressure for a settlement, rather than to a real commitment, from UNITA in particular, to make it work. Each side wished to hang on to the spoils that it had, using the political and military conflict to destroy or seize the spoils of its opponents…”

--Barry Munslow, “The Politics of Unsustainable Development,” *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 20, No. 3, (1999): 551-568.

“Since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994, Angolans have been living between war and peace. They are grateful for the cease-fire and peace process that ended the previous two years of unrestrained conflict. But they are concerned at repeated delays in implementation of the agreement.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Commitments entered into at the Lusaka Protocol were never fully—or even largely—carried out by either UNITA or the government of Angola. Violent hostilities continued throughout the rural zones, and humanitarian aid was impeded by fighting across provinces.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat to the existence of both UNITA and the Government of Angola if either had stopped attacks or ceased to address the attacks of the opposing side

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **966** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 December 1994** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **10** |
| **Demand number:** | **966.1011** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Grant security clearances and guaranties for relief deliveries to all locations and refrain from any action that could jeopardize the safety of relief personnel or disrupt the distribution of humanitarian assistance.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“International humanitarian agencies and donors, under UN co-ordination with NGOs active on the ground mounted a very successful emergency operation through 1993 and 1994, keeping tens of thousands displaced by war alive in besieged towns throughout the country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“On 15 September 1993, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council imposed an embargo on military goods and oil to UNITA.**7** During exploratory peace talks in October 1993 UNITA reaffirmed its acceptance of the Bicesse Accords and agreed to abide by the results of the 1992 elections. Angolan peace talks in Lusaka then commenced in November 1993. By mid-December sufficient progress had been recorded for the Secretary-General to recommend the postponement of additional measures against UNITA. However progress stalled in early 1994 and by June, military offensives had escalated again. Just one month prior to the scheduled signing of the Lusaka Protocol, heavy fighting occurred throughout Angola. The international community, the Security Council and the Secretary-General increased their pressure on the parties, and finally, on 20 November, 1994, the Lusaka Protocol was signed.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

“The coordination of action against land mines and coordination of humanitarian assistance to the areas in which UNITA soldiers were…was made difficult by the lack of resources available to UNITA soldiers, and the constancy of…threatening acts made by both the government and the rebels…”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

“The numbers of people displaced by the conflict continued to grow, estimated at two million by June 1993. According to the government, Angola required 27,000 tons of food per month plus medical supplies. Commercial food imports into Luanda diminished due to the lack of foreign exchange, with the government forced to spend money on armaments and exporters reluctant to send ships into a war zone. A U.N. World Food Program report suggested that a significant proportion of Angola's harvest would rot due to disruption caused by the fighting, and estimated that 1.9 million conflict- and drought-affected persons would require 337,000 tons of food assistance. Reports of human rights abuses by both sides increased as the conflict intensified and civilians became victims of calculated violence. Reports from the central and northern provinces indicated that both sides have engaged in killings and intimidation of civilians, especially if they were not from the home ethnic group. These tactics caused massive civilian displacement, especially out of UNITA, held areas, and have encouraged ethnic divisions. Africa Watch also received frequent reports of violations of the laws of war by both sides, including executions of captured soldiers and cases of children forced to fight on the war front. UNITA was also responsible for gross human rights abuses, including executions of civilians and other deliberate and arbitrary killings. Near Quipungo (Huila) UNITA attacked a train on May 27 in which 225 people were killed and several hundred injured, most of them civilians. Humanitarian efforts were also hampered by the war. Several relief flights were hit by UNITA fire. In April, a World Food Programme (WFP) aircraft was shot down by UNITA in eastern Angola. UNITA attempted to deny the delivery of food aid to isolated government towns in order to capture them. There were frequent suspensions of relief flights because of these attacks. The government also sought to deny food aid delivery to rebel-held areas. In July, an agreement reached between the government, UNITA and the U.N. allowedthe resumption of some relief flights to agreed locations. Only in late October was the U.N. able to fly again to all towns across the country.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report 1994* – Angola, UNHCR RefWorld, 1995.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Not only did UNITA and the government of Angola make little to no effort to clear roads, make rural areas safe, and disarm civilians in order to make humanitarian deliveries possible, both sides actively engaged in randomized violence which put humanitarian workers’ lives at risk and threatened the completion of humanitarian deliveries throughout Angola. There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The peace process that began in late 1994 has relatively improved stability and increased accessibility of areas within and between Government and UNITA-controlled parts of the country. Therefore in the past three years, the Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions have had improving opportunities for discussion and observation in the field. However, many areas remain difficult to access by road and the security situation in several provinces has deteriorated, particularly given repeated reports of bandit attacks.”

--Special Report- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola, 20 May 1998

“The first is Angolas increasing- and largely avoidable- humanitarian crisis. The return to war has exacerbated an already difficult internal refugee problem. By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The

Number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angola’s population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanjein the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000....The

War has also obstructed or interrupted aid flights and convoys by organizations such as the World Food Programme and CARE at a time when some donors have failed to live up to promises of relief aid to the region.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“And, despite large-scale international commitments of humanitarian and reconstruction aid, the prospects for quick implementation of sustainable projects for reconstruction which could give additional momentum to peaceful activities are still hampered by government incapacity, UNITA fears of losing control over their population base, and the lack of sufficient local knowledge and problems of coordination among newly arrived agencies.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Not only did UNITA and the government of Angola make little to no effort to clear roads, make rural areas safe, and disarm civilians in order to make humanitarian deliveries possible, both sides actively engaged in randomized violence which put humanitarian workers’ lives at risk and threatened the completion of humanitarian deliveries throughout Angola. There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **966** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 December 1994** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **11** |
| **Demand number:** | **966.1111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Respect and ensure the safety and security of international personnel in Angola.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The peace process that began in late 1994 has relatively improved stability and increased accessibility of areas within and between Government and UNITA-controlled parts of the country. Therefore in the past three years, the Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions have had improving opportunities for discussion and observation in the field. However, many areas remain difficult to access by road and the security situation in several provinces has deteriorated, particularly given repeated reports of bandit attacks.”

--Special Report- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola, 20 May 1998

“Between 1994 and 2001, poor roads and pervasive security concerns forced relief groups to transport 60 percent of all aid items by air despite aviation fuel shortages and often badly maintained rural airstrips. Combatants fired at three WFP relief planes during the year, forcing a temporary suspension of relief flights nationwide. UNITA rebels killed and abducted some local aid workers. “Overall humanitarian conditions deteriorated,” UN relief agencies reported late in the year. Child mortality rates climbed to nearly 40 percent, according to the UN Population Fund. Angola’s maternal mortality rates were reportedly ten times higher than in neighboring Namibia.”

--*World Refugee Survey 2002 Country Report: Angola*, USCR

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Not only did UNITA and the government of Angola make little to no effort to clear roads, make rural areas safe, and disarm civilians in order to make humanitarian deliveries possible, both sides actively engaged in randomized violence which put humanitarian workers’ lives at risk and threatened the completion of humanitarian deliveries throughout Angola. There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The peace process that began in late 1994 has relatively improved stability and increased accessibility of areas within and between Government and UNITA-controlled parts of the country. Therefore in the past three years, the Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions have had improving opportunities for discussion and observation in the field. However, many areas remain difficult to access by road and the security situation in several provinces has deteriorated, particularly given repeated reports of bandit attacks.”

--Special Report- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola, 20 May 1998

“Between 1994 and 2001, poor roads and pervasive security concerns forced relief groups to transport 60 percent of all aid items by air despite aviation fuel shortages and often badly maintained rural airstrips. Combatants fired at three WFP relief planes during the year, forcing a temporary suspension of relief flights nationwide. UNITA rebels killed and abducted some local aid workers. “Overall humanitarian conditions deteriorated,” UN relief agencies reported late in the year. Child mortality rates climbed to nearly 40 percent, according to the UN Population Fund. Angola’s maternal mortality rates were reportedly ten times higher than in neighboring Namibia.”

--*World Refugee Survey 2002 Country Report: Angola*, USCR

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Not only did UNITA and the government of Angola make little to no effort to clear roads, make rural areas safe, and disarm civilians in order to make humanitarian deliveries possible, both sides actively engaged in randomized violence which put humanitarian workers’ lives at risk and threatened the completion of humanitarian deliveries throughout Angola. There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **976** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 February 1995** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **12** |
| **Demand number:** | **976.1212** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Conclude an agreement with the UN on the Status of Forces.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In spite of the warm rhetoric of the Protocol and the fact that the cease-fire began to take reasonable hold in the first part of I995, the parties remained intensely hostile to each other. Consequently, the tone of the secretary-general's first progress report to the Security Council at the beginning of March I995 was guarded. It was 'essential that more concrete signs of co-operation and goodwill be provided by both parties'. In the meantime, UN attempts to arrange a face-to-face meeting between dos Santos and Savimbi continued.”

--United Nations Document S/I995/177, 5 March I995

“Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos met with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in Lusaka on 6 May 1995…The meeting held in Lusaka on 6 May 1995 between President dos Santos and Unita leader Jonas Savimbi took place in a cordial and fraternal climate. All issues related to the peace process and subsequent national reconciliation were discussed…The process of consolidating the ceasefire is to be speeded up, resolving the following outstanding military issues:completing the disengagement of troops in areas where they are very close to each other, ensuring the free movement of people and goods, de-mining the country, The immediate sending of Blue Helmets is to be pressed for, in order to ensure the immediate start of the process of quartering and disarming UNITA's military forces by UNAVEM III and putting the weapons in UNAVEM III custody…Plans were made to incorporate all troops…In a significant move towards the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, the Joint Commission at its fourteenth regular session, held in Luanda on 20 April, agreed on the principle of the "global incorporation" of UNITA soldiers into the Forcas Armadas Angola (FAA), which will then be gradually reduced until it reaches the level of 90,000 troops. The figure of has been jointly agreed between the Angolan Government and UNITA. The Status of Forces Agreement was signed.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, 19 May 1995, Issue no. 4, 19 May 1995, Published by ACTSA (Action for Southern Africa) on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign. University of Pennsylvania African Studies Center.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola showed a certain amount of good faith in complying with the UN in working to come to a conclusion regarding the status of forces in Angola. While the government remained committed to defeating UNITA through military force in the rural zones, and did not cease-fire after the Lusaka Protocol, per the demands, the government did work with the UN to be open regarding the status of forces.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos met with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in Lusaka on 6 May 1995…The meeting held in Lusaka on 6 May 1995 between President dos Santos and Unita leader Jonas Savimbi took place in a cordial and fraternal climate. All issues related to the peace process and subsequent national reconciliation were discussed…The process of consolidating the ceasefire is to be speeded up, resolving the following outstanding military issues:completing the disengagement of troops in areas where they are very close to each other, ensuring the free movement of people and goods, de-mining the country, The immediate sending of Blue Helmets is to be pressed for, in order to ensure the immediate start of the process of quartering and disarming UNITA's military forces by UNAVEM III and putting the weapons in UNAVEM III custody…Plans were made to incorporate all troops…In a significant move towards the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, the Joint Commission at its fourteenth regular session, held in Luanda on 20 April, agreed on the principle of the "global incorporation" of UNITA soldiers into the Forcas Armadas Angola (FAA), which will then be gradually reduced until it reaches the level of 90,000 troops. The figure of has been jointly agreed between the Angolan Government and UNITA. The Status of Forces Agreement was signed.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, 19 May 1995, Issue no. 4, 19 May 1995, Published by ACTSA (Action for Southern Africa) on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign. University of Pennsylvania African Studies Center.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola showed a certain amount of good faith in complying with the UN in working to come to a conclusion regarding the status of forces in Angola. While the government remained committed to defeating UNITA through military force in the rural zones, and did not cease-fire after the Lusaka Protocol, per the demands, the government did work with the UN to be open regarding the status of forces.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | **Medium depth of demand (2)** | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand did pose a threat to the legitimacy of the government of Angola. The government was being reprimanded by the international community for failing to abide by the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, and any further demands would have to be met in some way if it wished to preserve its political power internationally.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **976** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 February 1995** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **16** |
| **Demand number:** | **976.1611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Take the necessary measures to ensure the safety and freedom of movement of UN and other personnel deployed under UNAVEM III.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The peace process that began in late 1994 has relatively improved stability and increased accessibility of areas within and between Government and UNITA-controlled parts of the country. Therefore in the past three years, the Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions have had improving opportunities for discussion and observation in the field. However, many areas remain difficult to access by road and the security situation in several provinces has deteriorated, particularly given repeated reports of bandit attacks.”

--Special Report- FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola, 20 May 1998

“Full implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, originally envisaged to be completed with UN assistance by February 1997, is far behind schedule. The engagement of Angolan civil society in the peace process is weak. The right to freedom of movement, particularly in UNITA-controlled areas, is systematically violated, without an effective response from the international community.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Not only did UNITA and the government of Angola make little to no effort to clear roads, make rural areas safe, and disarm civilians in order to make humanitarian deliveries possible, both sides actively engaged in randomized violence which put humanitarian workers’ lives at risk and threatened the completion of humanitarian deliveries throughout Angola. There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Full implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, originally envisaged to be completed with UN assistance by February 1997, is far behind schedule. The engagement of Angolan civil society in the peace process is weak. The right to freedom of movement, particularly in UNITA-controlled areas, is systematically violated, without an effective response from the international community.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Not only did UNITA and the government of Angola make little to no effort to clear roads, make rural areas safe, and disarm civilians in order to make humanitarian deliveries possible, both sides actively engaged in randomized violence which put humanitarian workers’ lives at risk and threatened the completion of humanitarian deliveries throughout Angola. There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1008** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **7 August 1995** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **4** |
| **Demand number:** | **1008.0411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Finalize arrangements in cooperation with UNAVEM III for establishment of quartering areas, complete troops disengagement, and to expedite de-mining.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In August 1995, three months after the deployment of UNAVEM III’s main infantry units, by which time the UN should have assumed the 'traditional' peacekeeping function of interposition, the Security Council expressed deep concern at the pace of disengagement and the associated process of de-mining.”

--United Nations Document SC/RES/1008, 7 August 1995

“Only after coordinated pressure backed by the United States did the UN succeed in getting the first UNITA fighters to present themselves at the supervised quartering camps on the first anniversary of the Lusaka signing, almost a year behind the timetable set by the Protocol. This was to begin 45 days after 31 October 1994, the date of the initialling of the Lusaka agreement. The process should, therefore, have been underway by mid-December 1994.”

--UN Document S/I995/IOI2, 7 December 1995

“Between 1994 and 1998, UNITA purchased military hardware from Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine and Bulgaria. The purchases included about 50 T-55 and T-62 tanks; a significant number of 155-mm G-5, B-2, D-2 and D-30 guns; medium- and long-range D-130 guns; BMP-1 and BMP-2 combat vehicles; ZU-23s anti-aircraft weapons; and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.”

--BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Radio notes British study of UNITA's military resources,” 17 August 1999; Chris Gordon, “Eastern Europe aid bolsters UNITA,” *Africa News Online*, 15 January 1999.

“Humanitarian demining has been conducted in Angola since 1995 by government institutions, non governmental organizations responsible for humanitarian assistance and development. In some cases also private demining companies and military units.”

--Instituto Nacional de Ramocao de Obstaculos e Engenhos Explosivos.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola and UNITA made no effort to truly demilitarize, canon their troops, remove soldiers from occupied territories, or de-mine. In fact, UNITA and the government of Angola made major arms purchases- including mines- throughout 1994 and 1995. Neither side fully committed to demilitarizing in this period.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Luanda government complained about the small numbers of UNITA personnel arriving at the camps and the low quality of the weapons which they were surrendering…By 1 December 1995 only 363 UNITA fighters had registered at quartering centers.”

--United Nations Document S/1995/1012, 7 December 1995

“In Angola, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol required that government troops were to be disengaged and over 62,000 UNITA troops were to be confined to assembly areas and disarmed…UNITA's weapons and those in civilian hands were to be collected and stored. Twenty-six thousand UNITA soldiers were planned to be incorporated into the newly created national army, which is to finally number 90,000 strong…UNAVEM III, responsible for overseeing the demobilisation process, experienced enormous problems with the process due to lack of co-operation particularly from UNITA who consistently slowed down the confinement of its combatants. Under threat of sanctions by the UN, however, UNITA completed the quartering of 63,000 troops by 20 November 1996. However, about 7,000 of those registered were found to be under the age of 18. The Angolan Peace Monitor reported at the time that over 70% of those quartered were not combat troops. The UN now accepts that Savimbi has retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. Due to the delays, soldiers in the cantonment camps became restless and desertions were commonplace. By November 1996 some 12,543 UNITA troops had deserted leaving 55,013 in the camps.”

--Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“Humanitarian demining has been conducted in Angola since 1995 by government institutions, non governmental organizations responsible for humanitarian assistance and development. In some cases also private demining companies and military units.”

--Instituto Nacional de Ramocao de Obstaculos e Engenhos Explosivos.

“Between 1994 and 1998, UNITA purchased military hardware from Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine and Bulgaria. The purchases included about 50 T-55 and T-62 tanks; a significant number of 155-mm G-5, B-2, D-2 and D-30 guns; medium- and long-range D-130 guns; BMP-1 and BMP-2 combat vehicles; ZU-23s anti-aircraft weapons; and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.”

--BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Radio notes British study of UNITA's military resources,” 17 August 1999; Chris Gordon, “Eastern Europe aid bolsters UNITA,” *Africa News Online*, 15 January 1999.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola and UNITA made no effort to truly demilitarize, canon their troops, remove soldiers from occupied territories, or de-mine. In fact, UNITA and the government of Angola made major arms purchases- including mines- throughout 1994 and 1995. Neither side fully committed to demilitarizing in this period.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat to the existence of both UNITA and the Government of Angola if either had stopped attacks or ceased to address the attacks of the opposing side.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1008** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **7 August 1995** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **5** |
| **Demand number:** | **1008.0511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Adhere strictly to the revised timetable on implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, and accelerate the process.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In spite of the warm rhetoric of the Protocol and the fact that the cease-fire began to take reasonable hold in the first part of I995, the parties remained intensely hostile to each other. Consequently, the tone of the secretary-general's first progress report to the Security Council at the beginning of March I995 was guarded. It was 'essential that more concrete signs of co-operation and goodwill be provided by both parties'. In the meantime, UN attempts to arrange a face-to-face meeting between dos Santos and Savimbi continued.”

--United Nations Document S/I995/177, 5 March I995

“United Nations Angola Verification Verification Mission III and MONUA spent USD $1.5 billion overseeing implementation of the protocol. The UN largely did not enforce the provision prohibiting UNITA from buying foreign arms and both sides continued to build up their stockpile. The United Nations Security Council did not authorize a significant peacekeeping force in the area until 1995 and delayed full deployment until late 1996. U.N. Special Representative Blondin Beye covered up human rights violations because, as a UN official told Human Rights Watch in 1995, "the situation is too sensitive for serious human rights monitoring. Making public what we know could undermine the peace process and put us back to war." In May 1998 Beye changed his mind and the UN began reporting abuses. Three months after the government signed the treaty, in February 1995 Chief of Staff General João de Matos complained that peace would only be achieved when the government defeated UNITA militarily, calling the protocol a "mistake." By December the government and UNITA were again in a state of war. The UN's Human Rights Division did not publish any reports from January to July 1999 because fighting prevented them from investigating. Following the protocol the government and UNITA both engaged in the indiscriminate killing of civilians, torture, and other human rights violations.

Not only did UNITA not demobilize but it purchased a large amount of weapons in 1996 and 1997 from private sources in Albania and Bulgaria, and from Zaire, South Africa, Republic of the Congo, Zambia, Togo, and Burkina Faso. In October 1997 the UN imposed travel sanctions on UNITA leaders, but the UN waited until July 1998 to limit UNITA's exportation of diamonds and freeze UNITA bank accounts. While the U.S. government gave USD $250 million to UNITA between 1986 to 1991, UNITA made $1.72 billion between 1994 and 1999 exporting diamonds, primarily through Zaire to Europe. At the same time the Angolan government received large amounts of weapons from the governments of Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, the People's Republic of China, and South Africa. While no arms shipment to the government violated the protocol, no country informed the U.N. Register on Conventional Weapons as required.”

--Alex Vines, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process*, 1999. Human Rights Watch

##### “Since late 1995, UNITA has been engaged in the process of disarming and quartering its troops. It agreed to this when it freely signed the Lusaka protocol. The process of demilitarisation it has undertaken to complete, has been the focus of the peace process for the past year. As of 12 September 1996, UNITA had quartered 60 690 of the 62 500 troops agreed. This is welcome news, of course, because it means that there are less than 2 000 left to quarter, but it is also news that is about two and a half months late. This part of the process should have been finished by the beginning of July so that selection of 26 300 UNITA soldiers for the national army could begin, and the demobilisation of the remaining men could get under way before the next rainy season.”

--David Wimhurst, Spokesman for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Luanda, *Communication in Peace Operations: A Spokesperson's Perspective from UNAVEM III*, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997

##### “Those who have followed the progress made by UNAVEM in Luanda, may have noticed that there has been a change in pace since mid-1996. With the UNITA Congress over, and the transformation from a military organisation into a political party declared by Savimbi to be complete, the impetus of the peace process had to speed up. The Security Council would again consider renewing UNAVEM's mandate, due to expire definitively in February 1997, and it would rightly want to know if UNITA completed its demilitarisation, including the handing over of all heavy weapons to the UN, integrating ten generals into the Angolan armed forces general staff, and selecting the required number of soldiers for the national army and for the national police force…There are times when information has to be used to protect the peace process, as in late July 1996, when Reuters broke a story about the remains of some fifty bodies, the victims of torture and execution, found in the far north-west corner of the country. This was obviously an extremely sensitive issue and one that UNAVEM did not want the media to exploit to the detriment of the peace process. As Major-General Sibanda, the force commander, put it, "we don't want people to start oiling their guns." The question was how to deal with the issue, which was now public knowledge, without suppressing information…It was absolutely crucial that UNAVEM did not apportion blame for these events, that it did no point any fingers. Starting from this position, the spokesperson issued a very carefully worded statement acknowledging the tragedy, expressing solidarity with the Angolan people and especially the families of the victims, reminding everybody that such are the awful consequences of war, which the UNAVEM mission was dedicated to end once and for all, and calling on both sides to exercise mutual forgiveness. He specifically appealed to the media to refrain from exaggerating the story, and, with one exception, this appeal was respected.”

##### --David Wimhurst, Spokesman for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Luanda, Communication in Peace Operations: A Spokesperson's Perspective from UNAVEM III, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The implementation of the Lusaka Protocol was repeatedly stalled by reports of violent hostilities, outbreaks of war in the countryside, landmine explosions, humanitarian convoy disruptions, and the like. The timetable for implementing Lusaka kept shifting every few months with media reports.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Between 1994 and 1998, UNITA purchased military hardware from Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine and Bulgaria. The purchases included about 50 T-55 and T-62 tanks; a significant number of 155-mm G-5, B-2, D-2 and D-30 guns; medium- and long-range D-130 guns; BMP-1 and BMP-2 combat vehicles; ZU-23s anti-aircraft weapons; and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.”

--BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Radio notes British study of UNITA's military resources,” 17 August 1999; Chris Gordon, “Eastern Europe aid bolsters UNITA,” *Africa News Online*, 15 January 1999.

“The Lusaka Protocol had one fundamental flaw in relation to the prospects for a transition to peace. It owed more to international pressure for a settlement, rather than to a real commitment, from UNITA in particular, to make it work. Each side wished to hang on to the spoils that it had, using the political and military conflict to destroy or seize the spoils of its opponents…”

--Barry Munslow, “The Politics of Unsustainable Development,” *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 20, No. 3, (1999): 551-568.

“Since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994, Angolans have been living between war and peace. They are grateful for the cease-fire and peace process that ended the previous two years of unrestrained conflict. But they are concerned at repeated delays in implementation of the agreement.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The implementation of the Lusaka Protocol was repeatedly stalled by reports of violent hostilities, outbreaks of war in the countryside, landmine explosions, humanitarian convoy disruptions, and the like. The timetable for implementing Lusaka kept shifting every few months with media reports.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat to the existence of both UNITA and the Government of Angola if either had stopped attacks or ceased to address the attacks of the opposing side.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1008** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **7 August 1995** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **6** |
| **Demand number:** | **1008.0611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

The importance of completing the electoral process as provided by the Lusaka Protocol.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Lusaka Protocol had one fundamental flaw in relation to the prospects for a transition to peace. It owed more to international pressure for a settlement, rather than to a real commitment, from UNITA in particular, to make it work. Each side wished to hang on to the spoils that it had, using the political and military conflict to destroy or seize the spoils of its opponents…”

--Barry Munslow, “The Politics of Unsustainable Development,” *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 20, No. 3, (1999): 551-568.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The implementation of the Lusaka Protocol was repeatedly stalled by reports of violent hostilities, outbreaks of war in the countryside, landmine explosions, humanitarian convoy disruptions, and the like. The timetable for implementing Lusaka kept shifting every few months with media reports.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994, Angolans have been living between war and peace. They are grateful for the cease-fire and peace process that ended the previous two years of unrestrained conflict. But they are concerned at repeated delays in implementation of the agreement.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The implementation of the Lusaka Protocol was repeatedly stalled by reports of violent hostilities, outbreaks of war in the countryside, landmine explosions, humanitarian convoy disruptions, and the like. The timetable for implementing Lusaka kept shifting every few months with media reports.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because adhering to promises made regarding an electoral process would open the possibility of one “winner” of an election, with little provisions for power sharing. Althoug Lusaka did a much better job than the Bicesse Peace Accords at providing for negotiated parliamentary seats and provincial governoships, there was still little faith that the Lusaka Accord could build a post-election coalition government between UNITA and the MPLA ruling party. Thus, an election could pose an existential crisis to one of the parties.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1008** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **7 August 1995** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **7** |
| **Demand number:** | **1008.0711** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Adopt without delay a comprehensive and workable program for the formation of the new armed forces, accelerate exchange of prisoners and repatriation of mercenaries.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The number of people detained by the Government and UNITA for political and security reasons is unknown. In May the security police arrested opposition politician N'zuzi Domingos for allegedly defaming the character of Vice Minister of the Interior/National Police Commandant Francisco da Piedade Dias dos Santos, "Nando." Domingos was held incommunicado for a week and was eventually released in July with no charges filed against him. The Lusaka Protocol provides for the release, under ICRC auspices, of persons detained for war-related reasons. In August in the first group the Government released 210 prisoners, and UNITA released 20. As of November, UNITA continued to deny ICRC access to another 20 prisoners who should have been released with the first group. In November the ICRC visited 213 persons still being detained by both sides; however, it only had continuing access to, and sufficient information about, 78 of that number. During the exchange process, the Government detained 200 more people in October, and said it would only release them after UNITA released its prisoners. Subsequently the Government resumed cooperation with the ICRC, and the release of the Government held detainees got back on track. The detainees included 60 civilians who were arrested for engaging in alleged subversive activities and held in shipping containers in Uige after traveling to Uige from UNITA controlled territory. Most of these 60 had been released by year's end.”

--US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices, 1995,* Washington DC: Department of State Publications, 1996.

“The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for internal security. It exercises this function through the National Police and the paramilitary Rapid Intervention Police created in 1992 to quell civil unrest. The

armed forces have responsibility for external security but have been primarily engaged in fighting the civil war against UNITA. While civilian authorities generally maintain effective control of the security forces, there are frequent instances in which the security forces act independently of government authority. Members of the security forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.”

--US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices, 1995,* Washington DC: Department of State Publications, 1996.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Niether UNITA nor the government of Angola came close to forming a new armed forces by joining their two armies. Niether side fully disengaged with the war after Lusaka, and neither army was prepared to allow for the absorption of enemy soldiers at that time.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Between 1994 and 1998, UNITA purchased military hardware from Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine and Bulgaria. The purchases included about 50 T-55 and T-62 tanks; a significant number of 155-mm G-5, B-2, D-2 and D-30 guns; medium- and long-range D-130 guns; BMP-1 and BMP-2 combat vehicles; ZU-23s anti-aircraft weapons; and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.”

--BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Radio notes British study of UNITA's military resources,” 17 August 1999; Chris Gordon, “Eastern Europe aid bolsters UNITA,” *Africa News Online*, 15 January 1999.

“The number of people detained by the Government and UNITA for political and security reasons is unknown. In May the security police arrested opposition politician N'zuzi Domingos for allegedly defaming the character of Vice Minister of the Interior/National Police Commandant Francisco da Piedade Dias dos Santos, "Nando." Domingos was held incommunicado for a week and was eventually released in July with no charges filed against him. The Lusaka Protocol provides for the release, under ICRC auspices, of persons detained for war-related reasons. In August in the first group the Government released 210 prisoners, and UNITA released 20. As of November, UNITA continued to deny ICRC access to another 20 prisoners who should have been released with the first group. In November the ICRC visited 213 persons still being detained by both sides; however, it only had continuing access to, and sufficient information about, 78 of that number. During the exchange process, the Government detained 200 more people in October, and said it would only release them after UNITA released its prisoners. Subsequently the Government resumed cooperation with the ICRC, and the release of the Government held detainees got back on track. The detainees included 60 civilians who were arrested for engaging in alleged subversive activities and held in shipping containers in Uige after traveling to Uige from UNITA controlled territory. Most of these 60 had been released by year's end.”

--US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices, 1995,* Washington DC: Department of State Publications, 1996.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Niether UNITA nor the government of Angola came close to forming a new armed forces by joining their two armies. Niether side fully disengaged with the war after Lusaka, and neither army was prepared to allow for the absorption of enemy soldiers at that time.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because forming a new cohesive army would mean losing one’s own army forces and relinquishing control over soldiers. This placed generals and leaders on each side at risk.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1008** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **7 August 1995** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **8** |
| **Demand number:** | **1008.0811** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Assign urgently liaison officers to UNAVEM III regional headquarters.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

##### “Confidence-building between the belligerents took the form of daily or weekly meetings between the liaison officers of the belligerents chaired by the UN at team sites, at battalion or company headquarters (where these were not co-located with team sites), at regional headquarters, and at the Armed Conflict Prevention Group and the Joint Commission (both located in Luanda). The aim was to ensure that the belligerents did not misinterpret activities related to the peace process which each of the parties was undertaking. For example, the movement of large groups of UNITA elements to given locations in preparation for quartering could be misconstrued as preparations to attack government troop positions. On the other hand, movements by government forces from forward positions were not to be misconstrued by UNITA as regrouping in preparation to attack its positions. Confidence between the parties and the UN personnel was built through the latter’s impartiality when dealing with complaints raised by the parties, and by the provision of communication radios to some key personnel from the parties who were in isolated locations in the early part of the mission. Credibility was another important factor related to impartiality which helped to create confidence between the parties and the UN personnel.”

-- United Nations Operations in Southern Africa: Mandate, Means and Doctrine in UNAVEM III, Published in Monograph No 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There is little evidence that UNITA provided liaison officers to UNAVEM. There is some evidence to suggest that the government of Angola was closer to UNAVEM and complied with more demands for communication.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

##### “Confidence-building between the belligerents took the form of daily or weekly meetings between the liaison officers of the belligerents chaired by the UN at team sites, at battalion or company headquarters (where these were not co-located with team sites), at regional headquarters, and at the Armed Conflict Prevention Group and the Joint Commission (both located in Luanda). The aim was to ensure that the belligerents did not misinterpret activities related to the peace process which each of the parties was undertaking. For example, the movement of large groups of UNITA elements to given locations in preparation for quartering could be misconstrued as preparations to attack government troop positions. On the other hand, movements by government forces from forward positions were not to be misconstrued by UNITA as regrouping in preparation to attack its positions. Confidence between the parties and the UN personnel was built through the latter’s impartiality when dealing with complaints raised by the parties, and by the provision of communication radios to some key personnel from the parties who were in isolated locations in the early part of the mission. Credibility was another important factor related to impartiality which helped to create confidence between the parties and the UN personnel.”

-- United Nations Operations in Southern Africa: Mandate, Means and Doctrine in UNAVEM III, Published in Monograph No 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There is little evidence that UNITA provided liaison officers to UNAVEM. There is some evidence to suggest that the government of Angola was closer to UNAVEM and complied with more demands for communication.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as low because it required the assignment of communications officers—an act that did not threaten either party. It was simply a request for good faith conclusions of promises made to liaise with UNAVEM.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1008** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **7 August 1995** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **9** |
| **Demand number:** | **1008.0911** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Put an end to the laying of mines and reported unauthorized movement of troops.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Africa Watch claims that mine-laying in Angola…continues extensively…and examined the makes and types of mines that have been used, and the methods of their use. The 1996 report also examined the human impact of land mines, finding that civilians were the most common victims. In examining mine clearance between 1992 and 1995, Africa Watch discovered that some of these were seriously flawed. The report concluded that only a complete ban on the use of anti-personnel mines could remove the unreasonable danger they posed to civilians. Information obtained subsequent to publication of the report indicated that many land mines had been planted by both sides in the renewed conflict.”

--*Landmine Monitor Report,* Angola, 2000, p. 181.

“The intensive mine pollution in Angola seriously hinders the movement of goods and people as well as the resumption of economic activity. The problem is being addressed through a coordinated programme of mine survey and clearance, mine-awareness training for civilians and the training of Angolan technicians and managers.”

--*Angola,* Report of the Secretary-General, 1995- <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/SG-Rpt/ch4e-1.htm>

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola and UNITA made no effort to truly demilitarize, canon their troops, remove soldiers from occupied territories, or de-mine. In fact, UNITA and the government of Angola made major arms purchases- including mines- throughout 1994 and 1995. Neither side fully committed to demilitarizing in this period.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Between 1994 and 1998, UNITA purchased military hardware from Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine and Bulgaria. The purchases included about 50 T-55 and T-62 tanks; a significant number of 155-mm G-5, B-2, D-2 and D-30 guns; medium- and long-range D-130 guns; BMP-1 and BMP-2 combat vehicles; ZU-23s anti-aircraft weapons; and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.”

--BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Radio notes British study of UNITA's military resources,” 17 August 1999; Chris Gordon, “Eastern Europe aid bolsters UNITA,” *Africa News Online*, 15 January 1999.

“Angola signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, but continued to use landmines until the peace agreement signed with UNITA forces in April 2002.”

--*Landmine Monitor Report,* Angola, 2003.

“The Angolan government first publicly stated its support for a total prohibition of antipersonnel mines in May 1996 and the country participated actively in the Ottawa Process. Angola has attended every annual Meeting of States Parties, including in September 2003, as well as most intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva, including those held in February and June 2004. Angola’s participation posed particular problems in early meetings. At the First Meeting of States Parties in May 1999, Angola arrived on the last day of the conference to avoid any questions on its use of antipersonnel mines in fighting that erupted in November 1998, while during the Second Meeting of States Parties in September 2000, Angolan diplomats attempted to justify the government’s continued use of antipersonnel mines. Angola has voted in favor of every annual pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution since 1996, except for 1997 when it was absent.”

*--Landmine Monitor Report,* Angola, 2003.

“Little is known about the size or composition of the landmine stockpile that was held by former UNITA military forces and Landmine Monitor was told such information is closely guarded for security reasons. In 1999 and 2000, the Angolan army found antipersonnel and antivehicle mines in various UNITA weapons caches.”

--*Landmine Monitor Report,* Angola, 2000, p. 181.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola and UNITA made no effort to truly demilitarize, canon their troops, remove soldiers from occupied territories, or de-mine. In fact, UNITA and the government of Angola made major arms purchases- including mines- throughout 1994 and 1995. Neither side fully committed to demilitarizing in this period.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat to the existence of both UNITA and the Government of Angola if one side chose to de-mine with the other did not. There was somewhat of a zero-sum game occurring with these demands.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1008** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **7 August 1995** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **11** |
| **Demand number:** | **1008.1111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Provide UNAVEM III with the necessary information and ensure the freedom of movement of UNAVEM III.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Full implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, originally envisaged to be completed with UN assistance by February 1997, is far behind schedule. The engagement of Angolan civil society in the peace process is weak. The right to freedom of movement, particularly in UNITA-controlled areas, is systematically violated, without an effective response from the international community.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

“While the UNAVEM III mandate was clear and concise, the belligerents chose to argue with UN personnel over the question of overstepping their mandate. As an example, the government prevented UN personnel from entering the harbour area in Luanda on a number of occasions, while UNITA checkpoints either denied or delayed UN patrols along certain roads, or prevented UN personnel from verifying certain items delivered by plane, claiming that they were non-lethal and were therefore not subject to verification. With regard to personnel and equipment, these certainly did not match the mandated tasks. For example, the peacekeeping personnel requirement submitted to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) before the commencement of the mission was for some 15 000 soldiers, but the Security Council authorised only 7 000. Motor vehicles for police and military observers and other supporting staff were also generally inadequate and, except for a few that were purchased during the life of the mission, were old and had been shipped to Angola from other UN missions that had closed down in places such as Somalia and Cambodia. According to the mission standing operating procedures, each observer team site was supposed to operate with three vehicles, and each patrol was to consist of two vehicles, while one remained to execute administrative duties at the team site. There were very few occasions when this was achieved. This inadequacy meant that observers were at times unable to accomplish their tasks, or did so in violation of the standing operating procedures. Air transport was another area where there were glaring inadequacies. The mission had seven M18 helicopters, five Casa 212 light transport aircraft (which were later replaced by Cessna Caravans), two Beach Craft B200 light aircraft, and two Hercules C130 medium transporters (which were from time to time augmented by one Boeing 727 or an Ilyushin 76). While the fixed-wing aircraft complement was almost adequate, the helicopter fleet was most inadequate. The requirement was for at least fourteen, but only seven were provided. These could not adequately cater for the needs of the mission in a vast country like Angola, where the road network had been severely damaged by years of war and a lack of maintenance. In general terms, resources made available to UNAVEM III were therefore inadequate and this was attributed to inadequate funding. From a force commander’s perspective, it seemed as if the Security Council ‘wished’ to achieve maximum results from low inputs.”

-- United Nations Operations in Southern Africa: Mandate, Means and Doctrine in UNAVEM III, Published in Monograph No 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While UNITA never adhered to this demand, the government of Angola similarly did not take steps to ensure freedom of movement. Outside of Luanda, the Angolan rural zones were profoundly unsafe for UNAVEM personnel.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Full implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, originally envisaged to be completed with UN assistance by February 1997, is far behind schedule. The engagement of Angolan civil society in the peace process is weak. The right to freedom of movement, particularly in UNITA-controlled areas, is systematically violated, without an effective response from the international community.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

“While the UNAVEM III mandate was clear and concise, the belligerents chose to argue with UN personnel over the question of overstepping their mandate. As an example, the government prevented UN personnel from entering the harbour area in Luanda on a number of occasions, while UNITA checkpoints either denied or delayed UN patrols along certain roads, or prevented UN personnel from verifying certain items delivered by plane, claiming that they were non-lethal and were therefore not subject to verification. With regard to personnel and equipment, these certainly did not match the mandated tasks. For example, the peacekeeping personnel requirement submitted to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) before the commencement of the mission was for some 15 000 soldiers, but the Security Council authorised only 7 000. Motor vehicles for police and military observers and other supporting staff were also generally inadequate and, except for a few that were purchased during the life of the mission, were old and had been shipped to Angola from other UN missions that had closed down in places such as Somalia and Cambodia. According to the mission standing operating procedures, each observer team site was supposed to operate with three vehicles, and each patrol was to consist of two vehicles, while one remained to execute administrative duties at the team site. There were very few occasions when this was achieved. This inadequacy meant that observers were at times unable to accomplish their tasks, or did so in violation of the standing operating procedures. Air transport was another area where there were glaring inadequacies. The mission had seven M18 helicopters, five Casa 212 light transport aircraft (which were later replaced by Cessna Caravans), two Beach Craft B200 light aircraft, and two Hercules C130 medium transporters (which were from time to time augmented by one Boeing 727 or an Ilyushin 76). While the fixed-wing aircraft complement was almost adequate, the helicopter fleet was most inadequate. The requirement was for at least fourteen, but only seven were provided. These could not adequately cater for the needs of the mission in a vast country like Angola, where the road network had been severely damaged by years of war and a lack of maintenance. In general terms, resources made available to UNAVEM III were therefore inadequate and this was attributed to inadequate funding. From a force commander’s perspective, it seemed as if the Security Council ‘wished’ to achieve maximum results from low inputs.”

-- United Nations Operations in Southern Africa: Mandate, Means and Doctrine in UNAVEM III, Published in Monograph No 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While UNITA never adhered to this demand, the government of Angola similarly did not take steps to ensure freedom of movement. Outside of Luanda, the Angolan rural zones were profoundly unsafe for UNAVEM personnel.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1008** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **7 August 1995** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **13** |
| **Demand number:** | **1008.1311** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

provide all facilities for the prompt functioning of the radio.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Government tightly controls the media, including media access to controversial public figures. Luanda's commercial radio station (LAC) and the weekly newspaper Correio da Semana are privately owned but are not independent. The majority of LAC and Correio stockholders are MPLA leaders who hue closely to the party line. In mid-1994 even LAC was told to cancel a popular daily program somewhat critical of the Government. Media policy and censorship are controlled by a committee composed of the Minister of Information, the press spokesman for the Presidency, and the directors of the state-owned radio, television, and newspaper. Additionally, the Prime Minister has staff devoted exclusively to censoring the government-owned and controlled newspaper Jornal de Angola. Although national radio has separate stations in each provincial capital, broadcasters must clear all programs with national radio headquarters in Luanda. There are five private radio stations in Luanda which censor themselves. Transmissions of Vorgan, UNITA's radio station, are heard throughout Angola. UNITA's newspaper, Terra Angolana, cannot be found in Luanda.”

--US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices, 1995*, Washington, DC: Department of State Publication, 1996.

##### “Confidence between the parties and the UN personnel was built through the latter’s impartiality when dealing with complaints raised by the parties, and by the provision of communication radios to some key personnel from the parties who were in isolated locations in the early part of the mission. Credibility was another important factor related to impartiality which helped to create confidence between the parties and the UN personnel.”

-- United Nations Operations in Southern Africa: Mandate, Means and Doctrine in UNAVEM III, Published in Monograph No 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000.

##### “The Constitution provides for freedom of expression and of the press, and specifically provides that the press cannot be subject to political, ideological, or artistic censorship. However, the Government does not respect these rights in practice. Citizens, including deputies in the National Assembly, expect reprisals for public criticism of the Government or the MPLA, and the Government attempts to impede such criticism by monitoring political meetings. Journalists are intimidated into practicing self-censorship. The Government runs and tightly controls the only daily newspaper, the only television station, and the major radio station and tightly restricts opposition leaders' access to these media. Two commercial radio stations and three private weekly and biweekly newspapers all practice self-censorship. The transmissions of one private radio station were cut several times after it broadcast remarks mildly critical of the Government.”

--US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1995,* Washington DC: State Department Publication 1996.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola took slow steps to implement the functioning of radio in Angola. Eventually, radio was established in 1996, but the government was slow to communicate with the populace through radio and made it difficult to establish radio communication for UNAVEM.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

##### “Confidence between the parties and the UN personnel was built through the latter’s impartiality when dealing with complaints raised by the parties, and by the provision of communication radios to some key personnel from the parties who were in isolated locations in the early part of the mission. Credibility was another important factor related to impartiality which helped to create confidence between the parties and the UN personnel.”

-- United Nations Operations in Southern Africa: Mandate, Means and Doctrine in UNAVEM III, Published in Monograph No 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola took slow steps to implement the functioning of radio in Angola. Eventually, radio was established in 1996, but the government was slow to communicate with the populace through radio and made it difficult to establish radio communication for UNAVEM.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten the government in any way. If there were fears that establishing a radio would threaten the government’s position they were unfounded. Free communication would only have aided in the communication of valuable information regarding the status of the war in Angola.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1008** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **7 August 1995** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **14** |
| **Demand number:** | **1008.1411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Begin the disarmament of civilians immediately.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Despite initial reports of fighting post-ceasefire and great tension throughout the country, the Lusaka Protocol and the cease-fire held. The Lusaka Protocol *inter alia* reaffirmed the validity of the Bicesse Accords, reestablished a cease-fire, and provided for disarmament of all civilians, national reconciliation, and the completion of the electoral process. Significantly, many of the most militarily contentious issues were left for talks to be held immediately after the signing of the Lusaka Protocol.”

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

In 1995 and 1996, UCAH focused heavily on the formidable tasks of planning and then coordinating and implementing the humanitarian community's role in the demobilization and reintegration processes. Strictly civilian humanitarian needs throughout Angola generally appeared less dramatic -- especially compared with the high-profile, sensitive, and highly fluid nature of the demobilization exercise. UCAH's activities in coordinating and facilitating humanitarian activities decreased. UCAH's first director (the Humanitarian Coordinator) left in mid-1995. The next two Humanitarian Coordinators, appointed in mid-1995 and in mid 1996, were both instructed to close UCAH in the near future. However, due to continuing delays in demobilization and the very fragile nature of peace in Angola, UCAH was still in existence in early 1998.

--United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Complex crisis and complex peace: Humanitarian coordination in Angola,” OCHA Online, 1997.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola and UNITA proved both unwilling and unable to disarm their respective militaries, para-military associated groups, and civilians. The high number of civilians who in 1991 and 1992 were armed only increased with the purchasing of greater and greater numbers of weapons in 1994-1996. There was such a high number of armed citizens in Angola it would have taken an orchestrated national effort to disarm the population.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Angolan peace process, launched in 1991 with an accord between the Government and the rebel movement UNITA, had by the end of 1998 collapsed for a second time leaving international mediators on the sidelines, no longer able to influence events. Years of accumulated mistrust produced an environment of fear in which the chief opposition party is reluctant to relinquish the security of their arms and commit themselves completely to the parliamentary process. Since the signature of the Lusaka protocol in 1994, high level shuttle diplomacy between the belligerent party leaders, mediated by the UN, failed to bring UNITA on board as a stakeholder. The post-Lusaka attempt at building a peace process failed to trickle down to soften the fears and suspicions of communities at the grassroots, in what remains a divided country.”

--Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“Between 1994 and 1998, UNITA purchased military hardware from Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine and Bulgaria. The purchases included about 50 T-55 and T-62 tanks; a significant number of 155-mm G-5, B-2, D-2 and D-30 guns; medium- and long-range D-130 guns; BMP-1 and BMP-2 combat vehicles; ZU-23s anti-aircraft weapons; and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.”

--BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Radio notes British study of UNITA's military resources,” 17 August 1999; Chris Gordon, “Eastern Europe aid bolsters UNITA,” *Africa News Online*, 15 January 1999.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola and UNITA proved both unwilling and unable to disarm their respective militaries, para-military associated groups, and civilians. The high number of civilians who in 1991 and 1992 were armed only increased with the purchasing of greater and greater numbers of weapons in 1994-1996. There was such a high number of armed citizens in Angola it would have taken an orchestrated national effort to disarm the population.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” for while it would have taken an enormous effort to disarm the Angolan civilian population, neither the government nor UNITA would have been put at substantial risk of harm by engaging in such behavior.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1008** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **7 August 1995** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **15** |
| **Demand number:** | **1008.1511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Seek to control and disarm unaffiliated groups which are threats to the peace process.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“There are approximately 10,300 Zairian refugees in Angola. Angola is a signatory to both the United Nation's and Organization of African Unity's conventions on refugees, and the Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. An eligibility committee to evaluate asylum claims was established on paper in 1990, but it was first staffed in 1995 and has yet to meet. There were no reports of forced expulsions of persons with valid claims to refugee status, although some people who were deported in course of the year for criminal violations claimed to be refugees….these individuals are often threats to the stability of regions with limited resources…”

--US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1993,* Washington DC: State Department Publication 1994.

“Between 1994 and 1998, UNITA purchased military hardware from Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine and Bulgaria. The purchases included about 50 T-55 and T-62 tanks; a significant number of 155-mm G-5, B-2, D-2 and D-30 guns; medium- and long-range D-130 guns; BMP-1 and BMP-2 combat vehicles; ZU-23s anti-aircraft weapons; and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.”

--BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Radio notes British study of UNITA's military resources,” 17 August 1999; Chris Gordon, “Eastern Europe aid bolsters UNITA,” *Africa News Online*, 15 January 1999.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola and UNITA proved both unwilling and unable to disarm their respective militaries, para-military associated groups, and civilians. The high number of civilians who in 1991 and 1992 were armed only increased with the purchasing of greater and greater numbers of weapons in 1994-1996. There was such a high number of armed citizens in Angola it would have taken an orchestrated national effort to disarm the population.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“There are approximately 10,300 Zairian refugees in Angola. Angola is a signatory to both the United Nation's and Organization of African Unity's conventions on refugees, and the Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. An eligibility committee to evaluate asylum claims was established on paper in 1990, but it was first staffed in 1995 and has yet to meet. There were no reports of forced expulsions of persons with valid claims to refugee status, although some people who were deported in course of the year for criminal violations claimed to be refugees….these individuals are often threats to the stability of regions with limited resources…”

--US Department of State, *Angola Human Rights Practices 1993,* Washington DC: State Department Publication 1994.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola and UNITA proved both unwilling and unable to disarm their respective militaries, para-military associated groups, and civilians. The high number of civilians who in 1991 and

1992 were armed only increased with the purchasing of greater and greater numbers of weapons in 1994-1996. There was such a high number of armed citizens in Angola it would have taken an orchestrated national effort to disarm the population.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” for while it would have taken an enormous effort to disarm the affiliated groups and others, neither the government nor UNITA would have been put at substantial risk of harm by engaging in such behavior.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1008** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **7 August 1995** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **18** |
| **Demand number:** | **1008.1811** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Take necessary measures to ensure the safe passage of humanitarian supplies throughout the country.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The continued mining of fields seriously jeopardised the 1994 harvest.”

--Christopher Pycroft, “Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy,” *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 20, No, 2 (1994), page 242

“Although UNAVEM III lost some lives due to mines and bandit activities, only on one occasion did UN personnel use weapons to repel a group of armed bandits who had attacked a convoy that they were escorting in the Villa Nova area of Huambo Province. While the peacekeepers had a deterrent capability when deployed as a unit-sized group in one general area, the question that always nagged the mission command was the diminished fire power of these troops once deployed in companies, some as far away as 200 kilometres from other troop locations. The force commander’s concerns were further compounded by the non-existence of an air mobile reserve which could be used either to reinforce or to extract these troops in case of need. There is therefore a need for planners at DPKO to balance the Chapter VI principle of restricted use of force with a credible deterrent, coupled with a deployment concept that does not lead to the penny pocketing of troops. Finally, the principle of support for humanitarian activities — besides bringing the locals and the UN personnel together — brings much needed relief to people who would be in serious need of food and other basics of life in most cases. This principle should not be divorced from any UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement doctrine.”

--United Nations Operations in Southern Africa: Mandate, Means and Doctrine in UNAVEM III, Published in Monograph No 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Not only did UNITA and the government of Angola make little to no effort to clear roads, make rural areas safe, and disarm civilians in order to make humanitarian deliveries possible, both sides actively engaged in randomized violence which put humanitarian workers’ lives at risk and threatened the completion of humanitarian deliveries throughout Angola. There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The first is Angolas increasing- and largely avoidable- humanitarian crisis. The return to war has exacerbated an already difficult internal refugee problem. By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The

Number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angola’s population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanjein the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000....The

War has also obstructed or interrupted aid flights and convoys by organizations such as the World Food Programme and CARE at a time when some donors have failed to live up to promises of relief aid to the region.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“And, despite large-scale international commitments of humanitarian and reconstruction aid, the prospects for quick implementation of sustainable projects for reconstruction which could give additional momentum to peaceful activities are still hampered by government incapacity, UNITA fears of losing control over their population base, and the lack of sufficient local knowledge and problems of coordination among newly arrived agencies.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

“Although UNAVEM III lost some lives due to mines and bandit activities, only on one occasion did UN personnel use weapons to repel a group of armed bandits who had attacked a convoy that they were escorting in the Villa Nova area of Huambo Province. While the peacekeepers had a deterrent capability when deployed as a unit-sized group in one general area, the question that always nagged the mission command was the diminished fire power of these troops once deployed in companies, some as far away as 200 kilometres from other troop locations. The force commander’s concerns were further compounded by the non-existence of an air mobile reserve which could be used either to reinforce or to extract these troops in case of need. There is therefore a need for planners at DPKO to balance the Chapter VI principle of restricted use of force with a credible deterrent, coupled with a deployment concept that does not lead to the penny pocketing of troops. Finally, the principle of support for humanitarian activities — besides bringing the locals and the UN personnel together — brings much needed relief to people who would be in serious need of food and other basics of life in most cases. This principle should not be divorced from any UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement doctrine.”

--United Nations Operations in Southern Africa: Mandate, Means and Doctrine in UNAVEM III, Published in Monograph No 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Not only did UNITA and the government of Angola make little to no effort to clear roads, make rural areas safe, and disarm civilians in order to make humanitarian deliveries possible, both sides actively engaged in randomized violence which put humanitarian workers’ lives at risk and threatened the completion of humanitarian deliveries throughout Angola. There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1008** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **7 August 1995** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **19** |
| **Demand number:** | **1008.1911** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Continue providing substantial contributions to the UN peace-keeping operations.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In general terms, resources made available to UNAVEM III were therefore inadequate and this was attributed to inadequate funding.”

--United Nations Operations in Southern Africa: Mandate, Means and Doctrine in UNAVEM III, Published in Monograph No 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000.

“A former UN aide who had worked on the negotiations for funding with the Angolan government…claimed…the funds required for peacekeepers to patrol the country…and use nonmilitary means…it would take ten times the amount the government was offering.”

--Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices After War,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008) p. 142-144.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola proved unable to make large monetary contributions to the UN Peacekeeping operations. Funding was found elsewhere.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In general terms, resources made available to UNAVEM III were therefore inadequate and this was attributed to inadequate funding.”

--United Nations Operations in Southern Africa: Mandate, Means and Doctrine in UNAVEM III, Published in Monograph No 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000.

“A former UN aide who had worked on the negotiations for funding with the Angolan government…claimed…the funds required for peacekeepers to patrol the country…and use nonmilitary means…it would take ten times the amount the government was offering.”

--Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices After War,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008) p. 142-144.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola proved unable to make large monetary contributions to the UN Peacekeeping operations. Funding was found elsewhere.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand is ranked as “low” because assising in the funding of a UN Peacekeeping operation does not threaten the complier.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1008** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **7 August 1995** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **19** |
| **Demand number:** | **1008.1912** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Make every effort to contribute proportionally to assists with the UN peace-keeping operation in Angola.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“For rebel groups in particular, the chance to be treated as legitimate political actors…is often a key benefit of the peace deal. Peacekeepers’ reports of noncompliance can threaten that international legitimacy, providing an incentive against aggression. In Angola, the rebel group UNITA lost both international aid and legitimacy after it reneged on a peace supervised by UN Peacekeepers in 1995-1996.”

--Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices After War,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008) p. 142-144.

“UNITA was not…prepared to assist in the fulfillment of the Accord.”

--Security Council - 5 - Press Release SC/6211 3657th Meeting (PM) 24 April 1996

“In August 1995, UNITA destroyed several government buildings in Huambo…he fight for Huambo is viewed as a key battle because it has long been a rebel stronghold, and it has brought the fighting to urban areas.  Rebels already control about 75% of the countryside.  Government forces were routed in the city and large numbers of tanks, artillery pieces and prisoners were captured.  The fate of the prisoners is uncertain.  According to one relief worker, the worst part of the fighting is, UNITA captures a city and kills everyone they think supported the government, then the government army recaptures it and kills everyone they think helped UNITA. The fighting has spread to the key garrison town of Cubal in Benguela Province of the central highlands, and Caxito and Uige in Bengo Province, as well as Malanje, Kuite and Menonque.”

--*Angola Situation Report,* International Group, Ltd. CTC Intelligence. 1996.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

It is clear that throughout 1995 and through 1998 and 1999, Angola made no effort to assist in UN Peacekeeping operations, and on the contrary, destabilized regions, sought to gain territory, and purchased arms from abroad at an impressive rate. Peacekeeping was not on the agenda for UNITA in 1995.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“For rebel groups in particular, the chance to be treated as legitimate political actors…is often a key benefit of the peace deal. Peacekeepers’ reports of noncompliance can threaten that international legitimacy, providing an incentive against aggression. In Angola, the rebel group UNITA lost both international aid and legitimacy after it reneged on a peace supervised by UN Peacekeepers in 1995-1996.”

--Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices After War,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008) p. 142-144.

“In August 1995, UNITA destroyed several government buildings in Huambo…he fight for Huambo is viewed as a key battle because it has long been a rebel stronghold, and it has brought the fighting to urban areas.  Rebels already control about 75% of the countryside.  Government forces were routed in the city and large numbers of tanks, artillery pieces and prisoners were captured.  The fate of the prisoners is uncertain.  According to one relief worker, the worst part of the fighting is, UNITA captures a city and kills everyone they think supported the government, then the government army recaptures it and kills everyone they think helped UNITA. The fighting has spread to the key garrison town of Cubal in Benguela Province of the central highlands, and Caxito and Uige in Bengo Province, as well as Malanje, Kuite and Menonque.”

--*Angola Situation Report,* International Group, Ltd. CTC Intelligence. 1996.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In the medium-term, it was clear that throughout 1995 and through 1998 and 1999, Angola made no effort to assist in UN Peacekeeping operations, and on the contrary, destabilized regions, sought to gain territory, and purchased arms from abroad at an impressive rate. Peacekeeping was not on the agenda for UNITA in 1995 or in the years following.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This ranks as “high” because complying with peacekeeping would have meant a cessation of the land grabs, territorial takeovers, and hostile actions taking place in other regions, and while UNITA was highly destabilizing, engaging in random acts of Peacekeeping would have created a difficult chaos for certain regions who would become accustomed to peace and then re-engage in War when UNITA returned to that state of affairs. UNITA was almost consistently belligerent in the rural zones.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1045** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 February 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **3** |
| **Demand number:** | **1045.0311** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Obligations to consolidate the peace process; maintain an effective cease-fire, conclude military talks on integration of the armed forces, engage in the de-mining process, and integrate UNITA personnel into administrative and governmental institutions.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“On 30 January 1997, only 12 UNITA deputies and three nominees for cabinet posts arrived in Luanda by air from Bailundo on 12 February. The deputies were: Junior Joao, Smart Gaston Chata, Mateus Sousa, Arlete Chimbinda, Adelino Antonio, Almerindo Jaka Jamba, Vitorino Nhane, Celestino Kapapelo, Antonio Pitra Sobrinho, Aniceto Amukaya, Alberto Vasco Miguel, Sebastiao Veloso. The three nominees for cabinet posts who arrived are: Vitorino Domingos Hossi (Minister of Commerce), Anastacio Ruben Sicato (Minister of Health), Jorge Alicerces Valentim (Minister of Hotels and Tourism).   
UN Tussles with Problem of How to Bring UNITA into Line. Following the failure of UNITA to bring their deputies to Luanda, it is expected that the United Nations will only renew the United Nations Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) mandate until 31 March, with veiled warnings of further sanctions against UNITA after this, if they do not change their ways.”

--ANGOLA PEACE MONITOR, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 6, Vol. III, 25 February 1997

“Between 1994 and 1998, UNITA purchased military hardware from Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine and Bulgaria. The purchases included about 50 T-55 and T-62 tanks; a significant number of 155-mm G-5, B-2, D-2 and D-30 guns; medium- and long-range D-130 guns; BMP-1 and BMP-2 combat vehicles; ZU-23s anti-aircraft weapons; and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.”

--BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Radio notes British study of UNITA's military resources,” 17 August 1999; Chris Gordon, “Eastern Europe aid bolsters UNITA,” *Africa News Online*, 15 January 1999.

"The Security Council condemns the incident on 3 April 1996 which resulted in the death of two UNAVEM III personnel, the wounding of a third, and the death of a humanitarian assistance official, and reiterates the importance it attaches to the safety and security of UNAVEM III and humanitarian assistance personnel. The Council notes the cooperation offered by the Angolan Government and UNITA with the investigation by UNAVEM III of this deplorable incident.”

--UN Security Council - 5 - Press Release SC/6211 3657th Meeting (PM) 24 April 1996

A formal cease-fire between the government of President José Eduardo dos Santos and the armed opposition UNITA led by Jonas Malheiro Savimbi was agreed in February 1996, in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol peace settlement signed in November 1994…There were many violations of the cease-fire and hundreds of people were killed as a result of continued fighting, especially in the north and in Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul. Many people were also killed by landmines and there were reports of new mine laying by both sides. Despite this, the overall level of violence was reduced owing to the peace agreement, humanitarian aid became accessible to more of the population and people displaced by the war began to return to their homes.”

--1996 Annual Report for Angola, Amnesty International Annual Report 1996.

“The Government of Angola and the rebel movement Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola, UNITA, on 21 Maycompleted negotiations on the important issue of the integration of UNITA military personnel into the Angolan national army, FAA. This is a key provision of the Lusaka Protocol. If matched by political will from UNITA, this agreement paves the way for the disbandment of UNITA's military forces and the completion of the peace process. According to reports from the Portuguese radio station RDP Antena - 1, and the Angolan News Agency, ANGOP, an agreement has been reached that as from 1 June the selection of military personnel will begin, with the process ending on 30 July. No agreement has been made yet over the fate of those UNITA soldiers not chosen for the national army. The Government wants them placed in a new Fourth Branch of the military, to help with the reconstruction of the country. UNITA maintains that they should be immediately demobilised into civilian rehabilitation programmes.”

--Africa E-Policy Journal, *Angola*: *Peace Monitor*, Issue 9, Vol. 2, 27 May 1996.

“UNITA ministers loyal to government. Despite the present stalling of the peace process, there are encouraging signs that a section of the UNITA leadership are committed to peace. There is growing admiration for UNITA's four ministers and seven deputyministers appointed to the Government of Unity and National Reconstruction(GURN) by President dos Santos, in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol. Diplomatic sources have expressed surprise and delight at the hard work andseriousness of the UNITA appointees. However, this appreciation of theirwork is not shared by all. The UNITA mouthpiece in the United States, the Centre for Democracy in Angola Incorporated, on 23 October described their role as being "purely ceremonial". There is a growing gulf between those UNITA representatives who have movedto Luanda to participate in the GURN and the National Assembly, and thosewho have remained with Jonas Savimbi. At present, Jonas Savimbi is keepingboth the military and political option open. However, one UNITA minister has privately conceded that if there was a return to war, he would remain with the government.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.3, Vol. IV 27th November 1997

Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While overall the government of Angola and UNITA did not engage fully with the peace process or maintain an effective cease-fire, there were periods of relative functionality and moments where a cease-fire appeared to begin. However, neither side really integrated its armed forces, demilitarized, or de-mined.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Angolan peace process, launched in 1991 with an accord between the Government and the rebel movement UNITA, had by the end of 1998 collapsed for a second time leaving international mediators on the sidelines, no longer able to influence events. Years of accumulated mistrust produced an environment of fear in which the chief opposition party is reluctant to relinquish the security of their arms and commit themselves completely to the parliamentary process. Since the signature of the Lusaka protocol in 1994, high level shuttle diplomacy between the belligerent party leaders, mediated by the UN, failed to bring UNITA on board as a stakeholder. The post-Lusaka attempt at building a peace process failed to trickle down to soften the fears and suspicions of communities at the grassroots, in what remains a divided country.”

--Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“UNITA used its substantial diamond revenues to undertake a fundamental military reorganization…between 1993 and 1999…it moved away from its traditional posture as a guerrilla army into a more conventional disposition in preparation for delivering a final victorious blow against government forces and seizing state power. To this end, the rebels engaged in a major military procurement programme. UNITA has activities in acquiring arms and military equipment.”

--The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“The Government of Angola and the rebel movement Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola, UNITA, on 21 Maycompleted negotiations on the important issue of the integration of UNITA military personnel into the Angolan national army, FAA. This is a key provision of the Lusaka Protocol. If matched by political will from UNITA, this agreement paves the way for the disbandment of UNITA's military forces and the completion of the peace process. According to reports from the Portuguese radio station RDP Antena - 1, and the Angolan News Agency, ANGOP, an agreement has been reached that as from 1 June the selection of military personnel will begin, with the process ending on 30 July. No agreement has been made yet over the fate of those UNITA soldiers not chosen for the national army. The Government wants them placed in a new Fourth Branch of the military, to help with the reconstruction of the country. UNITA maintains that they should be immediately demobilised into civilian rehabilitation programmes.”

--Africa E-Policy Journal, *Angola*: *Peace Monitor*, Issue 9, Vol. 2, 27 May 1996.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While overall the government of Angola and UNITA did not engage fully with the peace process or maintain an effective cease-fire, there were periods of relative functionality and moments where a cease-fire appeared to begin. However, neither side really integrated its armed forces, demilitarized, or de-mined.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat to the existence of both UNITA and the Government of Angola if either had stopped attacks or ceased to address the attacks of the opposing side.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1045** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 February 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **5** |
| **Demand number:** | **1045.0511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Continue its progress in implementing the Lusaka Protocol.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA's compliance with the de-mobilisation process has been subject to frequent delays, misinformation and out-right contradiction. The laying of landmines certainly also continued after, and in violation of, the Lusaka accords; Human Rights Watch has documented new mine laying activities as recently as 1997, while attacks during May 1998 have provided ongoing evidence of this. High level pressure from the UN and US failed to hasten Savimbi's pace, eventually resulting in the imposition of much-delayed UN sanctions at the end of February 1998.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

"The Security Council condemns the incident on 3 April 1996 which resulted in the death of two UNAVEM III personnel, the wounding of a third, and the death of a humanitarian assistance official, and reiterates the importance it attaches to the safety and security of UNAVEM III and humanitarian assistance personnel. The Council notes the cooperation offered by the Angolan Government and UNITA with the investigation by UNAVEM III of this deplorable incident.”

--UN Security Council - 5 - Press Release SC/6211 3657th Meeting (PM) 24 April 1996

A formal cease-fire between the government of President José Eduardo dos Santos and the armed opposition UNITA led by Jonas Malheiro Savimbi was agreed in February 1996, in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol peace settlement signed in November 1994…There were many violations of the cease-fire and hundreds of people were killed as a result of continued fighting, especially in the north and in Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul. Many people were also killed by landmines and there were reports of new mine laying by both sides. Despite this, the overall level of violence was reduced owing to the peace agreement, humanitarian aid became accessible to more of the population and people displaced by the war began to return to their homes.”

--1996 Annual Report for Angola, Amnesty International Annual Report 1996.

“The Government of Angola and the rebel movement Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola, UNITA, on 21 May completed negotiations on the important issue of the integration of UNITA military personnel into the Angolan national army, FAA. This is a key provision of the Lusaka Protocol. If matched by political will from UNITA, this agreement paves the way for the disbandment of UNITA's military forces and the completion of the peace process. According to reports from the Portuguese radio station RDP Antena - 1, and the Angolan News Agency, ANGOP, an agreement has been reached that as from 1 June the selection of military personnel will begin, with the process ending on 30 July. No agreement has been made yet over the fate of those UNITA soldiers not chosen for the national army. The Government wants them placed in a new Fourth Branch of the military, to help with the reconstruction of the country. UNITA maintains that they should be immediately demobilised into civilian rehabilitation programmes.”

--Africa E-Policy Journal, *Angola*: *Peace Monitor*, Issue 9, Vol. 2, 27 May 1996.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Following the Lusaka protocol neither the government of Angola nor UNITA complied with demands to cease-fire, disarm, or remove their troops from occupied zones.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Angolan peace process, launched in 1991 with an accord between the Government and the rebel movement UNITA, had by the end of 1998 collapsed for a second time leaving international mediators on the sidelines, no longer able to influence events. Years of accumulated mistrust produced an environment of fear in which the chief opposition party is reluctant to relinquish the security of their arms and commit themselves completely to the parliamentary process. Since the signature of the Lusaka protocol in 1994, high level shuttle diplomacy between the belligerent party leaders, mediated by the UN, failed to bring UNITA on board as a stakeholder. The post-Lusaka attempt at building a peace process failed to trickle down to soften the fears and suspicions of communities at the grassroots, in what remains a divided country.”

--Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“The Lusaka Protocol had one fundamental flaw in relation to the prospects for a transition to peace. It owed more to international pressure for a settlement, rather than to a real commitment, from UNITA in particular, to make it work. Each side wished to hang on to the spoils that it had, using the political and military conflict to destroy or seize the spoils of its opponents…”

--Barry Munslow, “The Politics of Unsustainable Development,” *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 20, No. 3, (1999): 551-568.

“Since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994, Angolans have been living between war and peace. They are grateful for the cease-fire and peace process that ended the previous two years of unrestrained conflict. But they are concerned at repeated delays in implementation of the agreement.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Following the Lusaka protocol neither the government of Angola nor UNITA complied with demands to cease-fire, disarm, or remove their troops from occupied zones.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because fully implementing the Lusaka Protocol threatened the status quo for both parties and could have consequences for the leadership regarding political legitimacy in the future. Many UNITA members and leaders put their lives at risk even by signing the Protocol.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1045** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 February 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **7** |
| **Demand number:** | **1045.0711** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Proceed immediately with the movement of its troops to the quartering areas according to the new timetable agreed by the parties and in full cooperation with UNAVEM III.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In Angola, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol required that government troops were to be disengaged and over 62,000 UNITA troops were to be confined to assembly areas and disarmed…UNITA's weapons and those in civilian hands were to be collected and stored. Twenty-six thousand UNITA soldiers were planned to be incorporated into the newly created national army, which is to finally number 90,000 strong…UNAVEM III, responsible for overseeing the demobilisation process, experienced enormous problems with the process due to lack of co-operation particularly from UNITA who consistently slowed down the confinement of its combatants. Under threat of sanctions by the UN, however, UNITA completed the quartering of 63,000 troops by 20 November 1996. However, about 7,000 of those registered were found to be under the age of 18. The Angolan Peace Monitor reported at the time that over 70% of those quartered were not combat troops. The UN now accepts that Savimbi has retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. Due to the delays, soldiers in the cantonment camps became restless and desertions were commonplace. By November 1996 some 12,543 UNITA troops had deserted leaving 55,013 in the camps.”

-- Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“At a meeting on 8 May in New York, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1055 (1996), extending the UNAVEM III mandate for a further two months, until 11 July. This is one month less than the previous renewal, in a sign of greater international pressure on UNITA to comply with

the Lusaka Protocol. The resolution expressed "profound regret at the overall slow pace which is far behind schedule" and noted "with deep concern the failure of UNITA to complete the quartering of all its troops by 8 May in accordance with resolution 1045 (1996) of 8 February". It further went on to note "the recent progress in the quartering of UNITA troops and calls upon UNITA to fulfil by June 1996 its obligation to complete the credible, uninterrupted and fully verifiable quartering of its troops and to turn over to UNAVEM III all its arms, ammunition and military equipment".

In a dash to meet its self-imposed deadline of quartering 30,000 troops by 8 May, UNITA has moved thousands of its troops into official UN quartering areas, reaching a figure of 31,500 on 7 May. The large scale movement of UNITA troops into the quartering areas in the first week of May has brought a guarded response from the UN Security Council. Speaking on 8 May during the debate on the UN peacekeeping operation in Angola, UNAVEM III, the US Ambassador to the UN, Karl Inderfurth spoke for many

countries when he said that "the last-minute movements of thousands of troops to quartering areas in the final days before the renewal of UNAVEM's mandate is typical of UNITA's pattern of lurching forward in fits and starts towards its goals. This pattern does not help cement faith in UNITA's overall commitment to the peace process. It is essential that UNITA continue the quartering process without further delay or

interruption. Unless real soldiers bearing real weapons are quartered, the peace process will not move forward". According to information supplied to ACTSA by the UN Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unite in Luanda (UCAH), as of 15 May, a total of 33,675 UNITA soldiers were registered…An eleventh quartering area was opened on 17 May at Caiundo, Kuando Kubango Province, with a twelth due to open on 21 May at Chitembo, in Bie. Work is still taking place on two further sites, with the location of the last quartering area still under discussion. UNITA promises to quarter 50,000 by 15 June. The UNITA General Staff on 21 May issued a communique in which they pledged to confine 50,000 troops by 15 June. This clarifies a statement made by the UN Secretary General's Special Representative, Alioune Blondin Beye, who said after a visit to UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in Andulo on 14 May that "I am in a position to state firmly that UNITA will resume the confinement process before the end of this week and it will confine 50,000 men before 15 June".

--Africa E-Policy Journal, *Angola*: *Peace Monitor*, Issue 9, Vol. 2, 27 May 1996.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Overall, the pace of UNITA’s compliance was very slow. UNITA only really quartered a small number of its troops, and did so very much behind schedule. It was not a demonstration of good faith, and would later spell a return to war, as UNITA had never truly demobilized or disarmed, and never quartered a significant number of its troops.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA used its substantial diamond revenues to undertake a fundamental military reorganization…between 1993 and 1999…it moved away from its traditional posture as a guerrilla army into a more conventional disposition in preparation for delivering a final victorious blow against government forces and seizing state power. To this end, the rebels engaged in a major military procurement programme. UNITA has activities in acquiring arms and military equipment.”

--The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“UNITA has, since 1994, also imported conventional weapons systems including mechanized vehicles such as tanks and armored personnel carriers, mines and explosives, a variety of small arms and light weapons, and anti-aircraft weapons, and a variety of artillery pieces."

The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“Between 1994 and 1998, UNITA purchased military hardware from Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine and Bulgaria. The purchases included about 50 T-55 and T-62 tanks; a significant number of 155-mm G-5, B-2, D-2 and D-30 guns; medium- and long-range D-130 guns; BMP-1 and BMP-2 combat vehicles; ZU-23s anti-aircraft weapons; and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.”

--BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Radio notes British study of UNITA's military resources,” 17 August 1999; Chris Gordon, “Eastern Europe aid bolsters UNITA,” *Africa News Online*, 15 January 1999.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Overall, the pace of UNITA’s compliance was very slow. UNITA only really quartered a small number of its troops, and did so very much behind schedule. It was not a demonstration of good faith, and would later spell a return to war, as UNITA had never truly demobilized or disarmed, and never quartered a significant number of its troops.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because the quartering of troops signals an end to conflict, but also to military power. A demonstration of an abdication of military superiority can be very risky for the members of a party such as UNITA.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1045** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 February 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **8** |
| **Demand number:** | **1045.0811** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Proceed with the movement of all of its troops to other quartering areas other than the ones indicated by paragraph 7.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

##### “Since late 1995, UNITA has been engaged in the process of disarming and quartering its troops. It agreed to this when it freely signed the Lusaka protocol. The process of demilitarisation it has undertaken to complete, has been the focus of the peace process for the past year. As of 12 September 1996, UNITA had quartered 60 690 of the 62 500 troops agreed. This is welcome news, of course, because it means that there are less than 2 000 left to quarter, but it is also news that is about two and a half months late. This part of the process should have been finished by the beginning of July so that selection of 26 300 UNITA soldiers for the national army could begin, and the demobilisation of the remaining men could get under way before the next rainy season.”

--David Wimhurst, Spokesman for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Luanda, *Communication in Peace Operations: A Spokesperson's Perspective from UNAVEM III*, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997

“In Angola, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol required that government troops were to be disengaged and over 62,000 UNITA troops were to be confined to assembly areas and disarmed…UNITA's weapons and those in civilian hands were to be collected and stored. Twenty-six thousand UNITA soldiers were planned to be incorporated into the newly created national army, which is to finally number 90,000 strong…UNAVEM III, responsible for overseeing the demobilisation process, experienced enormous problems with the process due to lack of co-operation particularly from UNITA who consistently slowed down the confinement of its combatants. Under threat of sanctions by the UN, however, UNITA completed the quartering of 63,000 troops by 20 November 1996. However, about 7,000 of those registered were found to be under the age of 18. The Angolan Peace Monitor reported at the time that over 70% of those quartered were not combat troops. The UN now accepts that Savimbi has retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. Due to the delays, soldiers in the cantonment camps became restless and desertions were commonplace. By November 1996 some 12,543 UNITA troops had deserted leaving 55,013 in the camps.”

-- Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“The Secretary General of the UN, Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali has warned that the patience of UNITA soldiers staying in the quartering areas may be running out. In his report to the Security Council on 30 April (S/1996/328), he warned that "desertions from quartering sites were reported to number about 2,100, but the actual figure is probably higher, since, on several occasions UNITA commanders have prevented UNAVEM III personnel from conducting roll calls. UNITA representatives claimed that desertions were due to the harsh living conditions in the camps but there is reason to believe that some of them were covertly sanctioned by commanding officers and that others involved persons who had been forcibly recruited by UNITA for quartering. The age of some UNITA troops and the condition of weapons surrendered continue to be a major concern." The Secretary General went on to state that "Complaints by

UNITA, many of which have proved to be largely unfounded, have been carefully investigated and followed up. The [Joint] Commission, of which UNITA is a member, has concluded that the assistance being provided to the soldiers in the quartering areas is generally adequate". He continued that "It is disturbing, therefore, that UNITA's mass media continue to disseminate allegations about sub-standard conditions in quartering areas"

-- Africa E-Policy Journal, *Angola*: *Peace Monitor*, Issue 9, Vol. 2, 27 May 1996.

“Writing in his report to the Security Council, the Secretary General stated that "the major positive development was the withdrawal of the FAA to their nearest barracks in some provinces". He also pointed out that the Civilian Police component of UNAVEM III had "verified the quartering of the rapid reaction police in Benguela, Huambo, Luanda, Luena, Lubango, Uige and most recently, in Malange. As of 25 April, 3,605 of the declared strength of 3,745 personnel had been quartered in these 7 locations. Barracking of those in Saurimo will commence on 30 April, with those in Cabinda following in May." However, this positive view is rejected by UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, who said in an interview in Le Figaro on 17 May that "Government troops are only pretending to return to base. These soldiers and the special police forces, the "Ninjas", are still threatening our men who are now disarmed". Meanwhile, the Government announced on 13 May that the second stage of moving its troops to barracks was to commence, involving the barracking of 6,000 troops over the following two weeks.”

--Africa E-Policy Journal, *Angola*: *Peace Monitor*, Issue 9, Vol. 2, 27 May 1996.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Overall, the pace of UNITA’s compliance was very slow. UNITA only really quartered a small number of its troops, and did so very much behind schedule. It was not a demonstration of good faith, and would later spell a return to war, as UNITA had never truly demobilized or disarmed, and never quartered a significant number of its troops.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA used its substantial diamond revenues to undertake a fundamental military reorganization…between 1993 and 1999…it moved away from its traditional posture as a guerrilla army into a more conventional disposition in preparation for delivering a final victorious blow against government forces and seizing state power. To this end, the rebels engaged in a major military procurement programme. UNITA has activities in acquiring arms and military equipment.”

--The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“UNITA has, since 1994, also imported conventional weapons systems including mechanized vehicles such as tanks and armored personnel carriers, mines and explosives, a variety of small arms and light weapons, and anti-aircraft weapons, and a variety of artillery pieces."

The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“Between 1994 and 1998, UNITA purchased military hardware from Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine and Bulgaria. The purchases included about 50 T-55 and T-62 tanks; a significant number of 155-mm G-5, B-2, D-2 and D-30 guns; medium- and long-range D-130 guns; BMP-1 and BMP-2 combat vehicles; ZU-23s anti-aircraft weapons; and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.”

--BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Radio notes British study of UNITA's military resources,” 17 August 1999; Chris Gordon, “Eastern Europe aid bolsters UNITA,” *Africa News Online*, 15 January 1999.

“The Secretary General of the UN, Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali has warned that the patience of UNITA soldiers staying in the quartering areas may be running out. In his report to the Security Council on 30 April (S/1996/328), he warned that "desertions from quartering sites were reported to number about 2,100, but the actual figure is probably higher, since, on several occasions UNITA commanders have prevented UNAVEM III personnel from conducting roll calls. UNITA representatives claimed that desertions were due to the harsh living conditions in the camps but there is reason to believe that some of them were covertly sanctioned by commanding officers and that others involved persons who had been forcibly recruited by UNITA for quartering. The age of some UNITA troops and the condition of weapons surrendered continue to be a major concern." The Secretary General went on to state that "Complaints by

UNITA, many of which have proved to be largely unfounded, have been carefully investigated and followed up. The [Joint] Commission, of which UNITA is a member, has concluded that the assistance being provided to the soldiers in the quartering areas is generally adequate". He continued that "It is disturbing, therefore, that UNITA's mass media continue to disseminate allegations about sub-standard conditions in quartering areas"

-- Africa E-Policy Journal, *Angola*: *Peace Monitor*, Issue 9, Vol. 2, 27 May 1996.

“Writing in his report to the Security Council, the Secretary General stated that "the major positive development was the withdrawal of the FAA to their nearest barracks in some provinces". He also pointed out that the Civilian Police component of UNAVEM III had "verified the quartering of the rapid reaction police in Benguela, Huambo, Luanda, Luena, Lubango, Uige and most recently, in Malange. As of 25 April, 3,605 of the declared strength of 3,745 personnel had been quartered in these 7 locations. Barracking of those in Saurimo will commence on 30 April, with those in Cabinda following in May." However, this positive view is rejected by UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, who said in an interview in Le Figaro on 17 May that "Government troops are only pretending to return to base. These soldiers and the special police forces, the "Ninjas", are still threatening our men who are now disarmed". Meanwhile, the Government announced on 13 May that the second stage of moving its troops to barracks was to commence, involving the barracking of 6,000 troops over the following two weeks.”

--Africa E-Policy Journal, *Angola*: *Peace Monitor*, Issue 9, Vol. 2, 27 May 1996.

##### “Since late 1995, UNITA has been engaged in the process of disarming and quartering its troops. It agreed to this when it freely signed the Lusaka protocol. The process of demilitarisation it has undertaken to complete, has been the focus of the peace process for the past year. As of 12 September 1996, UNITA had quartered 60 690 of the 62 500 troops agreed. This is welcome news, of course, because it means that there are less than 2 000 left to quarter, but it is also news that is about two and a half months late. This part of the process should have been finished by the beginning of July so that selection of 26 300 UNITA soldiers for the national army could begin, and the demobilisation of the remaining men could get under way before the next rainy season.”

--David Wimhurst, Spokesman for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Luanda, *Communication in Peace Operations: A Spokesperson's Perspective from UNAVEM III*, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Overall, the pace of UNITA’s compliance was very slow. UNITA only really quartered a small number of its troops, and did so very much behind schedule. It was not a demonstration of good faith, and would later spell a return to war, as UNITA had never truly demobilized or disarmed, and never quartered a significant number of its troops.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because the quartering of troops signals an end to conflict, but also to military power. A demonstration of an abdication of military superiority can be very risky for the members of a party such as UNITA.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1045** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 February 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **9** |
| **Demand number:** | **1045.0911** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Extend full cooperation to UNAVEM III and the Joint Commission as required by the Lusaka Protocol.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Those who have followed the progress made by UNAVEM in Luanda, may have noticed that there has been a change in pace since mid-1996. With the UNITA Congress over, and the transformation from a military organisation into a political party declared by Savimbi to be complete, the impetus of the peace process had to speed up. The Security Council would again consider renewing UNAVEM's mandate, due to expire definitively in February 1997, and it would rightly want to know if UNITA completed its demilitarisation, including the handing over of all heavy weapons to the UN, integrating ten generals into the Angolan armed forces general staff, and selecting the required number of soldiers for the national army and for the national police force.”

--David Wimhurst, Spokesman for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Luanda, *Communication in Peace Operations: A Spokesperson's Perspective from UNAVEM III*, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997

“The UN Angola Verification Mission ([UNAVEM](http://acronyms.thefreedictionary.com/UNAVEM) UNAVEM United Nations Angola Verification Mission  III) has been extended by the Security Council until 11 July 1996. The Council, concerned with repeated delays in the implementation of successive timetables agreed to by the parties and with the "overall slow pace" of the peace process, declared that it would place "special emphasis" on [headway](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Headway) headway made in considering the Mission's future mandate. Particular concern was expressed with regard to the slow pace in quartering troops of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola ([UNITA](http://acronyms.thefreedictionary.com/UNITA)) and in completing talks regarding the integration of the [Angolan Armed Forces](http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Angolan+Armed+Forces) The Angolan Armed Forces (FAA)… "Progress in implementing the Lusaka Protocol has been disappointingly slow and many of the tasks which the parties themselves agreed to carry out in April remained unfulfilled", Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said…While the Government-UNITA dialogue had been maintained, the military situation had been stable and progress had been achieved with the partial barracking of the FM and the rapid reaction police, "the overall achievements fall well short of what the Security Council had been led to expect", the Secretary-General reported. The quartering of UNITA troops was "virtually stalled", although the flow had increased during the last few days of April. There were also delays in reaching agreement on incorporating UNITA troops into the FAA. As a result of the "unsatisfactory state of affairs", the Secretary-General recommended only a two-month extension of the Mission's mandate. The Council on 24 April urged President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi to "move the peace process forward", emphasizing that the ultimate responsibility for restoring peace in the country rested with the Angolans themselves.”

--“With the pace of peace process slow, meeting goals of Lusaka Protocol will determine UNAVEM’s continuation,” *UN Chronicle*, 22 June 1996, New York: UN Publication, 1996.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

It is hard to fully understand the compliance level by UNITA, here. UNITA never demonstrated cooperation with the UN mission at any point, but made some rhetorical promises at certain moments.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In Angola, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol required that government troops were to be disengaged and over 62,000 UNITA troops were to be confined to assembly areas and disarmed…UNITA's weapons and those in civilian hands were to be collected and stored. Twenty-six thousand UNITA soldiers were planned to be incorporated into the newly created national army, which is to finally number 90,000 strong…UNAVEM III, responsible for overseeing the demobilisation process, experienced enormous problems with the process due to lack of co-operation particularly from UNITA who consistently slowed down the confinement of its combatants. Under threat of sanctions by the UN, however, UNITA completed the quartering of 63,000 troops by 20 November 1996. However, about 7,000 of those registered were found to be under the age of 18. The Angolan Peace Monitor reported at the time that over 70% of those quartered were not combat troops. The UN now accepts that Savimbi has retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. Due to the delays, soldiers in the cantonment camps became restless and desertions were commonplace. By November 1996 some 12,543 UNITA troops had deserted leaving 55,013 in the camps.”

-- Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“Those who have followed the progress made by UNAVEM in Luanda, may have noticed that there has been a change in pace since mid-1996. With the UNITA Congress over, and the transformation from a military organisation into a political party declared by Savimbi to be complete, the impetus of the peace process had to speed up. The Security Council would again consider renewing UNAVEM's mandate, due to expire definitively in February 1997, and it would rightly want to know if UNITA completed its demilitarisation, including the handing over of all heavy weapons to the UN, integrating ten generals into the Angolan armed forces general staff, and selecting the required number of soldiers for the national army and for the national police force.”

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--“With the pace of peace process slow, meeting goals of Lusaka Protocol will determine UNAVEM’s continuation,” *UN Chronicle*, 22 June 1996, New York: UN Publication, 1996.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

It is hard to fully understand the compliance level by UNITA, here. UNITA never demonstrated cooperation with the UN mission at any point, but made some rhetorical promises at certain moments.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The depth of the demand here ranks as “low” because cooperation with the Joint Commission would most likely not have put UNITA or its leadership at risk.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1045** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 February 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **10** |
| **Demand number:** | **1045.1011** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Release all remaining prisoners.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The armed opposition União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (unita), National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, released some prisoners but failed to account for others, raising concern about their safety, and was responsible for deliberate and arbitrary killings.”

--1996 Annual Report for Angola, Amnesty International Annual Report 1996.

“Under the Lusaka Protocol, the government and unita agreed to release all prisoners held in connection with the conflict but only about 350 such prisoners had been released by the end of the year. The government released over 200 unita supporters in May but in June it said it was halting releases until unita freed a similar number. However, only 22 were released by unita during the year. It remained unclear how many prisoners were being held by each side and there was mounting concern about hundreds of people whose fate and whereabouts were unknown since their detention or abduction in 1992 and 1993 by the forces of one side or the other (see Amnesty International Reports 1993, 1994 and 1995).”

--1996 Annual Report for Angola, Amnesty International Annual Report 1996.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA continued to take prisoners throughout 1996 and 1997, and there is little evidence that most prisoners or hostages were released without harm. Many bodies were found who were those of prisoners and hostages of UNITA in regions such as Mulenje and Huambo.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The armed opposition União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), released some prisoners but failed to account for others, raising concern about their safety, and was responsible for deliberate and arbitrary killings.”

--1996 Annual Report for Angola, Amnesty International Annual Report 1996.

“Under the Lusaka Protocol, the government and unita agreed to release all prisoners held in connection with the conflict but only about 350 such prisoners had been released by the end of the year. The government released over 200 unita supporters in May but in June it said it was halting releases until unita freed a similar number. However, only 22 were released by unita during the year. It remained unclear how many prisoners were being held by each side and there was mounting concern about hundreds of people whose fate and whereabouts were unknown since their detention or abduction in 1992 and 1993 by the forces of one side or the other (see Amnesty International Reports 1993, 1994 and 1995).”

--1996 Annual Report for Angola, Amnesty International Annual Report 1996.

“In September or October, João Lina was reportedly beaten to death in public by unita forces after two of his relatives fled the area under unita control in Soyo to an area under government control. His body was reportedly left on public display for some days before his family was allowed to bury him. In October, three members of a Cabindan separatist group were said to have been summarily executed by unita for stealing arms. Five unita soldiers were also said to have been summarily executed for complicity.  
Throughout the year Amnesty International appealed to both the government and unita to account for the fate of those who had ''disappeared'' or were missing following abduction since the resumption of hostilities in late 1992. Amnesty International also made inquiries and expressed concern about reports of killings by the government and unita, including the killing of Ricardo de Melo. In August the organization wrote to the un Special Representative to Angola to seek information and make suggestions to strengthen human rights protection. The Special Representative welcomed these suggestions and informed Amnesty International of protective measures he had implemented.”

--1996 Annual Report for Angola, Amnesty International Annual Report 1996.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA continued to take prisoners throughout 1996 and 1997, and there is little evidence that most prisoners or hostages were released without harm. Many bodies were found who were those of prisoners and hostages of UNITA in regions such as Mulenje and Huambo.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This was really a low depth of demand because it did not demand that UNITA put themselves in a difficult position in order to comply with this demand. It was simply a release of prisoners, agreed to in the Lusaka protocol.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1045** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 February 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **11** |
| **Demand number:** | **1045.1111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Ensure the freedom of movement of people and goods throughout the country.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Full implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, originally envisaged to be completed with UN assistance by February 1997, is far behind schedule. The engagement of Angolan civil society in the peace process is weak. The right to freedom of movement, particularly in UNITA-controlled areas, is systematically violated, without an effective response from the international community.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

“There were many violations of the cease-fire and hundreds of people were killed as a result of continued fighting, especially in the north and in Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul. Many people were also killed by landmines and there were reports of new mine laying by both sides. Despite this, the overall level of violence was reduced owing to the peace agreement, humanitarian aid became accessible to more of the population and people displaced by the war began to return to their homes. An agreement between the government and the un High Commissioner for Refugees (unhcr) in June provided for the voluntary repatriation of refugees from neighbouring countries. A similar agreement was also reached between unita and the unhcr for the resettlement of 45,000 people from Jamba, unita's former headquarters, in the southeast.”

--1996 Annual Report for Angola, Amnesty International Annual Report 1996.

##### “On 10 August 1996, a five-vehicle convoy from BRABAT (the Brazilian Battalion) was carrying 85 UNITA soldiers and their families from Luena to Lumege in Moxico Province when the third vehicle in the convoy struck a landmine. The explosion injured 25 UNITA soldiers, seven of whom seriously enough to require hospitalisation at UNAVEM's advanced dressing station in Luena. Somehow, the UNITA troops in the Lumege quartering area thought that some of their comrades had been killed in an FAA action. UNAVEM's deputy regional commander assured the UNITA commander by radio that it was not the case and that all seven soldiers in the advance dressing station were in a stable condition. The UNITA commander said he would only be able to reassure his men if he came down to Luena first thing the next morning to check on them himself. This was agreed between the two officers and the incident seemed closed.”

--David Wimhurst, Spokesman for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Luanda, *Communication in Peace Operations: A Spokesperson's Perspective from UNAVEM III*, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997

“Free circulation of persons and goods, a specific principle of the Lusaka Protocol, continued to be abused by both sides. Dozens of Angolans interviewed by Human Rights Watch in June complained of not being able to move freely to their homes and that soldiers heavily "taxed" them when they traveled.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report 1996- Angola,* 1 January 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Full implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, originally envisaged to be completed with UN assistance by February 1997, is far behind schedule. The engagement of Angolan civil society in the peace process is weak. The right to freedom of movement, particularly in UNITA-controlled areas, is systematically violated, without an effective response from the international community.”

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--*Human Rights Watch World Report 1996- Angola,* 1 January 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1045** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 February 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **12** |
| **Demand number:** | **1045.1211** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate fully with humanitarian organization by granting them necessary guarantees and freedom of movement.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The first is Angolas increasing- and largely avoidable- humanitarian crisis. The return to war has exacerbated an already difficult internal refugee problem. By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The

Number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angola’s population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanjein the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000....The

War has also obstructed or interrupted aid flights and convoys by organizations such as the World Food Programme and CARE at a time when some donors have failed to live up to promises of relief aid to the region.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“Full implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, originally envisaged to be completed with UN assistance by February 1997, is far behind schedule. The engagement of Angolan civil society in the peace process is weak. The right to freedom of movement, particularly in UNITA-controlled areas, is systematically violated, without an effective response from the international community.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

Free circulation of persons and goods, a specific principle of the Lusaka Protocol, continued to be abused by both sides. Dozens of Angolans interviewed by Human Rights Watch in June complained of not being able to move freely to their homes and that soldiers heavily "taxed" them when they traveled.

--*Human Rights Watch World Report 1996- Angola,* 1 January 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The first is Angolas increasing- and largely avoidable- humanitarian crisis. The return to war has exacerbated an already difficult internal refugee problem. By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The

Number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angola’s population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanjein the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000....The

War has also obstructed or interrupted aid flights and convoys by organizations such as the World Food Programme and CARE at a time when some donors have failed to live up to promises of relief aid to the region.”

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“Full implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, originally envisaged to be completed with UN assistance by February 1997, is far behind schedule. The engagement of Angolan civil society in the peace process is weak. The right to freedom of movement, particularly in UNITA-controlled areas, is systematically violated, without an effective response from the international community.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

“And, despite large-scale international commitments of humanitarian and reconstruction aid, the prospects for quick implementation of sustainable projects for reconstruction which could give additional momentum to peaceful activities are still hampered by government incapacity, UNITA fears of losing control over their population base, and the lack of sufficient local knowledge and problems of coordination among newly arrived agencies.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

Free circulation of persons and goods, a specific principle of the Lusaka Protocol, continued to be abused by both sides. Dozens of Angolans interviewed by Human Rights Watch in June complained of not being able to move freely to their homes and that soldiers heavily "taxed" them when they traveled.

--*Human Rights Watch World Report 1996- Angola,* 1 January 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1045** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 February 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **13** |
| **Demand number:** | **1045.1311** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Obligation to cease the dissemination of hostile propaganda.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The same swift response is needed to refute false information, which is never in short supply. During August 1996, the Jornal de Angola published a report which said that the SRSG would be travelling to Bailundo the next day to meet Jonas Savimbi. This was untrue, and the UNAVEM spokesperson issued a denial. The next day, the same report was heard on a South African radio station that broadcasts in Portuguese, but this time with an addition. The purpose of the imaginary trip was now to persuade Jonas Savimbi to accept the vice-presidency offered him by the Angolan government. Within two hours, the radio station had received the spokesperson's strongly worded denial and a request for a correction, which was duly broadcast. The source of this damaging little fiction turned out to be Associated Press, whose local correspondent had decided, for reasons best known to himself, to fabricate some news. False information can also result from the deliberate omission of key facts. Early in September 1996, on his return from a meeting with the UNITA leadership, including Jonas Savimbi, the SRSG announced that UNITA had undertaken to complete some key military tasks by 14, 16 and 20 September. The national television news covered this significant announcement and then failed to broadcast a single word of the substantive portion of Maitre Beye's statement, editing the news item so that only platitudes remained. This was by any standards a pretty flagrant act of manipulation, and it left the impression that the SRSG had brought nothing back from the meeting with Savimbi. In this case, the spokesperson sent a strongly worded note to the state-controlled television station, copied to the minister responsible and to every member of the Joint Commission, pointing out, among others, the significance of the statements of the SRSG and the responsibility of the TV journalists to report them accurately. When UNITA's radio station (Radio Vorgan) sends out false information, such as its recent claims that the SRSG would be revising the whole question of the quartering of the Government's rapid reaction police force when he next met the president, the spokesperson reacted in the same way. He issued a strong denial to this fabrication, which was sent to UNITA through e-mail, copying it once again to the Joint Commission, so that all members of the peace process were aware of what had happened and what UNAVEM's response was.”

--David Wimhurst, Spokesman for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Luanda, *Communication in Peace Operations: A Spokesperson's Perspective from UNAVEM III*, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997

##### “Countering hostile propaganda basically follows the same procedure as outlined above, but usually requires input from the military side of the mission, whose observers and teams throughout the country are UNAVEM's eyes and ears. Hostile propaganda, which is banned under the Lusaka Protocol, usually takes the form of unverified allegations made by one side against the other side. Fortunately, this has substantially diminished by September 1996. However, there were still some occurrences of propaganda. For example, the UNITA radio station had a tendency to broadcast allegations accusing government forces of moving into a certain area, or arming the civilian population, or some such illegal act, for all these constitute cease-fire violations.”

--David Wimhurst, Spokesman for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Luanda, *Communication in Peace Operations: A Spokesperson's Perspective from UNAVEM III*, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA continued to emit propaganda throughout 1996 and 1997.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The same swift response is needed to refute false information, which is never in short supply. During August 1996, the Jornal de Angola published a report which said that the SRSG would be travelling to Bailundo the next day to meet Jonas Savimbi. This was untrue, and the UNAVEM spokesperson issued a denial. The next day, the same report was heard on a South African radio station that broadcasts in Portuguese, but this time with an addition. The purpose of the imaginary trip was now to persuade Jonas Savimbi to accept the vice-presidency offered him by the Angolan government. Within two hours, the radio station had received the spokesperson's strongly worded denial and a request for a correction, which was duly broadcast. The source of this damaging little fiction turned out to be Associated Press, whose local correspondent had decided, for reasons best known to himself, to fabricate some news. False information can also result from the deliberate omission of key facts. Early in September 1996, on his return from a meeting with the UNITA leadership, including Jonas Savimbi, the SRSG announced that UNITA had undertaken to complete some key military tasks by 14, 16 and 20 September. The national television news covered this significant announcement and then failed to broadcast a single word of the substantive portion of Maitre Beye's statement, editing the news item so that only platitudes remained. This was by any standards a pretty flagrant act of manipulation, and it left the impression that the SRSG had brought nothing back from the meeting with Savimbi. In this case, the spokesperson sent a strongly worded note to the state-controlled television station, copied to the minister responsible and to every member of the Joint Commission, pointing out, among others, the significance of the statements of the SRSG and the responsibility of the TV journalists to report them accurately. When UNITA's radio station (Radio Vorgan) sends out false information, such as its recent claims that the SRSG would be revising the whole question of the quartering of the Government's rapid reaction police force when he next met the president, the spokesperson reacted in the same way. He issued a strong denial to this fabrication, which was sent to UNITA through e-mail, copying it once again to the Joint Commission, so that all members of the peace process were aware of what had happened and what UNAVEM's response was.”

--David Wimhurst, Spokesman for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Luanda, *Communication in Peace Operations: A Spokesperson's Perspective from UNAVEM III*, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997

##### “Countering hostile propaganda basically follows the same procedure as outlined above, but usually requires input from the military side of the mission, whose observers and teams throughout the country are UNAVEM's eyes and ears. Hostile propaganda, which is banned under the Lusaka Protocol, usually takes the form of unverified allegations made by one side against the other side. Fortunately, this has substantially diminished by September 1996. However, there were still some occurrences of propaganda. For example, the UNITA radio station had a tendency to broadcast allegations accusing government forces of moving into a certain area, or arming the civilian population, or some such illegal act, for all these constitute cease-fire violations.”

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## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA continued to emit propaganda throughout 1996 and 1997.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as low due to the non-threatening nature of ceasing hostile propaganda.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1045** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 February 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **14** |
| **Demand number:** | **1045.1411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Provide all the facilities necessary for the independent functioning of UNAVEM radio.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In cases of false information, UNAVEM also responds with the correct information through its own radio and television programmes, which are broadcast every week, courtesy of government installations. In this way, the mission can counter false information or hostile propaganda, not only at the political level, but also at the level of the listening or viewing audience, where it does most damage.”

----David Wimhurst, Spokesman for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Luanda, Communication in Peace Operations: A Spokesperson's Perspective from UNAVEM III, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997

“Attempts by the U.N. mission to set up an independent radio station, Radio UNAVEM, were frustrated by government foot-dragging over the allocation of broadcasting frequencies. Freedom of expression was even more tightly controlled in UNITA dominated areas, with no criticism tolerated. Free circulation of persons and goods, a specific principle of the Lusaka Protocol, continued to be abused by both sides.”

--Human Rights Watch World Report 1996- Angola, 1 January 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

By all accounts, the government made minimal effort towards establishing a functioning radio for UNAVEM.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In cases of false information, UNAVEM also responds with the correct information through its own radio and television programmes, which are broadcast every week, courtesy of government installations. In this way, the mission can counter false information or hostile propaganda, not only at the political level, but also at the level of the listening or viewing audience, where it does most damage.”

----David Wimhurst, Spokesman for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Luanda, *Communication in Peace Operations: A Spokesperson's Perspective from UNAVEM III*, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997

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--*Human Rights Watch World Report 1996- Angola,* 1 January 1997

##### “UNAVEM publishes a monthly magazine, as well as running its own TV and radio broadcast units. It also publishes a daily news highlights bulletin and, taken together, these components make up the mission's Public Information Office (PIO). This office is distinct from the spokesperson's office, whose role is to speak on behalf of the mission and manage press relations. The function of the PIO is to generate a wider understanding of the peacekeeping operation and of the UN within the mission territory, as well as sending electronic items back to UN HQ for wider dissemination around the world….Radio is the most effective way of informing the population in the mission area, and UNAVEM's radio unit is able to generate enough material to fill the three available hours with ease. Some of this programming deals with the UN and its various agencies, and is supplied from headquarters. But the most important segments are generated on site, tailored to specific issues that need addressing…A recent key issue has been the demobilisation of 100 000 soldiers and their social reintegration. UNAVEM radio has prepared an extensive information campaign on this critical and complex subject, in an attempt to help the population understand the various aid programmes set up to benefit the demobilised soldiers, as well as the need to take these men back into society in a constructive way. While both UNAVEM radio and TV recently took time out from their regular work to help in promoting the polio vaccination campaign in Angola, their main purpose is to pass messages about the peace process to the local population that are appropriate to the needs of the moment, and as such they have a very important political role to play.”

--David Wimhurst, Spokesman for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Luanda, *Communication in Peace Operations: A Spokesperson's Perspective from UNAVEM III*, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

By all accounts, the government made minimal effort towards establishing a functioning radio for UNAVEM.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as low due to the non-threatening nature of establishing a radio for UNAVEM.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1045** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 February 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **15** |
| **Demand number:** | **1045.1511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Meet as soon as possible to promote mutual confidence and achieve implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Jonas Savimbi, José Eduardo dos Santos**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA's compliance with the de-mobilisation process has been subject to frequent delays, misinformation and out-right contradiction. The laying of landmines certainly also continued after, and in violation of, the Lusaka accords; Human Rights Watch has documented new mine laying activities as recently as 1997, while attacks during May 1998 have provided ongoing evidence of this. High level pressure from the UN and US failed to hasten Savimbi's pace, eventually resulting in the imposition of much-delayed UN sanctions at the end of February 1998.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“As of 12 September 1996, UNITA had quartered 60 690 of the 62 500 troops agreed. This is welcome news, of course, because it means that there are less than 2 000 left to quarter, but it is also news that is about two and a half months late. This part of the process should have been finished by the beginning of July so that selection of 26 300 UNITA soldiers for the national army could begin, and the demobilisation of the remaining men could get under way before the next rainy season.”

--David Wimhurst, Spokesman for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Luanda, *Communication in Peace Operations: A Spokesperson's Perspective from UNAVEM III*, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997

“Under the Lusaka Protocol, the government and unita agreed to release all prisoners held in connection with the conflict but only about 350 such prisoners had been released by the end of the year.”

--1996 Annual Report for Angola, Amnesty International Annual Report 1996.

“The UN Angola Verification Mission ([UNAVEM](http://acronyms.thefreedictionary.com/UNAVEM) UNAVEM United Nations Angola Verification Mission  III) has been extended by the Security Council until 11 July 1996. The Council, concerned with repeated delays in the implementation of successive timetables agreed to by the parties and with the "overall slow pace" of the peace process, declared that it would place "special emphasis" on [headway](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Headway) headway made in considering the Mission's future mandate. Particular concern was expressed with regard to the slow pace in quartering troops of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola ([UNITA](http://acronyms.thefreedictionary.com/UNITA)) and in completing talks regarding the integration of the [Angolan Armed Forces](http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Angolan+Armed+Forces) The Angolan Armed Forces (FAA)… "Progress in implementing the Lusaka Protocol has been disappointingly slow and many of the tasks which the parties themselves agreed to carry out in April remained unfulfilled", Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said…While the Government-UNITA dialogue had been maintained, the military situation had been stable and progress had been achieved with the partial barracking of the FM and the rapid reaction police, "the overall achievements fall well short of what the Security Council had been led to expect", the Secretary-General reported. The quartering of UNITA troops was "virtually stalled", although the flow had increased during the last few days of April. There were also delays in reaching agreement on incorporating UNITA troops into the FAA. As a result of the "unsatisfactory state of affairs", the Secretary-General recommended only a two-month extension of the Mission's mandate. The Council on 24 April urged President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi to "move the peace process forward", emphasizing that the ultimate responsibility for restoring peace in the country rested with the Angolans themselves.”

--“With the pace of peace process slow, meeting goals of Lusaka Protocol will determine UNAVEM’s continuation,” *UN Chronicle*, 22 June 1996, New York: UN Publication, 1996.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Savimbi and dos Santos met in 1996 in order to implement the Lusaka Protocol in Gabon. However, Both parties were intent on continuing their various hostile campaigns in the rural zone.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Progress in implementing the 'final timetable' under the Lusaka Protocol during March 1998 was smoother, but it again failed to meet even the revised deadline, and so continued into April…Notwithstanding these developments, UNITA has continued to give contradictory signals and even to launch new armed attacks. Several towns, villages and communes in Uige, Moxico Malanje and Lunda Sul provinces previously handed over to the government were retaken by UNITA soldiers. Other settle-ments in Benguela, Bengo, Cuando Cubango, Huambo, Malanje, Huila, Cabinda, Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul provinces were raided during March, April and May, when properties were destroyed and local administrators expelled or abducted.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“The UN Angola Verification Mission ([UNAVEM](http://acronyms.thefreedictionary.com/UNAVEM) UNAVEM United Nations Angola Verification Mission  III) has been extended by the Security Council until 11 July 1996. The Council, concerned with repeated delays in the implementation of successive timetables agreed to by the parties and with the "overall slow pace" of the peace process, declared that it would place "special emphasis" on [headway](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Headway) headway made in considering the Mission's future mandate. Particular concern was expressed with regard to the slow pace in quartering troops of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola ([UNITA](http://acronyms.thefreedictionary.com/UNITA)) and in completing talks regarding the integration of the [Angolan Armed Forces](http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Angolan+Armed+Forces) The Angolan Armed Forces (FAA)… "Progress in implementing the Lusaka Protocol has been disappointingly slow and many of the tasks which the parties themselves agreed to carry out in April remained unfulfilled", Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said…While the Government-UNITA dialogue had been maintained, the military situation had been stable and progress had been achieved with the partial barracking of the FM and the rapid reaction police, "the overall achievements fall well short of what the Security Council had been led to expect", the Secretary-General reported. The quartering of UNITA troops was "virtually stalled", although the flow had increased during the last few days of April. There were also delays in reaching agreement on incorporating UNITA troops into the FAA. As a result of the "unsatisfactory state of affairs", the Secretary-General recommended only a two-month extension of the Mission's mandate. The Council on 24 April urged President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi to "move the peace process forward", emphasizing that the ultimate responsibility for restoring peace in the country rested with the Angolans themselves.”

--“With the pace of peace process slow, meeting goals of Lusaka Protocol will determine UNAVEM’s continuation,” *UN Chronicle*, 22 June 1996, New York: UN Publication, 1996.

“The Angolan peace process, launched in 1991 with an accord between the Government and the rebel movement UNITA, had by the end of 1998 collapsed for a second time leaving international mediators on the sidelines, no longer able to influence events. Years of accumulated mistrust produced an environment of fear in which the chief opposition party is reluctant to relinquish the security of their arms and commit themselves completely to the parliamentary process. Since the signature of the Lusaka protocol in 1994, high level shuttle diplomacy between the belligerent party leaders, mediated by the UN, failed to bring UNITA on board as a stakeholder. The post-Lusaka attempt at building a peace process failed to trickle down to soften the fears and suspicions of communities at the grassroots, in what remains a divided country.”

--Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“UNITA used its substantial diamond revenues to undertake a fundamental military reorganization…between 1993 and 1999…it moved away from its traditional posture as a guerrilla army into a more conventional disposition in preparation for delivering a final victorious blow against government forces and seizing state power. To this end, the rebels engaged in a major military procurement programme. UNITA has activities in acquiring arms and military equipment.”

--The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“UNITA has, since 1994, also imported conventional weapons systems including mechanized vehicles such as tanks and armored personnel carriers, mines and explosives, a variety of small arms and light weapons, and anti-aircraft weapons, and a variety of artillery pieces."

The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“Between 1994 and 1998, UNITA purchased military hardware from Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine and Bulgaria. The purchases included about 50 T-55 and T-62 tanks; a significant number of 155-mm G-5, B-2, D-2 and D-30 guns; medium- and long-range D-130 guns; BMP-1 and BMP-2 combat vehicles; ZU-23s anti-aircraft weapons; and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.”

--BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Radio notes British study of UNITA's military resources,” 17 August 1999; Chris Gordon, “Eastern Europe aid bolsters UNITA,” *Africa News Online*, 15 January 1999.

“The Lusaka Protocol had one fundamental flaw in relation to the prospects for a transition to peace. It owed more to international pressure for a settlement, rather than to a real commitment, from UNITA in particular, to make it work. Each side wished to hang on to the spoils that it had, using the political and military conflict to destroy or seize the spoils of its opponents…”

--Barry Munslow, “The Politics of Unsustainable Development,” *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 20, No. 3, (1999): 551-568.

“Since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994, Angolans have been living between war and peace. They are grateful for the cease-fire and peace process that ended the previous two years of unrestrained conflict. But they are concerned at repeated delays in implementation of the agreement.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Savimbi and dos Santos met in 1996 in order to implement the Lusaka Protocol in Gabon. Both parties were intent on continuing their various hostile campaigns in the rural zone.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat to the existence of both UNITA and the Government of Angola if either had stopped attacks or ceased to address the attacks of the opposing side.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1055** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 May 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **6** |
| **Demand number:** | **1055.0611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Fulfill its obligation to complete the quartering of its troops and to turn over to UNAVEM III all arms, ammunition, and military equipment..

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In Angola, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol required that government troops were to be disengaged and over 62,000 UNITA troops were to be confined to assembly areas and disarmed…UNITA's weapons and those in civilian hands were to be collected and stored. Twenty-six thousand UNITA soldiers were planned to be incorporated into the newly created national army, which is to finally number 90,000 strong…UNAVEM III, responsible for overseeing the demobilisation process, experienced enormous problems with the process due to lack of co-operation particularly from UNITA who consistently slowed down the confinement of its combatants. Under threat of sanctions by the UN, however, UNITA completed the quartering of 63,000 troops by 20 November 1996. However, about 7,000 of those registered were found to be under the age of 18. The Angolan Peace Monitor reported at the time that over 70% of those quartered were not combat troops. The UN now accepts that Savimbi has retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. Due to the delays, soldiers in the cantonment camps became restless and desertions were commonplace. By November 1996 some 12,543 UNITA troops had deserted leaving 55,013 in the camps.”

--Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“In a 6 March report (S/1996/171), the Secretary-General called UNITA's quartering of more than 16,000 troops "a step forward" and commended the Government for the implementation of several of its commitments. But he also warned that "time is running short if the parties are to complete the numerous outstanding tasks foreseen in the Lusaka Protocol". Instances of forced recruitment and the substandard quality of weapons, equipment and ammunition brought to quartering areas were "bound to raise doubts about the good faith of UNITA in its approach to this process", he stated. Those doubts could only be dispelled by completing the process expeditiously.”

--“With the pace of peace process slow, meeting goals of Lusaka Protocol will determine UNAVEM’s continuation,” *UN Chronicle*, 22 June 1996, New York: UN Publication, 1996.

“According to the Lusaka Protocol, the next steps - selection of UNITA troops to join the national army and demobilization of excess forces - will not begin until the quartering process is completed. However, it is extremely unlikely that all the forces can in fact be quartered without simultaneous progress on integration into the national army, implementation of UNITA's agreed-on participation in the political process, and other confidence- building measures. The declared total of 62,500 UNITA military personnel to be quartered is possibly an overestimate, but the pace will have to quicken even to quarter a more modest figure of 45,000 to 50,000. If pressure to complete the quartering is not combined with measures to advance on other fronts, and attention focuses primarily on the numbers game of how many have been quartered, there are likely to be significant additional delays as well as increased chances of cease-fire violations and other incidents provoked by idle soldiers in the quartering areas.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Equipment remained firmly in the hands of UNITA in the 1996-1999 period. UNITA did not comply with the troop requirements of the Lusaka Protocol at any point, and only marginally began some demonstrations of troop quartering before fully re-engaging in war.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Significant problems remained on the military level after the formation of the new administration. The bulk of the UNITA component still had to be integrated with the FAA. UNITA checkpoints and installations remained active in the areas under its control, in particular the diamond rich north-east. Most seriously, both the government and the UN were concerned about the size and weaponry of Savimbi's personal 'security detachment', thought to comprise UNITA's most experienced and best equipped fighters. But the achievements of the previous six months had been considerable and the UN's management of UNITA by the graduated application of pressure had apparently been successful. The basic problem for the UN was how to interpret UNITA's motives for procrastination. Were the various delaying manoeuvres signs of a fundamental rejection of the peace process? Were the grudging concessions to external pressure merely the price UNITA was willing to pay for diplomatic toleration while it prepared for a return to war? Or, did its obduracy come from genuine concerns over specific aspects of a process that it was, ultimately, committed to? It may have been that UNITA and Savimbi himself were unclear as to their own motives.”

--Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

“UNITA used its substantial diamond revenues to undertake a fundamental military reorganization…between 1993 and 1999…it moved away from its traditional posture as a guerrilla army into a more conventional disposition in preparation for delivering a final victorious blow against government forces and seizing state power. To this end, the rebels engaged in a major military procurement programme. UNITA has activities in acquiring arms and military equipment.”

--The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“UNITA has, since 1994, also imported conventional weapons systems including mechanized vehicles such as tanks and armored personnel carriers, mines and explosives, a variety of small arms and light weapons, and anti-aircraft weapons, and a variety of artillery pieces."

The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“Between 1994 and 1998, UNITA purchased military hardware from Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine and Bulgaria. The purchases included about 50 T-55 and T-62 tanks; a significant number of 155-mm G-5, B-2, D-2 and D-30 guns; medium- and long-range D-130 guns; BMP-1 and BMP-2 combat vehicles; ZU-23s anti-aircraft weapons; and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.”

--BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Radio notes British study of UNITA's military resources,” 17 August 1999; Chris Gordon, “Eastern Europe aid bolsters UNITA,” *Africa News Online*, 15 January 1999.

“According to the Lusaka Protocol, the next steps - selection of UNITA troops to join the national army and demobilization of excess forces - will not begin until the quartering process is completed. However, it is extremely unlikely that all the forces can in fact be quartered without simultaneous progress on integration into the national army, implementation of UNITA's agreed-on participation in the political process, and other confidence- building measures. The declared total of 62,500 UNITA military personnel to be quartered is possibly an overestimate, but the pace will have to quicken even to quarter a more modest figure of 45,000 to 50,000. If pressure to complete the quartering is not combined with measures to advance on other fronts, and attention focuses primarily on the numbers game of how many have been quartered, there are likely to be significant additional delays as well as increased chances of cease-fire violations and other incidents provoked by idle soldiers in the quartering areas.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Equipment remained firmly in the hands of UNITA in the 1996-1999 period. UNITA did not comply with the troop requirements of the Lusaka Protocol at any point, and only marginally began some demonstrations of troop quartering before fully re-engaging in war.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because the handing over of weapons would have significantly weakened UNITA and could have placed its personnel and its leadership at risk.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1055** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 May 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **7** |
| **Demand number:** | **1055.0711** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Release unconditionally and without delay all remaining prisoners according to the Lusaka Protocol.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Under the Lusaka Protocol, the government and unita agreed to release all prisoners held in connection with the conflict but only about 350 such prisoners had been released by the end of the year. The government released over 200 unita supporters in May but in June it said it was halting releases until unita freed a similar number. However, only 22 were released by unita during the year. It remained unclear how many prisoners were being held by each side and there was mounting concern about hundreds of people whose fate and whereabouts were unknown since their detention or abduction in 1992 and 1993 by the forces of one side or the other (see Amnesty International Reports 1993, 1994 and 1995). There were reports of new political arrests of suspected unita supporters and other opponents of the government, including possible prisoners of conscience. Few details were available and independent corroboration was rarely forthcoming. Some detainees were released within days or a few weeks. One of those held was Nzuzi Domingos, a leading member of the Partido Democrático para o Progresso–Aliança Nacional Angolana, Democratic Party for Progress–Angolan National Alliance. He was arrested in May and charged with defamation after he publicly accused the chief of police of involvement in killings of members of the Bakongo ethnic group in January 1993 (see Amnesty International Report 1994). He was freed on bail after over a month in detention but had not been tried by the end of the year. Some detainees were reportedly tortured or ill-treated. They included two members of the clergy, Reverend Justino Wako and Father João Maria Futi, and João Baptista Sousa, a journalist. They were detained for several hours with dozens of other people in January when they attended a peaceful political meeting in Cabinda. They were reportedly beaten with batons, kicked and threatened at gunpoint. Other government opponents were killed in suspicious circumstances, raising fears that they may have been victims of extrajudicial executions. Ricardo de Melo, the director of an independent newspaper, was shot dead in January after publishing an article which implicated senior government officials in corruption. He had received death threats on several occasions and had been briefly detained in November 1994 for criticizing the government (see Amnesty International Report 1995). Police reportedly investigated the killing but the results were not published. In Cabinda, a suspected member of flec, João Pequeno, was shot dead by soldiers when they arrested him in July.  
There were also reports of government soldiers carrying out extrajudicial executions after taking control of towns previously held by unita, but few details were available and it was impossible to corroborate the reports. Amnesty International received new information that Manuel Elemina, a lawyer, had not been killed by government forces in Benguela in 1993 as earlier reported (see Amnesty International Report 1994). He had been detained for several months from January 1993 and tortured, resulting in permanent damage to his health. He died in 1995. unita was responsible for gross human rights abuses, including deliberate and arbitrary killings. In all, unita was known to have released only 22 prisoners by the end of the year despite the peace agreement's requirements. unita failed to account for prisoners detained before the peace agreement, as well as two South Africans whom unita had captured and threatened to execute in 1994 (see Amnesty International Report 1995). It continued to deny any responsibility for the fate of Valdemar Peres da Silva (see Amnesty International Report 1994), saying he had never been detained.”

--1996 Annual Report for Angola, Amnesty International Annual Report 1996.

“Between 1996 and 1997, the repatriation of prisoners of war has been slow. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) supervised the release of 523 prisoners of war. Of these, 361 had been held by the government and 162 by UNITA.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1997,* Events, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA continued to take prisoners throughout 1996 and 1997, and there is little evidence that most prisoners or hostages were released without harm. Many bodies were found who were those of prisoners and hostages of UNITA in regions such as Mulenje and Huambo.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Between 1996 and 1997, the repatriation of prisoners of war has been slow. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) supervised the release of 523 prisoners of war. Of these, 361 had been held by the government and 162 by UNITA.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1997,* Events, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA continued to take prisoners throughout 1996 and 1997, and there is little evidence that most prisoners or hostages were released without harm. Many bodies were found who were those of prisoners and hostages of UNITA in regions such as Mulenje and Huambo.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This was really a low depth of demand because it did not demand that UNITA put themselves in a difficult position in order to comply with this demand. It was simply a release of prisoners, agreed to in the Lusaka protocol.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1055** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 May 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **7** |
| **Demand number:** | **1055.0811** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Resolve the remaining issues regarding the integration of UNITA troops into the Angolan Armed Forces and formation of a joint military command.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

Those who have followed the progress made by UNAVEM in Luanda, may have noticed that there has been a change in pace since mid-1996. With the UNITA Congress over, and the transformation from a military organisation into a political party declared by Savimbi to be complete, the impetus of the peace process had to speed up. The Security Council would again consider renewing UNAVEM's mandate, due to expire definitively in February 1997, and it would rightly want to know if UNITA completed its demilitarisation, including the handing over of all heavy weapons to the UN, integrating ten generals into the Angolan armed forces general staff, and selecting the required number of soldiers for the national army and for the national police force.

--David Wimhurst, Spokesman for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Luanda, *Communication in Peace Operations: A Spokesperson's Perspective from UNAVEM III*, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997

“Significant problems remained on the military level after the formation of the new administration. The bulk of the UNITA component still had to be integrated with the FAA…”

--Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

The Secretary General went on to state that "Complaints by UNITA, many of which have proved to be largely unfounded, have been carefully investigated and followed up. The [Joint] Commission, of which UNITA is a member, has concluded that the assistance being provided to the soldiers in the quartering

areas is generally adequate". He continued that "It is disturbing, therefore, that UNITA's mass media continue to disseminate allegations about sub-standard conditions in quartering areas"… On the issue of troop morale, he stated that "The soldiers who arrived late last year at the first quartering areas in Vila

Nova and Londiumbali have now been quartered there for five months, which is the maximum period originally planned. Not only is their prolonged stay rapidly depleting United Nations resources (those allocated for first assembly will almost be exhausted in May) but discipline in some camps has started to

deteriorate. These factors make it imperative to begin without delay the gradual incorporation of UNITA troops into FAA and the demobilization of those who are willing to be discharged."

--Africa E-Policy Journal, *Angola*: *Peace Monitor*, Issue 9, Vol. 2, 27 May 1996.

Writing in his report to the Security Council, the Secretary General stated that "the major positive development was the withdrawal of the FAA to their nearest barracks in some provinces". He also pointed out that the Civilian Police component of UNAVEM III had "verified the quartering of the rapid reaction police in Benguela, Huambo, Luanda, Luena, Lubango, Uige and most recently, in Malange. As of 25 April, 3,605 of the declared strength of 3,745 personnel had been quartered in these 7 locations. Barracking of those in Saurimo will commence on 30 April, with those in Cabinda following in May."

--Africa E-Policy Journal, *Angola*: *Peace Monitor*, Issue 9, Vol. 2, 27 May 1996.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola and UNITA never fully or even partially integrated their armed forces into one national military unit.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“At the beginning of December 1996, Boutros-Ghali, in his last report on Angola as secretary-general, was able to report that over 69,000 UNITA troops had presented themselves at the I 5 UN assembly areas and that, despite worryingly high desertion rates, almost 19,000 of the planned 26,300-strong UNITA component of the integrated FAA had been selected. On 10 April I997, on the eve of the inauguration of the unity government, just under 8,000 UNITA troops had been incorporated into the FAA with about another 10,500 selected for future integration; 10 UNITA generals had also been sworn in to the new national force.”

--Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

“Significant problems remained on the military level after the formation of the new administration. The bulk of the UNITA component still had to be integrated with the FAA. UNITA checkpoints and installations remained active in the areas under its control, in particular the diamond rich north-east. Most seriously, both the government and the UN were concerned about the size and weaponry of Savimbi's personal 'security detachment', thought to comprise UNITA's most experienced and best equipped fighters. But the achievements of the previous six months had been considerable and the UN's management of UNITA by the graduated application of pressure had apparently been successful. The basic problem for the UN was how to interpret UNITA's motives for procrastination. Were the various delaying manoeuvres signs of a fundamental rejection of the peace process? Were the grudging concessions to external pressure merely the price UNITA was willing to pay for diplomatic toleration while it prepared for a return to war? Or, did its obduracy come from genuine concerns over specific aspects of a process that it was, ultimately, committed to? It may have been that UNITA and Savimbi himself were unclear as to their own motives.”

--Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola and UNITA never fully or even partially integrated their armed forces into one national military unit.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This depth of demand ranks as “high” because the integration of one’s military into a combined military unit can be threatening to both parties’ existence. Without a military force that is exclusively loyal to one party, hostilities cannot be maintained.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1055** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 May 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **10** |
| **Demand number:** | **1055.1011** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Abide strictly by the obligations under the Lusaka Protocol as well as the commitments entered into in Libreville, Gabon on 03/01/96.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA's compliance with the de-mobilisation process has been subject to frequent delays, misinformation and out-right contradiction. The laying of landmines certainly also continued after, and in violation of, the Lusaka accords; Human Rights Watch has documented new mine laying activities as recently as 1997, while attacks during May 1998 have provided ongoing evidence of this. High level pressure from the UN and US failed to hasten Savimbi's pace, eventually resulting in the imposition of much-delayed UN sanctions at the end of February 1998.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“The first part of 1996 saw changing and frequently contradictory signals emerging from the Angolan parties. At the beginning of March a further meeting was arranged between dos Santos and Savimbi in the Gabon capital Libreville. Here Savimbi evidently agreed to a June target for the creation of the new unified FAA. But again no real movement followed, and by the end of April the government was threatening to boycott the Joint Commission in protest at UNITA's failure to deliver more than about a third of its estimated 70,000 fighters.”

--United Nations Document S/1996/175 Annex, 7 March 1996.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Following the Lusaka protocol neither the government of Angola nor UNITA complied with demands to cease-fire, disarm, or remove their troops from occupied zones.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Progress in implementing the 'final timetable' under the Lusaka Protocol during March 1998 was smoother, but it again failed to meet even the revised deadline, and so continued into April…Notwithstanding these developments, UNITA has continued to give contradictory signals and even to launch new armed attacks. Several towns, villages and communes in Uige, Moxico Malanje and Lunda Sul provinces previously handed over to the government were retaken by UNITA soldiers. Other settle-ments in Benguela, Bengo, Cuando Cubango, Huambo, Malanje, Huila, Cabinda, Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul provinces were raided during March, April and May, when properties were destroyed and local administrators expelled or abducted.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“The Angolan peace process, launched in 1991 with an accord between the Government and the rebel movement UNITA, had by the end of 1998 collapsed for a second time leaving international mediators on the sidelines, no longer able to influence events. Years of accumulated mistrust produced an environment of fear in which the chief opposition party is reluctant to relinquish the security of their arms and commit themselves completely to the parliamentary process. Since the signature of the Lusaka protocol in 1994, high level shuttle diplomacy between the belligerent party leaders, mediated by the UN, failed to bring UNITA on board as a stakeholder. The post-Lusaka attempt at building a peace process failed to trickle down to soften the fears and suspicions of communities at the grassroots, in what remains a divided country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“In Angola, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol required that government troops were to be disengaged and over 62,000 UNITA troops were to be confined to assembly areas and disarmed…UNITA's weapons and those in civilian hands were to be collected and stored. Twenty-six thousand UNITA soldiers were planned to be incorporated into the newly created national army, which is to finally number 90,000 strong…UNAVEM III, responsible for overseeing the demobilisation process, experienced enormous problems with the process due to lack of co-operation particularly from UNITA who consistently slowed down the confinement of its combatants. Under threat of sanctions by the UN, however, UNITA completed the quartering of 63,000 troops by 20 November 1996. However, about 7,000 of those registered were found to be under the age of 18. The Angolan Peace Monitor reported at the time that over 70% of those quartered were not combat troops. The UN now accepts that Savimbi has retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. Due to the delays, soldiers in the cantonment camps became restless and desertions were commonplace. By November 1996 some 12,543 UNITA troops had deserted leaving 55,013 in the camps.”

-- Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“UNITA used its substantial diamond revenues to undertake a fundamental military reorganization…between 1993 and 1999…it moved away from its traditional posture as a guerrilla army into a more conventional disposition in preparation for delivering a final victorious blow against government forces and seizing state power. To this end, the rebels engaged in a major military procurement programme. UNITA has activities in acquiring arms and military equipment.”

--The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“UNITA has, since 1994, also imported conventional weapons systems including mechanized vehicles such as tanks and armored personnel carriers, mines and explosives, a variety of small arms and light weapons, and anti-aircraft weapons, and a variety of artillery pieces."

The Fowler Report, prepared in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999), quoted in --United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA*, S/2000/203,10 March 2000.

“Between 1994 and 1998, UNITA purchased military hardware from Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine and Bulgaria. The purchases included about 50 T-55 and T-62 tanks; a significant number of 155-mm G-5, B-2, D-2 and D-30 guns; medium- and long-range D-130 guns; BMP-1 and BMP-2 combat vehicles; ZU-23s anti-aircraft weapons; and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.”

--BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Radio notes British study of UNITA's military resources,” 17 August 1999; Chris Gordon, “Eastern Europe aid bolsters UNITA,” *Africa News Online*, 15 January 1999.

“The Lusaka Protocol had one fundamental flaw in relation to the prospects for a transition to peace. It owed more to international pressure for a settlement, rather than to a real commitment, from UNITA in particular, to make it work. Each side wished to hang on to the spoils that it had, using the political and military conflict to destroy or seize the spoils of its opponents…”

--Barry Munslow, “The Politics of Unsustainable Development,” *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 20, No. 3, (1999): 551-568.

“Since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994, Angolans have been living between war and peace. They are grateful for the cease-fire and peace process that ended the previous two years of unrestrained conflict. But they are concerned at repeated delays in implementation of the agreement.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Following the Lusaka protocol neither the government of Angola nor UNITA complied with demands to cease-fire, disarm, or remove their troops from occupied zones.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat to the existence of both UNITA and the Government of Angola if either had stopped attacks or ceased to address the attacks of the opposing side.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1055** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 May 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **11** |
| **Demand number:** | **1055.1111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Take all necessary steps for UNITA deputies join the National Assembly, for the controlled movement of UNITA troops out of quartering areas, the incorporation of UNITA personnel into the State administration, the Angolan Armed Forces, and the national poll.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The first part of 1996 saw changing and frequently contradictory signals emerging from the Angolan parties. At the beginning of March a further meeting was arranged between dos Santos and Savimbi in the Gabon capital Libreville. Here Savimbi evidently agreed to a June target for the creation of the new unified FAA. But again no real movement followed, and by the end of April the government was threatening to boycott the Joint Commission in protest at UNITA's failure to deliver more than about a third of its estimated 70,000 fighters.”

--United Nations Document S/1996/175 Annex, 7 March 1996.

“UNITA ministers loyal to government. Despite the present stalling of the peace process, there are encouragingsigns that a section of the UNITA leadership are committed to peace. There is growing admiration for UNITA's four ministers and seven deputyministers appointed to the Government of Unity and National Reconstruction(GURN) by President dos Santos, in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol. Diplomatic sources have expressed surprise and delight at the hard work andseriousness of the UNITA appointees. However, this appreciation of theirwork is not shared by all. The UNITA mouthpiece in the United States, the Centre for Democracy in Angola Incorporated, on 23 October described their role as being "purely ceremonial". There is a growing gulf between those UNITA representatives who have movedto Luanda to participate in the GURN and the National Assembly, and thosewho have remained with Jonas Savimbi. At present, Jonas Savimbi is keepingboth the military and political option open. However, one UNITA minister has privately conceded that if there was a return to war, he would remain with the government.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.3, Vol. IV 27th November 1997

“According to the Lusaka Protocol, the next steps - selection of UNITA troops to join the national army and demobilization of excess forces - will not begin until the quartering process is completed. However, it is extremely unlikely that all the forces can in fact be quartered without simultaneous progress on integration into the national army, implementation of UNITA's agreed-on participation in the political process, and other confidence- building measures. The declared total of 62,500 UNITA military personnel to be quartered is possibly an overestimate, but the pace will have to quicken even to quarter a more modest figure of 45,000 to 50,000. If pressure to complete the quartering is not combined with measures to advance on other fronts, and attention focuses primarily on the numbers game of how many have been quartered, there are likely to be significant additional delays as well as increased chances of cease-fire violations and other incidents provoked by idle soldiers in the quartering areas.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola and UNITA never fully or even partially integrated their armed forces into one national military unit.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“At the beginning of December 1996, Boutros-Ghali, in his last report on Angola as secretary-general, was able to report that over 69,000 UNITA troops had presented themselves at the I 5 UN assembly areas and that, despite worryingly high desertion rates, almost 19,000 of the planned 26,300-strong UNITA component of the integrated FAA had been selected. On 10 April I997, on the eve of the inauguration of the unity government, just under 8,000 UNITA troops had been incorporated into the FAA with about another 10,500 selected for future integration; 10 UNITA generals had also been sworn in to the new national force.”

--Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

“Significant problems remained on the military level after the formation of the new administration. The bulk of the UNITA component still had to be integrated with the FAA. UNITA checkpoints and installations remained active in the areas under its control, in particular the diamond rich north-east. Most seriously, both the government and the UN were concerned about the size and weaponry of Savimbi's personal 'security detachment', thought to comprise UNITA's most experienced and best equipped fighters. But the achievements of the previous six months had been considerable and the UN's management of UNITA by the graduated application of pressure had apparently been successful. The basic problem for the UN was how to interpret UNITA's motives for procrastination. Were the various delaying manoeuvres signs of a fundamental rejection of the peace process? Were the grudging concessions to external pressure merely the price UNITA was willing to pay for diplomatic toleration while it prepared for a return to war? Or, did its obduracy come from genuine concerns over specific aspects of a process that it was, ultimately, committed to? It may have been that UNITA and Savimbi himself were unclear as to their own motives.”

--Norrie MacQueen, “Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* vol. 36, No. 3 (1998): 399-422.

“In Angola, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol required that government troops were to be disengaged and over 62,000 UNITA troops were to be confined to assembly areas and disarmed…UNITA's weapons and those in civilian hands were to be collected and stored. Twenty-six thousand UNITA soldiers were planned to be incorporated into the newly created national army, which is to finally number 90,000 strong…UNAVEM III, responsible for overseeing the demobilisation process, experienced enormous problems with the process due to lack of co-operation particularly from UNITA who consistently slowed down the confinement of its combatants. Under threat of sanctions by the UN, however, UNITA completed the quartering of 63,000 troops by 20 November 1996. However, about 7,000 of those registered were found to be under the age of 18. The Angolan Peace Monitor reported at the time that over 70% of those quartered were not combat troops. The UN now accepts that Savimbi has retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. Due to the delays, soldiers in the cantonment camps became restless and desertions were commonplace. By November 1996 some 12,543 UNITA troops had deserted leaving 55,013 in the camps.”

--Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“UNITA ministers loyal to government. Despite the present stalling of the peace process, there are encouragingsigns that a section of the UNITA leadership are committed to peace. There is growing admiration for UNITA's four ministers and seven deputyministers appointed to the Government of Unity and National Reconstruction(GURN) by President dos Santos, in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol. Diplomatic sources have expressed surprise and delight at the hard work andseriousness of the UNITA appointees. However, this appreciation of theirwork is not shared by all. The UNITA mouthpiece in the United States, the Centre for Democracy in Angola Incorporated, on 23 October described their role as being "purely ceremonial". There is a growing gulf between those UNITA representatives who have movedto Luanda to participate in the GURN and the National Assembly, and thosewho have remained with Jonas Savimbi. At present, Jonas Savimbi is keepingboth the military and political option open. However, one UNITA minister has privately conceded that if there was a return to war, he would remain with the government.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.3, Vol. IV 27th November 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola and UNITA never fully or even partially integrated their armed forces into one national military unit.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This depth of demand ranks as “high” because the integration of one’s military into a combined military unit can be threatening to both parties’ existence. Without a military force that is exclusively loyal to one party, hostilities cannot be maintained.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1055** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 May 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **12** |
| **Demand number:** | **1055.1211** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Meet at the earliest opportunity to resolve all the remaining issues.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Jonas Savimbi, José Eduardo dos Santos**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The planned direct talks between president Jose Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in order to help advance the Angolan peace process which is now at a standstill, have been adjourned to 1998. In November, President dos Santos announced that he and Jonas Savimbi had had a telephone conversation and agreed to meet in early December in Angola's capital, Luanda. It is not yet clear why the talks have been postponed. Reports say it is because Savimbi has resumed his allegations of a "lack of security conditions" in Luanda…Last year, Mr Savimbi also did not meet with the former US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, who had wanted to meet with Savimbi in Luanda during an official visit….The last time Santos and Savimbi met in direct talks was on March 1 1996, in Libreville in Gabon.”

--ANGOLA NEWS ONLINE, Edition No. 7, 28 December 1997, University of Pennsylvania.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Savimbi and Dos Santos met in person in 1996 in Gabon. However, each was engaged in war with the other side, with little hope for peace progress.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Angolan peace process has effectively stalled following UNITA's failure to comply with the Lusaka Protocol, the agreement underpinning the process. Sources in Angola describe an "alarming calm" in the country, with no substantial hand-over of UNITA-controlled areas to the government, and no further hand-over of UNITA weapons to the United Nations.”

--*Angola Peace Monitor*, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.3, Vol. IV 27th November 1997

“Despite the present stalling of the peace process, there are encouraging signs that a section of the UNITA leadership are committed to peace. There is growing admiration for UNITA's four ministers and seven deputy ministers appointed to the Government of Unity and National Reconstruction(GURN) by President dos Santos, in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol. Diplomatic sources have expressed surprise and delight at the hard work and seriousness of the UNITA appointees. However, this appreciation of their work is not shared by all. The UNITA mouthpiece in the United States, the Centre for Democracy in Angola Incorporated, on 23 October described their role as being "purely ceremonial". There is a growing gulf between those UNITA representatives who have moved to Luanda to participate in the GURN and the National Assembly, and those who have remained with Jonas Savimbi. At present, Jonas Savimbi is keeping both the military and political option open. However, one UNITA minister has privately conceded that if there was a return to war, he would remain with the government.”

--*Angola Peace Monitor*, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.3, Vol. IV 27th November 1997

“The Angolan peace process, launched in 1991 with an accord between the Government and the rebel movement UNITA, had by the end of 1998 collapsed for a second time leaving international mediators on the sidelines, no longer able to influence events. Years of accumulated mistrust produced an environment of fear in which the chief opposition party is reluctant to relinquish the security of their arms and commit themselves completely to the parliamentary process. Since the signature of the Lusaka protocol in 1994, high level shuttle diplomacy between the belligerent party leaders, mediated by the UN, failed to bring UNITA on board as a stakeholder. The post-Lusaka attempt at building a peace process failed to trickle down to soften the fears and suspicions of communities at the grassroots, in what remains a divided country.”

--Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“The planned direct talks between president Jose Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in order to help advance the Angolan peace process which is now at a standstill, have been adjourned to 1998. In November, President dos Santos announced that he and Jonas Savimbi had had a telephone conversation and agreed to meet in early December in Angola's capital, Luanda. It is not yet clear why the talks have been postponed. Reports say it is because Savimbi has resumed his allegations of a "lack of security conditions" in Luanda…Last year, Mr Savimbi also did not meet with the former US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, who had wanted to meet with Savimbi in Luanda during an official visit….The last time Santos and Savimbi met in direct talks was on March 1 1996, in Libreville in Gabon.”

--ANGOLA NEWS ONLINE, Edition No. 7, 28 December 1997, University of Pennsylvania.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Savimbi and Dos Santos met in person in 1996 in Gabon. However, each was engaged in war with the other side, with little hope for peace progress.

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# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The depth of demand is ranked “high” because each man was so re-engaged in war by late 1996, that a meeting could have put a serious risk to each man’s life. The peace process was almost entirely defunct.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1055** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 May 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **14** |
| **Demand number:** | **1055.1411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Continue to pull back forces from areas near UNITA quarters and complete the return of the police to barracks under UNAVEM III monitoring.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The first part of 1996 saw changing and frequently contradictory signals emerging from the Angolan parties. At the beginning of March a further meeting was arranged between dos Santos and Savimbi in the Gabon capital Libreville. Here Savimbi evidently agreed to a June target for the creation of the new unified FAA. But again no real movement followed, and by the end of April the government was threatening to boycott the Joint Commission in protest at UNITA's failure to deliver more than about a third of its estimated 70,000 fighters.”

--United Nations Document S/1996/175 Annex, 7 March 1996.

“In June 1997, the first fourteen UNITA officers arrived at a designated base outside Luanda. It ws not until September 9 that five generals from UNITA’s army arrived in Luanda to join the Angolan Armed Forces. Under the Lusaka Protocol, UNITA generals were made responsible for deciding with other officers of the Armed Forces how to incorporate 26,500 UNITA soldiers and officers into the army, with the rest being demobilized…the reintegration process remained behind schedule…UNITA also failed to confine to quarters its self-proclaimed police force, despite strong demands that it do so. UNITA appeared to have replaced uniformed soldiers in some areas with persons that it claimed were its police, even though the establishment of such a force was contrary to the Lusaka Protocol.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1997,* Events, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch 1998.

“According to the Lusaka Protocol, the next steps - selection of UNITA troops to join the national army and demobilization of excess forces - will not begin until the quartering process is completed. However, it is extremely unlikely that all the forces can in fact be quartered without simultaneous progress on integration into the national army, implementation of UNITA's agreed-on participation in the political process, and other confidence- building measures. The declared total of 62,500 UNITA military personnel to be quartered is possibly an overestimate, but the pace will have to quicken even to quarter a more modest figure of 45,000 to 50,000. If pressure to complete the quartering is not combined with measures to advance on other fronts, and attention focuses primarily on the numbers game of how many have been quartered, there are likely to be significant additional delays as well as increased chances of cease-fire violations and other incidents provoked by idle soldiers in the quartering areas.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola made no effort to truly demilitarize, canon their troops, remove soldiers from occupied territories under UNAVEM monitoring.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The first part of 1996 saw changing and frequently contradictory signals emerging from the Angolan parties. At the beginning of March a further meeting was arranged between dos Santos and Savimbi in the Gabon capital Libreville. Here Savimbi evidently agreed to a June target for the creation of the new unified FAA. But again no real movement followed, and by the end of April the government was threatening to boycott the Joint Commission in protest at UNITA's failure to deliver more than about a third of its estimated 70,000 fighters.”

--United Nations Document S/1996/175 Annex, 7 March 1996.

“According to the Lusaka Protocol, the next steps - selection of UNITA troops to join the national army and demobilization of excess forces - will not begin until the quartering process is completed. However, it is extremely unlikely that all the forces can in fact be quartered without simultaneous progress on integration into the national army, implementation of UNITA's agreed-on participation in the political process, and other confidence- building measures. The declared total of 62,500 UNITA military personnel to be quartered is possibly an overestimate, but the pace will have to quicken even to quarter a more modest figure of 45,000 to 50,000. If pressure to complete the quartering is not combined with measures to advance on other fronts, and attention focuses primarily on the numbers game of how many have been quartered, there are likely to be significant additional delays as well as increased chances of cease-fire violations and other incidents provoked by idle soldiers in the quartering areas.”

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--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1997,* Events, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola made no effort to truly demilitarize, canon their troops, remove soldiers from occupied territories under UNAVEM monitoring.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This depth of demand ranks as “high” because the integration of one’s military into a combined military unit can be threatening to both parties’ existence. Without a military force that is exclusively loyal to one party, hostilities cannot be maintained

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1055** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 May 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **15** |
| **Demand number:** | **1055.1511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Begin the implementation of the plan for the disarmament of the civilian population.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Angolan government has asked Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement to "scrupulously" complete all its obligations in the ongoing peace process by January 22, 1998. In a new timetable recently submitted both to the international mediators and to UNITA itself, the government says that the steps UNITA should finalize by January 22 include the surrender to the UN mission (MONUA) of soldiers still armed, and their weaponry, as well as full cooperation in the normalizing of state administration throughout the country, especially in such key locations as Bailundo, Andulo (in central region), Cazombo (east) and Jamba (southeast). A demand has also been issued to UNITA to produce a public declaration stating the time plan for the end of the demobilization process. MONUA officials have repeatedly accused UNITA of unilaterally suspending the implementation of the peace process by putting a stop to the surrender of large tracts of the country's territory to the government. This is allegedly in retaliation for the UN security council sanctions of October 30. Because of this, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has warned of tighter sanctions if UNITA persistently takes no steps to implement the tasks stipulated in the 1994 Lusaka peace plan.”

--ANGOLA NEWS ONLINE, Edition No. 7, 28 December 1997, University of Pennsylvania.

“UNITA have failed to demobilise their army and hand over their weapons. This has led the United Nations to impose further international sanctions against the rebels(see APM no.2 vol. IV). According to reliable sources, the six thousand UNITA troops which in October had turned up at UN camps for registration and demobilisation, demanded their weapons back and left the camps following the imposition of UN sanctions on UNITA at the end of October. They have now rejoined their comrades-in-arms, making up a military force estimated to be between 15,000 and 35,000 strong.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.3, Vol. IV 27th November 1997

“The Angolan army has made fresh allegations that UNITA is preparing tore launch military conflict. UNITA have counter-charged that the government thas been preparing for a military assault in the north of the country. The commander of the Angolan army's southern front, General Francisco Furtado, stated on 13 November that UNITA had moved hidden long-range artillery and other weapons to new command posts. He also asserted that it was building up military bases in the regions on Benguela and Huila in the South, Bie and Huambo in the centre and Cuando-Cubango in the south west. This was in part confirmed by the UN Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) who warned on 7 November of an increasing number of security incidents in Benguela province. The Angolan government also charged that UNITA have shelled several villages in Huila province, forcing hundreds of villagers to flee their homes. In response to armed actions by UNITA, on 11 November, 22 UNITA soldiers were arrested and charged with attacking a police unit at Kangandala, in northern Angola. A further deserter from UNITA's military wing has further strengthened the Angolan army's allegations.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.3, Vol. IV 27th November 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Neither UNITA nor the government of Angola disarmed the civilian population or affiliated groups.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Angolan government has asked Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement to "scrupulously" complete all its obligations in the ongoing peace process by January 22, 1998. In a new timetable recently submitted both to the international mediators and to UNITA itself, the government says that the steps UNITA should finalize by January 22 include the surrender to the UN mission (MONUA) of soldiers still armed, and their weaponry, as well as full cooperation in the normalizing of state administration throughout the country, especially in such key locations as Bailundo, Andulo (in central region), Cazombo (east) and Jamba (southeast). A demand has also been issued to UNITA to produce a public declaration stating the time plan for the end of the demobilization process. MONUA officials have repeatedly accused UNITA of unilaterally suspending the implementation of the peace process by putting a stop to the surrender of large tracts of the country's territory to the government. This is allegedly in retaliation for the UN security council sanctions of October 30. Because of this, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has warned of tighter sanctions if UNITA persistently takes no steps to implement the tasks stipulated in the 1994 Lusaka peace plan.”

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--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.3, Vol. IV 27th November 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Neither UNITA nor the government of Angola disarmed the civilian population or affiliated groups.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Disarming civilians would have required a large amount of coordinated action on the part of UNITA and the government, something which was both risky and unfeasible given the situation. This demand ranks as “high”

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1055** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 May 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **16** |
| **Demand number:** | **1055.1611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cease the dissemination of hostile propaganda.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The same swift response is needed to refute false information, which is never in short supply. During August 1996, the Jornal de Angola published a report which said that the SRSG would be travelling to Bailundo the next day to meet Jonas Savimbi. This was untrue, and the UNAVEM spokesperson issued a denial. The next day, the same report was heard on a South African radio station that broadcasts in Portuguese, but this time with an addition. The purpose of the imaginary trip was now to persuade Jonas Savimbi to accept the vice-presidency offered him by the Angolan government. Within two hours, the radio station had received the spokesperson's strongly worded denial and a request for a correction, which was duly broadcast. The source of this damaging little fiction turned out to be Associated Press, whose local correspondent had decided, for reasons best known to himself, to fabricate some news. False information can also result from the deliberate omission of key facts. Early in September 1996, on his return from a meeting with the UNITA leadership, including Jonas Savimbi, the SRSG announced that UNITA had undertaken to complete some key military tasks by 14, 16 and 20 September. The national television news covered this significant announcement and then failed to broadcast a single word of the substantive portion of Maitre Beye's statement, editing the news item so that only platitudes remained. This was by any standards a pretty flagrant act of manipulation, and it left the impression that the SRSG had brought nothing back from the meeting with Savimbi. In this case, the spokesperson sent a strongly worded note to the state-controlled television station, copied to the minister responsible and to every member of the Joint Commission, pointing out, among others, the significance of the statements of the SRSG and the responsibility of the TV journalists to report them accurately. When UNITA's radio station (Radio Vorgan) sends out false information, such as its recent claims that the SRSG would be revising the whole question of the quartering of the Government's rapid reaction police force when he next met the president, the spokesperson reacted in the same way. He issued a strong denial to this fabrication, which was sent to UNITA through e-mail, copying it once again to the Joint Commission, so that all members of the peace process were aware of what had happened and what UNAVEM's response was.”

--David Wimhurst, Spokesman for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Luanda, *Communication in Peace Operations: A Spokesperson's Perspective from UNAVEM III*, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997

##### “Countering hostile propaganda basically follows the same procedure as outlined above, but usually requires input from the military side of the mission, whose observers and teams throughout the country are UNAVEM's eyes and ears. Hostile propaganda, which is banned under the Lusaka Protocol, usually takes the form of unverified allegations made by one side against the other side. Fortunately, this has substantially diminished by September 1996. However, there were still some occurrences of propaganda. For example, the UNITA radio station had a tendency to broadcast allegations accusing government forces of moving into a certain area, or arming the civilian population, or some such illegal act, for all these constitute cease-fire violations.”

--David Wimhurst, Spokesman for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Luanda, *Communication in Peace Operations: A Spokesperson's Perspective from UNAVEM III*, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA continued to emit propaganda throughout 1996 and 1997.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The same swift response is needed to refute false information, which is never in short supply. During August 1996, the Jornal de Angola published a report which said that the SRSG would be travelling to Bailundo the next day to meet Jonas Savimbi. This was untrue, and the UNAVEM spokesperson issued a denial. The next day, the same report was heard on a South African radio station that broadcasts in Portuguese, but this time with an addition. The purpose of the imaginary trip was now to persuade Jonas Savimbi to accept the vice-presidency offered him by the Angolan government. Within two hours, the radio station had received the spokesperson's strongly worded denial and a request for a correction, which was duly broadcast. The source of this damaging little fiction turned out to be Associated Press, whose local correspondent had decided, for reasons best known to himself, to fabricate some news. False information can also result from the deliberate omission of key facts. Early in September 1996, on his return from a meeting with the UNITA leadership, including Jonas Savimbi, the SRSG announced that UNITA had undertaken to complete some key military tasks by 14, 16 and 20 September. The national television news covered this significant announcement and then failed to broadcast a single word of the substantive portion of Maitre Beye's statement, editing the news item so that only platitudes remained. This was by any standards a pretty flagrant act of manipulation, and it left the impression that the SRSG had brought nothing back from the meeting with Savimbi. In this case, the spokesperson sent a strongly worded note to the state-controlled television station, copied to the minister responsible and to every member of the Joint Commission, pointing out, among others, the significance of the statements of the SRSG and the responsibility of the TV journalists to report them accurately. When UNITA's radio station (Radio Vorgan) sends out false information, such as its recent claims that the SRSG would be revising the whole question of the quartering of the Government's rapid reaction police force when he next met the president, the spokesperson reacted in the same way. He issued a strong denial to this fabrication, which was sent to UNITA through e-mail, copying it once again to the Joint Commission, so that all members of the peace process were aware of what had happened and what UNAVEM's response was.”

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##### “Countering hostile propaganda basically follows the same procedure as outlined above, but usually requires input from the military side of the mission, whose observers and teams throughout the country are UNAVEM's eyes and ears. Hostile propaganda, which is banned under the Lusaka Protocol, usually takes the form of unverified allegations made by one side against the other side. Fortunately, this has substantially diminished by September 1996. However, there were still some occurrences of propaganda. For example, the UNITA radio station had a tendency to broadcast allegations accusing government forces of moving into a certain area, or arming the civilian population, or some such illegal act, for all these constitute cease-fire violations.”

--David Wimhurst, Spokesman for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Luanda, *Communication in Peace Operations: A Spokesperson's Perspective from UNAVEM III*, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA continued to emit propaganda throughout 1996 and 1997.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as low due to the non-threatening nature of ceasing hostile propaganda.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1055** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 May 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **17** |
| **Demand number:** | **1055.1711** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Provide the requisite facilities for the establishment of an independent UN radio.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In cases of false information, UNAVEM also responds with the correct information through its own radio and television programmes, which are broadcast every week, courtesy of government installations. In this way, the mission can counter false information or hostile propaganda, not only at the political level, but also at the level of the listening or viewing audience, where it does most damage.”

----David Wimhurst, Spokesman for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Luanda, *Communication in Peace Operations: A Spokesperson's Perspective from UNAVEM III*, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997

“Attempts by the U.N. mission to set up an independent radio station, Radio UNAVEM, were frustrated by government foot-dragging over the allocation of broadcasting frequencies. Freedom of expression was even more tightly controlled in UNITA dominated areas, with no criticism tolerated. Free circulation of persons and goods, a specific principle of the Lusaka Protocol, continued to be abused by both sides.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report 1996- Angola,* 1 January 1997

##### “UNAVEM publishes a monthly magazine, as well as running its own TV and radio broadcast units. It also publishes a daily news highlights bulletin and, taken together, these components make up the mission's Public Information Office (PIO). This office is distinct from the spokesperson's office, whose role is to speak on behalf of the mission and manage press relations. The function of the PIO is to generate a wider understanding of the peacekeeping operation and of the UN within the mission territory, as well as sending electronic items back to UN HQ for wider dissemination around the world….Radio is the most effective way of informing the population in the mission area, and UNAVEM's radio unit is able to generate enough material to fill the three available hours with ease. Some of this programming deals with the UN and its various agencies, and is supplied from headquarters. But the most important segments are generated on site, tailored to specific issues that need addressing…A recent key issue has been the demobilisation of 100 000 soldiers and their social reintegration. UNAVEM radio has prepared an extensive information campaign on this critical and complex subject, in an attempt to help the population understand the various aid programmes set up to benefit the demobilised soldiers, as well as the need to take these men back into society in a constructive way. While both UNAVEM radio and TV recently took time out from their regular work to help in promoting the polio vaccination campaign in Angola, their main purpose is to pass messages about the peace process to the local population that are appropriate to the needs of the moment, and as such they have a very important political role to play.”

--David Wimhurst, Spokesman for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Luanda, *Communication in Peace Operations: A Spokesperson's Perspective from UNAVEM III*, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

By all accounts, the government made minimal effort towards establishing a functioning radio for UNAVEM.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In cases of false information, UNAVEM also responds with the correct information through its own radio and television programmes, which are broadcast every week, courtesy of government installations. In this way, the mission can counter false information or hostile propaganda, not only at the political level, but also at the level of the listening or viewing audience, where it does most damage.”

----David Wimhurst, Spokesman for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Luanda, *Communication in Peace Operations: A Spokesperson's Perspective from UNAVEM III*, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997

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## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

By all accounts, the government made minimal effort towards establishing a functioning radio for UNAVEM.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as low due to the non-threatening nature of establishing a radio for UNAVEM.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1055** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 May 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **18** |
| **Demand number:** | **1055.1811** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Signal commitment to peace by destroying stockpiles of landmines, and begin this process through joint public action.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA procurement from 1996: the role of Togo. UNITA initiated efforts to try to secure Togo as a possible future base for UNITA. In 1993 Savimbi despatched Col. Alcides Lucas Kangunga…to Lomé to approach President Eyadema on the matter…He was also to claim that many weapons suppliers were already reluctant to ship to Zaire, and that UNITA needed to prepare itself militarily. Kallias was to emphasize to Eyadema that UNITA needed weapons, and that it needed credible end-user certificates - something that Togo could provide. Kallias was to say that UNITA was looking to Togo for support, and that Togo could provide a safe place to locate UNITA equipment…Savimbi's proposal that Togo play a more active role in support of UNITA (a proposal that also included Togo hosting some of Savimbi's children) was accepted by President Eyadema in late 1993. As a token of appreciation, Kallias gave to Eyadema a "passport sized" packet of diamonds on Savimbi's behalf. Kallias became UNITA's representative in Togo, and served there from 1993-1995. According to Kallias, the working arrangement between Togo and UNITA provided for Togo to keep a share of the arms and military equipment that was imported for UNITA, normally 20%...The Togo connection took on particular importance for UNITA in January 1997 when Savimbi reportedly became convinced that "the United States had decided to get rid of Mobutu". Soon afterwards, UNITA began a concerted effort to transfer to Angola the equipment that had been stored in Zaire. Savimbi also made an effort to try to purchase as much new equipment as possible from Eastern Europe before Zaire was closed to UNITA. By May 1997, all of UNITA's equipment in Kinshasa had been shipped out to Angola, with the exception of some SAM6 anti-aircraft missiles that were sent to Togo in an effort to avoid detection by UNAVEM. The equipment in Gbadolite was also pulled out, with much of it going to Togo.”

--The Fowler Report, Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA,S/2000/203, 10 March 2000.

“From 1992-1997, UNITA ran the world's biggest diamond-smuggling operation - using the proceeds to buy arms…thousands of minefields were layed…UNITA's surprising show of strength in the current fighting confirms fears by regional analysts that far from demobilising, UNITA maintained a significant fighting force and continued forced recruitment in territories it controlled. And despite an earlier international embargo on fuel and armament sales to the rebels, UNITA managed to import up to 40 planeloads of petroleum and other supplies per week, according to the publication Africa Analysis….Information available indicates that this war will be even more devastating. A report by the Secretary-General in August 1997 pointed out that new mines have been planted in UNITA territory. This was at a time when only 8% of the 1,532 minefields identified have been cleared.”

--“War Resumes in Angola,” *Third World Network,* <http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/geo-cn.htm>

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA and the government refused to collect or destroy stockpiles of landmines, and on the contrary, enaged in large-scale purchasing, laying, and detonation of landmines throughout Angola.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“From 1992-1997, UNITA ran the world's biggest diamond-smuggling operation - using the proceeds to buy arms…thousands of minefields were layed…UNITA's surprising show of strength in the current fighting confirms fears by regional analysts that far from demobilising, UNITA maintained a significant fighting force and continued forced recruitment in territories it controlled. And despite an earlier international embargo on fuel and armament sales to the rebels, UNITA managed to import up to 40 planeloads of petroleum and other supplies per week, according to the publication Africa Analysis….Information available indicates that this war will be even more devastating. A report by the Secretary-General in August 1997 pointed out that new mines have been planted in UNITA territory. This was at a time when only 8% of the 1,532 minefields identified have been cleared.”

--“War Resumes in Angola,” *Third World Network,* <http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/geo-cn.htm>

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA and the government refused to collect or destroy stockpiles of landmines, and on the contrary, enaged in large-scale purchasing, laying, and detonation of landmines throughout Angola.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the threat of non-compliance of the other side. If only one party commits to stockpiling landmines and ceasing their use, and the other side continues their use and does not stockpile, there is a serious threat that emerges.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1055** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 May 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **19** |
| **Demand number:** | **1055.1912** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Continuing acquisition of weapons would be contrary to par. 12 of res. 976 and undermine confidence in the peace process.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The FAA and Angolan police have also regularly seized weapons and uncovered a number of substantial arms caches. However, most of UNITA's heavy arms and artillery, which have not been surrendered to the UN under the demobilisation process, remain unaccounted for. These events indicate a continuing UNITA military capability, whether authorised or freelance, in almost every province of the country.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“From 1992-1997, UNITA ran the world's biggest diamond-smuggling operation - using the proceeds to buy arms…thousands of minefields were layed…UNITA's surprising show of strength in the current fighting confirms fears by regional analysts that far from demobilising, UNITA maintained a significant fighting force and continued forced recruitment in territories it controlled. And despite an earlier international embargo on fuel and armament sales to the rebels, UNITA managed to import up to 40 planeloads of petroleum and other supplies per week, according to the publication Africa Analysis….Information available indicates that this war will be even more devastating. A report by the Secretary-General in August 1997 pointed out that new mines have been planted in UNITA territory. This was at a time when only 8% of the 1,532 minefields identified have been cleared.”

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“UNITA procurement from 1996: the role of Togo. UNITA initiated efforts to try to secure Togo as a possible future base for UNITA. In 1993 Savimbi despatched Col. Alcides Lucas Kangunga…to Lomé to approach President Eyadema on the matter…He was also to claim that many weapons suppliers were already reluctant to ship to Zaire, and that UNITA needed to prepare itself militarily. Kallias was to emphasize to Eyadema that UNITA needed weapons, and that it needed credible end-user certificates - something that Togo could provide. Kallias was to say that UNITA was looking to Togo for support, and that Togo could provide a safe place to locate UNITA equipment…Savimbi's proposal that Togo play a more active role in support of UNITA (a proposal that also included Togo hosting some of Savimbi's children) was accepted by President Eyadema in late 1993. As a token of appreciation, Kallias gave to Eyadema a "passport sized" packet of diamonds on Savimbi's behalf. Kallias became UNITA's representative in Togo, and served there from 1993-1995. According to Kallias, the working arrangement between Togo and UNITA provided for Togo to keep a share of the arms and military equipment that was imported for UNITA, normally 20%...The Togo connection took on particular importance for UNITA in January 1997 when Savimbi reportedly became convinced that "the United States had decided to get rid of Mobutu". Soon afterwards, UNITA began a concerted effort to transfer to Angola the equipment that had been stored in Zaire. Savimbi also made an effort to try to purchase as much new equipment as possible from Eastern Europe before Zaire was closed to UNITA. By May 1997, all of UNITA's equipment in Kinshasa had been shipped out to Angola, with the exception of some SAM6 anti-aircraft missiles that were sent to Togo in an effort to avoid detection by UNAVEM. The equipment in Gbadolite was also pulled out, with much of it going to Togo.”

--The Fowler Report, Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA,S/2000/203, 10 March 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola and UNITA continued to acquire weapons throughout 1996 and 1997, until the year 2000s.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“From 1992-1997, UNITA ran the world's biggest diamond-smuggling operation - using the proceeds to buy arms…thousands of minefields were layed…UNITA's surprising show of strength in the current fighting confirms fears by regional analysts that far from demobilising, UNITA maintained a significant fighting force and continued forced recruitment in territories it controlled. And despite an earlier international embargo on fuel and armament sales to the rebels, UNITA managed to import up to 40 planeloads of petroleum and other supplies per week, according to the publication Africa Analysis….Information available indicates that this war will be even more devastating. A report by the Secretary-General in August 1997 pointed out that new mines have been planted in UNITA territory. This was at a time when only 8% of the 1,532 minefields identified have been cleared.”

--“War Resumes in Angola,” *Third World Network,* <http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/geo-cn.htm>

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola and UNITA continued to acquire weapons throughout 1996 and 1997, until the year 2000s.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

. This depth of demand ranks as “high” because compliance is reliant on both parties engaging. It is risky for one party alone to comply.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1055** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 May 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **20** |
| **Demand number:** | **1055.2011** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Extend full cooperation to UNAVEM III and the Joint Commission at all levels.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

The UN set up a 7,500-member UN peacekeeping force, known as UNAVEM-III (UN Angola Verification Mission) in February 1995 to help monitor compliance with the Lusaka accord. Its mandate expired on 30 June 1997, when it was replaced by the scaled-down UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)… FOUR years after the United Nations brokered a deal to end civil war in Angola, the war has resumed in earnest. Declaring the peace deal officially dead, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan told the Security Council after the new outbreak of fighting that 'the events of the last few months have clearly proved that, for all intents and purposes, the peace process has collapsed.' The restart of the war comes after months of mounting tension caused by repeated accord violations and skirmishes.

--“War Resumes in Angola,” *Third World Network,* <http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/geo-cn.htm>

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There is no evidence that either the Government of Angola or UNITA cooperated with UNAVEM and the Joint Commission at this stage in the process.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In Angola, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol required that government troops were to be disengaged and over 62,000 UNITA troops were to be confined to assembly areas and disarmed…UNITA's weapons and those in civilian hands were to be collected and stored. Twenty-six thousand UNITA soldiers were planned to be incorporated into the newly created national army, which is to finally number 90,000 strong…UNAVEM III, responsible for overseeing the demobilisation process, experienced enormous problems with the process due to lack of co-operation particularly from UNITA who consistently slowed down the confinement of its combatants. Under threat of sanctions by the UN, however, UNITA completed the quartering of 63,000 troops by 20 November 1996. However, about 7,000 of those registered were found to be under the age of 18. The Angolan Peace Monitor reported at the time that over 70% of those quartered were not combat troops. The UN now accepts that Savimbi has retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. Due to the delays, soldiers in the cantonment camps became restless and desertions were commonplace. By November 1996 some 12,543 UNITA troops had deserted leaving 55,013 in the camps.”

--Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

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--“War Resumes in Angola,” *Third World Network,* <http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/geo-cn.htm>

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There is no evidence that either the Government of Angola or UNITA cooperated with UNAVEM and the Joint Commission at this stage in the process.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

At this stage in the process, there was little cooperation occurring and the risks involved for one party to begin cooperating would have been substantial.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1055** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **8 May 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **21** |
| **Demand number:** | **1055.2111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Take all necessary measure to ensure the safety of UN and int'l personnel and premises and guarantee the safety and freedom of movement of humanitarian supplies.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The first is Angolas increasing- and largely avoidable- humanitarian crisis. The return to war has exacerbated an already difficult internal refugee problem. By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The

Number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angola’s population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanjein the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000....The

War has also obstructed or interrupted aid flights and convoys by organizations such as the World Food Programme and CARE at a time when some donors have failed to live up to promises of relief aid to the region.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“Full implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, originally envisaged to be completed with UN assistance by February 1997, is far behind schedule. The engagement of Angolan civil society in the peace process is weak. The right to freedom of movement, particularly in UNITA-controlled areas, is systematically violated, without an effective response from the international community.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Not only did UNITA and the government of Angola make little to no effort to clear roads, make rural areas safe, and disarm civilians in order to make humanitarian deliveries possible, both sides actively engaged in randomized violence which put humanitarian workers’ lives at risk and threatened the completion of humanitarian deliveries throughout Angola. There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The first is Angolas increasing- and largely avoidable- humanitarian crisis. The return to war has exacerbated an already difficult internal refugee problem. By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The

Number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angola’s population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanjein the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000....The

War has also obstructed or interrupted aid flights and convoys by organizations such as the World Food Programme and CARE at a time when some donors have failed to live up to promises of relief aid to the region.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“And, despite large-scale international commitments of humanitarian and reconstruction aid, the prospects for quick implementation of sustainable projects for reconstruction which could give additional momentum to peaceful activities are still hampered by government incapacity, UNITA fears of losing control over their population base, and the lack of sufficient local knowledge and problems of coordination among newly arrived agencies.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Not only did UNITA and the government of Angola make little to no effort to clear roads, make rural areas safe, and disarm civilians in order to make humanitarian deliveries possible, both sides actively engaged in randomized violence which put humanitarian workers’ lives at risk and threatened the completion of humanitarian deliveries throughout Angola. There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1064** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 July 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **5** |
| **Demand number:** | **1064.0511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Use units of the newly integrated military forces to improve the security situation.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Angola, however, would…have a chart-topping 7.2 troops per thousand population if the post-demobilisation Lusaka Protocol Peace Agreement national army total of 90 000 troops had been adhered to, which it has not. The ratio of troops per thousand population is far higher even than this in Angola, as many UNITA troops were never demobilised. UNITA's non-demobilised troops fought in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997 on the side of defeated President Mobuto, and in renewed clashes with government troops in Angola from April 1998 onwards as open warfare recommenced. A large UNITA army is still operating illegally inside Angola outside of the peace agreement. Best estimates suggest that UNITA may have up to 40 000 troops.”

--Barry Munslow, “The Politics of Unsustainable Development,” *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 20, No. 3, (1999): 551-568.

“The International Organisation of Migration (IOM), which was implementing the demobilisation assistance programme for UNITA, had in a report, drawn attention to donor concerns over the 'remobilisation' of demobilised soldiers. News reports also say that a third of some 78,000 UNITA fighters who registered for demobilisation have 'disappeared'. The UN itself was an early casualty of this latest outbreak of hostilities. In the last two months, the organisation has lost two of its chartered aircraft, along with about 23 passengers and crew members, including several peacekeepers. Other peace-keepers were also reportedly trapped in UNITA-controlled areas at the beginning of hostilities.”

--“War Resumes in Angola,” *Third World Network,* <http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/geo-cn.htm>

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola and UNITA never fully or even partially integrated their armed forces into one national military unit.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Angola, however, would…have a chart-topping 7.2 troops per thousand population if the post-demobilisation Lusaka Protocol Peace Agreement national army total of 90 000 troops had been adhered to, which it has not. The ratio of troops per thousand population is far higher even than this in Angola, as many UNITA troops were never demobilised. UNITA's non-demobilised troops fought in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997 on the side of defeated President Mobuto, and in renewed clashes with government troops in Angola from April 1998 onwards as open warfare recommenced. A large UNITA army is still operating illegally inside Angola outside of the peace agreement. Best estimates suggest that UNITA may have up to 40 000 troops.”

--Barry Munslow, “The Politics of Unsustainable Development,” *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 20, No. 3, (1999): 551-568.

“The International Organisation of Migration (IOM), which was implementing the demobilisation assistance programme for UNITA, had in a report, drawn attention to donor concerns over the 'remobilisation' of demobilised soldiers. News reports also say that a third of some 78,000 UNITA fighters who registered for demobilisation have 'disappeared'. The UN itself was an early casualty of this latest outbreak of hostilities. In the last two months, the organisation has lost two of its chartered aircraft, along with about 23 passengers and crew members, including several peacekeepers. Other peace-keepers were also reportedly trapped in UNITA-controlled areas at the beginning of hostilities.”

--“War Resumes in Angola,” *Third World Network,* <http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/geo-cn.htm>

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola and UNITA never fully or even partially integrated their armed forces into one national military unit.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This depth of demand ranks as “high” because the integration of one’s military into a combined military unit can be threatening to both parties’ existence. Without a military force that is exclusively loyal to one party, hostilities cannot be maintained.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1064** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 July 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **6** |
| **Demand number:** | **1064.0611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Complete the quartering of all troops according to the Joint Commission timetable, and hand over to UNAVEM III all arms, ammunition and military equipment.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Angola, however, would…have a chart-topping 7.2 troops per thousand population if the post-demobilisation Lusaka Protocol Peace Agreement national army total of 90 000 troops had been adhered to, which it has not. The ratio of troops per thousand population is far higher even than this in Angola, as many UNITA troops were never demobilised. UNITA's non-demobilised troops fought in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997 on the side of defeated President Mobuto, and in renewed clashes with government troops in Angola from April 1998 onwards as open warfare recommenced. A large UNITA army is still operating illegally inside Angola outside of the peace agreement. Best estimates suggest that UNITA may have up to 40 000 troops.”

--Barry Munslow, “The Politics of Unsustainable Development,” *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 20, No. 3, (1999): 551-568.

“According to the Lusaka Protocol, the next steps - selection of UNITA troops to join the national army and demobilization of excess forces - will not begin until the quartering process is completed. However, it is extremely unlikely that all the forces can in fact be quartered without simultaneous progress on integration into the national army, implementation of UNITA's agreed-on participation in the political process, and other confidence- building measures. The declared total of 62,500 UNITA military personnel to be quartered is possibly an overestimate, but the pace will have to quicken even to quarter a more modest figure of 45,000 to 50,000. If pressure to complete the quartering is not combined with measures to advance on other fronts, and attention focuses primarily on the numbers game of how many have been quartered, there are likely to be significant additional delays as well as increased chances of cease-fire violations and other incidents provoked by idle soldiers in the quartering areas.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

By all accounts, UNITA made no effort to truly demilitarize, canon its troops, remove soldiers from occupied territories under UNAVEM monitoring, or hand over arms.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In Angola, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol required that government troops were to be disengaged and over 62,000 UNITA troops were to be confined to assembly areas and disarmed…UNITA's weapons and those in civilian hands were to be collected and stored. Twenty-six thousand UNITA soldiers were planned to be incorporated into the newly created national army, which is to finally number 90,000 strong…UNAVEM III, responsible for overseeing the demobilisation process, experienced enormous problems with the process due to lack of co-operation particularly from UNITA who consistently slowed down the confinement of its combatants. Under threat of sanctions by the UN, however, UNITA completed the quartering of 63,000 troops by 20 November 1996. However, about 7,000 of those registered were found to be under the age of 18. The Angolan Peace Monitor reported at the time that over 70% of those quartered were not combat troops. The UN now accepts that Savimbi has retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. Due to the delays, soldiers in the cantonment camps became restless and desertions were commonplace. By November 1996 some 12,543 UNITA troops had deserted leaving 55,013 in the camps.”

-- Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“UNITA procurement from 1996: the role of Togo. UNITA initiated efforts to try to secure Togo as a possible future base for UNITA. In 1993 Savimbi despatched Col. Alcides Lucas Kangunga…to Lomé to approach President Eyadema on the matter…He was also to claim that many weapons suppliers were already reluctant to ship to Zaire, and that UNITA needed to prepare itself militarily. Kallias was to emphasize to Eyadema that UNITA needed weapons, and that it needed credible end-user certificates - something that Togo could provide. Kallias was to say that UNITA was looking to Togo for support, and that Togo could provide a safe place to locate UNITA equipment…Savimbi's proposal that Togo play a more active role in support of UNITA (a proposal that also included Togo hosting some of Savimbi's children) was accepted by President Eyadema in late 1993. As a token of appreciation, Kallias gave to Eyadema a "passport sized" packet of diamonds on Savimbi's behalf. Kallias became UNITA's representative in Togo, and served there from 1993-1995. According to Kallias, the working arrangement between Togo and UNITA provided for Togo to keep a share of the arms and military equipment that was imported for UNITA, normally 20%...The Togo connection took on particular importance for UNITA in January 1997 when Savimbi reportedly became convinced that "the United States had decided to get rid of Mobutu". Soon afterwards, UNITA began a concerted effort to transfer to Angola the equipment that had been stored in Zaire. Savimbi also made an effort to try to purchase as much new equipment as possible from Eastern Europe before Zaire was closed to UNITA. By May 1997, all of UNITA's equipment in Kinshasa had been shipped out to Angola, with the exception of some SAM6 anti-aircraft missiles that were sent to Togo in an effort to avoid detection by UNAVEM. The equipment in Gbadolite was also pulled out, with much of it going to Togo.”

--The Fowler Report, Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA,S/2000/203, 10 March 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

By all accounts, UNITA made no effort to truly demilitarize, canon its troops, remove soldiers from occupied territories under UNAVEM monitoring, or hand over arms.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This depth of demand ranks as “high” because the integration of one’s military into a combined military unit can be threatening to both parties’ existence. Without a military force that is exclusively loyal to one party, hostilities cannot be maintained.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1064** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 July 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **8** |
| **Demand number:** | **1064.0811** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Make available for duty the Generals and other high ranking military officers designated to enter the Angolan Armed Forces, as well as UNITA officials to take up posts in the state at all levels.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Angola, however, would…have a chart-topping 7.2 troops per thousand population if the post-demobilisation Lusaka Protocol Peace Agreement national army total of 90 000 troops had been adhered to, which it has not. The ratio of troops per thousand population is far higher even than this in Angola, as many UNITA troops were never demobilised. UNITA's non-demobilised troops fought in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997 on the side of defeated President Mobuto, and in renewed clashes with government troops in Angola from April 1998 onwards as open warfare recommenced. A large UNITA army is still operating illegally inside Angola outside of the peace agreement. Best estimates suggest that UNITA may have up to 40 000 troops.”

--Barry Munslow, “The Politics of Unsustainable Development,” *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 20, No. 3, (1999): 551-568.

“In June 1997, the first fourteen UNITA officers arrived at a designated base outside Luanda. It ws not until September 9 that five generals from UNITA’s army arrived in Luanda to join the Angolan Armed Forces. Under the Lusaka Protocol, UNITA generals were made responsible for deciding with other officers of the Armed Forces how to incorporate 26,500 UNITA soldiers and officers into the army, with the rest being demobilized…the reintegration process remained behind schedule…UNITA also failed to confine to quarters its self-proclaimed police force, despite strong demands that it do so. UNITA appeared to have replaced uniformed soldiers in some areas with persons that it claimed were its police, even though the establishment of such a force was contrary to the Lusaka Protocol.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1997,* Events, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

It would take until 1997 to have any generals of UNITA entering into the FAA. Compliance at first was nearly non-existent.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Angola, however, would…have a chart-topping 7.2 troops per thousand population if the post-demobilisation Lusaka Protocol Peace Agreement national army total of 90 000 troops had been adhered to, which it has not. The ratio of troops per thousand population is far higher even than this in Angola, as many UNITA troops were never demobilised. UNITA's non-demobilised troops fought in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997 on the side of defeated President Mobuto, and in renewed clashes with government troops in Angola from April 1998 onwards as open warfare recommenced. A large UNITA army is still operating illegally inside Angola outside of the peace agreement. Best estimates suggest that UNITA may have up to 40 000 troops.”

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“In June 1997, the first fourteen UNITA officers arrived at a designated base outside Luanda. It ws not until September 9 that five generals from UNITA’s army arrived in Luanda to join the Angolan Armed Forces. Under the Lusaka Protocol, UNITA generals were made responsible for deciding with other officers of the Armed Forces how to incorporate 26,500 UNITA soldiers and officers into the army, with the rest being demobilized…the reintegration process remained behind schedule…UNITA also failed to confine to quarters its self-proclaimed police force, despite strong demands that it do so. UNITA appeared to have replaced uniformed soldiers in some areas with persons that it claimed were its police, even though the establishment of such a force was contrary to the Lusaka Protocol.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1997,* Events, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

In the medium-term, by 1997, UNITA would have some generals integrated into the FAA of Angola.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “high” because of the risky nature of military integration at this time of engaged warfare between UNITA and the government.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1064** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 July 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **9** |
| **Demand number:** | **1064.0911** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Take the required corrective measures regarding the withdrawal of Angola Armed Forces to barracks as agreed with UNAVEM III.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Writing in his report to the Security Council, the Secretary General stated that "the major positive development was the withdrawal of the FAA to their nearest barracks in some provinces". He also pointed out that the Civilian Police component of UNAVEM III had "verified the quartering of the rapid reaction police in Benguela, Huambo, Luanda, Luena, Lubango, Uige and most recently, in Malange. As of 25 April, 3,605 of the declared strength of 3,745 personnel had been quartered in these 7 locations. Barracking of those in Saurimo will commence on 30 April, with those in Cabinda following in May." However, this positive view is rejected by UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, who said in an interview in Le Figaro on 17 May that "Government troops are only pretending to return to base. These soldiers and the special police forces, the "Ninjas", are still threatening our men who are now disarmed". Meanwhile, the Government announced on 13 May that the second stage of moving its troops to barracks was to commence, involving the barracking of 6,000 troops over the following two weeks.”

--Africa E-Policy Journal, Angola: Peace Monitor, Issue 9, Vol. 2, 27 May 1996.

“UNAVEM's main task was to supervise the implementation of the military elements of the Lusaka protocol: the withdrawal of Government troops (the FAA) to barracks; the assembly of UNITA troops in quartering areas and the collection of their weapons; the selection of 26,300 UNITA troops to join the FAA and the demobilisation of surplus troops from both sides; the dismantling of check points; the quartering of the Governments Rapid Intervention Police; and the quartering and integration of the UNITA police. On 1st July 1997 UNAVEM III was replaced by a UN Civilian Observer Mission (MONUA). UNAVEM III's infantry battalions were all scheduled to withdraw, but in view of the volatile situation, particularly in the northeast provinces, the withdrawal was delayed several times. At the beginning of 1998 MONUA had a military component of 1750 men, which was reduced to about 1000 including military observers. In February 1999, when the UN announced plans to withdraw from Angola, following the complete breakdown of the peace process.”

--Asylum in the UK: Angola Assessment, April 2000. UK Immigration and Nationality Directorate Online.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government did little to withdraw its forces in 1996.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNAVEM's main task was to supervise the implementation of the military elements of the Lusaka protocol: the withdrawal of Government troops (the FAA) to barracks; the assembly of UNITA troops in quartering areas and the collection of their weapons; the selection of 26,300 UNITA troops to join the FAA and the demobilisation of surplus troops from both sides; the dismantling of check points; the quartering of the Governments Rapid Intervention Police; and the quartering and integration of the UNITA police. On 1st July 1997 UNAVEM III was replaced by a UN Civilian Observer Mission (MONUA). UNAVEM III's infantry battalions were all scheduled to withdraw, but in view of the volatile situation, particularly in the northeast provinces, the withdrawal was delayed several times. At the beginning of 1998 MONUA had a military component of 1750 men, which was reduced to about 1000 including military observers. In February 1999, when the UN announced plans to withdraw from Angola, following the complete breakdown of the peace process.”

--Asylum in the UK: Angola Assessment, April 2000. UK Immigration and Nationality Directorate Online.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government did little to withdraw its forces in 1996.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This depth of demand ranks as “high” because the integration of one’s military into a combined military unit can be threatening to both parties’ existence. Without a military force that is exclusively loyal to one party, hostilities cannot be maintained.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1064** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 July 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **10** |
| **Demand number:** | **1064.1011** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Need for full and effective implementation of the disarmament of civilian population by the Gov't of Angola.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The first un peacekeeping battalions were deployed in June. The Constitution was amended in July in order to create two posts of vice-president, one of which was offered to unita. By the end of the year the Rapid Reaction Police had not been confined to barracks nor were civilians disarmed, as required by the peace agreement.”

--1996 Annual Report for Angola, Amnesty International Annual Report 1996.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola did practically nothing to disarm the civilian population in 1996 and 1997.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The first un peacekeeping battalions were deployed in June. The Constitution was amended in July in order to create two posts of vice-president, one of which was offered to unita. By the end of the year the Rapid Reaction Police had not been confined to barracks nor were civilians disarmed, as required by the peace agreement.”

--1996 Annual Report for Angola, Amnesty International Annual Report 1996.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola did practically nothing to disarm the civilian population in 1996 and 1997.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” for while it would have taken an enormous effort to disarm the Angolan civilian population, neither the government nor UNITA would have been put at substantial risk of harm by engaging in such behavior.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1064** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 July 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **11** |
| **Demand number:** | **1064.1111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Prepare a program for phased demobilization and social reintegration of ex-combatants.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In addition, financial assistance for retraining programmes for ex-combatants failed to materialise…Consequently, the chances of large numbers of ex-combatants being able 'normalise' into civilian life appear remote. Reports of increasing outbreaks of banditry in certain parts of the country tend to confirm observers' worst fears about the breakdown of the reintegration process.”

--Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“The prospect of new pretexts for delay, however, is still significant. The agenda includes not only completion of the quartering of UNITA troops, but also many other critical issues yet to be implemented, including demobilization or integration into the national army of quartered troops, integration of UNITA recruits into the police, and incorporation of UNITA into agreed posts in the national government. UNITA has raised questions about the legitimacy of the national assembly after November 1996, when its initial four-year mandate will have passed.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The Government of Angola operated way behind schedule and never fully implemented any social reintegration programs for ex-combatants.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Angola, however, would…have a chart-topping 7.2 troops per thousand population if the post-demobilisation Lusaka Protocol Peace Agreement national army total of 90 000 troops had been adhered to, which it has not. The ratio of troops per thousand population is far higher even than this in Angola, as many UNITA troops were never demobilised. UNITA's non-demobilised troops fought in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997 on the side of defeated President Mobuto, and in renewed clashes with government troops in Angola from April 1998 onwards as open warfare recommenced. A large UNITA army is still operating illegally inside Angola outside of the peace agreement. Best estimates suggest that UNITA may have up to 40 000 troops.”

--Barry Munslow, “The Politics of Unsustainable Development,” *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 20, No. 3, (1999): 551-568.

“There has been recent momentum gained since late 1995 by the Angolan government's flexibility on several disputed points and the quartering of the first substantial number of UNITA troops.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

“The prospect of new pretexts for delay, however, is still significant. The agenda includes not only completion of the quartering of UNITA troops, but also many other critical issues yet to be implemented, including demobilization or integration into the national army of quartered troops, integration of UNITA recruits into the police, and incorporation of UNITA into agreed posts in the national government. UNITA has raised questions about the legitimacy of the national assembly after November 1996, when its initial four-year mandate will have passed.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The Government of Angola operated way behind schedule and never fully implemented any social reintegration programs for ex-combatants.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as low because the social reintegration of ex-combatants would never have put the government at risk. On the contrary, failing to re-integrate members of UNITA and the army into society posed a greater political and physical risk.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1064** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 July 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **11** |
| **Demand number:** | **1064.1112** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Extend full cooperation and support to the demobilization and social reintegration of ex-combatants.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Crucially, however, at least 8,000 and perhaps as many as 20,000 of UNITA's best soldiers are estimated never to have participated in the demobilisation process, [as of May 1998] and therefore remain a potentially potent fighting force spread around the country. This represents one of the major shortcomings of the UNAVEM/MONUA process.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“In addition, financial assistance for retraining programmes for ex-combatants failed to materialise…Consequently, the chances of large numbers of ex-combatants being able 'normalise' into civilian life appear remote. Reports of increasing outbreaks of banditry in certain parts of the country tend to confirm observers' worst fears about the breakdown of the reintegration process.”

--Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“There has been recent momentum gained since late 1995 by the Angolan government's flexibility on several disputed points and the quartering of the first substantial number of UNITA troops.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The Government of Angola operated way behind schedule and never fully implemented any social reintegration programs for ex-combatants.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In Angola, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol required that government troops were to be disengaged and over 62,000 UNITA troops were to be confined to assembly areas and disarmed…UNITA's weapons and those in civilian hands were to be collected and stored. Twenty-six thousand UNITA soldiers were planned to be incorporated into the newly created national army, which is to finally number 90,000 strong…UNAVEM III, responsible for overseeing the demobilisation process, experienced enormous problems with the process due to lack of co-operation particularly from UNITA who consistently slowed down the confinement of its combatants. Under threat of sanctions by the UN, however, UNITA completed the quartering of 63,000 troops by 20 November 1996. However, about 7,000 of those registered were found to be under the age of 18. The Angolan Peace Monitor reported at the time that over 70% of those quartered were not combat troops. The UN now accepts that Savimbi has retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. Due to the delays, soldiers in the cantonment camps became restless and desertions were commonplace. By November 1996 some 12,543 UNITA troops had deserted leaving 55,013 in the camps.”

--Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“Angola, however, would…have a chart-topping 7.2 troops per thousand population if the post-demobilisation Lusaka Protocol Peace Agreement national army total of 90 000 troops had been adhered to, which it has not. The ratio of troops per thousand population is far higher even than this in Angola, as many UNITA troops were never demobilised. UNITA's non-demobilised troops fought in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997 on the side of defeated President Mobuto, and in renewed clashes with government troops in Angola from April 1998 onwards as open warfare recommenced. A large UNITA army is still operating illegally inside Angola outside of the peace agreement. Best estimates suggest that UNITA may have up to 40 000 troops.”

--Barry Munslow, “The Politics of Unsustainable Development,” *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 20, No. 3, (1999): 551-568.

“The prospect of new pretexts for delay, however, is still significant. The agenda includes not only completion of the quartering of UNITA troops, but also many other critical issues yet to be implemented, including demobilization or integration into the national army of quartered troops, integration of UNITA recruits into the police, and incorporation of UNITA into agreed posts in the national government. UNITA has raised questions about the legitimacy of the national assembly after November 1996, when its initial four-year mandate will have passed.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The Government of Angola operated way behind schedule and never fully implemented any social reintegration programs for ex-combatants.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as low because the social reintegration of ex-combatants would never have put the government at risk. On the contrary, failing to re-integrate members of UNITA and the army into society posed a greater political and physical risk.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1064** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 July 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **12** |
| **Demand number:** | **1064.1211** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Take all necessary steps for completion of the formation of the national armed forces, for the planned movement of UNITA troops out of quartering areas, and for the orderly transition of demobilized troops to civilian life.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In Angola, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol required that government troops were to be disengaged and over 62,000 UNITA troops were to be confined to assembly areas and disarmed…UNITA's weapons and those in civilian hands were to be collected and stored. Twenty-six thousand UNITA soldiers were planned to be incorporated into the newly created national army, which is to finally number 90,000 strong…UNAVEM III, responsible for overseeing the demobilisation process, experienced enormous problems with the process due to lack of co-operation particularly from UNITA who consistently slowed down the confinement of its combatants. Under threat of sanctions by the UN, however, UNITA completed the quartering of 63,000 troops by 20 November 1996. However, about 7,000 of those registered were found to be under the age of 18. The Angolan Peace Monitor reported at the time that over 70% of those quartered were not combat troops. The UN now accepts that Savimbi has retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. Due to the delays, soldiers in the cantonment camps became restless and desertions were commonplace. By November 1996 some 12,543 UNITA troops had deserted leaving 55,013 in the camps.”

--Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“There has been recent momentum gained since late 1995 by the Angolan government's flexibility on several disputed points and the quartering of the first substantial number of UNITA troops.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

“According to the Lusaka Protocol, the next steps - selection of UNITA troops to join the national army and demobilization of excess forces - will not begin until the quartering process is completed. However, it is extremely unlikely that all the forces can in fact be quartered without simultaneous progress on integration into the national army, implementation of UNITA's agreed-on participation in the political process, and other confidence- building measures. The declared total of 62,500 UNITA military personnel to be quartered is possibly an overestimate, but the pace will have to quicken even to quarter a more modest figure of 45,000 to 50,000. If pressure to complete the quartering is not combined with measures to advance on other fronts, and attention focuses primarily on the numbers game of how many have been quartered, there are likely to be significant additional delays as well as increased chances of cease-fire violations and other incidents provoked by idle soldiers in the quartering areas.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

By all accounts, troops were not quartered on schedule, a national armed forces was never truly formed in those late 1990s, and troops were never demobilized until many, many years later, in 2002.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Crucially, however, at least 8,000 and perhaps as many as 20,000 of UNITA's best soldiers are estimated never to have participated in the demobilisation process, [as of May 1998] and therefore remain a potentially potent fighting force spread around the country. This represents one of the major shortcomings of the UNAVEM/MONUA process.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“Angola, however, would…have a chart-topping 7.2 troops per thousand population if the post-demobilisation Lusaka Protocol Peace Agreement national army total of 90 000 troops had been adhered to, which it has not. The ratio of troops per thousand population is far higher even than this in Angola, as many UNITA troops were never demobilised. UNITA's non-demobilised troops fought in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997 on the side of defeated President Mobuto, and in renewed clashes with government troops in Angola from April 1998 onwards as open warfare recommenced. A large UNITA army is still operating illegally inside Angola outside of the peace agreement. Best estimates suggest that UNITA may have up to 40 000 troops.”

--Barry Munslow, “The Politics of Unsustainable Development,” *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 20, No. 3, (1999): 551-568.

“The prospect of new pretexts for delay, however, is still significant. The agenda includes not only completion of the quartering of UNITA troops, but also many other critical issues yet to be implemented, including demobilization or integration into the national army of quartered troops, integration of UNITA recruits into the police, and incorporation of UNITA into agreed posts in the national government. UNITA has raised questions about the legitimacy of the national assembly after November 1996, when its initial four-year mandate will have passed.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

By all accounts, troops were not quartered on schedule, a national armed forces was never truly formed in those late 1990s, and troops were never demobilized until many, many years later, in 2002.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This is a high depth of demand, because each component part contains risks to each party regarding troops and military power.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1064** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 July 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **13** |
| **Demand number:** | **1064.1311** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Take all necessary steps for UNITA deputies join the National Assembly, for the controlled movement of UNITA troops out of quartering areas, the incorporation of UNITA personnel into the State administration, the Angolan Armed Forces, and the national poll.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In Angola, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol required that government troops were to be disengaged and over 62,000 UNITA troops were to be confined to assembly areas and disarmed…UNITA's weapons and those in civilian hands were to be collected and stored. Twenty-six thousand UNITA soldiers were planned to be incorporated into the newly created national army, which is to finally number 90,000 strong…UNAVEM III, responsible for overseeing the demobilisation process, experienced enormous problems with the process due to lack of co-operation particularly from UNITA who consistently slowed down the confinement of its combatants. Under threat of sanctions by the UN, however, UNITA completed the quartering of 63,000 troops by 20 November 1996. However, about 7,000 of those registered were found to be under the age of 18. The Angolan Peace Monitor reported at the time that over 70% of those quartered were not combat troops. The UN now accepts that Savimbi has retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. Due to the delays, soldiers in the cantonment camps became restless and desertions were commonplace. By November 1996 some 12,543 UNITA troops had deserted leaving 55,013 in the camps.”

-- Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“According to the Lusaka Protocol, the next steps - selection of UNITA troops to join the national army and demobilization of excess forces - will not begin until the quartering process is completed. However, it is extremely unlikely that all the forces can in fact be quartered without simultaneous progress on integration into the national army, implementation of UNITA's agreed-on participation in the political process, and other confidence- building measures. The declared total of 62,500 UNITA military personnel to be quartered is possibly an overestimate, but the pace will have to quicken even to quarter a more modest figure of 45,000 to 50,000. If pressure to complete the quartering is not combined with measures to advance on other fronts, and attention focuses primarily on the numbers game of how many have been quartered, there are likely to be significant additional delays as well as increased chances of cease-fire violations and other incidents provoked by idle soldiers in the quartering areas.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

“UNITA ministers loyal to government. Despite the present stalling of the peace process, there are encouragingsigns that a section of the UNITA leadership are committed to peace. There is growing admiration for UNITA's four ministers and seven deputyministers appointed to the Government of Unity and National Reconstruction(GURN) by President dos Santos, in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol. Diplomatic sources have expressed surprise and delight at the hard work andseriousness of the UNITA appointees. However, this appreciation of theirwork is not shared by all. The UNITA mouthpiece in the United States, the Centre for Democracy in Angola Incorporated, on 23 October described their role as being "purely ceremonial". There is a growing gulf between those UNITA representatives who have movedto Luanda to participate in the GURN and the National Assembly, and thosewho have remained with Jonas Savimbi. At present, Jonas Savimbi is keepingboth the military and political option open. However, one UNITA minister has privately conceded that if there was a return to war, he would remain with the government.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.3, Vol. IV 27th November 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

By all accounts, troops were not quartered on schedule, a national armed forces was never truly formed in those late 1990s, and troops were never demobilized until many, many years later, in 2002.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Angola, however, would…have a chart-topping 7.2 troops per thousand population if the post-demobilisation Lusaka Protocol Peace Agreement national army total of 90 000 troops had been adhered to, which it has not. The ratio of troops per thousand population is far higher even than this in Angola, as many UNITA troops were never demobilised. UNITA's non-demobilised troops fought in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997 on the side of defeated President Mobuto, and in renewed clashes with government troops in Angola from April 1998 onwards as open warfare recommenced. A large UNITA army is still operating illegally inside Angola outside of the peace agreement. Best estimates suggest that UNITA may have up to 40 000 troops.”

--Barry Munslow, “The Politics of Unsustainable Development,” *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 20, No. 3, (1999): 551-568.

“UNITA ministers loyal to government. Despite the present stalling of the peace process, there are encouragingsigns that a section of the UNITA leadership are committed to peace. There is growing admiration for UNITA's four ministers and seven deputyministers appointed to the Government of Unity and National Reconstruction(GURN) by President dos Santos, in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol. Diplomatic sources have expressed surprise and delight at the hard work andseriousness of the UNITA appointees. However, this appreciation of theirwork is not shared by all. The UNITA mouthpiece in the United States, the Centre for Democracy in Angola Incorporated, on 23 October described their role as being "purely ceremonial". There is a growing gulf between those UNITA representatives who have movedto Luanda to participate in the GURN and the National Assembly, and thosewho have remained with Jonas Savimbi. At present, Jonas Savimbi is keepingboth the military and political option open. However, one UNITA minister has privately conceded that if there was a return to war, he would remain with the government.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.3, Vol. IV 27th November 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

By all accounts, troops were not quartered on schedule, a national armed forces was never truly formed in those late 1990s, and troops were never demobilized until many, many years later, in 2002.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1064** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 July 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **14** |
| **Demand number:** | **1064.1411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Meet at the earliest opportunity to resolve all the remaining issues.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Jonas Savimbi, Eduardo dos Santos**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The planned direct talks between president Jose Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in order to help advance the Angolan peace process which is now at a standstill, have been adjourned to 1998. In November, President dos Santos announced that he and Jonas Savimbi had had a telephone conversation and agreed to meet in early December in Angola's capital, Luanda. It is not yet clear why the talks have been postponed. Reports say it is because Savimbi has resumed his allegations of a "lack of security conditions" in Luanda…Last year, Mr Savimbi also did not meet with the former US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, who had wanted to meet with Savimbi in Luanda during an official visit….The last time Santos and Savimbi met in direct talks was on March 1 1996, in Libreville in Gabon.”

--ANGOLA NEWS ONLINE, Edition No. 7, 28 December 1997, University of Pennsylvania.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Savimbi and Dos Santos met in person in 1996 in Gabon. However, each was engaged in war with the other side, with little hope for peace progress.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The planned direct talks between president Jose Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in order to help advance the Angolan peace process which is now at a standstill, have been adjourned to 1998. In November, President dos Santos announced that he and Jonas Savimbi had had a telephone conversation and agreed to meet in early December in Angola's capital, Luanda. It is not yet clear why the talks have been postponed. Reports say it is because Savimbi has resumed his allegations of a "lack of security conditions" in Luanda…Last year, Mr Savimbi also did not meet with the former US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, who had wanted to meet with Savimbi in Luanda during an official visit….The last time Santos and Savimbi met in direct talks was on March 1 1996, in Libreville in Gabon.”

--ANGOLA NEWS ONLINE, Edition No. 7, 28 December 1997, University of Pennsylvania.

“The Angolan peace process, launched in 1991 with an accord between the Government and the rebel movement UNITA, had by the end of 1998 collapsed for a second time leaving international mediators on the sidelines, no longer able to influence events. Years of accumulated mistrust produced an environment of fear in which the chief opposition party is reluctant to relinquish the security of their arms and commit themselves completely to the parliamentary process. Since the signature of the Lusaka protocol in 1994, high level shuttle diplomacy between the belligerent party leaders, mediated by the UN, failed to bring UNITA on board as a stakeholder. The post-Lusaka attempt at building a peace process failed to trickle down to soften the fears and suspicions of communities at the grassroots, in what remains a divided country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Savimbi and Dos Santos met in person in 1996 in Gabon. However, each was engaged in war with the other side, with little hope for peace progress.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1064** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 July 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **15** |
| **Demand number:** | **1064.1511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Intensify demining efforts and destroy stockpiles of landmines.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA procurement of weapons from Togo…in the period before 1999…included mechanized vehicles such as tanks and armoured personnel carriers, mines and explosives, a variety of small arms and light [...] aircraft weapons, and a variety of artillery pieces.”

--The Fowler Report, Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA,S/2000/203, 10 March 2000.

“UNITA's compliance with the de-mobilisation process has been subject to frequent delays, misinformation and out-right contradiction. The laying of landmines certainly also continued after, and in violation of, the Lusaka accords; Human Rights Watch has documented new mine laying activities as recently as 1997, while attacks during May 1998 have provided ongoing evidence of this. High level pressure from the UN and US failed to hasten Savimbi's pace, eventually resulting in the imposition of much-delayed UN sanctions at the end of February 1998.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“From 1992-1997, UNITA ran the world's biggest diamond-smuggling operation - using the proceeds to buy arms…thousands of minefields were layed…UNITA's surprising show of strength in the current fighting confirms fears by regional analysts that far from demobilising, UNITA maintained a significant fighting force and continued forced recruitment in territories it controlled. And despite an earlier international embargo on fuel and armament sales to the rebels, UNITA managed to import up to 40 planeloads of petroleum and other supplies per week, according to the publication Africa Analysis….Information available indicates that this war will be even more devastating. A report by the Secretary-General in August 1997 pointed out that new mines have been planted in UNITA territory. This was at a time when only 8% of the 1,532 minefields identified have been cleared.”

--“War Resumes in Angola,” *Third World Network,* <http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/geo-cn.htm>

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA and the government refused to collect or destroy stockpiles of landmines, and on the contrary, enaged in large-scale purchasing, laying, and detonation of landmines throughout Angola.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA's compliance with the de-mobilisation process has been subject to frequent delays, misinformation and out-right contradiction. The laying of landmines certainly also continued after, and in violation of, the Lusaka accords; Human Rights Watch has documented new mine laying activities as recently as 1997, while attacks during May 1998 have provided ongoing evidence of this. High level pressure from the UN and US failed to hasten Savimbi's pace, eventually resulting in the imposition of much-delayed UN sanctions at the end of February 1998.”

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--“War Resumes in Angola,” *Third World Network,* <http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/geo-cn.htm>

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA and the government refused to collect or destroy stockpiles of landmines, and on the contrary, enaged in large-scale purchasing, laying, and detonation of landmines throughout Angola.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1064** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 July 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **16** |
| **Demand number:** | **1064.1611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cease the dissemination of hostile propaganda.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The same swift response is needed to refute false information, which is never in short supply. During August 1996, the Jornal de Angola published a report which said that the SRSG would be travelling to Bailundo the next day to meet Jonas Savimbi. This was untrue, and the UNAVEM spokesperson issued a denial. The next day, the same report was heard on a South African radio station that broadcasts in Portuguese, but this time with an addition. The purpose of the imaginary trip was now to persuade Jonas Savimbi to accept the vice-presidency offered him by the Angolan government. Within two hours, the radio station had received the spokesperson's strongly worded denial and a request for a correction, which was duly broadcast. The source of this damaging little fiction turned out to be Associated Press, whose local correspondent had decided, for reasons best known to himself, to fabricate some news. False information can also result from the deliberate omission of key facts. Early in September 1996, on his return from a meeting with the UNITA leadership, including Jonas Savimbi, the SRSG announced that UNITA had undertaken to complete some key military tasks by 14, 16 and 20 September. The national television news covered this significant announcement and then failed to broadcast a single word of the substantive portion of Maitre Beye's statement, editing the news item so that only platitudes remained. This was by any standards a pretty flagrant act of manipulation, and it left the impression that the SRSG had brought nothing back from the meeting with Savimbi. In this case, the spokesperson sent a strongly worded note to the state-controlled television station, copied to the minister responsible and to every member of the Joint Commission, pointing out, among others, the significance of the statements of the SRSG and the responsibility of the TV journalists to report them accurately. When UNITA's radio station (Radio Vorgan) sends out false information, such as its recent claims that the SRSG would be revising the whole question of the quartering of the Government's rapid reaction police force when he next met the president, the spokesperson reacted in the same way. He issued a strong denial to this fabrication, which was sent to UNITA through e-mail, copying it once again to the Joint Commission, so that all members of the peace process were aware of what had happened and what UNAVEM's response was.”

--David Wimhurst, Spokesman for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Luanda, *Communication in Peace Operations: A Spokesperson's Perspective from UNAVEM III*, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997

##### “Countering hostile propaganda basically follows the same procedure as outlined above, but usually requires input from the military side of the mission, whose observers and teams throughout the country are UNAVEM's eyes and ears. Hostile propaganda, which is banned under the Lusaka Protocol, usually takes the form of unverified allegations made by one side against the other side. Fortunately, this has substantially diminished by September 1996. However, there were still some occurrences of propaganda. For example, the UNITA radio station had a tendency to broadcast allegations accusing government forces of moving into a certain area, or arming the civilian population, or some such illegal act, for all these constitute cease-fire violations.”

--David Wimhurst, Spokesman for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Luanda, *Communication in Peace Operations: A Spokesperson's Perspective from UNAVEM III*, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as low due to the non-threatening nature of ceasing hostile propaganda.

UNITA continued to emit propaganda throughout 1996 and 1997.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The same swift response is needed to refute false information, which is never in short supply. During August 1996, the Jornal de Angola published a report which said that the SRSG would be travelling to Bailundo the next day to meet Jonas Savimbi. This was untrue, and the UNAVEM spokesperson issued a denial. The next day, the same report was heard on a South African radio station that broadcasts in Portuguese, but this time with an addition. The purpose of the imaginary trip was now to persuade Jonas Savimbi to accept the vice-presidency offered him by the Angolan government. Within two hours, the radio station had received the spokesperson's strongly worded denial and a request for a correction, which was duly broadcast. The source of this damaging little fiction turned out to be Associated Press, whose local correspondent had decided, for reasons best known to himself, to fabricate some news. False information can also result from the deliberate omission of key facts. Early in September 1996, on his return from a meeting with the UNITA leadership, including Jonas Savimbi, the SRSG announced that UNITA had undertaken to complete some key military tasks by 14, 16 and 20 September. The national television news covered this significant announcement and then failed to broadcast a single word of the substantive portion of Maitre Beye's statement, editing the news item so that only platitudes remained. This was by any standards a pretty flagrant act of manipulation, and it left the impression that the SRSG had brought nothing back from the meeting with Savimbi. In this case, the spokesperson sent a strongly worded note to the state-controlled television station, copied to the minister responsible and to every member of the Joint Commission, pointing out, among others, the significance of the statements of the SRSG and the responsibility of the TV journalists to report them accurately. When UNITA's radio station (Radio Vorgan) sends out false information, such as its recent claims that the SRSG would be revising the whole question of the quartering of the Government's rapid reaction police force when he next met the president, the spokesperson reacted in the same way. He issued a strong denial to this fabrication, which was sent to UNITA through e-mail, copying it once again to the Joint Commission, so that all members of the peace process were aware of what had happened and what UNAVEM's response was.”

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## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as low due to the non-threatening nature of ceasing hostile propaganda.

UNITA continued to emit propaganda throughout 1996 and 1997.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1064** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 July 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **17** |
| **Demand number:** | **1064.1711** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Provide the requisite facilities for the establishment of an independent UN radio.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In cases of false information, UNAVEM also responds with the correct information through its own radio and television programmes, which are broadcast every week, courtesy of government installations. In this way, the mission can counter false information or hostile propaganda, not only at the political level, but also at the level of the listening or viewing audience, where it does most damage.”

----David Wimhurst, Spokesman for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Luanda, *Communication in Peace Operations: A Spokesperson's Perspective from UNAVEM III*, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997

“Attempts by the U.N. mission to set up an independent radio station, Radio UNAVEM, were frustrated by government foot-dragging over the allocation of broadcasting frequencies. Freedom of expression was even more tightly controlled in UNITA dominated areas, with no criticism tolerated. Free circulation of persons and goods, a specific principle of the Lusaka Protocol, continued to be abused by both sides.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report 1996- Angola,* 1 January 1997

##### “UNAVEM publishes a monthly magazine, as well as running its own TV and radio broadcast units. It also publishes a daily news highlights bulletin and, taken together, these components make up the mission's Public Information Office (PIO). This office is distinct from the spokesperson's office, whose role is to speak on behalf of the mission and manage press relations. The function of the PIO is to generate a wider understanding of the peacekeeping operation and of the UN within the mission territory, as well as sending electronic items back to UN HQ for wider dissemination around the world….Radio is the most effective way of informing the population in the mission area, and UNAVEM's radio unit is able to generate enough material to fill the three available hours with ease. Some of this programming deals with the UN and its various agencies, and is supplied from headquarters. But the most important segments are generated on site, tailored to specific issues that need addressing…A recent key issue has been the demobilisation of 100 000 soldiers and their social reintegration. UNAVEM radio has prepared an extensive information campaign on this critical and complex subject, in an attempt to help the population understand the various aid programmes set up to benefit the demobilised soldiers, as well as the need to take these men back into society in a constructive way. While both UNAVEM radio and TV recently took time out from their regular work to help in promoting the polio vaccination campaign in Angola, their main purpose is to pass messages about the peace process to the local population that are appropriate to the needs of the moment, and as such they have a very important political role to play.”

--David Wimhurst, Spokesman for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Luanda, *Communication in Peace Operations: A Spokesperson's Perspective from UNAVEM III*, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

By all accounts, the government made minimal effort towards establishing a functioning radio for UNAVEM.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In cases of false information, UNAVEM also responds with the correct information through its own radio and television programmes, which are broadcast every week, courtesy of government installations. In this way, the mission can counter false information or hostile propaganda, not only at the political level, but also at the level of the listening or viewing audience, where it does most damage.”

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## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

By all accounts, the government made minimal effort towards establishing a functioning radio for UNAVEM.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1064** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 July 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **21** |
| **Demand number:** | **1064.2111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of UN and other international personnel and premises, and guarantee the safety and freedom of movement of humanitarian supplies throughout the country.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The first is Angolas increasing- and largely avoidable- humanitarian crisis. The return to war has exacerbated an already difficult internal refugee problem. By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The

Number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angola’s population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanjein the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000....The

War has also obstructed or interrupted aid flights and convoys by organizations such as the World Food Programme and CARE at a time when some donors have failed to live up to promises of relief aid to the region.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“Full implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, originally envisaged to be completed with UN assistance by February 1997, is far behind schedule. The engagement of Angolan civil society in the peace process is weak. The right to freedom of movement, particularly in UNITA-controlled areas, is systematically violated, without an effective response from the international community.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While UNITA never adhered to this demand, the government of Angola similarly did not take steps to ensure freedom of movement. Outside of Luanda, the Angolan rural zones were profoundly unsafe for UNAVEM personnel.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The first is Angolas increasing- and largely avoidable- humanitarian crisis. The return to war has exacerbated an already difficult internal refugee problem. By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The

Number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angola’s population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanjein the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000....The

War has also obstructed or interrupted aid flights and convoys by organizations such as the World Food Programme and CARE at a time when some donors have failed to live up to promises of relief aid to the region.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“And, despite large-scale international commitments of humanitarian and reconstruction aid, the prospects for quick implementation of sustainable projects for reconstruction which could give additional momentum to peaceful activities are still hampered by government incapacity, UNITA fears of losing control over their population base, and the lack of sufficient local knowledge and problems of coordination among newly arrived agencies.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While UNITA never adhered to this demand, the government of Angola similarly did not take steps to ensure freedom of movement. Outside of Luanda, the Angolan rural zones were profoundly unsafe for UNAVEM personnel.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1064** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 July 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **21** |
| **Demand number:** | **1064.2112** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Extend full cooperation to UNAVEM III at all levels.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The UN Security Council went into private session on 25 February 1997, during which it will agree to a plan to progressively cut its presence in Angola. The UN's new Secretary General, Kofi Annan, had hoped that improvements in the situation in Angola could lead to the mandate of the UN's mission in Angola, UNAVEM III, to be extended for a two month period. However, problems blamed on UNITA (see below) will almost certainly lead to the Security Council asking to review the situation at the end of March. Bad Faith Gives UN Planning Difficulties.UNITA has broken its promise made to the Joint Commission (1) on 23 January that it would ensure that all its 70 deputies to the Angolan Parliament, the National Assembly, and its members of the future Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN) would arrive in the Angolan capital, Luanda, by 12 February. This would have enabled the Angolan Government to set a date for the inauguration of the GURN.”

--ANGOLA PEACE MONITOR 1997, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 6, Vol. III, 25 February 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

By July 1996, both the government and UNITA were uncooperative with UNAVEM personnel and had re-engaged in warfare in almost every region of Angola.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In Angola, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol required that government troops were to be disengaged and over 62,000 UNITA troops were to be confined to assembly areas and disarmed…UNITA's weapons and those in civilian hands were to be collected and stored. Twenty-six thousand UNITA soldiers were planned to be incorporated into the newly created national army, which is to finally number 90,000 strong…UNAVEM III, responsible for overseeing the demobilisation process, experienced enormous problems with the process due to lack of co-operation particularly from UNITA who consistently slowed down the confinement of its combatants. Under threat of sanctions by the UN, however, UNITA completed the quartering of 63,000 troops by 20 November 1996. However, about 7,000 of those registered were found to be under the age of 18. The Angolan Peace Monitor reported at the time that over 70% of those quartered were not combat troops. The UN now accepts that Savimbi has retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. Due to the delays, soldiers in the cantonment camps became restless and desertions were commonplace. By November 1996 some 12,543 UNITA troops had deserted leaving 55,013 in the camps.”

-- Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“The UN Security Council went into private session on 25 February 1997, during which it will agree to a plan to progressively cut its presence in Angola. The UN's new Secretary General, Kofi Annan, had hoped that improvements in the situation in Angola could lead to the mandate of the UN's mission in Angola, UNAVEM III, to be extended for a two month period. However, problems blamed on UNITA (see below) will almost certainly lead to the Security Council asking to review the situation at the end of March. Bad Faith Gives UN Planning Difficulties.UNITA has broken its promise made to the Joint Commission (1) on 23 January that it would ensure that all its 70 deputies to the Angolan Parliament, the National Assembly, and its members of the future Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN) would arrive in the Angolan capital, Luanda, by 12 February. This would have enabled the Angolan Government to set a date for the inauguration of the GURN.”

--ANGOLA PEACE MONITOR 1997, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no. 6, Vol. III, 25 February 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

By July 1996, both the government and UNITA were uncooperative with UNAVEM personnel and had re-engaged in warfare in almost every region of Angola.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1064** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 July 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **23** |
| **Demand number:** | **1064.2312** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Meet obligations under the Lusaka Protocol to create the necessary stability for economic recovery.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government o Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Most people survive via candongo, the informal or parallel economy. Even since the Lusaka Protocol, the state's capacity to provide services and pay salaries has continued to collapse as a result of disillusionment, bankruptcy, corruption, the endless delays in the peace process and return of UNITA areas to government control and the like. The government has resorted to devaluation of the Kwanza as a crisis management tool, resulting in high inflation rates which peaked at 31.5% per month in 1995. However, the 'New Life Programme' introduced in 1996 with the objective of balancing the budget, succeeded in bring-ing down inflation dramatically, to a manageable 6% in December 1996. IMF data suggest an annualised 92% by June 1997. However, a further devaluation of 25% in July 1997 still failed to close the gap between the official and parallel exchange rates, and seemed to revive the previous vicious spiral. The fall in the oil price during April and May 1998 will squeeze government expenditure further and probably renew inflationary pressures.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Economic recovery would not be possible in the short-term, as the Lusaka protocol was being patently ignored and would become completely defunct by 1998.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Most people survive via candongo, the informal or parallel economy. Even since the Lusaka Protocol, the state's capacity to provide services and pay salaries has continued to collapse as a result of disillusionment, bankruptcy, corruption, the endless delays in the peace process and return of UNITA areas to government control and the like. The government has resorted to devaluation of the Kwanza as a crisis management tool, resulting in high inflation rates which peaked at 31.5% per month in 1995. However, the 'New Life Programme' introduced in 1996 with the objective of balancing the budget, succeeded in bring-ing down inflation dramatically, to a manageable 6% in December 1996. IMF data suggest an annualised 92% by June 1997. However, a further devaluation of 25% in July 1997 still failed to close the gap between the official and parallel exchange rates, and seemed to revive the previous vicious spiral. The fall in the oil price during April and May 1998 will squeeze government expenditure further and probably renew inflationary pressures.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“The Community Rehabilitation Programme (CRP) was launched in Brussels on 25-26 September 1995 at a Round Table Conference of the Angolan Government and their civil society and donor partners…Government did not implement the expected structural adjustment reforms that were considered as preconditions for major donor investment. The national private sector did not engage because the Government failed to carry out the promised monetary, banking and legal restructuring which would stimulate local small and medium scale private sector development. Potential local entrepreneurs lacked confidence due to the slow movement on the peace process and the failure to guarantee free movement of people and commodities around the country and between the cities and rural areas.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Economic recovery would not be possible in the medium-term, as the Lusaka protocol was being patently ignored and would become completely defunct by 1998.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1075** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 October 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **4** |
| **Demand number:** | **1075.0411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Move UNITA personnel rapidly from the quartering areas.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In Angola, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol required that government troops were to be disengaged and over 62,000 UNITA troops were to be confined to assembly areas and disarmed…UNITA's weapons and those in civilian hands were to be collected and stored. Twenty-six thousand UNITA soldiers were planned to be incorporated into the newly created national army, which is to finally number 90,000 strong…UNAVEM III, responsible for overseeing the demobilisation process, experienced enormous problems with the process due to lack of co-operation particularly from UNITA who consistently slowed down the confinement of its combatants. Under threat of sanctions by the UN, however, UNITA completed the quartering of 63,000 troops by 20 November 1996. However, about 7,000 of those registered were found to be under the age of 18. The Angolan Peace Monitor reported at the time that over 70% of those quartered were not combat troops. The UN now accepts that Savimbi has retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. Due to the delays, soldiers in the cantonment camps became restless and desertions were commonplace. By November 1996 some 12,543 UNITA troops had deserted leaving 55,013 in the camps.”

-- Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“According to the Lusaka Protocol, the next steps - selection of UNITA troops to join the national army and demobilization of excess forces - will not begin until the quartering process is completed. However, it is extremely unlikely that all the forces can in fact be quartered without simultaneous progress on integration into the national army, implementation of UNITA's agreed-on participation in the political process, and other confidence- building measures. The declared total of 62,500 UNITA military personnel to be quartered is possibly an overestimate, but the pace will have to quicken even to quarter a more modest figure of 45,000 to 50,000. If pressure to complete the quartering is not combined with measures to advance on other fronts, and attention focuses primarily on the numbers game of how many have been quartered, there are likely to be significant additional delays as well as increased chances of cease-fire violations and other incidents provoked by idle soldiers in the quartering areas.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA operated consistently behind schedule on the troop quartering mandates. It eventually would return the vast majority of its troops to the bush to re-engage in rural warfare.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In Angola, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol required that government troops were to be disengaged and over 62,000 UNITA troops were to be confined to assembly areas and disarmed…UNITA's weapons and those in civilian hands were to be collected and stored. Twenty-six thousand UNITA soldiers were planned to be incorporated into the newly created national army, which is to finally number 90,000 strong…UNAVEM III, responsible for overseeing the demobilisation process, experienced enormous problems with the process due to lack of co-operation particularly from UNITA who consistently slowed down the confinement of its combatants. Under threat of sanctions by the UN, however, UNITA completed the quartering of 63,000 troops by 20 November 1996. However, about 7,000 of those registered were found to be under the age of 18. The Angolan Peace Monitor reported at the time that over 70% of those quartered were not combat troops. The UN now accepts that Savimbi has retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. Due to the delays, soldiers in the cantonment camps became restless and desertions were commonplace. By November 1996 some 12,543 UNITA troops had deserted leaving 55,013 in the camps.”

-- Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“According to the Lusaka Protocol, the next steps - selection of UNITA troops to join the national army and demobilization of excess forces - will not begin until the quartering process is completed. However, it is extremely unlikely that all the forces can in fact be quartered without simultaneous progress on integration into the national army, implementation of UNITA's agreed-on participation in the political process, and other confidence- building measures. The declared total of 62,500 UNITA military personnel to be quartered is possibly an overestimate, but the pace will have to quicken even to quarter a more modest figure of 45,000 to 50,000. If pressure to complete the quartering is not combined with measures to advance on other fronts, and attention focuses primarily on the numbers game of how many have been quartered, there are likely to be significant additional delays as well as increased chances of cease-fire violations and other incidents provoked by idle soldiers in the quartering areas.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA operated consistently behind schedule on the troop quartering mandates. It eventually would return the vast majority of its troops to the bush to re-engage in rural warfare.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1075** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 October 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **6** |
| **Demand number:** | **1075.0611** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Continue making progress in that direction [implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol.]

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Four years after the United Nations brokered a deal to end civil war in Angola in Lusaka, the war has resumed in earnest. Declaring the peace deal officially dead, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan told the Security Council after the new outbreak of fighting that 'the events of the last few months have clearly proved that, for all intents and purposes, the peace process has collapsed.'

The restart of the war comes after months of mounting tension caused by repeated accord violations and skirmishes. UN sources admit that the peace process had been stalled for months now. Most diplomats blame Dr Jonas Savimbi and his rebel movement UNITA (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), for refusing to hand over rebel-held territory to government control.

They say that instead, Savimbi opted for rearming his forces in violation of the peace accord signed between UNITA and the government in Lusaka, Zambia in November 1994….A government of national unity, created in April 1997 as a result of the Lusaka accord, quickly fell into disarray.”

--“War Resumes in Angola,” *Third World Network,* <http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/geo-cn.htm>

“UNITA have failed to demobilise their army and hand over their weapons. This has led the United Nations to impose further international sanctions against the rebels(see APM no.2 vol. IV). According to reliable sources, the six thousand UNITA troops which in October had turned up at UN camps for registration and demobilisation, demanded their weapons back and left the camps following the imposition of UN sanctions on UNITA at the end of October. They have now rejoined their comrades-in-arms, making up a military force estimated to be between 15,000 and 35,000 strong.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.3, Vol. IV 27th November 1997

“The Angolan army has made fresh allegations that UNITA is preparing tore launch military conflict. UNITA have counter-charged that the government thas been preparing for a military assault in the north of the country. The commander of the Angolan army's southern front, General Francisco Furtado, stated on 13 November that UNITA had moved hidden long-range artillery and other weapons to new command posts. He also asserted that it was building up military bases in the regions on Benguela and Huila in the South, Bie and Huambo in the centre and Cuando-Cubango in the south west. This was in part confirmed by the UN Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) who warned on 7 November of an increasing number of security incidents in Benguela province. The Angolan government also charged that UNITA have shelled several villages in Huila province, forcing hundreds of villagers to flee their homes. In response to armed actions by UNITA, on 11 November, 22 UNITA soldiers were arrested and charged with attacking a police unit at Kangandala, in northern Angola. A further deserter from UNITA's military wing has further strengthened the Angolan army's allegations.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.3, Vol. IV 27th November 1997

“UNITA's compliance with the de-mobilisation process has been subject to frequent delays, misinformation and out-right contradiction. The laying of landmines certainly also continued after, and in violation of, the Lusaka accords; Human Rights Watch has documented new mine laying activities as recently as 1997, while attacks during May 1998 have provided ongoing evidence of this. High level pressure from the UN and US failed to hasten Savimbi's pace, eventually resulting in the imposition of much-delayed UN sanctions at the end of February 1998.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

By late 1996, it was difficult to point to any specific element of the Protocol that was being scrupulously observed or being implemented in a timely manner.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Progress in implementing the 'final timetable' under the Lusaka Protocol during March 1998 was smoother, but it again failed to meet even the revised deadline, and so continued into April…Notwithstanding these developments, UNITA has continued to give contradictory signals and even to launch new armed attacks. Several towns, villages and communes in Uige, Moxico Malanje and Lunda Sul provinces previously handed over to the government were retaken by UNITA soldiers. Other settle-ments in Benguela, Bengo, Cuando Cubango, Huambo, Malanje, Huila, Cabinda, Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul provinces were raided during March, April and May, when properties were destroyed and local administrators expelled or abducted.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“The Angolan peace process, launched in 1991 with an accord between the Government and the rebel movement UNITA, had by the end of 1998 collapsed for a second time leaving international mediators on the sidelines, no longer able to influence events. Years of accumulated mistrust produced an environment of fear in which the chief opposition party is reluctant to relinquish the security of their arms and commit themselves completely to the parliamentary process. Since the signature of the Lusaka protocol in 1994, high level shuttle diplomacy between the belligerent party leaders, mediated by the UN, failed to bring UNITA on board as a stakeholder. The post-Lusaka attempt at building a peace process failed to trickle down to soften the fears and suspicions of communities at the grassroots, in what remains a divided country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

By late 1996 and continuing into 1997 and 1998, it was difficult to point to any specific element of the Protocol that was being scrupulously observed or being implemented in a timely manner.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1075** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 October 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **10** |
| **Demand number:** | **1075.1011** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Meet at the earliest opportunity to resolve all the remaining issues.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Jonas Savimbi, José Eduardo dos Santos**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The planned direct talks between president Jose Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in order to help advance the Angolan peace process which is now at a standstill, have been adjourned to 1998. In November, President dos Santos announced that he and Jonas Savimbi had had a telephone conversation and agreed to meet in early December in Angola's capital, Luanda. It is not yet clear why the talks have been postponed. Reports say it is because Savimbi has resumed his allegations of a "lack of security conditions" in Luanda…Last year, Mr Savimbi also did not meet with the former US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, who had wanted to meet with Savimbi in Luanda during an official visit….The last time Santos and Savimbi met in direct talks was on March 1 1996, in Libreville in Gabon.”

--ANGOLA NEWS ONLINE, Edition No. 7, 28 December 1997, University of Pennsylvania.

“The Angolan peace process has effectively stalled following UNITA's failure to comply with the Lusaka Protocol, the agreement underpinning the process. Sources in Angola describe an "alarming calm" in the country, with no substantial hand-over of UNITA-controlled areas to the government, and no further hand-over of UNITA weapons to the United Nations.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.3, Vol. IV 27th November 1997

“Despite the present stalling of the peace process, there are encouraging signs that a section of the UNITA leadership are committed to peace. There is growing admiration for UNITA's four ministers and seven deputy ministers appointed to the Government of Unity and National Reconstruction(GURN) by President dos Santos, in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol. Diplomatic sources have expressed surprise and delight at the hard work and seriousness of the UNITA appointees. However, this appreciation of their work is not shared by all. The UNITA mouthpiece in the United States, the Centre for Democracy in Angola Incorporated, on 23 October described their role as being "purely ceremonial". There is a growing gulf between those UNITA representatives who have moved to Luanda to participate in the GURN and the National Assembly, and those who have remained with Jonas Savimbi. At present, Jonas Savimbi is keeping both the military and political option open. However, one UNITA minister has privately conceded that if there was a return to war, he would remain with the government.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.3, Vol. IV 27th November 1997

“The Angolan peace process, launched in 1991 with an accord between the Government and the rebel movement UNITA, had by the end of 1998 collapsed for a second time leaving international mediators on the sidelines, no longer able to influence events. Years of accumulated mistrust produced an environment of fear in which the chief opposition party is reluctant to relinquish the security of their arms and commit themselves completely to the parliamentary process. Since the signature of the Lusaka protocol in 1994, high level shuttle diplomacy between the belligerent party leaders, mediated by the UN, failed to bring UNITA on board as a stakeholder. The post-Lusaka attempt at building a peace process failed to trickle down to soften the fears and suspicions of communities at the grassroots, in what remains a divided country.”

--Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

After meeting in Gabon in March 1996, Savimbi and Dos Santos did not meet again until many years later.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Angolan peace process, launched in 1991 with an accord between the Government and the rebel movement UNITA, had by the end of 1998 collapsed for a second time leaving international mediators on the sidelines, no longer able to influence events. Years of accumulated mistrust produced an environment of fear in which the chief opposition party is reluctant to relinquish the security of their arms and commit themselves completely to the parliamentary process. Since the signature of the Lusaka protocol in 1994, high level shuttle diplomacy between the belligerent party leaders, mediated by the UN, failed to bring UNITA on board as a stakeholder. The post-Lusaka attempt at building a peace process failed to trickle down to soften the fears and suspicions of communities at the grassroots, in what remains a divided country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

“The planned direct talks between president Jose Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in order to help advance the Angolan peace process which is now at a standstill, have been adjourned to 1998. In November, President dos Santos announced that he and Jonas Savimbi had had a telephone conversation and agreed to meet in early December in Angola's capital, Luanda. It is not yet clear why the talks have been postponed. Reports say it is because Savimbi has resumed his allegations of a "lack of security conditions" in Luanda…Last year, Mr Savimbi also did not meet with the former US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, who had wanted to meet with Savimbi in Luanda during an official visit….The last time Santos and Savimbi met in direct talks was on March 1 1996, in Libreville in Gabon.”

--ANGOLA NEWS ONLINE, Edition No. 7, 28 December 1997, University of Pennsylvania.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

After meeting in Gabon in March 1996, Savimbi and Dos Santos did not meet again until many years later.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1075** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 October 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **11** |
| **Demand number:** | **1075.1111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Uphold obligations under the Lusaka Protocol and commitments made at the meeting between the President of Angola and the leader of UNITA in Gabon, on 03/01/96.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA's compliance with the de-mobilisation process has been subject to frequent delays, misinformation and out-right contradiction. The laying of landmines certainly also continued after, and in violation of, the Lusaka accords; Human Rights Watch has documented new mine laying activities as recently as 1997, while attacks during May 1998 have provided ongoing evidence of this. High level pressure from the UN and US failed to hasten Savimbi's pace, eventually resulting in the imposition of much-delayed UN sanctions at the end of February 1998.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“The Angolan peace process has effectively stalled following UNITA's failure to comply with the Lusaka Protocol, the agreement underpinning the process. Sources in Angola describe an "alarming calm" in the country, with no substantial hand-over of UNITA-controlled areas to the government, and no further hand-over of UNITA weapons to the United Nations.”

--*Angola Peace Monitor*, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.3, Vol. IV 27th November 1997

“Despite the present stalling of the peace process, there are encouraging signs that a section of the UNITA leadership are committed to peace. There is growing admiration for UNITA's four ministers and seven deputy ministers appointed to the Government of Unity and National Reconstruction(GURN) by President dos Santos, in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol. Diplomatic sources have expressed surprise and delight at the hard work and seriousness of the UNITA appointees. However, this appreciation of their work is not shared by all. The UNITA mouthpiece in the United States, the Centre for Democracy in Angola Incorporated, on 23 October described their role as being "purely ceremonial". There is a growing gulf between those UNITA representatives who have moved to Luanda to participate in the GURN and the National Assembly, and those who have remained with Jonas Savimbi. At present, Jonas Savimbi is keeping both the military and political option open. However, one UNITA minister has privately conceded that if there was a return to war, he would remain with the government.”

--*Angola Peace Monitor*, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.3, Vol. IV 27th November 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There was truly no compliance, primarily by UNITA, and subsequently the government of Angola to uphold the obligations promised in Gabon in March 1996. The Lusaka accords continued to be ignored through 1998.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Angolan peace process, launched in 1991 with an accord between the Government and the rebel movement UNITA, had by the end of 1998 collapsed for a second time leaving international mediators on the sidelines, no longer able to influence events. Years of accumulated mistrust produced an environment of fear in which the chief opposition party is reluctant to relinquish the security of their arms and commit themselves completely to the parliamentary process. Since the signature of the Lusaka protocol in 1994, high level shuttle diplomacy between the belligerent party leaders, mediated by the UN, failed to bring UNITA on board as a stakeholder. The post-Lusaka attempt at building a peace process failed to trickle down to soften the fears and suspicions of communities at the grassroots, in what remains a divided country.”

-- Allan Cain, “Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90, (2001): 577-586.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There was truly no compliance, primarily by UNITA, and subsequently the government of Angola to uphold the obligations promised in Gabon in March 1996. The Lusaka accords continued to be ignored through 1998.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1075** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 October 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **12** |
| **Demand number:** | **1075.1211** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Complete substantially the selection of 26,300 UNITA soldiers for incorporation into the FAA.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“the demobilisation of excess troops of both FAA and UNITA has commenced…it required the selection and incorporation into FAA of 26,300 ex-UNITA troops. The selection of ex-UNITA troops commenced in mid- 1996, and is still ongoing. As of this writing, some 19,000 troops have been selected, and over 5,500 integrated into FAA…Since late 1996 humanitarian partners have stressed the need to agree on a clear timetable for the completion of the entire demobilisation process. This led in February 1997 to the approval of a Plan for the Rapid Demobilisation of Excess Troops, introducing some modifications to what was originally outlined in the Lusaka Protocol.”

--United Nations Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal for Angola, January - December 1997, United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 25 March 1997.

“In Angola, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol required that government troops were to be disengaged and over 62,000 UNITA troops were to be confined to assembly areas and disarmed…UNITA's weapons and those in civilian hands were to be collected and stored. Twenty-six thousand UNITA soldiers were planned to be incorporated into the newly created national army, which is to finally number 90,000 strong…UNAVEM III, responsible for overseeing the demobilisation process, experienced enormous problems with the process due to lack of co-operation particularly from UNITA who consistently slowed down the confinement of its combatants. Under threat of sanctions by the UN, however, UNITA completed the quartering of 63,000 troops by 20 November 1996. However, about 7,000 of those registered were found to be under the age of 18. The Angolan Peace Monitor reported at the time that over 70% of those quartered were not combat troops. The UN now accepts that Savimbi has retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. Due to the delays, soldiers in the cantonment camps became restless and desertions were commonplace. By November 1996 some 12,543 UNITA troops had deserted leaving 55,013 in the camps.”

-- Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola and UNITA never fully or even partially integrated their armed forces into one national military unit.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“the demobilisation of excess troops of both FAA and UNITA has commenced…it required the selection and incorporation into FAA of 26,300 ex-UNITA troops. The selection of ex-UNITA troops commenced in mid- 1996, and is still ongoing. As of this writing, some 19,000 troops have been selected, and over 5,500 integrated into FAA…Since late 1996 humanitarian partners have stressed the need to agree on a clear timetable for the completion of the entire demobilisation process. This led in February 1997 to the approval of a Plan for the Rapid Demobilisation of Excess Troops, introducing some modifications to what was originally outlined in the Lusaka Protocol.”

--United Nations Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal for Angola, January - December 1997, United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 25 March 1997.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola and UNITA never fully or even partially integrated their armed forces into one national military unit.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This depth of demand ranks as “high” because the integration of one’s military into a combined military unit can be threatening to both parties’ existence. Without a military force that is exclusively loyal to one party, hostilities cannot be maintained.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1075** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 October 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **12** |
| **Demand number:** | **1075.12110** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cooperate in good faith with the Government of Angola to finalize the transformation of its radio station into a non-partisan station.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“A number of important tasks required under the Lusaka Protocol were in fact completed. UNITA shut down its partisan radio station and appeared, at least initially, to make some progress toward disarmament and demobilization.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“Further, he continues, the transformation of UNITA's radio Vorgan into a non-partisan station has not made progress. Rather, after some reduction in hostile propaganda, there has recently been an increase in such broadcasts, particularly by UNITA. Accusations, unfounded rumours and inflammatory public pronouncements have further aggravated the political atmosphere. Some radio Vorgan propaganda broadcasts were aimed at United Nations staff and other international personnel in Angola. Those working for MONUA and non-governmental organizations have been physically attacked, despite statements by Mr. Savimbi and other UNITA political organs that such actions would stop. Restrictions on the movement of MONUA observers in several strategic areas by both sides have prevented the Mission from fully carrying out its tasks. Angola's military situation, the Secretary-General states, is characterized by tension in almost the entire country, particularly in the provinces of Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul and Malange. The mobilization of troops and military equipment and an increase in hostile propaganda was reported. Large-scale, last-minute changes in the destination of demobilized ex-UNITA troops and their deployment at strategic UNITA-controlled locations underline the gravity of the deteriorating situation in Angola.”

--United Nations, “Security Council Says UNITA, Endangering Angola Peace Process, Must Live Up to Terms of Agreements Reached,” Security Council - 3 - Press Release SC/6414 3814th Meeting (AM) 28 August 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

RADIO VORGAN slowly became more non-partisan at different stages, but never truly became a non-partisan radio station. Moments of balance gave way to UNITA-controlled rhetoric against the government.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“A number of important tasks required under the Lusaka Protocol were in fact completed. UNITA shut down its partisan radio station and appeared, at least initially, to make some progress toward disarmament and demobilization.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“Further, he continues, the transformation of UNITA's radio Vorgan into a non-partisan station has not made progress. Rather, after some reduction in hostile propaganda, there has recently been an increase in such broadcasts, particularly by UNITA. Accusations, unfounded rumours and inflammatory public pronouncements have further aggravated the political atmosphere. Some radio Vorgan propaganda broadcasts were aimed at United Nations staff and other international personnel in Angola. Those working for MONUA and non-governmental organizations have been physically attacked, despite statements by Mr. Savimbi and other UNITA political organs that such actions would stop. Restrictions on the movement of MONUA observers in several strategic areas by both sides have prevented the Mission from fully carrying out its tasks. Angola's military situation, the Secretary-General states, is characterized by tension in almost the entire country, particularly in the provinces of Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul and Malange. The mobilization of troops and military equipment and an increase in hostile propaganda was reported. Large-scale, last-minute changes in the destination of demobilized ex-UNITA troops and their deployment at strategic UNITA-controlled locations underline the gravity of the deteriorating situation in Angola.”

--United Nations, “Security Council Says UNITA, Endangering Angola Peace Process, Must Live Up to Terms of Agreements Reached,” Security Council - 3 - Press Release SC/6414 3814th Meeting (AM) 28 August 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | **Medium low compliance (2)** | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

RADIO VORGAN slowly became more non-partisan at different stages, but never truly became a non-partisan radio station. Moments of balance gave way to UNITA-controlled rhetoric against the government.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as low because it did not threaten UNITA in any real physical way.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1075** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 October 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **12** |
| **Demand number:** | **1075.12111** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Complete the training of UNITA personnel for the protection of UNITA leaders.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Security met this morning to consider the situation in Angola. It had before it a report from the Secretary-General on developments related to the United Nations Observer Mission In Angola (MONUA) (document S/1997/640), relaying his intention to postpone the withdrawal of United Nations military units from Angola and to retain up to 2,650 military personnel until the end of October. He took the decision because of the precarious situation in Angola, the incomplete implementation of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, the need to give the Angolan parties an additional chance to complete the peace process, as well as the need to ensure the security of United Nations and other international personnel in Angola. In reaching the decision, the Secretary- General also considered the Angolan Government's request for the retention of a sizeable United Nations presence until the process of demobilizing combatants is completed.”

--United Nations, “Security Council Says UNITA, Endangering Angola Peace Process, Must Live Up to Terms of Agreements Reached,” Security Council - 3 - Press Release SC/6414 3814th Meeting (AM) 28 August 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA certainly continued to train its personnel.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Security met this morning to consider the situation in Angola. It had before it a report from the Secretary-General on developments related to the United Nations Observer Mission In Angola (MONUA) (document S/1997/640), relaying his intention to postpone the withdrawal of United Nations military units from Angola and to retain up to 2,650 military personnel until the end of October. He took the decision because of the precarious situation in Angola, the incomplete implementation of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, the need to give the Angolan parties an additional chance to complete the peace process, as well as the need to ensure the security of United Nations and other international personnel in Angola. In reaching the decision, the Secretary- General also considered the Angolan Government's request for the retention of a sizeable United Nations presence until the process of demobilizing combatants is completed.”

--United Nations, “Security Council Says UNITA, Endangering Angola Peace Process, Must Live Up to Terms of Agreements Reached,” Security Council - 3 - Press Release SC/6414 3814th Meeting (AM) 28 August 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA certainly continued to train its personnel.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1075** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 October 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **12** |
| **Demand number:** | **1075.12112** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

establish the free circulation of people and goods.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UN helicopters ferrying officials into areas where bridges have been destroyed were fired on in Malanje Province on 18 February and 24 March 1998, but without causing casualties. However, a UN translator was killed in an ambush near Calandula village in Malanje Province on 21 May; two peace monitors and a senior policeman were also wounded.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503

“Full implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, originally envisaged to be completed with UN assistance by February 1997, is far behind schedule. The engagement of Angolan civil society in the peace process is weak. The right to freedom of movement, particularly in UNITA-controlled areas, is systematically violated, without an effective response from the international community.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While UNITA never adhered to this demand, the government of Angola similarly did not take steps to ensure freedom of movement. Outside of Luanda, the Angolan rural zones were profoundly unsafe for UNAVEM personnel.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UN helicopters ferrying officials into areas where bridges have been destroyed were fired on in Malanje Province on 18 February and 24 March 1998, but without causing casualties. However, a UN translator was killed in an ambush near Calandula village in Malanje Province on 21 May; two peace monitors and a senior policeman were also wounded.”

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--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

While UNITA never adhered to this demand, the government of Angola similarly did not take steps to ensure freedom of movement. Outside of Luanda, the Angolan rural zones were profoundly unsafe for UNAVEM personnel.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1075** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 October 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **12** |
| **Demand number:** | **1075.1212** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

stem the flow of deserters from quartering areas and to continue to return those soldiers who have deserted.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Secretary General of the UN, Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali has warned that the patience of UNITA soldiers staying in the quartering areas may be running out. In his report to the Security Council on 30 April (S/1996/328), he warned that "desertions from quartering sites were reported to number about 2,100, but the actual figure is probably higher, since, on several occasions UNITA commanders have prevented UNAVEM III personnel from conducting roll calls. UNITA representatives claimed that desertions were due to the harsh living conditions in the camps but there is reason to believe that some of them were covertly sanctioned by commanding officers and that others involved persons who had been forcibly recruited by UNITA for quartering. The age of some UNITA troops and the condition of weapons surrendered continue to be a major concern." The Secretary General went on to state that "Complaints by

UNITA, many of which have proved to be largely unfounded, have been carefully investigated and followed up. The [Joint] Commission, of which UNITA is a member, has concluded that the assistance being provided to the soldiers in the quartering areas is generally adequate". He continued that "It is disturbing, therefore, that UNITA's mass media continue to disseminate allegations about sub-standard conditions in quartering areas"

-- Africa E-Policy Journal, *Angola*: *Peace Monitor*, Issue 9, Vol. 2, 27 May 1996.

“In Angola, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol required that government troops were to be disengaged and over 62,000 UNITA troops were to be confined to assembly areas and disarmed…UNITA's weapons and those in civilian hands were to be collected and stored. Twenty-six thousand UNITA soldiers were planned to be incorporated into the newly created national army, which is to finally number 90,000 strong…UNAVEM III, responsible for overseeing the demobilisation process, experienced enormous problems with the process due to lack of co-operation particularly from UNITA who consistently slowed down the confinement of its combatants. Under threat of sanctions by the UN, however, UNITA completed the quartering of 63,000 troops by 20 November 1996. However, about 7,000 of those registered were found to be under the age of 18. The Angolan Peace Monitor reported at the time that over 70% of those quartered were not combat troops. The UN now accepts that Savimbi has retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. Due to the delays, soldiers in the cantonment camps became restless and desertions were commonplace. By November 1996 some 12,543 UNITA troops had deserted leaving 55,013 in the camps.”

--Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“Since January 1996 there has been significant momentum in moving the peace process along, culminating in intense pressure on UNITA to move its troops to the agreed quartering areas. Although UNITA did not fulfill the pledge by its leader Jonas Savimbi to have 16,500 troops quartered before the 8 February United Nations Security Council meeting, by 6 March 1996 the number registered at the four quartering areas had reached 16,985, while the number of weapons turned in at the camps added up to 14,485.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

“According to the Lusaka Protocol, the next steps - selection of UNITA troops to join the national army and demobilization of excess forces - will not begin until the quartering process is completed. However, it is extremely unlikely that all the forces can in fact be quartered without simultaneous progress on integration into the national army, implementation of UNITA's agreed-on participation in the political process, and other confidence- building measures. The declared total of 62,500 UNITA military personnel to be quartered is possibly an overestimate, but the pace will have to quicken even to quarter a more modest figure of 45,000 to 50,000. If pressure to complete the quartering is not combined with measures to advance on other fronts, and attention focuses primarily on the numbers game of how many have been quartered, there are likely to be significant additional delays as well as increased chances of cease-fire violations and other incidents provoked by idle soldiers in the quartering areas.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Deserters continued to flood cities in this period, especially in Luanda and other provincial capitals. Soldier morale was low and desertion was common.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Since January 1996 there has been significant momentum in moving the peace process along, culminating in intense pressure on UNITA to move its troops to the agreed quartering areas. Although UNITA did not fulfill the pledge by its leader Jonas Savimbi to have 16,500 troops quartered before the 8 February United Nations Security Council meeting, by 6 March 1996 the number registered at the four quartering areas had reached 16,985, while the number of weapons turned in at the camps added up to 14,485.”

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“The Secretary General of the UN, Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali has warned that the patience of UNITA soldiers staying in the quartering areas may be running out. In his report to the Security Council on 30 April (S/1996/328), he warned that "desertions from quartering sites were reported to number about 2,100, but the actual figure is probably higher, since, on several occasions UNITA commanders have prevented UNAVEM III personnel from conducting roll calls. UNITA representatives claimed that desertions were due to the harsh living conditions in the camps but there is reason to believe that some of them were covertly sanctioned by commanding officers and that others involved persons who had been forcibly recruited by UNITA for quartering. The age of some UNITA troops and the condition of weapons surrendered continue to be a major concern." The Secretary General went on to state that "Complaints by

UNITA, many of which have proved to be largely unfounded, have been carefully investigated and followed up. The [Joint] Commission, of which UNITA is a member, has concluded that the assistance being provided to the soldiers in the quartering areas is generally adequate". He continued that "It is disturbing, therefore, that UNITA's mass media continue to disseminate allegations about sub-standard conditions in quartering areas"

-- Africa E-Policy Journal, *Angola*: *Peace Monitor*, Issue 9, Vol. 2, 27 May 1996.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Deserters continued to flood cities in this period, especially in Luanda and other provincial capitals. Soldier morale was low and desertion was common.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1075** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 October 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **12** |
| **Demand number:** | **1075.1213** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

register in the quartering areas UNITA policemen who have remained in the areas vacated by UNITA military forces.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA police force still in operation. UNITA has failed to quarter its self-proclaimed police force,

despite strong demands that it do so. The UN Secretary General, Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his

report to the UN Security Council on 11 July, (S/1996/503) stated that "another source of concern is the presence in areas vacated by UNITA of persons which it claims are its police, even though the establishment of such a force is contrary to the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol. It is imperative that these personnel also be quartered and their weapons handed over to the United Nations". The Lusaka Protocol provided for the incorporation of UNITA members into the National Police so that it can function as a

non-partisan institution. 12 specific principles, along with a series of modalities, were agreed on how this was to be achieved. These included arrangements for the participation of 5,500 UNITA members, including 180 officers. However, none of the above has been implemented. Road blocks previously operated by UNITA soldiers are now under the control of UNITA "police". Estimates of the strength of this force vary. According to a report on 23 September from the news agency Clarinet, there are 5,000 in the force. The London based journal Southscan puts the figure at 15,000. On 18 September UNAVEM III put forward a proposal to the Joint Commission concerning the disarming and quartering of the UNITA police.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.1 Vol III, 27 September 1996

“In June 1997, the first fourteen UNITA officers arrived at a designated base outside Luanda. It ws not until September 9 that five generals from UNITA’s army arrived in Luanda to join the Angolan Armed Forces. Under the Lusaka Protocol, UNITA generals were made responsible for deciding with other officers of the Armed Forces how to incorporate 26,500 UNITA soldiers and officers into the army, with the rest being demobilized…the reintegration process remained behind schedule…UNITA also failed to confine to quarters its self-proclaimed police force, despite strong demands that it do so. UNITA appeared to have replaced uniformed soldiers in some areas with persons that it claimed were its police, even though the establishment of such a force was contrary to the Lusaka Protocol.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1997,* Events, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch 1998.

“In Angola, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol required that government troops were to be disengaged and over 62,000 UNITA troops were to be confined to assembly areas and disarmed…UNITA's weapons and those in civilian hands were to be collected and stored. Twenty-six thousand UNITA soldiers were planned to be incorporated into the newly created national army, which is to finally number 90,000 strong…UNAVEM III, responsible for overseeing the demobilisation process, experienced enormous problems with the process due to lack of co-operation particularly from UNITA who consistently slowed down the confinement of its combatants. Under threat of sanctions by the UN, however, UNITA completed the quartering of 63,000 troops by 20 November 1996. However, about 7,000 of those registered were found to be under the age of 18. The Angolan Peace Monitor reported at the time that over 70% of those quartered were not combat troops. The UN now accepts that Savimbi has retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. Due to the delays, soldiers in the cantonment camps became restless and desertions were commonplace. By November 1996 some 12,543 UNITA troops had deserted leaving 55,013 in the camps.”

-- Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“According to the Lusaka Protocol, the next steps - selection of UNITA troops to join the national army and demobilization of excess forces - will not begin until the quartering process is completed. However, it is extremely unlikely that all the forces can in fact be quartered without simultaneous progress on integration into the national army, implementation of UNITA's agreed-on participation in the political process, and other confidence- building measures. The declared total of 62,500 UNITA military personnel to be quartered is possibly an overestimate, but the pace will have to quicken even to quarter a more modest figure of 45,000 to 50,000. If pressure to complete the quartering is not combined with measures to advance on other fronts, and attention focuses primarily on the numbers game of how many have been quartered, there are likely to be significant additional delays as well as increased chances of cease-fire violations and other incidents provoked by idle soldiers in the quartering areas.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

It was difficult to understand on the ground the difference between UNITA policemen and UNITA soliders. It seemed like a distinction in name only. Nevertheless, policemen did become registered.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA police force still in operation. UNITA has failed to quarter its self-proclaimed police force,

despite strong demands that it do so. The UN Secretary General, Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his

report to the UN Security Council on 11 July, (S/1996/503) stated that "another source of concern is the presence in areas vacated by UNITA of persons which it claims are its police, even though the establishment of such a force is contrary to the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol. It is imperative that these personnel also be quartered and their weapons handed over to the United Nations". The Lusaka Protocol provided for the incorporation of UNITA members into the National Police so that it can function as a

non-partisan institution. 12 specific principles, along with a series of modalities, were agreed on how this was to be achieved. These included arrangements for the participation of 5,500 UNITA members, including 180 officers. However, none of the above has been implemented. Road blocks previously operated by UNITA soldiers are now under the control of UNITA "police". Estimates of the strength of this force vary. According to a report on 23 September from the news agency Clarinet, there are 5,000 in the force. The London based journal Southscan puts the figure at 15,000. On 18 September UNAVEM III put forward a proposal to the Joint Commission concerning the disarming and quartering of the UNITA police.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.1 Vol III, 27 September 1996

“In June 1997, the first fourteen UNITA officers arrived at a designated base outside Luanda. It ws not until September 9 that five generals from UNITA’s army arrived in Luanda to join the Angolan Armed Forces. Under the Lusaka Protocol, UNITA generals were made responsible for deciding with other officers of the Armed Forces how to incorporate 26,500 UNITA soldiers and officers into the army, with the rest being demobilized…the reintegration process remained behind schedule…UNITA also failed to confine to quarters its self-proclaimed police force, despite strong demands that it do so. UNITA appeared to have replaced uniformed soldiers in some areas with persons that it claimed were its police, even though the establishment of such a force was contrary to the Lusaka Protocol.”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1997,* Events, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch 1998.

“In Angola, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol required that government troops were to be disengaged and over 62,000 UNITA troops were to be confined to assembly areas and disarmed…UNITA's weapons and those in civilian hands were to be collected and stored. Twenty-six thousand UNITA soldiers were planned to be incorporated into the newly created national army, which is to finally number 90,000 strong…UNAVEM III, responsible for overseeing the demobilisation process, experienced enormous problems with the process due to lack of co-operation particularly from UNITA who consistently slowed down the confinement of its combatants. Under threat of sanctions by the UN, however, UNITA completed the quartering of 63,000 troops by 20 November 1996. However, about 7,000 of those registered were found to be under the age of 18. The Angolan Peace Monitor reported at the time that over 70% of those quartered were not combat troops. The UN now accepts that Savimbi has retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. Due to the delays, soldiers in the cantonment camps became restless and desertions were commonplace. By November 1996 some 12,543 UNITA troops had deserted leaving 55,013 in the camps.”

-- Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“According to the Lusaka Protocol, the next steps - selection of UNITA troops to join the national army and demobilization of excess forces - will not begin until the quartering process is completed. However, it is extremely unlikely that all the forces can in fact be quartered without simultaneous progress on integration into the national army, implementation of UNITA's agreed-on participation in the political process, and other confidence- building measures. The declared total of 62,500 UNITA military personnel to be quartered is possibly an overestimate, but the pace will have to quicken even to quarter a more modest figure of 45,000 to 50,000. If pressure to complete the quartering is not combined with measures to advance on other fronts, and attention focuses primarily on the numbers game of how many have been quartered, there are likely to be significant additional delays as well as increased chances of cease-fire violations and other incidents provoked by idle soldiers in the quartering areas.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

It was difficult to understand on the ground the difference between UNITA policemen and UNITA soliders. It seemed like a distinction in name only. Nevertheless, policemen did become registered.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1075** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 October 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **12** |
| **Demand number:** | **1075.1214** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

dismantle all command posts of UNITA military forces.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

According to the New African magazine UNITA still possess 100 artillery pieces, multiple rocket launchers and mortars. They also are said to have a small number of SAM-7s, SAM-14s and SAM-16s. UNITA also controls vast numbers of command posts. Savimbi waits as Government heads towards end of fourth year. A number of media commentators have recently written that UNITA is continuing with a policy of dragging out the peace process in the hope of gaining more concessions or even outright victory. A report by the Clarinet news organisation states that "Savimbi is playing a waiting game, hoping the regime will collapse. He is trying to wriggle out of what he signed in 1994 and is now saying the timetable should be flexible". The report concludes that "whether or not Savimbi plans to resume fighting, he is getting rich by keeping Angola in limbo. By occupying most of Angola's diamond fields, UNITA earns around $500 million a year". A report in the New African magazine stated that, "though publicly UNITA says it will abide by the peace process, a secret agenda provides for the core elements to resume full scale guerrilla activity if the central authority in Luanda collapses. This could be provoked by an army coup d'etat or by serious civil unrest in the cities caused by food shortages". In an ominous sign that the above analysis may be partially correct, Jonas Savimbi said in an interview with Agence France Press, AFP, that he is "waiting for the country to implode...then I will take it".

---Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.1 Vol III, 27 September 1996

“Since January 1996 there has been significant momentum in moving the peace process along, culminating in intense pressure on UNITA to move its troops to the agreed quartering areas. Although UNITA did not fulfill the pledge by its leader Jonas Savimbi to have 16,500 troops quartered before the 8 February United Nations Security Council meeting, by 6 March 1996 the number registered at the four quartering areas had reached 16,985, while the number of weapons turned in at the camps added up to 14,485.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

By all accounts, UNITA command posts were not dismantled.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Since January 1996 there has been significant momentum in moving the peace process along, culminating in intense pressure on UNITA to move its troops to the agreed quartering areas. Although UNITA did not fulfill the pledge by its leader Jonas Savimbi to have 16,500 troops quartered before the 8 February United Nations Security Council meeting, by 6 March 1996 the number registered at the four quartering areas had reached 16,985, while the number of weapons turned in at the camps added up to 14,485.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

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---Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.1 Vol III, 27 September 1996

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

By all accounts, UNITA command posts were not dismantled.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1075** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 October 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **12** |
| **Demand number:** | **1075.1215** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

issue a formal, written declaration that all UNITA soldiers have been quartered and that UNITA has no more weapons and military equipment in its possession, in order to remove any obstacles to the extension of State administration throughout Angola.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

According to the New African magazine UNITA still possess 100 artillery pieces, multiple rocket launchers and mortars. They also are said to have a small number of SAM-7s, SAM-14s and SAM-16s. UNITA also controls vast numbers of command posts. Savimbi waits as Government heads towards end of fourth year. A number of media commentators have recently written that UNITA is continuing with a policy of dragging out the peace process in the hope of gaining more concessions or even outright victory. A report by the Clarinet news organisation states that "Savimbi is playing a waiting game, hoping the regime will collapse. He is trying to wriggle out of what he signed in 1994 and is now saying the timetable should be flexible". The report concludes that "whether or not Savimbi plans to resume fighting, he is getting rich by keeping Angola in limbo. By occupying most of Angola's diamond fields, UNITA earns around $500 million a year". A report in the New African magazine stated that, "though publicly UNITA says it will abide by the peace process, a secret agenda provides for the core elements to resume full scale guerrilla activity if the central authority in Luanda collapses. This could be provoked by an army coup d'etat or by serious civil unrest in the cities caused by food shortages". In an ominous sign that the above analysis may be partially correct, Jonas Savimbi said in an interview with Agence France Press, AFP, that he is "waiting for the country to implode...then I will take it".

---Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.1 Vol III, 27 September 1996

“The FAA and Angolan police have also regularly seized weapons and uncovered a number of substantial arms caches. However, most of UNITA's heavy arms and artillery, which have not been surrendered to the UN under the demobilisation process, remain unaccounted for. These events indicate a continuing UNITA military capability, whether authorised or freelance, in almost every province of the country.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“In Angola, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol required that government troops were to be disengaged and over 62,000 UNITA troops were to be confined to assembly areas and disarmed…UNITA's weapons and those in civilian hands were to be collected and stored. Twenty-six thousand UNITA soldiers were planned to be incorporated into the newly created national army, which is to finally number 90,000 strong…UNAVEM III, responsible for overseeing the demobilisation process, experienced enormous problems with the process due to lack of co-operation particularly from UNITA who consistently slowed down the confinement of its combatants. Under threat of sanctions by the UN, however, UNITA completed the quartering of 63,000 troops by 20 November 1996. However, about 7,000 of those registered were found to be under the age of 18. The Angolan Peace Monitor reported at the time that over 70% of those quartered were not combat troops. The UN now accepts that Savimbi has retained his best troops in the strategically vital regions of Luanda and Cabinda. Due to the delays, soldiers in the cantonment camps became restless and desertions were commonplace. By November 1996 some 12,543 UNITA troops had deserted leaving 55,013 in the camps.”

--Susan Willett, “Demilitarisation, Disarmament & Development in Southern Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 25, No. 77, (1998), pp. 409-430

“Since January 1996 there has been significant momentum in moving the peace process along, culminating in intense pressure on UNITA to move its troops to the agreed quartering areas. Although UNITA did not fulfill the pledge by its leader Jonas Savimbi to have 16,500 troops quartered before the 8 February United Nations Security Council meeting, by 6 March 1996 the number registered at the four quartering areas had reached 16,985, while the number of weapons turned in at the camps added up to 14,485.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

“According to the Lusaka Protocol, the next steps - selection of UNITA troops to join the national army and demobilization of excess forces - will not begin until the quartering process is completed. However, it is extremely unlikely that all the forces can in fact be quartered without simultaneous progress on integration into the national army, implementation of UNITA's agreed-on participation in the political process, and other confidence- building measures. The declared total of 62,500 UNITA military personnel to be quartered is possibly an overestimate, but the pace will have to quicken even to quarter a more modest figure of 45,000 to 50,000. If pressure to complete the quartering is not combined with measures to advance on other fronts, and attention focuses primarily on the numbers game of how many have been quartered, there are likely to be significant additional delays as well as increased chances of cease-fire violations and other incidents provoked by idle soldiers in the quartering areas.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA operated consistently behind schedule on the troop quartering mandates. It eventually would return the vast majority of its troops to the bush to re-engage in rural warfare.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“Since January 1996 there has been significant momentum in moving the peace process along, culminating in intense pressure on UNITA to move its troops to the agreed quartering areas. Although UNITA did not fulfill the pledge by its leader Jonas Savimbi to have 16,500 troops quartered before the 8 February United Nations Security Council meeting, by 6 March 1996 the number registered at the four quartering areas had reached 16,985, while the number of weapons turned in at the camps added up to 14,485.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA operated consistently behind schedule on the troop quartering mandates. It eventually would return the vast majority of its troops to the bush to re-engage in rural warfare.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1075** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 October 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **12** |
| **Demand number:** | **1075.1216** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

cooperate fully with UNAVEM and the Joint Commission in the extension of State administration throughout Angola.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The first part of 1996 saw changing and frequently contradictory signals emerging from the Angolan parties. At the beginning of March a further meeting was arranged between dos Santos and Savimbi in the Gabon capital Libreville. Here Savimbi evidently agreed to a June target for the creation of the new unified FAA. But again no real movement followed, and by the end of April the government was threatening to boycott the Joint Commission in protest at UNITA's failure to deliver more than about a third of its estimated 70,000 fighters.”

--United Nations Document S/1996/175 Annex, 7 March 1996.

“UNITA ministers loyal to government. Despite the present stalling of the peace process, there are encouragingsigns that a section of the UNITA leadership are committed to peace. There is growing admiration for UNITA's four ministers and seven deputyministers appointed to the Government of Unity and National Reconstruction(GURN) by President dos Santos, in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol. Diplomatic sources have expressed surprise and delight at the hard work andseriousness of the UNITA appointees. However, this appreciation of theirwork is not shared by all. The UNITA mouthpiece in the United States, the Centre for Democracy in Angola Incorporated, on 23 October described thei rrole as being "purely ceremonial". There is a growing gulf between those UNITA representatives who have movedto Luanda to participate in the GURN and the National Assembly, and thosewho have remained with Jonas Savimbi. At present, Jonas Savimbi is keepingboth the military and political option open. However, one UNITA minister has privately conceded that if there was a return to war, he would remain with the government.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.3, Vol. IV 27th November 1997

“According to the Lusaka Protocol, the next steps - selection of UNITA troops to join the national army and demobilization of excess forces - will not begin until the quartering process is completed. However, it is extremely unlikely that all the forces can in fact be quartered without simultaneous progress on integration into the national army, implementation of UNITA's agreed-on participation in the political process, and other confidence- building measures. The declared total of 62,500 UNITA military personnel to be quartered is possibly an overestimate, but the pace will have to quicken even to quarter a more modest figure of 45,000 to 50,000. If pressure to complete the quartering is not combined with measures to advance on other fronts, and attention focuses primarily on the numbers game of how many have been quartered, there are likely to be significant additional delays as well as increased chances of cease-fire violations and other incidents provoked by idle soldiers in the quartering areas.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There is no evidence that either the Government of Angola or UNITA cooperated with UNAVEM and the Joint Commission at this stage in the process

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The first part of 1996 saw changing and frequently contradictory signals emerging from the Angolan parties. At the beginning of March a further meeting was arranged between dos Santos and Savimbi in the Gabon capital Libreville. Here Savimbi evidently agreed to a June target for the creation of the new unified FAA. But again no real movement followed, and by the end of April the government was threatening to boycott the Joint Commission in protest at UNITA's failure to deliver more than about a third of its estimated 70,000 fighters.”

--United Nations Document S/1996/175 Annex, 7 March 1996.

“UNITA ministers loyal to government. Despite the present stalling of the peace process, there are encouragingsigns that a section of the UNITA leadership are committed to peace. There is growing admiration for UNITA's four ministers and seven deputyministers appointed to the Government of Unity and National Reconstruction(GURN) by President dos Santos, in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol. Diplomatic sources have expressed surprise and delight at the hard work andseriousness of the UNITA appointees. However, this appreciation of theirwork is not shared by all. The UNITA mouthpiece in the United States, the Centre for Democracy in Angola Incorporated, on 23 October described their role as being "purely ceremonial". There is a growing gulf between those UNITA representatives who have movedto Luanda to participate in the GURN and the National Assembly, and thosewho have remained with Jonas Savimbi. At present, Jonas Savimbi is keepingboth the military and political option open. However, one UNITA minister has privately conceded that if there was a return to war, he would remain with the government.”

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--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There is no evidence that either the Government of Angola or UNITA cooperated with UNAVEM and the Joint Commission at this stage in the process

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1075** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 October 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **12** |
| **Demand number:** | **1075.1217** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

make available other generals and high-ranking military officers for duty in the FAA, as well as the UNITA officials designated to take up posts in the State administration at the national, provincial, and local levels.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA generals arrive in Luanda, but progress is slow. Following strong pressure from the United States and the United Nations, five generals from UNITA's army arrived in Luanda on 9 September to rejoin the Angolan army, the FAA, and prepare the ground for the integration of UNITA soldiers. The delegation was led by General Arlindo Chenda "Ben Ben" Pena. Under the Lusaka Protocol UNITA generals are to return to the Angolan army, which they had deserted after the elections in 1992. These generals would be responsible for working out with other officers of the FAA how to incorporate 26,500 UNITA soldiers and officers into the army, with the rest being demobilised. The failure so far of UNITA to abide by their commitment to provide ten top generals to lead the integration of UNITA troops was seen by many as a sign of their lack of willingness to stick by the Lusaka Protocol. UNITA promised UNAVEM's Beye that a further five generals would arrive in Luanda before 20 September - this did not happen. Equally serious is the allegation that the generals sent so far are not the top UNITA generals, who are said to have remained with their fighting units in case of a resumption of hostilities.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.1 Vol III, 27 September 1996

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Certain generals from UNITA would only become part of the FAA in 1998. Otherwise, such integrations operated far behind schedule or were nonexistent.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA generals arrive in Luanda, but progress is slow. Following strong pressure from the United States and the United Nations, five generals from UNITA's army arrived in Luanda on 9 September to rejoin the Angolan army, the FAA, and prepare the ground for the integration of UNITA soldiers. The delegation was led by General Arlindo Chenda "Ben Ben" Pena. Under the Lusaka Protocol UNITA generals are to return to the Angolan army, which they had deserted after the elections in 1992. These generals would be responsible for working out with other officers of the FAA how to incorporate 26,500 UNITA soldiers and officers into the army, with the rest being demobilised. The failure so far of UNITA to abide by their commitment to provide ten top generals to lead the integration of UNITA troops was seen by many as a sign of their lack of willingness to stick by the Lusaka Protocol. UNITA promised UNAVEM's Beye that a further five generals would arrive in Luanda before 20 September - this did not happen. Equally serious is the allegation that the generals sent so far are not the top UNITA generals, who are said to have remained with their fighting units in case of a resumption of hostilities.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.1 Vol III, 27 September 1996

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Certain generals from UNITA would only become part of the FAA in 1998. Otherwise, such integrations operated far behind schedule or were nonexistent.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1075** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 October 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **12** |
| **Demand number:** | **1075.1218** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

return all elected deputies to the National Assembly.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA ministers loyal to government. Despite the present stalling of the peace process, there are encouragingsigns that a section of the UNITA leadership are committed to peace. There is growing admiration for UNITA's four ministers and seven deputyministers appointed to the Government of Unity and National Reconstruction(GURN) by President dos Santos, in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol. Diplomatic sources have expressed surprise and delight at the hard work andseriousness of the UNITA appointees. However, this appreciation of theirwork is not shared by all. The UNITA mouthpiece in the United States, the Centre for Democracy in Angola Incorporated, on 23 October described their role as being "purely ceremonial". There is a growing gulf between those UNITA representatives who have movedto Luanda to participate in the GURN and the National Assembly, and thosewho have remained with Jonas Savimbi. At present, Jonas Savimbi is keepingboth the military and political option open. However, one UNITA minister has privately conceded that if there was a return to war, he would remain with the government.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.3, Vol. IV 27th November 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Deputies to the National Assembly did return to Luanda and many remained loyal to the peace process and searching for diplomatic negotiations with the MPLA party.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA ministers loyal to government. Despite the present stalling of the peace process, there are encouragingsigns that a section of the UNITA leadership are committed to peace. There is growing admiration for UNITA's four ministers and seven deputyministers appointed to the Government of Unity and National Reconstruction(GURN) by President dos Santos, in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol. Diplomatic sources have expressed surprise and delight at the hard work andseriousness of the UNITA appointees. However, this appreciation of theirwork is not shared by all. The UNITA mouthpiece in the United States, the Centre for Democracy in Angola Incorporated, on 23 October described their role as being "purely ceremonial". There is a growing gulf between those UNITA representatives who have movedto Luanda to participate in the GURN and the National Assembly, and thosewho have remained with Jonas Savimbi. At present, Jonas Savimbi is keepingboth the military and political option open. However, one UNITA minister has privately conceded that if there was a return to war, he would remain with the government.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Published by ACTSA on behalf of the Angola Emergency Campaign, Issue no.3, Vol. IV 27th November 1997

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| No or marginal compliance (1) | Medium low compliance (2) | **Medium high compliance (3)** | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Deputies to the National Assembly did return to Luanda and many remained loyal to the peace process and searching for diplomatic negotiations with the MPLA party.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1075** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 October 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **12** |
| **Demand number:** | **1075.1219** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Cease interference with United Nations aircraft flights and with mine-clearing activities.

# List of addressees of the demand

**UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“In 1996 and 1997…UN investigation teams have previously visited both crash sites, but due to fighting in the area their investigations were cut short. However, they did find that the flight recorders were removed from the aircraft, and that attempts had been made to camouflage the aircraft shells….It is widely accepted that UNITA shot down the two aircraft. Ambassador Robert Fowler, the Chair of the UN Sanctions Committee, interviewed several UNITA defectors during his visit to Angola in January, and heard accounts of how Jonas Savimbi had personally ordered the shooting down of the two aircraft.”

---- Edmund Jan Osmañczyk, Anthony Mango, *Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements,* Volume 4, New York: Taylor & Francis, 2002.

In December 1998 and January 1999, two UN aircraft were downed over territory controlled by UNITA…”

-- Edmund Jan Osmañczyk, Anthony Mango, *Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements,* Volume 4, New York: Taylor & Francis, 2002.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA continued to violently aggress UN aircraft as well as humanitarian aircraft throughout 1996-2000.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“19 May 1999: Security Council demands information on and release of passengers of Antonov-26 aircraft, shot down by UNITA on 12 May 1999 In Presidential Statement [S/PRST/1999/14](http://www.un.org/plweb-cgi/idoc2.pl?18+unix+_free_user_+www.un.org..80+un+un+scstats+scstats++19981231%3cdate%3c20000101) by the Security Council issued on 19 May 1999, Members of the Council strongly condemned the criminal act by the União Nacional Para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) against commercial aircraft, namely the shooting down of an Antonov-26 aircraft on 12 May 1999 near Luzamba and the taking hostage of its Russian crew, while the fate of its Angolan passengers remained unknown. The Council expressed grave concern at the fate of those who were on board the downed aircraft, demanded the immediate and unconditional release of the Russian crew members and all other foreign nationals that might be held hostage by UNITA in Angola, and demanded also information on the fate of the Angolan passengers. It stressed that UNITA and its leader Mr. Jonas Savimbi carried full responsibility for their security. The Security Council called upon the Government of Angola and all other concerned parties to cooperate in obtaining the release of the Russian crew members as well as in ascertaining the fate of passengers and crew members of other commercial aircraft lost under suspicious ircumstances over UNITA-controlled territory.”

--United Nations Mission of Observers in Angola, 1999 Report. UN Peacekeeping Operations Press Release.

“In 1996 and 1997…UN investigation teams have previously visited both crash sites, but due to fighting in the area their investigations were cut short. However, they did find that the flight recorders were removed from the aircraft, and that attempts had been made to camouflage the aircraft shells….It is widely accepted that UNITA shot down the two aircraft. Ambassador Robert Fowler, the Chair of the UN Sanctions Committee, interviewed several UNITA defectors during his visit to Angola in January, and heard accounts of how Jonas Savimbi had personally ordered the shooting down of the two aircraft.”

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In December 1998 and January 1999, two UN aircraft were downed over territory controlled by UNITA…”

-- Edmund Jan Osmañczyk, Anthony Mango, *Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements,* Volume 4, New York: Taylor & Francis, 2002.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA continued to violently aggress UN aircraft as well as humanitarian aircraft throughout 1996-2000.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| **Low depth of demand (1)** | Medium depth of demand (2) | High depth of demand (3) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

This demand ranks as “low” because it did not threaten UNITA in any way. It was a simple humanitarian request.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1075** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 October 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **14** |
| **Demand number:** | **1075.1411** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Need for full and effective implementation of the disarmament of civilian population by the Gov't of Angola, including the Civilian Defense Corps.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Minister of the Interior, Roberto Leal Monteiro "Ngongo", has confirmed that the Ministry of the Interior will soon launch a campaign to educate society about the need to disarm civilians.  According to the Angolan news agency Ngongo made this announcement on 28 February 1998 at a ceremony marking the 32nd anniversary of the National Police. After the educational campaign there will be a phase in which civilians can hand over illegally held weapons on a voluntary basis. However, after that phase the Angolan police will take steps to enforce the law that prohibits the holding of unlicensed weapons.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Issue no.5, Vol.XIV, 1998

“Since January 1996 there has been significant momentum in moving the peace process along, culminating in intense pressure on UNITA to move its troops to the agreed quartering areas. Although UNITA did not fulfill the pledge by its leader Jonas Savimbi to have 16,500 troops quartered before the 8 February United Nations Security Council meeting, by 6 March 1996 the number registered at the four quartering areas had reached 16,985, while the number of weapons turned in at the camps added up to 14,485.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola did practically nothing to disarm the civilian population in 1996 and 1997.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The Minister of the Interior, Roberto Leal Monteiro "Ngongo", has confirmed that the Ministry of the Interior will soon launch a campaign to educate society about the need to disarm civilians.  According to the Angolan news agency Ngongo made this announcement on 28 February 1998 at a ceremony marking the 32nd anniversary of the National Police. After the educational campaign there will be a phase in which civilians can hand over illegally held weapons on a voluntary basis. However, after that phase the Angolan police will take steps to enforce the law that prohibits the holding of unlicensed weapons.”

--Angola Peace Monitor, Issue no.5, Vol.XIV, 1998

“Since January 1996 there has been significant momentum in moving the peace process along, culminating in intense pressure on UNITA to move its troops to the agreed quartering areas. Although UNITA did not fulfill the pledge by its leader Jonas Savimbi to have 16,500 troops quartered before the 8 February United Nations Security Council meeting, by 6 March 1996 the number registered at the four quartering areas had reached 16,985, while the number of weapons turned in at the camps added up to 14,485.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola did practically nothing to disarm the civilian population in 1996 and 1997.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1075** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 October 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **15** |
| **Demand number:** | **1075.1511** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Take all necessary steps to stop immediately and effectively any direct or indirect military or paramilitary interference.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“17 January 1999: With peace process in Angola collapsed, Secretary-General recommends termination of MONUA folowing expiration of mandate on 26 February**.** Observing that the peace process in Angola has collapsed and the country found itself in a state of war, Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated in his 17 January 1999 report to the Security Council (S/1999/49), that MONUA had no other option but to continue to reduce its presence and proceed with the orderly repatriation of UN personnel and property. Upon expiration of MONUA's mandate on 26 February, the United Nations would then proceed with the mission's technical liquidation. Citing the determination of the parties in Angola to test their fortunes on the battlefield, the steady worsening security situation and MONUA's inability to carry out its mandate, the Secretary-General assessed that the conditions for a meaningful United Nations peacekeeping role have ceased to exist. He noted that the Angolan Government did not support the extension of MONUA beyond its current mandate, which was to expire on 26 February 1999. All MONUA team sites and regional headquarters were to be withdrawn to the capital Luanda by mid-February and most of UN peacekeeping personnel repatriated by 20 March. The Secretary-General suggested retaining an infantry company of up to 200 personnel to protect UN property during the first months of liquidation.”

--United Nations Mission of Observers in Angola, 1999 Report. UN Peacekeeping Operations Press Release.

“UNITA appeared adamant on continuing its military operations in provincial regions of Angola…UNITA continues its crossborder…operations, bringing in new weapons and supplies both overland and on secret flights from Zaire…UNITA continued to stall the peace process through military organization throughout 1996 and 1997…”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1997,* Events, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola and UNITA found that it had little influence over their large armies and paramilitary groups affiliated with them. Other than a total cease-fire, which neither side engaged in, it was impossible for each party to stop the interfering acts of their decentralized soldiers.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“17 January 1999: With peace process in Angola collapsed, Secretary-General recommends termination of MONUA folowing expiration of mandate on 26 February**.** Observing that the peace process in Angola has collapsed and the country found itself in a state of war, Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated in his 17 January 1999 report to the Security Council (S/1999/49), that MONUA had no other option but to continue to reduce its presence and proceed with the orderly repatriation of UN personnel and property. Upon expiration of MONUA's mandate on 26 February, the United Nations would then proceed with the mission's technical liquidation. Citing the determination of the parties in Angola to test their fortunes on the battlefield, the steady worsening security situation and MONUA's inability to carry out its mandate, the Secretary-General assessed that the conditions for a meaningful United Nations peacekeeping role have ceased to exist. He noted that the Angolan Government did not support the extension of MONUA beyond its current mandate, which was to expire on 26 February 1999. All MONUA team sites and regional headquarters were to be withdrawn to the capital Luanda by mid-February and most of UN peacekeeping personnel repatriated by 20 March. The Secretary-General suggested retaining an infantry company of up to 200 personnel to protect UN property during the first months of liquidation.”

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--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1997,* Events, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

The government of Angola and UNITA found that it had little influence over their large armies and paramilitary groups affiliated with them. Other than a total cease-fire, which neither side engaged in, it was impossible for each party to stop the interfering acts of their decentralized soldiers.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1075** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 October 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **18** |
| **Demand number:** | **1075.1811** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of UN and other international personnel and premises and to guarantee the safety and freedom of movement of humanitarian supplies.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UN helicopters ferrying officials into areas where bridges have been destroyed were fired on in Malanje Province on 18 February and 24 March 1998, but without causing casualties. However, a UN translator was killed in an ambush near Calandula village in Malanje Province on 21 May; two peace monitors and a senior policeman were also wounded.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503

“Full implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, originally envisaged to be completed with UN assistance by February 1997, is far behind schedule. The engagement of Angolan civil society in the peace process is weak. The right to freedom of movement, particularly in UNITA-controlled areas, is systematically violated, without an effective response from the international community.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Through 1996 and 1997 and 1998, not only did UNITA and the government of Angola make little to no effort to clear roads, make rural areas safe, and disarm civilians in order to make humanitarian deliveries possible, both sides actively engaged in randomized violence which put humanitarian workers’ lives at risk and threatened the completion of humanitarian deliveries throughout Angola. There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“The first is Angolas increasing- and largely avoidable- humanitarian crisis. The return to war has exacerbated an already difficult internal refugee problem. By January 1999, after just one month of fighting, an estimated 250,000 Angolans had been forced from their homes. The

Number rose to 800,000 by May and to an estimated 1 million by June - almost one-tenth of Angola’s population. As they have come under siege, individual cities such as Malanjein the northern half of Angola and Kuito in central Angola have had to cope with an additional 200,000 and 70,000....The

War has also obstructed or interrupted aid flights and convoys by organizations such as the World Food Programme and CARE at a time when some donors have failed to live up to promises of relief aid to the region.”

--Ian S. Spears, “Angola’s Elusive Peace: The Collapse of the Lusaka Accord,” *International Journal,* Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999): 562-581

“And, despite large-scale international commitments of humanitarian and reconstruction aid, the prospects for quick implementation of sustainable projects for reconstruction which could give additional momentum to peaceful activities are still hampered by government incapacity, UNITA fears of losing control over their population base, and the lack of sufficient local knowledge and problems of coordination among newly arrived agencies.”

--Bill Minter, “From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success,” *Review of African Political Economy,* Vol. 23, No. 67 (1996): 111-118.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

Through 1996 and 1997 and 1998, not only did UNITA and the government of Angola make little to no effort to clear roads, make rural areas safe, and disarm civilians in order to make humanitarian deliveries possible, both sides actively engaged in randomized violence which put humanitarian workers’ lives at risk and threatened the completion of humanitarian deliveries throughout Angola. There were a large number of cases of stalled humanitarian deliveries, impeded access, and violent confrontations with humanitarian aid convoys. Neither the government of Angola nor UNITA could stop decentralized soldiers from attacking, and neither side was capable of organizing widespread protections for the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Angola

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1075** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 October 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **19** |
| **Demand number:** | **1075.1911** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Extend full cooperation to UNAVEM III at all levels.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“17 January 1999: With peace process in Angola collapsed, Secretary-General recommends termination of MONUA folowing expiration of mandate on 26 February**.** Observing that the peace process in Angola has collapsed and the country found itself in a state of war, Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated in his 17 January 1999 report to the Security Council (S/1999/49), that MONUA had no other option but to continue to reduce its presence and proceed with the orderly repatriation of UN personnel and property. Upon expiration of MONUA's mandate on 26 February, the United Nations would then proceed with the mission's technical liquidation. Citing the determination of the parties in Angola to test their fortunes on the battlefield, the steady worsening security situation and MONUA's inability to carry out its mandate, the Secretary-General assessed that the conditions for a meaningful United Nations peacekeeping role have ceased to exist. He noted that the Angolan Government did not support the extension of MONUA beyond its current mandate, which was to expire on 26 February 1999. All MONUA team sites and regional headquarters were to be withdrawn to the capital Luanda by mid-February and most of UN peacekeeping personnel repatriated by 20 March. The Secretary-General suggested retaining an infantry company of up to 200 personnel to protect UN property during the first months of liquidation.”

--United Nations Mission of Observers in Angola, 1999 Report. UN Peacekeeping Operations Press Release.

“UNITA appeared adamant on continuing its military operations in provincial regions of Angola…UNITA continues its crossborder…operations, bringing in new weapons and supplies both overland and on secret flights from Zaire…UNITA continued to stall the peace process through military organization throughout 1996 and 1997…”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1997,* Events, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There is little evidence to demonstrate that either the government of Angola or UNITA cooperated in any real way with UNAVEM in the late 1996 period.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“17 January 1999: With peace process in Angola collapsed, Secretary-General recommends termination of MONUA folowing expiration of mandate on 26 February**.** Observing that the peace process in Angola has collapsed and the country found itself in a state of war, Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated in his 17 January 1999 report to the Security Council (S/1999/49), that MONUA had no other option but to continue to reduce its presence and proceed with the orderly repatriation of UN personnel and property. Upon expiration of MONUA's mandate on 26 February, the United Nations would then proceed with the mission's technical liquidation. Citing the determination of the parties in Angola to test their fortunes on the battlefield, the steady worsening security situation and MONUA's inability to carry out its mandate, the Secretary-General assessed that the conditions for a meaningful United Nations peacekeeping role have ceased to exist. He noted that the Angolan Government did not support the extension of MONUA beyond its current mandate, which was to expire on 26 February 1999. All MONUA team sites and regional headquarters were to be withdrawn to the capital Luanda by mid-February and most of UN peacekeeping personnel repatriated by 20 March. The Secretary-General suggested retaining an infantry company of up to 200 personnel to protect UN property during the first months of liquidation.”

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--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1997,* Events, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch 1998.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

There is little evidence to demonstrate that either the government of Angola or UNITA cooperated in any real way with UNAVEM in the late 1996 period.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

.

# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |

# Comments to IPI (if any)

**Civil war in: Angola**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **UNSC Resolution:** | **1075** |
| **Date of adoption:** | **11 October 1996** |
| **Operative paragraph:** | **20** |
| **Demand number:** | **1075.2011** |

**Charlotte Walker**

# Wording of demand

Intensify demining efforts and destroy stockpiles of mines.

# List of addressees of the demand

**Government of Angola, UNITA**

# Short-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA's compliance with the de-mobilisation process has been subject to frequent delays, misinformation and out-right contradiction. The laying of landmines certainly also continued after, and in violation of, the Lusaka accords; Human Rights Watch has documented new mine laying activities as recently as 1997, while attacks during May 1998 have provided ongoing evidence of this. High level pressure from the UN and US failed to hasten Savimbi's pace, eventually resulting in the imposition of much-delayed UN sanctions at the end of February 1998.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“UNITA appeared adamant on continuing its military operations in provincial regions of Angola…UNITA continues its crossborder…operations, bringing in new weapons and supplies both overland and on secret flights from Zaire…UNITA continued to stall the peace process through military organization throughout 1996 and 1997…”

--*Human Rights Watch World Report, 1997,* Events, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch 1998.

“UNITA procurement from 1996: the role of Togo. UNITA initiated efforts to try to secure Togo as a possible future base for UNITA. In 1993 Savimbi despatched Col. Alcides Lucas Kangunga…to Lomé to approach President Eyadema on the matter…He was also to claim that many weapons suppliers were already reluctant to ship to Zaire, and that UNITA needed to prepare itself militarily. Kallias was to emphasize to Eyadema that UNITA needed weapons, and that it needed credible end-user certificates - something that Togo could provide. Kallias was to say that UNITA was looking to Togo for support, and that Togo could provide a safe place to locate UNITA equipment…Savimbi's proposal that Togo play a more active role in support of UNITA (a proposal that also included Togo hosting some of Savimbi's children) was accepted by President Eyadema in late 1993. As a token of appreciation, Kallias gave to Eyadema a "passport sized" packet of diamonds on Savimbi's behalf. Kallias became UNITA's representative in Togo, and served there from 1993-1995. According to Kallias, the working arrangement between Togo and UNITA provided for Togo to keep a share of the arms and military equipment that was imported for UNITA, normally 20%...The Togo connection took on particular importance for UNITA in January 1997 when Savimbi reportedly became convinced that "the United States had decided to get rid of Mobutu". Soon afterwards, UNITA began a concerted effort to transfer to Angola the equipment that had been stored in Zaire. Savimbi also made an effort to try to purchase as much new equipment as possible from Eastern Europe before Zaire was closed to UNITA. By May 1997, all of UNITA's equipment in Kinshasa had been shipped out to Angola, with the exception of some SAM6 anti-aircraft missiles that were sent to Togo in an effort to avoid detection by UNAVEM. The equipment in Gbadolite was also pulled out, with much of it going to Togo.”

--The Fowler Report, Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA,S/2000/203, 10 March 2000.

## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Short-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA and the government refused to collect or destroy stockpiles of landmines, and on the contrary, enaged in large-scale purchasing, laying, and detonation of landmines throughout Angola.

# Medium-term compliance

## Description of the addressee(s)’ conduct

“UNITA's compliance with the de-mobilisation process has been subject to frequent delays, misinformation and out-right contradiction. The laying of landmines certainly also continued after, and in violation of, the Lusaka accords; Human Rights Watch has documented new mine laying activities as recently as 1997, while attacks during May 1998 have provided ongoing evidence of this. High level pressure from the UN and US failed to hasten Savimbi's pace, eventually resulting in the imposition of much-delayed UN sanctions at the end of February 1998.”

--David Simon, “Angola: The Peace Is Not Yet Fully Won,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 25, No. 77, (Sep., 1998), pp. 495-503.

“UNITA appeared adamant on continuing its military operations in provincial regions of Angola…UNITA continues its crossborder…operations, bringing in new weapons and supplies both overland and on secret flights from Zaire…UNITA continued to stall the peace process through military organization throughout 1996 and 1997…”

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## Assessment

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Medium-term compliance*** | | | |
| **No or marginal compliance (1)** | Medium low compliance (2) | Medium high compliance (3) | Full or almost full compliance (4) |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

UNITA and the government refused to collect or destroy stockpiles of landmines, and on the contrary, enaged in large-scale purchasing, laying, and detonation of landmines throughout Angola.

# Depth of demand

## Assessment

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of depth of demand*** | | |
| Low depth of demand (1) | Medium depth of demand (2) | **High depth of demand (3)** |

## Considerations underlying the assessment

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# Level of confidence about coding decisions

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ***Level of confidence about coding decision*** | | |
| Extremely high | **\* High \*** | Moderate |